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Abstract 
 
This thesis looks at a familiar topic for studies on Lebanon, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, but in a 
markedly different way. Specifically, it conceives of the STL as a mediating institution between world 
order and the idiosyncratic Lebanese state-society. Moreover, it conceives of this mediation as existing 
within a historical structure of world order. It provides explanation and understanding of their 
dialectical interaction through a critical discourse analysis (CDA) of contemporary court transcripts, 
and a comparative historical analysis with the 1860 European Intervention in Syria; a political-legal 
intervention of the nineteenth century. This analysis of the long-term interactions of legal and political 
power is done with a view to understanding whether its exercise is emancipatory and legitimate or 
ideological and dominating. The thesis finds that modern Lebanon has been, and continues to be, 
constituted historically through judicial intervention from world order.  
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Introduction 
 
Context and Rationale  
 
This project’s empirical focus is The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), a tribunal of “international 
character” (United Nations Security Council 2007, p. 1) established by UNSC Resolution 1757 on 23rd 
January 2007 to prosecute the alleged perpetrators of the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister 
Rafiq al-Hariri and 22 others on the 14th February 2005 via a massive car bomb (Kerr 2012, p. 25). In 
addition, it has established jurisdiction over three other bombings which targeted prominent 
Lebanese politicians and journalists, between 1st October 2004 and 12th July 2005 and can, with the 
consent of the UNSC, establish jurisdiction over crimes from later dates if they can be connected to 
the Hariri case (Special Tribunal for Lebanon 2018). The establishment of the STL has heavily 
influenced the political topography of Lebanon for the past thirteen years as the major political parties 
coalesced into two blocs, known as March 8th and March 14th, which took opposing views of the 
legitimacy of the tribunal (Kerr 2012, p. 25). March 8th is largely based around the major Shia parties 
of Amal and Hizballah whilst March 14th is based around the Sunni party al Mustaqbal (Future 
Movement) which Rafik Hariri founded and which is now led by Saad Hariri, his son. The former 
movement took a pro-Syrian position of opposition to the STL whilst the latter has generally been in 
support. This political divide subsequently transitioned seamlessly in to divisions over the Syrian Civil 
War (2011-Present) with Hizballah intervening on behalf of Bashar Al-Assad and March 14th supporting 
the opposition (Oxford Research Daily Brief Service 2012a). The assassination of Hariri was the catalyst 
for Lebanon’s independence intifada or cedar revolution in 2005 which secured Lebanon’s 
independence from Syria through massive popular mobilisation (See Blanford 2006, Young 2010). 
Syria had instituted an internationally backed tutelage of Lebanon in its post-civil war phase through 
the Taif accords in 1989 and cemented it through a bilateral Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and 
Coordination in 1991 (Ziadeh 2006, p. 143). The phase of Lebanon’s history between 1991 and 2005 
is often referred to as Pax Syriana (Blanford 2006, p. 40, Salloukh, Barakat et al. 2015, p. 5). The March 
8th alliance spent the years between 2005-2011 either in political opposition or as a minority partner 
in the national unity government headed by Saad Hariri (Oxford Research Daily Brief Service 2011). 
This changed on 12th January 2011 when March 8th ministers walked out of the unity government in 
response to the expectation that the STL was due to hand down indictments implicating senior 
Hizballah members (Ibid). This it subsequently did, submitting “an indictment to the pre-trial judge on 
17 January 2011 [which] was confirmed on 28 June 2011.” (Special Tribunal for Lebanon 2018). This 
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walkout precipitated an election in which March 8th came to power, resulting in violent 
demonstrations by March 14th protesters (Oxford Research Daily Brief Service 2011). This led to the 
paradox of a government being obliged to fund and support a tribunal which was trying to prosecute 
some of its affiliates and which the leader of Hizballah, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, intimated was a 
politicised tool of American and Israeli foreign policy (Knudsen 2012, p. 229). The STL had, indirectly, 
prompted the fall of Saad Hariri and brought a Hizballah-backed government to power.  
 It would be tempting to consider 2011 as a transitional moment at which the most prominent 
question for Lebanon’s internal stability moved from being the establishment of the STL to the civil 
war in neighbouring Syria. However, as previously mentioned, the divisions over the STL transitioned 
without breaking step to divisions over the Syrian war. This interrelation can best be summarised by 
the assassination of Brigadier General Wissam Al-Hassan of the Lebanese ISF, known to have been 
investigating both the Hariri assassination and alleged terrorist activity on behalf of Syria by Lebanese 
MP Michel Samaha (Oxford Research Daily Brief Service 2012b). The obvious inference was that pro-
Syrian forces had undertaken this assassination in addition to those which occurred between 2005 
and 2008 (Ibid) and which culminated in a Hizballah military operation in Beirut and mount Lebanon 
in response to government interference with its communications network (Worrall 2013, p. 242). This 
earlier conflict was only mitigated after a conference hosted in Doha established a national unity 
government with mutual veto, which later collapsed after STL indictments were handed down. 
Moreover, it was around 2012 that reports began to emerge that Hizballah was supporting the Assad 
regime militarily (Oxford Research Daily Brief Service 2012b), which it continues to do until the time 
of writing (2019). Domestic conflict over the war in Syria has led to profound governmental paralysis. 
For example, the Lebanese parliament (elected in 2009) extended its mandate beyond constitutional 
bounds in May 2013 after Prime Minister Najib Mikati’s resignation, again in November 2014 and 
further extension was only avoided in April 2017 because President Michel Aoun dismissed parliament 
(Oxford Research Daily Brief Service 2017). Aoun himself had only become President on 1st November 
2016 after the March 8th and March 14th stalemate was overcome and the position could be filled after 
more than two years of vacancy (Oxford Research Daily Brief Service 2016).  
 This thesis presents a unique historical perspective through its research on the STL and 
questions what this tells us about the politics of Lebanon, world order and, crucially, their dialectical 
interaction over time through the prism of law and politics. Particularly, it is the way the STL is 
conceived in this thesis, using the Critical Theoretical concepts of historical structures, hegemony, 
ideology, institutions, world order, state-society complexes, social forces, legitimacy and immanent 
critique (see chapter one), which distinguish it from both the political and legal literature currently 
pertaining to the STL. By utilising the STL as a mediation through which to identify and analyse key 
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mechanisms and their impact on Lebanon and by demonstrating their historical, rather than 
contemporary character, it is held that one can better understand this contemporary politics and how 
its destructive nature might be incrementally overcome. Consideration of world order, particularly as 
it pertains to International Criminal Law (ICL) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), is 
warranted by the fact that Lebanese politics is particularly susceptible to the vicissitudes of global 
politics and, as will be demonstrated, has been constructed and constituted in ways which reinforce 
these dynamics. Moreover, given certain disciplinary predilections and conventions, Lebanon and 
world order are often discussed separately, rather than as dialectically interacting parts of one 
ontological whole. In extreme cases, particularly in the sub-discipline of International Criminal Justice 
(ICJ), this leads to a representation of world order as de-politicised and Lebanon as in need of the 
disinterested beneficence of ICL interventions. Thus, the historical, structural and conceptual 
approach taken in this thesis challenge these perceptions, particularly when such representations may 
help to constitute conditions of dominance or ideological hegemony for the pentarchy of permanent 
members of the UNSC.  
 Whether the appointment of key figures to key governmental posts and the election of a new 
parliament in Lebanon signals an end to paralysis and polarisation between the two camps and 
whether, in the light of Saad Hariri’s surprise resignation (or abduction, depending on one’s reading 
of the event) as Prime Minister whilst in Riyadh on 4th November 2017 (Oxford Research Daily Brief 
Service 2017b), the Lebanese will be allowed by foreign patrons to reconcile, is an important question. 
It is not a question, however, which this thesis addresses directly. There is clearly much scope for 
academic work accounting for this most recent phase of Lebanese politics and whilst this thesis may 
contain insights which pertain to this politics, its core focus is conceptual and historical rather than 
contemporary and event-based. Nevertheless, the focus in this thesis on the historical operation of 
underlying mechanisms and the material power relations underpinning the STL may give one the 
conceptual tools necessary to postulate the dialectical relationships, and therefore likely outcomes, 
of regional and international events pertaining to Lebanon.  
 
Approach of the thesis 
 
This thesis utilises Critical Theory and the meta-theory of Critical Realism (CR) to construct, pursue and 
answer its research questions. This approach has not been applied to the empirical case of the STL 
before, but its core precepts hold particular advantages for analysis, as will be demonstrated 
presently. In general terms, Critical Theory as a research program emphasises the empirical analysis 
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of relational social structures (Morrow, Brown 1994, p. 209, Patomaki 2002, p. 117, Wight 2007, p. 15, 
Fairclough, Jessop et al. 2010 [2004], p. 202) through intensive explication but also through limited 
comparative generalisation (Morrow, Brown 1994, p. 221). In this way it attempts to account for the 
historical nature of structural constraints, particularly as they pertain to domination, with an eye to 
emancipation from said domination where  
Emancipation is the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from those physical and 
human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do. War 
and the threat of war is one of those constraints, together with poverty, poor education, 
political oppression and so on. (Booth 1990, p. 319) 
Here, Robert W. Cox’s (1981, p. 132-133) theorising of historical structures of world order is 
particularly useful as a theoretical guide to the empirical analysis carried out in this thesis. The core 
concern with emancipation moves some way towards immunisation from political partisanship and 
encourages an objectiveness related to open and fair mindedness, rather than as value neutrality or 
a god’s eye view. From the perspective of this study, this translates as conceiving of the STL as a 
mediating institution between world order and Lebanon and a commitment to analysing the concrete 
social-relational structures in a qualitative, intensive explication. The historical and comparative 
element arises with a comparative analysis of the 1860 International Commission for Syria, a political-
legal intervention of the mid-nineteenth century (See Fawaz 1994, & Rodogno 2012). This approach 
elaborates the historical and structural development of world order and the striking similarities 
between this colonial intervention and the nominally cutting-edge hybrid institution of the STL. This 
approach has the merit of overcoming the prevalent chronocentrism of political and legal literature 
on Lebanon and the STL. It suggests that legal institutions of world order are not an external variable 
bearing upon Lebanon as a pre-existing, unitary nation-state. Rather, legal-political interventions have 
historically constituted, and continue to constitute, the sectarian-consociational polity which now 
exists.  
Critical Theory, also actively encourages supradisciplinarity (Morrow, Brown 1994, p. 13) and 
an appreciation for the uniqueness of actors, not simply a reduction to a generalised category (Cox 
1981, p. 134). These commitments, in tandem with a CR emphasis on ontological reality (Patomaki 
2002, p. 72) the unity of science, and plurality of appropriate methods (Lopez, Potter 2001, p. 13), 
leads to this thesis’ approach. The approach combines a critique of the law literature on the STL with 
an operationalisation of concepts pertaining to the Lebanese state-society derived from the multi-
disciplinary literature on Lebanon. The operationalised concepts derived from the multi-disciplinary 
Lebanon literature used to inform this thesis are clientelism, sectarianism, consociationalism and 
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memory. These concepts are elaborated in the spirit of CR meta-theory which attempts to account for 
underlying mechanisms, structures and tendencies which under certain conditions interact to produce 
results (Lopez, Potter 2001 p. 11, Patomaki 2002, p. 76). Critical review of the law literature assumes 
that international law is an integral part of the ideational, material and institutional architecture of 
world order historically (See Anghie 2005) and that an epistemic community is best placed to report 
on its own meanings, relational structures, rationalisations, preconceptions and practical and 
ideological blind-spots, whether consciously or otherwise. This approach follows Raymond Morrow 
and David Browns’ (1994, p. 232-237) understanding of literature review as a non-empirical method 
of historicist and deconstructive argumentation. They argue that, while this should never amount to 
ad hominum attacks, nevertheless “such questioning about the contexts of theoretical activity does 
provide primae facie evidence for difficulties and may facilitate the formulation of suggestive research 
questions.” (Ibid, p. 237). This approach provides a way in which the structural powers, mechanisms 
and tendencies of the social structure on both “sides” of the mediating STL, namely the legal 
architecture of world order and sectarian-consociational Lebanon, can be elaborated. Critically, it lays 
a much heavier emphasis on the dialectical interaction of these two “sides” and the concomitant 
potential outcomes for peace, emancipation and justice. As Cox (1981, p. 126) notes in relation to 
supradisciplinarity  
Academic conventions divide up the seamless web of the real social world into separate 
spheres, each with its own theorising; this is a necessary way of gaining understanding … the 
starting point is some initial subdivision of reality, usually dictated by convention. It is wise to 
bear in mind that such a conventional cutting up of reality is at best just a convenience of the 
mind. 
The case of the STL, Lebanon and wider Middle East international relations illustrate this point well. 
The emphasis on epistemological division has led to vertical divisions between law and politics, a 
division which this thesis will demonstrate has practical, theoretical, and ideological implications. 
Whist the ontological reality that the forces of law and politics come in to contact in the real world 
encourages some forays either side of the disciplinary divide (to fully separate the discussion would 
be impossible), full transgression of disciplinary boundaries is rare. It appears that a Critical Theoretical 
study which considers law, not simply as a source of empirical information on the STL, but as an 
epistemic community deeply embedded in the relational-social structure of world order, with a view 
to analysing its very own “logics-in-use” (Morrow, Brown 1994, p. 235), is not something usually 
countenanced. Similarly, within the discipline of IR, this division of “the seamless web of the real” has 
resulted in distinct paradigms of explanation, often displaying a tendency towards what Bassel F. 
Salloukh (2017, p. 660) has usefully termed “theoretical sectarianism”. Furthermore, as he points out, 
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the problems with this epistemic emphasis is amplified when one comes to study the Middle East, a 
region which stubbornly refuses to locate itself within one paradigm of explanation (Ibid, p. 660). 
Salloukh’s answer to this issue is to engage with theoretical eclecticism which, he points out, many 
scholars of Middle East IR have been obliged to engage in by their unruly subject (Ibid, p. 661). This is 
certainly part of the answer, but it does not address the underlying issue that in IR, politics and law, 
epistemology is privileged over ontology. This is manifest in the defence of disciplinary boundaries 
and paradigms and in the reification of certain epistemological concepts, such as horizontal levels-of-
analysis, which obscure real vertical social-relational structures. What this thesis offers is an 
integrated meta-theoretical, theoretical and methodological approach which establishes its 
boundaries through theory but privileges the study of real relational structure.  
The core case study subjected to intensive explication through Critical Discourse Analysis 
(CDA) in this thesis is the four days of testimony provided by Lebanese politician and ex-militia leader 
Walid Jumblatt to the STL and televised in Lebanon. The theoretical sampling of these particular 470 
pages of transcript was driven on the basis that Jumblatt’s testimony was most likely to 
exhibit/interact with aspects of sectarianism, clientelism, consociational democracy and memory, 
given his centrality to these structures and processes as an ex-militia leader benefitting from a blanket 
amnesty for alleged crimes in the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990) and his membership of a prominent 
and ancient family. This was also likely to highlight contradictions within the STL as a nominally 
impunity ending and extra-political institution. The subsequent fine-grained qualitative and linguistic 
CDA based on the work of Norman Fairclough (2015) is geared towards an explication of whether the 
STL challenges or reproduces social norms and common-sense attitudes likely to maintain structures 
of violence within world order and the Lebanese state-society. Given this qualitative and linguistic 
approach, the case selected is relatively narrow (though large in absolute terms) but the number of 
“variables” or aspects of reality analysed are extensive. These include 37 descriptive codes designed 
to identify the formal features of the texts, 10 interpretive questions designed to bridge the gap 
between formal empirical features and the meanings co-created by readers and participants, and 
explanatory analysis related to theoretical and empirical concepts regarding the Lebanese state-
society, legal architecture of world order, and Critical Theory, operationalised in chapters one, two 
and four, historically framed in chapter three and ultimately re-contextualised in the conclusion. 
Salloukh et al. (2015, p. 4) explicitly highlight the hegemonic ideology of the sectarian system in 
Lebanon indicating a renewed concern with Critical Theoretical concepts as emancipatory tools for 
Middle East IR scholarship. The critique of hegemonic ideology as “systematically distorted 
communication” (Habermas 1970, p. 205) and “meaning (or signification) [which] serves to sustain 
relations of domination.” (Thompson 1984, p. 4) is central to this thesis and its CDA method. In this 
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way, it is typical of a Critical Theory research programme which prioritises “interpretations of meaning 
[which] are sensitized to detecting forms of distorted communication linked to power and strategic 
(or manipulative) forms of interaction” (Morrow, Brown 1994, p. 262). This sort of qualitative CDA is 
well suited for an analysis of Lebanon and its place in world order. 
However, this sort of analysis has not been done with regard to Lebanon. The most similar 
study (in terms of topic and data) by researchers on Lebanon and the STL appears to be the research 
conducted by Sari Hanafi, Are Knudsen and Robert Flahive (2016) which uses quantitative content 
analysis to explain the attitudes of various media institutions in Lebanon towards the STL. 
Notwithstanding the difference of content, the methodological difference is the most pronounced. As 
is usual for quantitative research, the number of cases is very large  
232 news articles and op-eds [from] five Lebanese newspapers based on their high circulation 
rates, robust national coverage, and political party constituencies [over] a 1,035-day sampling 
period. (Ibid, p. 73 -74) 
Similarly, for this type of quantitative method, the variables of analysis applied were much smaller. 
Two structural variables, type of article and type of author, were tabulated along with content-based 
variables related to the sources cited in the article (Politicians, Experts, the Public) and the types of 
arguments used (Legal, Moral and Political) (Ibid, p. 79). Thus, the logic of quantitative research 
necessarily reduces the role of meaning to its use by researchers to pre-define their variables and then 
for the meaning expressed in these news articles to be converted and expressed numerically in tables 
of incidences and co-incidences, rather than qualitatively. The use of structure here is also distinct 
from the relational conception of structure found in this thesis and rather relates to the structure of 
the data (type of article and type of author) rather than the relational structure of society. The 
practical upshot of this methodological difference can perhaps be best expressed in the assumption 
that the content-based variables (legal, moral and political argument) are taken to be externally 
related and internally stable, consistent and atomistic. In contrast, the present thesis’ utilisation of 
qualitative, linguistic CDA, inter alia, demonstrates the ways in which these concepts are utilised in 
actual speech by different actors and how they are conceptually, and concretely, internally related 
through creative use and combination of discourse types by participants. Methodological plurality can 
provide complementarity of strengths, weaknesses and findings and it is in this spirit that this thesis 
provides a CDA linguistic and historically comparative, account.  
A final note needs to be made regarding substantive theoretical and analytical choices. 
Apropos of the injunction to study idiosyncratic actors and underlying mechanisms set forth in this 
introduction (more fully justified in chapter one), there was a clear choice to be made regarding 
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whether empirical focus should rest on key actors, for example Hizballah and Rafik Hariri, or key 
underlying concepts such as sectarianism or clientelism. The former of these approaches has been 
undertaken with great success by James Worrall (2013) who utilises immanent critique (the analysis 
of contradictions between an actors’ theory and practice) to highlight the hopeful and problematic 
aspects of Hizballah for Critical Theorists. The analysis set out in this thesis may contribute some 
insights to an update of Worrall’s analysis (mostly on the negative side of the docket since their 
intervention to support a repressive regime), however, an explicit focus on these actors is not the tack 
taken here.  
What one can term a conceptual critical analysis which focuses on long-term structures, 
relations and underlying mechanisms is undertaken in The Politics of Sectarianism in post war Lebanon  
(Salloukh, Barakat et al. 2015). This analysis emphasises the way in which actors (ostensibly enemies) 
nevertheless exist and collaborate within a sectarian system against secularising or rights-based civil 
society organisations. Given the focus on historical structures of world order in this thesis, a broader 
conceptual understanding in this latter tradition is prioritised. This conceptual approach limits the 
fine-grained analysis of actors which could be achieved by an actor-based focus, however, conceptual 
focus lends itself much better and, indeed, is essential for, a historical-structural analysis of this kind. 
Moreover, notwithstanding Worrall’s excellent and necessary analysis of Hizballah from a Critical 
Theory standpoint, focus on this actor can often be driven by western-centric policy concerns with no 
emancipatory purpose and can lend an impression that Hizballah is merely a historical (terrorist?) 
anomaly, rather than an actor (among many historically in Lebanon) which is partially emergent from 
underlying conditions (for example, political marginalisation of a particular community) engaging in 
particular strategies of empowerment within the Lebanese state-society complex (for example, 
construction of parallel institutions). For these reasons, Hizballah and Hariri are considered 
contextually within wider tendencies and underlying mechanisms of the Lebanese state-society in this 
thesis. This approach also has the normative merit (arising from the empirical) of considering what is 
a common set of experiences for Lebanese, rather than surface political or sectarian differences. 
 
Originality and Contribution to Knowledge 
 
Having set out this approach, we can now elaborate the originality of this research which relates to 
four distinct areas. Firstly, to the best of the author’s knowledge, no one has yet conducted an analysis 
of STL transcripts, particularly those relating to Walid Jumblatt. Secondly, no one has yet adapted and 
applied the CDA method of Norman Fairclough either to Lebanon generally, or the STL specifically. 
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Thirdly, comparative analysis of the STL with its nineteenth century antecedent, the European 
Commission for Syria, is apparently unique to this thesis. Fourthly, the thesis presents an integrated 
meta-theoretical, theoretical and methodological approach synthesised and elaborated from the work 
of Critical Theorists and underpinned by CR from a range of fields with a view to practical application 
for the study of international politics and global society.  
As has been alluded to, the approach of this thesis, theoretical, meta-theoretical and its 
particular method, is what sets it apart. This thesis has much to contribute to scholars of IR, particularly 
those concerned with the study of the Middle East. One key benefit of this approach is that rather 
than an epistemically based, ad hoc, retreat to theoretical eclecticism on the basis of an unruly object 
of study [the Middle East] (See Salloukh 2017), a CR ontologically focused study gives one a 
philosophically grounded set of reasons and tools for utilising theoretical eclecticism and plurality of 
methods. The centrality of ontology and focus on concrete relational social structures in this Critical 
Theory and CR based approach ensures that disciplinary divisions do not determine the questions that 
can be asked regarding the shape of world order which are crucial for emancipatory politics. Specialists 
on Lebanon will also find this thesis useful as it overcomes chrono-centrism, synthesises the state of 
the art in theory about Lebanon, and offers a convincing re-contextualisation of these processes 
within, and dialectical relationship with, structures and processes of world order. Whist certainly not 
a work of ICL, it may well be useful as a meta account of this epistemic community in this particular 
instance and, by extension, its role in the world and the concrete, material and structural powers it 
enables and supports. In particular, Critical Legal Studies (CLS) will perhaps be most likely to come 
across this research given its less self-referential nature compared to ICJ and, to a lesser extent, TJ 
approaches. Thus, it can be summarised that, whilst the thesis can typically be conceived as coming 
from the epistemic communities of IR, Politics and Middle East studies, it is unorthodox to all of these 
disciplines.  
Central to its analytic and normative concerns is Critical Theory concerned with human 
emancipation and an under-girding meta-theory of CR. Its focus on hierarchical relational social 
structures, positioned practices and institutions within historical structures of world order set it apart 
from mainstream IR. Heikki Patomaki (2002, p. 21-41, 73-92) has identified the core of mainstream IR 
(particularly Neo-Realism and variants thereof), as the “levels of analysis problematic” where the 
levels relate to the individual, state and system. The behaviour of the state is to be explained by 
recourse to the independent variables of individuals or the system (ibid). More fundamentally, this 
problematic presumes an anarchic (non-hierarchical) system populated by atomistic (internally 
consistent and externally related) units (states and individuals) pursuing military-political interests 
using a mono-logical, instrumental rationality (ibid). In addition, it has been noted that mainstream IR 
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has tended to display the twin issues of chronocentrism and ahistoricism (Buzan, Little 2000, p. 18-
19). Chronocentrism describes a tendency in IR for scholarship to be driven by contemporary issues 
and changing policy demands which results in disproportionate attention being given to the present 
and future, decontextualized from the past (ibid). Ahistoricism describes a limited approach to history, 
common in mainstream IR, that attempts to discover invariant, universal laws, equally applicable 
across time and space. This purpose often leads to the anachronistic reading of the present on to the 
past (ibid). This thesis, by contrast, takes an historicist position utilising limited historical, comparative 
generalisation to explain and understand change and continuity within, and between, historical 
structures of world order in a particular case. It thus adopts a view of history which pays “attention to 
micro-developments that are often governed by contingency but [takes] care to place these within 
broader patterns of historical development.” (Hobson, Lawson et al. 2010, p. 8) It also focuses on 
concrete social relations to more fully understand and explain the STL within its context, at the 
interstice of law, politics and regional and international systems, and which atomism and anarchy 
consequently do little to explain.  
The ontological focus of CR on the actual and real, rather than an epistemic focus on 
theoretical and methodological boundaries encourages use of multidisciplinary literature pertaining 
to complex phenomena and are crucial in the development of concepts for explanation of empirical 
findings beyond the immediate. Multidisciplinarity is also crucial in the process of theoretically driven 
sampling. This study demonstrates this process. Finally, utilisation of qualitative, linguistic, CDA 
undergirded by a CR meta-theory means that the positivist methodological bias towards reifying 
variables as internally stable and externally related and the concomitant tendency to convert 
meaningful data into numerical data is problematised and changes the nature of questions which can 
be asked as a result. Whilst parsimony might encourage one to consider political and legal argument 
as separate “variables” in a quantitative analysis, this CDA approach allows for their co-occurrence in 
actual speech and their internal relation. 
The thesis does not possess a hypothesis as such, given that it is not conducted in the tradition 
of the hypothetico-deductive model associated with positivism or a quantitative methodology 
(Morrow, Brown 1994, p. 162). Thus, the proving or disproving of a pre-set question operationalised 
to provide binary yes/no answers is not what the thesis aims to accomplish. It is better understood as 
an abductive (rather than inductive or deductive) approach, which “re-describes the observable 
everyday objects of social science [court transcripts] in an abstracted and more general sense in order 
to describe the sequence of causation that gives rise to observed regularities in the pattern of events.” 
(O'Mahoney, Vincent 2014, p. 17). Thus, this approach utilises guiding research questions for the 
abductive process rather than a hypothesis in the traditional sense. This has the added benefit of 
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allowing the data to speak in nuanced ways and keep open the possibility that the questions asked at 
the beginning of the research process might have been misconceived. Rather than being regarded as 
a problem, this should be welcomed as a way to reflect on research results and conclusions and as a 
way of advancing fallible and transitive knowledge through the research process.  
 
Research Questions 
 
1. What are the differences and similarities in hegemony, domination and legitimacy in the 1860 
commissions and the STL? 
2. What ideological, hegemonic and legitimating discursive practices are employed at the STL? 
3. How do these strategies inform structural power in international law and politics? 
4. What do the 1860 commissions and the STL tell us about hegemonic world order? And what are the 
implications for Lebanon? 
 
Chapter Outlines 
 
To answer the research questions posed in this thesis, the chapter structure of the thesis is designed 
to pursue the approach outlined above.  
 
Chapter One 
Theory and Methodology, presents a meta-theoretical approach associated with CR which underpins 
this thesis. This includes, inter alia, the concepts of ontological realism, epistemological relativism and 
judgemental rationalism. From this foundation, key Critical Theoretical concepts associated with 
Robert W. Cox, Antonio Gramsci, the Frankfurt School and others are defined and operationalised for 
utilisation in interpretive and explanatory analysis from chapters four to six. These include historical 
structures of world order, ideology, hegemony, domination, legitimacy and historical blocs, among 
others. This theoretical discussion explains the significance of the historical case study of the European 
Commission for Syria of 1860 for comparison with the STL and lays out the precise way in which the 
CDA method of Norman Fairclough is adapted and applied within a comparative case study research 
design and the data sampling applied in this thesis. This includes tables detailing the analytic codes 
utilised, their meaning, and the use of qualitative data analysis software, Nvivo.  
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Chapter Two 
The Lebanese State-Society, undertakes the contextual and historical work of providing a background 
for Lebanon and its politics and society. It also provides conceptual work through the elaboration of 
this background through the key phenomena of clientelism, sectarianism, consociational democracy 
and memory. The chapter utilises multidisciplinary literature emanating from, inter alia, political 
science, sociology, anthropology and history. It is from this multidisciplinary literature that the key 
phenomena are identified, and the background of Lebanon is elaborated. The concepts defined here 
are discussed with a view to operationalising their meaning and theorising the ways in which they 
have historically interacted to produce outcomes, particularly violent ones. These concepts inform the 
historical case of the 1860 commission discussed in chapter three and are retained for later use in the 
explanatory phase of the CDA analysis presented in chapters five and six.  
 
Chapter Three 
The STL in the historical structure of world order, seeks to contextualise the CDA analysis conducted in 
chapters five and six. Its purpose is to facilitate comparative historical analysis of the two Lebanese 
tribunals as two historical mediations reflecting two world orders. This is done with a view to analysing 
the change which has occurred (and not occurred) regarding colonial and post-colonial practices of 
law in successive world orders and exploring what implications this has for emancipation in Lebanon 
and elsewhere. First, the chapter reviews the structure of the STL and situates this explicitly within the 
contemporary legal architecture of world order regarding ad hoc, hybrid and permanent institutional 
options. Developing the historical overview of Lebanon from chapter one, the circumstances of 
colonial involvement in nineteenth century Lebanon and the resulting violence and recourse to a 
European Commission for Syria are elaborated. These discussions frame the analyses in chapters five, 
six and the conclusions.   
 
Chapter Four 
STL in the Context of International Criminal Law, provides a review and critique of the ICL literature as 
it pertains to the STL using a historicist and deconstructive method. Historicism is achieved by 
reviewing the literature chronologically to elaborate the ways in which the concerns and assumptions 
of legal scholars changed or remained the same, from the establishment of the STL in 2007 through 
key decisions until 2012. Contradictions arising in accounts or arguments, in addition to the application 
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of insights from chapter two regarding Lebanon, are then used to deconstruct and critique these 
accounts. The methodological inconsistencies of the STL in making decisions with political implications 
is highlighted and used to inform the CDA and comparative analysis carried out in chapters five and 
six. In addition, themes and rationalisations presented by scholars of ICL, such as the preoccupation 
with perceptions of legitimacy and what this author refers to as the “some justice is better than none” 
discourse, are identified.  
 
Chapter Five 
Critical Discourse Analysis of Walid Jumblatt’s testimony to the STL 4-5 May 2015, consists of the 
application of the qualitative codes and techniques developed in chapter one, the operationalised 
explanatory concepts of clientelism, sectarianism, consociational democracy and memory from 
chapter two and explanatory insights regarding the structure and debates of ICL regarding the STL 
from chapter three, to the testimony of Walid Jumblatt. This accounts for approximately just under 
50% of the total testimony. The testimony from 4-5th May consists of prosecution questioning of 
Jumblatt as a prosecution witness. The conclusions garnered from this CDA are organised around three 
emergent themes from the discourse; Remembrances and active forgetting, Structural power and 
access to justice, and Domination. These emerging insights inform chapter five and, ultimately, the 
conclusion. This analysis also includes a recording of Rafik Hariri and a Syrian Regime official analysis, 
which concludes that the interactional conventions of the speech indicate hostility from the latter 
toward the former, somewhat supporting the conventional assumption of Syrian hostility towards 
Hariri.   
 
Chapter Six 
Critical Discourse Analysis of Walid Jumblatt’s testimony to the STL 6-7 May 2015, applies the same 
CDA techniques as the previous chapter to the second half of the testimony of Walid Jumblatt at the 
STL from 6-7th May 2015. These documents account for approximately just over 50% of the transcripts. 
These transcripts see the end of prosecution questioning and key interventions from the 
representative for the victims in addition to defence questioning. The conclusions garnered from this 
CDA are organised around three emergent themes from the discourse; Consociationalism, dissonance 
and relativism, The nexus of clientelist-sectarian conflict and violence and (Il)liberal world order. 
Combined with the insights from chapter five, the chapter concludes with a historical comparative 
analysis which re-contextualises this discourse within a historical structure of world order discussed 
in chapter three. A comparative analysis is conducted between these findings on the STL, and the 1860 
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tribunal for Syria. The Comparisons and conclusions here cluster in to six themes; The pentarchy and 
sovereignty, Executive domination of the Judiciary, The dialectic of intervention, destabilisation and 
domination, Worthy and unworthy victims, European Commission for Syria Vs The STL: inclusivity vs 
exclusivity, Consociationalism: from colonial solution to neo-colonial problem. 
 
Conclusion  
A conclusion is presented which provides a summary of the thesis. Conclusions are justified from the 
insights of the analyses carried out from chapters one to six with reference to the research questions. 
Reflection on the researcher’s contribution in addition to potential limitations and avenues for further 
research will be carried out. Through the addressing of research questions and development of 
theoretical models, the prospects for emancipation will be assessed.  
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Chapter One: Theory and Methodology 
 
Introduction 
 
This thesis applies a methodological and theoretical framework developed from the work of Robert 
W. Cox. It is applied to the empirical problematic of International Criminal Law (ICL) at the STL and its 
dialectical relationship to the Lebanese state-society. This thesis is pursued in the belief that any 
account of the historical structure of world order is incomplete without addressing the material and 
ideational aspects of legal architectures. To develop the Coxian model for application to this particular 
case, the argument is advanced that Cox’s Critical Theory is best understood and applied, not as an 
example of interpretivism as it is often classified (Lynch 2014, p. 51-52), but as CR in its basic ontology 
and epistemology. Having demonstrated the compatibility of Cox’s historical materialism and CR on 
key philosophical questions, the chapter employs CR categories to enrich, develop and reinforce Cox’s 
approach for application to the STL. In the process of establishing the compatibility of Cox’s approach 
and CR, the chapter lays out and embellishes the important aspects of Cox’s theory for the thesis, 
which includes discussion of historical structures, hegemony, ideology, institutions, world order, state-
society complexes and social forces. This broad framework is modified by key concepts from Frankfurt 
School scholarship which are pertinent to this study; legitimacy and immanent critique. Having 
justified the philosophical assumptions and elaborated the theoretical framework through which to 
view the STL, the work of Norman Fairclough is employed to provide a rigorous method of Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA) which Cox’s theoretical framework lacks. The CDA of Norman Fairclough does 
not pose any compatibility problems given its basis in Critical Theory and CR meta-theory. It presents 
many important opportunities for the analysis of court transcripts and their social and institutional 
context. Investigating the historical antecedents of the STL and the previous historical structure of 
world order as it pertains to the European intervention in Syria in 1860 informs the case study of the 
STL and provides context to the thick description offered through the CDA analysis. This will provide 
comparative accounts of the dialectical development and structure of the Lebanese state-society 
complex and world order through ICL. 
 
Theory  
 
This thesis’ theoretical framework builds on the Critical Theory of Robert W. Cox. This was 
elaborated in a 1981 article in the Millennium journal of international studies and further developed 
in subsequent work (Cox 1983 [1996], Cox 1987, Cox 1992 [1996]). Cox’s framework places him at 
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odds with the mainstream of the discipline of IR. Heikki Patomaki (2002, p. 21-41, 73-92) has identified 
the core of the IR discipline as what he calls the ‘levels-of-analysis problematic’. This problematic can 
be summarised as ‘independent variables’ at three ‘levels’ bearing on the behaviour of the state taken 
to be the ‘dependent variable’. It has been argued that the roots of this problematic can be detected 
in the work of Hans J. Morganthau (Koivisto 2010) but was more fully realised during the 
behaviouralist phase in IR after the second ‘great debate’, particularly in the work of David Singer and 
Kenneth Waltz (Patomaki 2002, p. 74). The three analytical ‘levels’ relate to the individual, the state 
and the international system. The ‘structure’ of the system posited by Waltz is generated by the 
interaction of states and is taken to be anarchic (Waltz 1959, Waltz 1979). For parsimony, the state 
was taken to represent a ‘billiard ball’ type ‘unit’ defined solely in terms of its (military) material power 
and distinguishable from like units only in terms of how much power it possessed. It was taken to 
exhibit an inside/outside dichotomy, with the former being generally excluded from the disciplinary 
problematic of IR. This atomistic unit was presumed to pursue its ‘interests defined in terms of power’ 
(Morgenthau 1973, p.4) using the singular ‘self-interested instrumental rationality’ of neo-classical 
economics, concerned only with relative and/or absolute gains (Patomaki 2002, p.4).   
Similarly, these traits were said to be reflected at the individual level. The advent of the inter-
paradigm debate in IR introduced pluralism added new actors to the levels-of-analysis problematic 
and stabilised into the neo-debates from the 1980’s which addressed a narrow set of questions 
associated with the extent to which “rational” states and individuals in an anarchic system could be 
encouraged to cooperate, often employing some form of rational choice theory. For the international 
relations of the Middle East, key scholars have highlighted the inadequacy of these assumptions. Fred 
Halliday (2005) noted that “… it is above all in parts of the world where states, and societies, have long 
been subordinated to structures of global power that the limits of realism, above all an emphasis on 
the unitary state, are most evident.” Raymond Hinnebusch (2015) similarly questioned the utility of 
the unitary state model in a post-colonial context in which the “… process of state formation … is very 
much incomplete”. Cox’s framework provides an alternative to the levels of analysis problematic by 
rejecting the basic theoretical assumptions concerning anarchy, instrumental rationality and the 
atomistic nature of units (states and individuals) and proposing a Critical Theory of world politics.  
 Cox’s framework relies on the social ontology of historical structures represented through the 
two tripartite models representing forces and spheres of activity. The model of forces (Figure 1) is 
taken as ontologically prior to the spheres of activity (Figure 2) out of which it emerges. The model of 
forces constrains and enables societal actors and defines the form of the social. Their 
interrelationships are not taken to be determinate, linear or hierarchical (Cox 1981, p.135). Cox 
describes the forces as ‘potentials’ (ibid, p.135) indicating that some (but not all) forces may be 
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present in any given context, that they may manifest in different quantities and/or qualities, or indeed 
remain present but latent. The most obvious example of this is that both ideas and material forces in 
the correct quantity and quality are needed in combination for institutions to arise, given that they 
represent the dialectical manifestation of the former two forces.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
The definition of these forces adds further complexity to the model. Cox defines material 
capabilities as “productive and destructive potentials.” (ibid, 1981, p. 135). He divides these between 
dynamic and accumulated forms, with technology typifying the former and raw materials the latter.  
Similarly, he identifies two types of ideas, inter-subjective and collective images. Cox defines inter-
subjective ideas as “those shared notions of the nature of social relations which tend to perpetuate 
habits and expectations of behaviour…” (ibid 1981, p. 135) that are historically and socially 
constituted. Collective images pertain to differing and potentially conflictual images of social order 
held by distinctive groups. It is with collective images that we perceive a realm of the political and 
conceive of the possibility of emergence for new social forces and new historical structures. Cox 
further defines the nature of inter-subjectivity as “… the prevailing sense of the nature of the world, 
or the ‘common sense’ of reality shared among a population” (Cox, Schechter 2002, p.88). This 
concept of inter-subjectivity as common sense and its tension with the politicised realm of collective 
images is key to the critical methodology. Institutions coalesce at the interstice of material and 
ideational forces and are a means of stabilising and reproducing relationships. Cox argues that they 
“reflect the power relations prevailing at their point of origin and tend, at least initially, to encourage 
collective images consistent with these power relations.” (Cox 1981, p. 136). However, Cox warns that 
Ideas 
Material 
Capabilities 
Institutions 
Figure 1: Forces 
Source: Cox, R. (1981). Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory. Millennium, 10 (2), 
126-155. 
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institutions may become detached from the forces of material and ideational power, particularly as 
time goes on. Thus, for the analyst, the question becomes one of the extent to which institutions 
embody certain forms of power and how well they stabilise the relationships they were created to 
manage. The configuration of these forces, ideas, materials and institutions are studied, not as 
universal, but as pertaining to historically specific spheres of activity which are to be studied 
empirically as such (See figure 2).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
These spheres of activity are represented in a triumvirate model, much like the model of 
forces, which suggests non-linearity, non-determinism and non-hierarchy. Indeed, Cox (1981, p. 138) 
states that whilst social forces are logically prior to, and under certain material and ideational 
conditions lead to institutionalisation of, states and world orders, these states and world orders can 
give rise to, shape or suppress social forces. Social forces have the potential to become transnational 
and shape the historical structure of states and world order outside their immediate locale. However, 
Cox somewhat confuses the issue by using the concepts of “spheres of activity” and “levels” 
interchangeably, the latter being evocative of the mainstream vision discussed by Patomaki (2002) 
and Koivisto (2010). This may simply be a residue from the process of socialisation into the IR 
discipline. The actual content and purpose of Cox’s ontology of historical structures represents a 
significant break with the mainstream. For this reason, this thesis employs the language of “spheres 
of activity” and to buttress this concept as distinct from the “levels-of-analysis problematic” by 
utilisation of CR, which will be explained later in this chapter.  
Social Forces 
World 
Orders 
Forms of 
State 
Figure 2: Spheres of Activity 
Source: Cox, R. (1981). Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory. Millennium, 10 (2), 
126-155. 
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The three spheres of activity bear little resemblance to the “levels” elaborated in mainstream 
sources and challenge the attendant concepts of atomism, instrumental rationality and anarchy. In 
the first instance, reductionism and atomism are disposed of through the focus on social forces arising 
out of social relations (Cox 1987, p. 11). In this way, people are not abstracted from their social context 
which structures the opportunities and obstacles they contend with and which constitute their inter-
subjective world views and collective images. Moreover, these ideational aspects are not universally, 
instrumentally “rational” as the classical economists would have it, but may take myriad and 
contradictory forms. Whilst it is not denied that instrumental rationality exists in the world, 
rationality’s singular nature is denied and the obsession with this particular form is shown not to be 
universal, but the result of a particular world view (Cox 1981, p. 132). Thus, whilst the Coxian model 
provides the language to speak about important individuals, they are always discussed as historically 
and socially constituted individuals. This commitment by Cox to social forces as the basic constituent 
of world politics places him close to the CR ontology, which argues for the reality of society against 
atomistic positivism and thus reduces society to the smallest “observable” unit, the individual 
(Patomaki, Wight 2000, Patomaki 2002, Wight 2007, Joseph, Wight 2010).  
 Having effectively jettisoned atomism and instrumental rationality by taking social forces as 
the basic constituent of analysis, Cox supplies a distinctly different understanding of the state from 
the mainstream. Following Antonio Gramsci (1971, p.268), he rejects “Statolatry”, the tendency to 
reify the state by reducing it to “government by functionaries” by proposing a model which employs 
Gramsci’s famous equation “State = political society + civil society” (ibid 1971, p. 263).  Here, political 
society refers to institutions often taken to be equated with the state (executives, legislatures, 
judiciary, armed forces) and relating this to civil society which in Gramsci’s terminology referred to 
“the ensemble of organisms commonly called “private” (ibid, p. 12) typified by “the church, the 
educational system, the press, all the institutions which helped to create in people certain modes of 
behaviour and expectations consistent with the hegemonic social order.” (Cox 1983 [1996], p.126). 
The definition of civil society here is descriptive, not normative, and can in theory be applied with 
reference to “post-colonial” or “non-western” societies for empirical analysis (See Bilgin, Morton 
2002). In total contrast to mainstream IR which, dichotomises the “domestic” and “international” 
sides of state-societies, and disregards the former or adds it in as an “independent variable”, Cox’s 
approach is to study how changes in social relations affect the form of political society, how the 
emergence and distribution of social forces effects governance, and in particular how hegemonic 
social forces constitute historic blocs by forming alliances with subordinate social forces (domestic 
and/or foreign) and exercising ethico-political leadership (ibid 1983 [1996], p. 132). Historical blocs 
sometimes lead to a tight fit between political and civil society creating the “integral state”, however 
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this is far from a universal condition. This led Cox to argue that “Gramsci's thinking contains the 
potential for considering state/society complexes as the constituent entities of a world order and for 
exploring the particular historical forms taken by these complexes.” (Cox 1981, p. 134). In addition, in 
employing a social ontology rather than an atomist one, analytical depth for comprehending 
phenomena, such as imperialism and colonialism, can be attained. These phenomena constitute 
historically specific hierarchical orders impinging on social relations which in turn affect forms of state 
and the complex ensemble of relations between social forces and states (horizontally and vertically). 
They cannot be easily identified through the “levels-of-analysis problematic”. This thesis thus engages 
with the specifics of Lebanese socio-historical structure (See chapter two) as relevant to the ways in 
which it interacts with the STL as an institution of world order. An alternative way to consider Middle 
Eastern states in a non-unitary way is to employ bureaucratic models associated with Foreign Policy 
Analysis (FPA) (Halliday 2005, p. 29; Hinnebusch 2015, p. 3). Whilst this does indeed represent a useful 
approach for deconstructing the billiard ball reification, its approach still represents a form of 
statolatry and a focus on government by functionaries. Thus, the more inclusive heuristic of state-
society complex is employed in this thesis.  
 As a sphere of activity, the concept of world order is distinct in fundamental ways from the 
mainstream conception of international system defined in terms of anarchy. A clue to this is in the 
terms themselves, for how can one discuss order in the world if one assumes it is anarchic (with 
anarchy being defined in terms of a lack of global government and hierarchy)? Cox argues  
It is a misleading oversimplification to regard all interstate systems as essentially the same 
insofar as they all lack a supreme world authority. The qualitative differences between world 
orders touch the nature and incidence of wars, the manner of resolving disputes, and the 
creation and distribution of wealth and poverty. (Cox 1987, p. 7) 
In conceiving of order, Cox draws partly on the classic work of Hedley Bull, who stated, “To say of a 
number of things that they display order is … to say that they are related to one another according to 
some pattern, that their relationship is not purely haphazard but contains some discernible principle.” 
(Bull 2012 [1977], p. 3). Following this definition, order is not defined as the lack of conflict, but as 
“patterns” and “regularities” in social relations which may be cooperative, conflictual or stable but 
exploitative (Cox 1992 [1996], p. 148). If we take the example of colonialism, as a set of hierarchical, 
exploitative social relations, one can see that anarchy cannot describe it, and indeed conceals it 
theoretically by reifying the international system as collections of atomistic units and individuals. On 
the other hand, from a world order perspective, colonialism is readily identifiable through analysis of 
social relations in states and world orders. In Cox’s conception, small states are not simply materially 
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smaller versions of the great powers. Instead, they are potentially differentiated, inter alia, by their 
agency vis-à-vis domestic and international actors, the complex of social relations which constitute 
them, their relations with other state-society complexes and institutions in a world economy and the 
structural diversity of centre and periphery within the boundaries of the supposedly atomistic 
territorial, sovereign state (Cox 1983 [1996], p.137). Hinnebusch (2015, p. 2) argues this is particularly 
salient in the Middle East where “… the main causes of the Middle East’s exceptional war and 
instability … [arise from] the peculiar historical construction of the regional system under imperialism 
…”. Hinnebusch draws on the core-periphery analyses of Marxian Structuralism to describe and 
analyse hierarchy.  
Given the Marxian nature of Structuralism, emphasis remains on the economic nature of the 
Middle East’s peripheral position in world order (ibid, p. 2). No doubt, economic marginalisation is a 
necessary account of the Middle East’s position in world order, but there are potentially aspects of 
hegemonic domination through world order associated with what traditionally would have been 
accorded to the superstructure, which this account neglects. This is one reason this thesis goes to 
some lengths to acknowledge, but also move beyond such accounts, to a post-Marxist position based 
on CR for application to institutions of ICL (as is discussed later in this chapter). This approach allows 
for the application of the Structuralist insight that “… the region’s penetrated client states behave 
quite differently from fully sovereign states …” but can apply this to contexts outside of purely 
economic dependency.  
A key ordering principle of world politics is international law. This is particularly so, as it 
pertains to sovereign rights and duties, for these are at least as much legal concepts as political ones. 
Logically therefore, sovereignty is likely to display elements of hierarchy and differentiation as 
constitutive and reflective of world order, permeating institutions of international organisation and 
state-society complexes. Anthony Anghies’ (2005, 2006) work is particularly useful here, he argues 
that colonialism was not simply a historical episode subject to a radical break. He argues it developed 
symbiotically with international law whose origin continues to influence world order, particularly 
through the sovereignty doctrine. As he states, “The acquisition of sovereignty by the Third World was 
an extraordinarily significant event; and yet, various limitations and disadvantages appeared to be 
somehow peculiarly connected with that sovereignty.” (Anghie 2005, p.2). This adds depth to Cox’s 
notion that differentiation of ostensibly sovereign units in world order is not simply a matter of military 
power. Anghie shows legal sovereignty itself is stratified in important ways. The present thesis thus 
takes seriously what the structure, practices and relations of the STL tell one about sovereignty in 
Lebanon as an example of wider world order. It should be noted here that a crude reductionist 
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argument which attempts to treat colonialism and imperialism as synonymous with international law 
is certainly not the purpose here.  
Indeed, Anghie himself has pointed to the potential importance of international law as 
(political) arena through which the claims of the marginalised might be pursued (Anghie 2006, p. 752). 
Instead, he follows a methodology which traces the ways in which colonial origins produce certain 
tendencies through “… a set of structures that continually repeat themselves at various stages in the 
history of international law.” (Anghie 2005, p. 3). This approach is commensurate with the ontology 
of historical structures and as such informs the framework elaborated in this thesis. Of particular 
interest is the structure of multi-tiered sovereignty arising from the colonial differentiation between 
“civilised” (European) and “semi- civilised” or “barbarous” (non-European) peoples in the colonial 
period which ostensibly came to an end with the achievement of sovereignty by third world states and 
the establishment of the UN system (Anghie 2005, Rodogno 2012). The question of whether this 
structure is at all repeated in contemporary world order in some form, is therefore of central 
importance for Lebanon-STL relations particularly, and world order generally. From here emanates 
the need for historical sensitivity to Lebanon’s colonial past, its “post-colonial” present, and the 
interactions it has had with processes of the ICL during formative phases. This thesis focuses on one 
such episode (in addition to that of the STL), that of the European intervention of 1860 (See chapter 
three) as a comparative example by which to trace similarities and differences between world orders 
and to understand the potential impact of legal intervention on the development of the Lebanese 
state-society complex.  
Following Bull, Cox argues that different world orders are differentiated by norms and values 
which are taken as their raison d’etre and not simply by a universal a-historical set of instrumentally 
rational interests. In the concrete historical structure of particular world orders there is no one-way 
determinism, but a dialectical and variable set of relations constituting or contesting the normative 
structure of inter-subjective ideas, collective images and instrumental rationalities (Cox 1981, p.138). 
Cox follows Giambatista Vico in defining historical structures of world order as traceable through mind 
in which  
Mind is … the thread connecting the present with the past, a means of access to a knowledge 
of these changing modes of social reality [so that] … A proper study of human affairs should 
be able to reveal both the coherence of minds and institutions characteristic of different ages, 
and the process whereby one such coherent pattern - which we can call a historical structure 
- succeeds another. (Cox 1981, p. 132-133 emphasis added). 
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From this we can see that, applying Cox’s method of historical structures to the empirical example of 
Lebanon and the STL generates a new problematic comprising a complex set of historical relations. In 
this problematic, Cox’s approach implies that Lebanon should be studied historically as a specific state-
society complex in which its material, ideational and institutional aspects should be considered, and 
not reduced to a unit among like units. Moreover, the STL, conceived as an institutional set of relations 
in world order, should be considered, not as atomistic, but as related in important ways to a wider 
historical structure of world order (in this case, the legal and political structure) and as potentially 
exhibiting “the coherence of minds” characteristic of the age. To denaturalise and compare these 
contemporary ideas, reference should be made to similar institutions as examples to discern 
development within historical structure(s). Following this problematic, therefore, this thesis pays close 
attention to phenomena which typify the Lebanese state-society complex identified in chapter two 
and the structure of the STL from chapter four. From the second chapter, it is apparent that the 
Lebanese state-society is not simply a pre-constituted variable with which international law has 
interacted externally through various tribunals and interventions. Rather its very process of formation 
from the nineteenth century, resulting from the complex interaction of colonialism, political and civil 
violence, and constitution creation, was influenced by tribunals and interventions, particularly in 1860 
(See Fawaz 1994, Rodogno 2012). Cox’s method of historical structures entails a “… commitment … to 
discerning parallels and correspondences between different phases of culture that might be separate 
in time and space.” arising from the insight that “… the social world can be understood by looking 
through history to analyse the changing mental processes of the makers of history.”  (Bieler, Morton 
2001, p. 17). CDA provides a useful method through which to understand the symbiotic development 
of the historical structures of legal-political world order and the Lebanese state-society. In the process, 
this will have the critical benefit of de-naturalising and de-universalising the views of the present in 
addition to offering comparative insights into what has changed and what has endured, what is 
beneficial and what is not. It is precisely in this context where inter-subjective ideas as common sense 
become important for order through the concept of hegemony. 
The notion of hegemony adopted by Cox depends on the dual notion of power as consisting 
of consent and coercion. This model comes from Niccolo Machiavelli’s discussion of the centaur, 
embodying man and beast (Machiavelli 1988, p. 61). Gramsci makes use of it to distinguish hegemonic 
and non-hegemonic uses of power (Gramsci 1971, p. 170). For Gramsci, hegemonic orders and uses 
of power are those which rest primarily on consent (man), where non-hegemonic orders are those 
based largely on coercion (beast) (ibid, p. 57-58). These aspects should not be thought of as mutually 
exclusive however, but as dialectically related, with the one which is most prominent in a given order 
defining that order as either hegemonic or not. As Cox notes “To the extent that the consensual aspect 
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of power is in the forefront, hegemony prevails. Coercion is always latent but is only applied in 
marginal, deviant cases.” (Cox 1983 [1996], p. 127). Machiavelli describes this as a relation between 
“law” and “force” highlighting, as he does so, the important relationship between law, and the 
hegemonic orders which are Gramsci’s concern. It has been noted that hegemony “is the central 
concept in Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks and the fulcrum around which all other concepts revolve” 
(Bennett, Martin et al. 1981, p. 192) and to this extent a thorough discussion of the concept and its 
intersections is warranted.  
Gramsci argued that hegemony was to be thought of as emanating from the effective 
construction of a historic bloc achieved through “economic-corporate” (instrumental) concessions 
and/or “ethico-political” (ideological) leadership (Gramsci 1971, p. 161). This was dialectically related 
to the coercive dominance of enemy groups outside or peripheral to the historic bloc (ibid, p. 57-8). 
Thus dominance, broadly conceived, is divided between dominance through coercion, and hegemony 
through consent. Hegemonic consent is then further subdivided between material and ideological 
aspects, providing both instrumentally rational motives and normative frameworks for compliance 
with a hegemonic group (Eagleton 2007, p. 113). This highlights that hegemony is internally related 
to, but not reducible to, ideology (Ibid, p. 114). To become hegemonic, a leading group must thus think 
outside of its immediate self-interest and grant certain concessions to form a historic bloc (Gramsci 
1971 p. 181). The ideological aspect of hegemony formed the core of Gramsci’s critique of Marxist 
“economism” and liberal idealism. The former consists of considering the superstructure of ideas as 
merely reflecting the material structure (ibid, p. 178, 448). The latter involves a conception of history 
as the history of ideas removed from material processes. For Gramsci, ideas are material forces to the 
extent that they are produced, have concrete effects on everyday life and organise people (Gramsci 
1971, p. 165). Hegemony is thus partially conceived as “the attainment of a ‘cultural-social’ unity 
through which a multiplicity of dispersed wills, with heterogeneous aims, are welded together with a 
single aim” (ibid, p. 349). This is a necessary basis for the process of forging an historic bloc for 
instrumental and/or ideological leadership.  
An element of hegemony which was of particular interest to Gramsci was “common sense.” 
Gramsci describes “common sense” as “folklore”, a historical “sedimentation” of “popular religion”, 
along with past philosophies combining in “strangely composite… Stone Age elements and principles 
of a more advanced science…” (ibid, p. 324). Common sense is intimately bound with history and is to 
be distinguished from an active program of ideological propaganda because of its spontaneous nature. 
However, hegemonic projects are more likely to succeed in their bid for ethico-political leadership, 
and ideology is more likely to gain traction, if they mesh effectively with the contours of common 
sense; contributing in the process to the “stratified deposits” of common sense which succeed them 
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historically (ibid, p. 324-326). Gramsci, however, held that common sense included “good sense” or 
elements of nascent emancipatory philosophy (ibid, p. 326). This is where Gramsci indicates the 
purpose of a Critical Theory, not to instrumentally use common sense for purposes of manipulation, 
but to illuminate the nature of common sense to lay actors and to develop the “good sense” in their 
“spontaneous philosophy” (Ibid, p. 326). He argues, “The starting-point of critical elaboration is the 
consciousness of what one really is, and is ‘knowing thyself’ as a product of the historical process to 
date which has deposited in you an infinity of traces, without leaving an inventory.” (ibid, p.324). 
Norman Fairclough (2015, p. 13) has adopted the method of immanent critique from the Frankfurt 
School of Critical Theory as a tool of analysis of common sense in his version of CDA. Immanent critique 
does not seek a transcendental yardstick by which to critique a given set of ideas, but instead observes 
their operation in a social context and attempts to highlight theory-practice contradictions inherent to 
them, which allow one to separate the good sense from the common sense and to elaborate 
alternative forms of social being or to facilitate the critique of existing institutions and exercises of 
power (ibid, p.12). Very simply, a theory-practice contradiction consists of the theory a person or 
institution espouses contradicting their practice. Variations on this critique can be found in practice-
practice and theory-theory contradictions where the former consist of contradictory practices and the 
latter of contradictory sets of theories regarding reality. This is a fruitful, non-moralistic, way of 
critiquing ideas and practices related to the STL and is one of the reasons Fairclough’s version of CDA 
is adopted as a method in this thesis.  
Cox says of the Gramscian concept of hegemony that it “is loose and elastic and attains 
precision only when brought into contact with a particular situation which it helps to explain, a contact 
which also develops the meaning of the concept.’ (Cox 1983 [1996], p. 124). This is even more so for 
the related concept of ideology. The definitions of ideology are varied and potentially contradictory. 
Here we shall outline some of the “elastic” aspects of the concepts which will be used in this 
theoretical framework and which will “attain precision” in the analysis to be carried out in this thesis. 
Like hegemony, ideology is linked to the concept of power. Hegemony refers to powers’ consensual 
use while ideology is located at the intersection of beliefs and power where “meaning (or signification) 
serves to sustain relations of domination.” (Thompson 1984, p. 4). Terry Eagleton points out that 
ideology becomes hegemonic to the extent that it remains consensual and hidden (and indeed this is 
a frequent objective of the ideological), but that when ideology is coercive or imposed, it is all the 
more visible as ideology (Eagleton 2007, p. 112). Both Eagleton and Raymond Geuss outline two broad 
conceptions of ideology; one sociological (ideology as system of ideas), which are often descriptive, 
and one epistemological (ideology as falsity), which is often pejorative (Geuss 1981, p. 4- 21, Eagleton 
2007, p. 3). The CDA methods employed herein foreground the epistemological version. The systems 
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of ideas definition can often be encapsulated by reference to culture or philosophy, but this is not to 
say that there is no overlap.  
The epistemological or false view of ideology is contentious. The major objection to the 
concept centres around the fact that ideologies must contain some truth for them to correspond with 
the practical common sense and effective inter-subjective communication of their adherents, 
therefore they cannot be said to be false. In response, Eagleton suggests that ideology can be true on 
one level and false on another. One way this manifests is as truth through assertion, but falsity through 
denial or omission. Similarly, following the Saussurian insight that there is no necessary correlation 
between signifier and signified, it is possible to show that something is a correct example of language 
but is false at the level of society if it (re)produces undesirable effects. Eagleton links this to Jurgen 
Habermas’ definition of ideology as “systematically distorted communication” (Habermas 1970, p. 
205). The key intersection once again is power. If a discursive utterance is factually accurate as an 
example of language but produces an effect which buttresses an unjust social order, this can be said 
to be ideologically false. Another way in which this double operation of ideology works is with 
reference to epistemology and ontology. This arises out of the fact that “What is subjective in 
understanding becomes objective through action.” (Cox 1992 [1996], p. 145). On this understanding, 
for example, we can say that whilst the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) campaigns to destroy 
antiquities because of their supposed encouragement of polytheism are ontologically true events (real 
objects were destroyed), we can also state that they are epistemologically false, either because they 
are mistaken in the view that archaeology and worship are similar activities, or because their 
leadership have ulterior (false) motives for these actions. This last aspect demonstrates Eagleton’s 
insight that denying the existence of falsity would be tantamount to saying a lie was true because it 
objectively happened (Eagleton 2007, p. 22).  
In addition to these general epistemological definitions of ideology as domination at the level 
of signification or as systematically distorted communication Eagleton provides a useful taxonomy of 
sufficient but not necessary manifestations of ideology. The first element is rationalisation in the 
psychoanalytic sense of having a conscious articulated purpose and a sub or un-conscious motive (ibid, 
p. 52). Rationalisation can manifest in many ways; as rational reasons for irrational desires, as 
reputable aims for unethical ends or as contradiction between two sets of ideological ideas resulting 
in contradictory utterance and practice. The second element is legitimation which should be 
considered as a process of hegemonic argumentation and justification where “a ruling power comes 
to secure from its subjects an at least tacit consent to its authority” (ibid, p. 54). The third element, 
Universalisation, presents ideologies as universally valid, applicable and accepted and often as having 
always existed, because “ideology is reluctant to believe that it was ever born, since to do so is to 
27 
 
acknowledge that it can die.” (ibid, p. 58). Although, universalisation might be a genuine expression 
within a historic bloc of universal aggregations of interests, it is also capable of becoming false 
universalism to the extent that the language of universality is used to present particular interests as 
universal. Richard Falk has used this conception to critique the false universalism of the architecture 
of international law to the extent that it fails to include and represent Islamic civilization (Falk 1997) 
and Martti Koskienemmi has argued that all international law is false universalism (Koskenniemi 2011, 
p. 219). The fourth element, naturalisation, is a hegemonic strategy which seeks to overlap and 
influence common sense. If an ideology can successfully make its own ideas common sense it 
successfully makes them ahistorical. The prize is to be able to “not so much combat alternative ideas 
as thrust them beyond the very bounds of the thinkable.” (Eagleton 2007, p. 28). The fifth aspect which 
Eagleton offers is mystification which refers to processes which obscure or suppress certain 
contradictions arising from the unequal possession and use of power or the “imaginary resolution of 
real contractions.” (ibid, p. 6).   
All these processes often entail reification of social life which means that we begin to see 
theoretical objects as real or socially constructed objects as natural and universal (ibid, p. 95). Norman 
Fairclough notes Louis Althusser’s position that reification of the subject as unitary, natural and pre-
constituted rather than socially constructed is “the elementary ideological effect.” (Althusser 1971 
quoted in Fairclough 2015, p. 121). In Fairclough’s view, the subject is placed in subject positions 
through discourse as an effect of power. The extent to which this is seen as natural is an expression of 
its effectiveness. Fairclough’s CDA covers the elements outlined above. In addition, he proposes 
another definition, related to immanent critique, which posits that where discourse has a “theory-
practice” or “practice-practice” or “theory-theory” contradictions and where these contradictions are 
necessary for the reproduction of social structure and power for particular interests, this can be said 
to be ideological (Fairclough 2015, p. 32). The CDA of the practices of the STL in this thesis will refer 
to these operationalised definitions and elements as part of its ideology critique.   
Our previous discussion of domination outlined the way in which it is divided between 
hegemonic (consensual) and non-hegemonic (coercive) forms. However, this distinction does not 
address under what circumstances the exercise of power could be considered legitimate. This thesis 
uses Fairclough and Fairclough’s (2012) definition of legitimacy to remedy this potential lack of 
falsifiability. Legitimacy for them is a special kind of justification which operates at two levels. The first 
level is a justification of action regarding reasons and the second is a justification of those reasons 
relating to a system of social norms, values and laws (ibid p. 110). They take a mixed procedural-
deliberative understanding of legitimate exercises of power where an inclusively agreed procedure 
must be deliberated inclusively. They hold to the distinction between legitimacy and perceived 
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legitimacy, with perceived legitimacy overlapping with the notion of hegemony. By so doing, they align 
themselves with Habermas’ normative understanding (and against Weber) of legitimacy in the sense 
that legitimacy is not simply something which is perceived, but is an activity in which the exercise of 
power is none-exclusively, freely deliberated in conditions which are not distorted through ideological 
effects (ibid, p. 112).  
These theoretical concepts constitute operationalisations, that is, working definitions of 
concepts for application to analysis in this thesis. Operationalisation requires the development of 
conceptual definitions into operational definitions through the linking of concepts and data indicators. 
In qualitative studies, this is done during empirical analysis (Punch 2005, p. 46). In this thesis, this is 
achieved by applying these concepts to the formal features of our texts during the interpretative and 
explanatory phases of analysis as part of the CDA method elaborated below. The research questions 
can now be stated.  
 
Research Questions  
 
1. What are the differences and similarities in hegemony, domination and legitimacy in the 1860 
commissions and the STL? 
2. What ideological, hegemonic and legitimating discursive practices are employed at the STL? 
3. How do these strategies inform structural power in international law and politics? 
4. What do the 1860 commissions and the STL tell us about hegemonic world order? And what are the 
implications for Lebanon? 
 
Methodology 1: Meta-theory 
 
Despite Cox’s use of a tripartite model of forces which represent the social world as composed of 
equal parts ideas and materials with an ostensible lack of any one-way determinism, the fact remains 
that in practice the emphasis in Cox’s work (particularly his 1987 magnum opus Production, Power 
and World Order; Social Forces in the Making of History) remains very much economic production. 
Thus, despite the potential of the model which Cox elaborated in 1981, a materialist and (economic) 
production bias seems to creep back into the definition of social forces and their identities. This is 
unsurprising to the extent that Gramsci’s work, on which Cox largely bases his own, itself contained 
these same contradictions and thus they have been reproduced in Cox’s work. On one level, Gramsci 
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clearly represents an advance in Marxist thought through his emphasis on the superstructure and its 
potentially independent role in society vis-à-vis the economic structure. His entire theoretical project 
in many ways represents an intellectual challenge to both Liberal “voluntarism” and orthodox Marxist 
“economism” (Bennett, Martin et al. 1981, p. 192). Marxist economism, according to Gramsci, posited 
a clear distinction between superstructure (ideas) and structure (economic base) and a one-way 
determinism whereby changes in the latter mechanically produce changes in the former (Gramsci 
1971, p. 376). This led logically to its tendency to be dismissive toward ideas in general as explanatory 
factors in societal change and it was considered impossible that ideology might affect the structure 
(ibid, p. 376).  
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985, p. 67) pointed out that Gramsci’s theory of 
hegemony, through the articulation of historic blocs, was the first and most important conception 
which moved beyond the orthodox Marxist view that i) revolution could only come through the 
working class by and for itself and ii) that socialist parties should be concerned with the narrow 
“economic-corporate” interests of the working class only. Historic blocs potentially represent a 
formation of interests and identity beyond an instrumental alliance and incorporate other groups not 
solely determined by an objective position within an economic mode of production. Bennett and 
Martin et al. (1981, p. 210) note that Gramsci “loosen[s] up” the economistic determinism of 
structure/superstructure relations, however, it is argued here that he still does not abandon the 
hierarchy. 
Thus, determination in the last instance by the economy is evident in Gramsci (1971, p. 161) 
as he insists on “… the decisive nucleus of economic activity” which undermines the posited ideas –
materials parity by inferring they only gain salience in the context of economic production and come  
“ … into existence on the original terrain of an essential function in the world of economic 
production …” (ibid, p. 5 emphasis added). Here, one can infer that social groups/classes are 
determined (a-historically) by their position in the mode of production. The notion that in any concrete 
historical situation identity could be determined by anything other than economic production and 
thus exhibit vertical and horizontal fissures formed primarily, or even partially, at the level of symbols 
and discourse is alien to this conception. Now consider Cox’s position “The objective delineation of 
each mode, [of production] … is matched by an intersubjective content – the common understandings 
shared by the people embraced by the mode in respect to the relationships and purposes in which 
they are involved.” (Cox 1987, p. 17). Both views assert that inter-subjective identity arises 
mechanically from the mode of production. Therefore, when Gramsci discusses the formation of 
historic blocs, he holds that only the “…hegemony of fundamental social groups…” (Gramsci 1971, p. 
182 emphasis added) can form the centre of a hegemonic bloc, namely, the bourgeoisie or proletariat. 
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Laclau and Mouffe (1985, p. 77) note that, in Marxism “The contradiction between 
bourgeoisie and proletariat is, … the social and political expression of a primal economic contradiction, 
one which combines a general law of development of the productive forces with the laws of 
development specific to the capitalist mode of production.” In this conception, all social groups relate 
in one way or another to two fundamental classes and these classes and their ideologies are, in turn, 
determined by their objective position in a closed mode of production. Contra this position, this thesis 
does not assume social forces are mechanically defined by their place in a mode of production and is, 
in this sense, post-Marxist. It keeps Cox’s focus on “social relations” but drops the auto-adjunct “of 
production”. This allows the thesis to keep the benefit of Cox’s model in escaping the atomism, 
anarchy and instrumental rationality of mainstream IR through a focus on social forces as constituent 
entities of world politics, whilst remaining agnostic about the material, ideational, productive and 
discursive elements which give rise to them in any given context. This move liberates Cox’s model of 
historical structures and his Vichean insights about mind from economism, making it more readily 
applicable to international law.  
This leads to some unorthodox uses of familiar theoretical concepts in this thesis, particularly, 
the concept of historic bloc. There are two primary reasons for these unorthodox usages. One is 
necessitated by the post-Marxist approach set out above which decentres economic production in the 
identification of these phenomena. The second is the question of scale associated with an analysis 
which moves dialectically between historical structures of world order and state-society complexes. 
Thus, historic blocs, when applied to international relations by Cox and other neo-Gramscians have 
been largely applied within the field of International Political Economy (IPE) to describe the formation 
of (unsurprisingly) economic historical structures undergirded by global historic blocs for promoting 
hegemonic economic ideology (particularly neo-liberalism). This same approach has been used in 
political economic analyses of Lebanon at the state-society scale. The purpose here, however, is to 
provide a post-Marxist approach which can be inclusive of these concerns, but which can be applied 
to wider concerns in international relations; in this case, the historical structure of International 
Criminal Law (ICL), hierarchies of legal sovereignty, the complexities of political cooperation, conflict 
and violence, and the ideological justification for these at multiple scales. Examples of this 
unorthodoxy can be found in chapters five and six. Here, the analysis purports to identify a link 
between the regional Pax Syriana (the post-Taif accord hegemony over Lebanon by Syria) and a global 
Pax Americana which leant its hegemonic legitimacy to Syria’s rule in Lebanon from 1990 to 2005. The 
analyses posit the nascent emergence of this historic bloc in the 1970’s when Henry Kissinger 
encouraged Syria under Hafez Assad to intervene in Lebanon to prevent a Leftist victory in the civil 
war, though this was not properly cemented until the Taif accords. One might properly question 
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whether this might better be characterised as an alliance or some other arrangement, rather than a 
historic bloc, particularly given the lack of economic centrality.  
There are several responses to this. One is that the distinction Gramsci makes between 
economic-corporate (i.e. instrumental) and ethico-political (i.e. ideological) historic blocs has great 
utility for understanding the emergence and fall of the U.S.-Syria historic bloc. The argument advanced 
is that this relationship was constructed on instrumental considerations which persisted for a long 
time, but which never transitioned to ethico-political. Hence, when the instrumental considerations 
changed, the bloc fell apart. This kind of analysis is not possible with a simple conception of alliance. 
Similarly, the analysis of the decline and collapse of the regional hegemony of Pax Syriana as directly 
related to its ostracization from the global hegemony of Pax Americana (beginning with the 2003 war 
in Iraq) is enriched by a post-Marxist conception of historic bloc. Indeed, according to this analysis, 
U.S. withdrawal of support for Pax Syriana was synonymous with the removal of a large portion of its 
legitimacy (a key ingredient of hegemony), the concomitant split of the largely coherent historic bloc 
of Lebanese politicians, the emboldening of resistance, the relatively rapid need for Bashar al-Assad 
to resort to coercion, and the end of Pax Syriana. This analysis is impoverished if we state simply that 
the alliance between the U.S. and Syria ended.  
Another potential issue relates to scale, where the extension of the concept of historic bloc to 
the study of international relations means that they are not simply constituted by social forces within 
a state but are constituted internationally by social forces and multiple states. However, Cox’s model 
of social forces, states and world orders implies that for him, this is not an issue in the discussion of 
global hegemony. Thus, discussion of Pax Syriana and its relation to Pax Americana implies, 
unproblematically, a heuristic for multiple states and social forces interacting. A final objection to 
applying the concept of historic bloc in this way is that it raises certain apparent contradictions, for 
example, considering two apparently opposing states like Syria and Israel as forming some part of the 
global U.S. historic bloc. This objection can be addressed in two key ways. The first is to state that 
Gramsci gives us the language to describe the differing positions of Syria and Israel in the global U.S. 
bloc. Whilst Syria clearly occupied a peripheral position based on economic-corporate concerns 
(instrumental), Israel occupied a core position based on acceptance of U.S. ethico-political 
(ideological) leadership. Scholars elsewhere have applied Gramscian ideas to describe the formation 
of hegemony in unorthodox contexts, for example, security integration through hegemonic ideology 
between states in the global core (See Charbonneau, Cox 2008). The present analysis deals with the 
other end of the spectrum, where Syria was peripheral, only temporarily brought in, and only by weak 
attractive forces. Secondly, the status quo ante under Pax Syriana was war and resistance in the 10% 
of Lebanese territory occupied by Israel and neo-liberal reconstruction in the remaining area under 
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direct Syrian control. Despite the conflict and (relatively) limited proxy war in the south, this was the 
era of peace talks between Israel and Syria. Thus, the presence of violence and antagonism locally 
does not discount the possibility of two actors occupying positions within the global hegemonic 
historic bloc. None of this, of course, means that these concepts should not be applied in the more 
traditional political economy way. Rather, it is an argument that these concepts may have analytical 
purchase outside of the context of pure political economy. It is in this spirit, which the concept of 
historic bloc is applied in this thesis.  
Laclau and Mouffe argue Marxism holds three theses which lead to economism, which they 
critique. For the bourgeoisie and proletariat to constitute the inevitable and homogenised antagonists 
of history, Marxism must posit reductionism to the level of the economy. The first thesis thus posits 
that the economy consists of endogenous “laws of motion” closed off from causation emanating from 
the social and political spheres (Laclau, Mouffe 1985, p. 75). The second thesis is that the bourgeoisie 
and proletariat attain their (inter)subjectivities by virtue of the development of the “laws of motion” 
at the level of the economy (ibid, p. 75). Finally, the objective position of agents in the mode of 
production endows them with “historical interests” which are economic in nature. They argue that 
this is why Gramsci’s theory of hegemony does not include places of work in the category of civil 
society, despite their relevance as a key location of socialisation and political struggle. In contrast, 
Laclau and Mouffe argue that “… the space of the economy is itself structured as a political space, 
and … in it, as in any other 'level’ of society, those practices we characterized as hegemonic are fully 
operative.” (Laclau, Mouffe 1985, p. 76). However, once the economy is opened to human agency it 
can no longer fill the deterministic role of identity and interest formation posited in Marxism. Laclau 
and Mouffe moved towards a meta-theoretical approach of post-structuralism in order to overcome 
the deterministic shortcomings of Marxism. However, this thesis takes a different meta-theoretical 
approach, that of Critical Realism. 
Critical realists are at pains to stress, contra positivism and economistic Marxism, that the 
social world is an open system and does not constitute a closed system in which variables can be 
isolated and repeatedly tested to look for causation as invariance defined in David Hume’s terms as 
“constant conjunctions of events” which lead to “whenever A then B” propositions derived from 
Newtonian mechanics (Patomaki 2002, p. 21). Positivism assumes that society, like a laboratory, 
constitutes a closed system in which variables are externally related and internally stable/consistent 
(atomistic) and that they can be isolated in the open system of society from myriad intervening 
variables (Lopez, Potter 2001, p. 11). CR meta-theory distinguishes itself from its two main meta-
theoretical rivals, positivism and interpretivism (with post-modernism considered a variant of 
hermeneutic interpretivism) (Lopez, Potter 2001, p. 8). Though clearly different, CR holds that these 
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approaches contain important similarities. Their central debate concerns the appropriateness of 
positivist methods in social science, with interpretivists holding that social systems are typified by 
meaning, making them different from natural systems and necessitating different methods contra 
positivists who propose that their version of naturalist methods is appropriate for all sciences (ibid, p. 
9). Whilst they disagree on this particular point, they actually agree that positivism is the most 
appropriate form of natural science. CR, however, argues that “in the philosophy of science, positivism 
had been rejected as an adequate model of science in the 1950's” (Joseph, Wight 2010, p. 1) because 
“With few exceptions, there are no closed systems in nature or society.” (Patomaki 2002, p. 8). This 
partition of social and natural science was mirrored by a distinction between explanation and 
understanding where the latter was assumed by interpretivists to be appropriate, and the former was 
thought impossible, in social science. Mirroring this position, the positivists held that the only 
knowledge worth having was explanatory and that understanding violated objectivity as value-
neutrality. Given that CR does not recognise this partition, it argues that both explanatory and 
meaningful modes of knowledge creation are not only necessary for social science, but 
interdependent. This is so, because meaningful “reasons are causes” in social science and must 
therefore be understood in order to explain outcomes (Patomaki 2002, p. 87, Kurki 2007, p. 366) but, 
more importantly, CR holds, like positivism, that there is an ontological world external to thought 
which is amenable to (fallible) human knowledge. However, contra positivism, knowledge need not 
emanate from value-neutral, infallible human subjects as positivism claims (Patomaki 2002, p. 72).  
The second way positivism and interpretivism are similar, is their anthropocentric positions 
on knowledge and being. For positivism, this amounts to an epistemological position Roy Bhaskar 
referred to as “actualism,” where what can be empirically observed, quantified and measured was 
taken to be coextensive with what ontologically exists, leading to its insistence on a singular scientific 
quantitative method of social science (Lopez, Potter 2001, p. 10). For interpretivism, and post-
modernism in particular, actualism manifests itself in the reification of discourse or concepts with a 
concomitant abandonment of ontological reality on the basis that subjects cannot apprehend the 
nature of objects outside of discourse. What often results is a reduction of reality to discourse. The 
interpretivist and the positivist position thus share what Roy Bhasker termed the epistemic fallacy, 
which equates to giving an “epistemological category an ontological task.” (Joseph, Wight 2010, p. 
10). In contrast, CR holds a position of deep realism where unobservable deep structures and multiple 
causal forces in open systems generate empirical experiences and observations. It is the scientists’ 
task to conceptualise the operation and nature of these deep structures beyond immediate sense 
experience with reference to empirical data. As Jonathan Joseph and Colin Wight (2010, p. 8) argue, 
“This approach to the philosophy of science [CR] … indicates a reversal of a long-standing philosophical 
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orthodoxy and a turn away from epistemological concerns to those of ontology.” Whilst CR agrees 
with interpretivists that there is no point external to history and society from which to obtain 
universally objective knowledge and that society is a uniquely meaningful realm (Lopez, Potter 2001, 
p.4), the retreat to discourse and concepts often results in relativism. CR agrees, contra positivism, 
and with interpretivism, that knowledge is socially constructed and humanly interested (ibid, p. 7). 
Nevertheless, due to CR’s ontological emphasis, it is still held, with positivism, that one can have 
rational reasons for preferring one theory of social reality over another (Lopez, Potter 2001, p. 7, 
Patomaki 2002, p. 9, Joseph, Wight 2010, p. 13).  
 Thus, the basic position of CR can be summarised as three broad, interdependent 
propositions; ontological realism, epistemological relativism and judgemental rationalism (Patomaki 
2002, p. 8, Joseph, Wight 2010, p.9). Ontological realism holds that there is a world external to thought 
which is intransitive, that is, it exists whether we perceive it or not (Lopez, Potter 2001, p. 12). The 
intransitive realm is held to consist of complex, deep and structured open systems often not directly 
empirically observable and thus often expressed through metaphor or analogy by scientists (Patomaki 
2002, p. 128). The intransitive nature of objects or forces has nothing to do with their natural or 
socially constructed status, but with the more basic assertion of their existence. Moreover, it is 
possible for something which did exist to become absent or change, which is a different assertion to 
it never having existed (ibid, p.8) Thus, intransitive is not synonymous with invariant. It is the 
structured nature of open, intransitive, systems which leads CR to reject the Humean definition of 
causes as reproducible, “actual”, constant conjunctions of events and instead view causes as the 
properties of structures, processes or powers which may be actual or potential, recurring, singular or 
latent (ibid, p. 8). Similarly, whilst the Humean definition of causality conceives of internally consistent 
atomistic objects interacting externally, the CR account holds that relations of causality can be both 
external and/or internal (Patomaki 2002, p, 108, Joseph, Wight 2010, p. 2).  
 Another aspect of ontological realism is emergence, where the intransitive structured world 
emerges in layers one from the other. The most uncontroversial instance of this is the social world’s 
emergence from the natural. The key insight and value of the concept of emergence is that, though 
the social world emerges out of a pre-existing natural world on which it is dependent for its existence 
and which in many ways shapes the societies that emerge, the social world is not reducible to the 
earlier layer out of which it emerged. The simple idea that emergent levels have powers and liabilities 
which are unique to that level militate against reductionism. Thus, a certain nuance is obtained 
through the dialectical understanding of reality in which emergent layers are influenced by more 
fundamental layers, but through their emergent powers, they can in turn feedback to influence the 
shape of the layers out of which they emerge (one need only think of the impact of industrial activity 
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on the environment to illustrate this point). Thus, we can posit that the STL is emergent out of 
economic and political structures and processes, but then we can reject any automatic determinism 
by these levels and study also the emergent powers and properties of law as a system of ideas and 
the agency of individuals in positioned practices. The question therefore becomes, to what extent 
fundamental levels determine behaviour and outlook. This question is an empirical and historical one, 
not one determined by a priori reductive theory. However, the fact that CR draws our attention to 
emergence enables us to perceive the structural influence of layers other than the immediate 
empirical ones. The critique of Marxism by Laclau and Mouffe can thus be reformulated in CR terms; 
Marxism’s insistence on social explanation and subjectivity being reducible to the level of the economy 
depends on the economy being conceived as a closed Humean, Newtonian and indeed Darwinian, 
system with one evolutionary and teleological end point. Once one accepts that the world at all levels 
is an open system characterised by emergence, it is no longer possible to maintain economistic 
determinism dependent on the reification of the economic “level”. 
The account of open, intransitive, systems of deep structures in CR necessitates a developed 
conceptualisation of structure, agency and causal forces and the tendencies which result. The 
conception of structure and agency most influential in CR is the theory of morphogenesis developed 
by Margaret Archer (1995). Archer identifies three aspects of societies which typify them; that they 
are dependent for existence on people, that they are transformable by human agency and that human 
agents are moulded by the social structure they exist within (ibid, p. 1). Morphogenesis is based on 
analytical dualism, which consists of resisting the conflation of agents and structures and instead 
considering their separate qualities before thinking about their interaction. Archer develops the 
argument of Roy Bhaskar, that despite their origin in human agency, social structures logically pre-
exist particular agents in time and that “their pre-existence establishes their autonomy as potential 
objects of scientific investigation and that their causal power establishes their reality.” (2005, p. 27). 
The issue of pre-existence is central to the theory, for although she accepts that agents may elaborate 
or transform social structure, this is done by agents who are born into a pre-existing social-structural 
context (Archer 1995, p. 139). Through this analytical dualism, it is possible to differentiate the 
properties of structures and agents. The former constitute, inter alia, internal and external relations 
and positioned practices, which bestow enabling and constraining forms of causal or constitutive 
power (Kurki 2007, p. 363-366, Joseph, Wight 2010, p. 19-20). The latter meanwhile possess, 
consciousness, reflexivity, intentionality, cognition and emotion (Joseph, Wight 2010, p. 19). It is these 
differing features and the logical pre-existence of structure, which justify the analytical dualism of 
morphogenesis.  
36 
 
These considerations lead to CR being defined as a relational theory of society (Patomaki 2002, 
p. 117, Wight 2007, p. 15) a view it shares with Fairclough’s CDA (Fairclough, Jessop et al. 2010 [2004], 
p. 202) and Critical Theory more generally (Morrow, Brown 1994, p. 209). There are two types of 
relation relevant to this theory, external and internal. External relations can be conceived as regulative 
social rules which regulate relations between agents in positioned practices. Accordingly, these 
external relations are contingent and if violated or altered would not change the identity or nature of 
the agents or positioned practices concerned. Internal relations can be conceived as constitutive social 
rules owing to the fact that they constitute the interdependent identities or nature of the agents or 
positioned practices concerned. Therefore, if they are altered, they would change the nature of the 
identities of the agents or positioned practices concerned. Patomaki helpfully provides the example 
of a courtroom to demonstrate the difference (Patomaki 2002, p. 107-8). Where a regulative rule 
might proscribe council from making emotional pleas to the jury, constitutive rules of the courtroom 
are those which demand that there be a jury and define their roles relationally to other roles (judge, 
council and others). If the first rule is disobeyed, the nature of the positioned practices of the court 
are unaltered. However, if one were to change the rules governing jury behaviour or abandon the use 
of a jury altogether, this would fundamentally alter the nature of the positioned practices of the 
courtroom. 
 Within this open system of structures, agents and practices bound by internal and external 
relations, Patomaki (2002, p. 78) provides a CR definition of causal forces; “Insufficient but Non-
redundant element of a complex that is itself Unnecessary but Sufficient for the production of a 
result”. This definition stands in contrast to the Humean model of “whenever A then B”. As Patomaki 
argues, “In open systems, probabilistic empirical invariances that seem to connect phenomena are 
often causally unrelated.” (ibid, 76). Thus, just because a cause was triggered does not mean it will be 
again, or that the same result could not have been arrived at through other causes. Patomaki, 
advocates the conception of societies as composed of causal complexes  
It can thus be argued that there are five necessary elements of social being in any relational 
causal complex (K) capable of producing events, episodes, and tendencies (and the like), 
namely; historically constructed and socially positioned corporeal actors (AR); meaningful 
historically structured action (AN); regulative and constitutive rules implicated in every action 
and constitution of actors (RU); resources as competencies and facilities (RE); and relational 
and positioned practices (PRA). Together these form the sufficient but unnecessary complex 
for the production of a result. Hence there is never a single cause but always a causal complex 
K= {AR,RU,RE,PRA,AN}. (ibid, p. 78) 
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Referring back to the earlier discussion of state-society complexes and world order and the particular 
examples of Lebanon and the STL, these can be conceived as causal complexes. For example, Lebanon 
is externally and internally related to both international and domestic society through the STL and the 
STL, in turn, is externally and internally related to Lebanon and international society. Though Cox’s 
model confused the issue by conflating spheres of activity with levels, application of the insights of CR 
allow us to consider society in his model as describing all routinised human interaction including what 
we regularly term “the international”. World order is simply the name we give to the structural 
properties and positioned agents and practices from micro to macro scales in networks of social 
interaction. This fully elaborates the reason why conception of atomistic actors and 
compartmentalised levels in traditional IR is inappropriate when considering such phenomena, they 
would be incapable of apprehending the internal and external relations, for example, of national legal 
systems, ICL, the STL institution and state practices. Moreover, while positivism is “event” centred and 
looks for constant conjunctions of events as causality, CR is “thing” centred and looks to describe and 
account for the various types of things, their powers and their potential interactions (Lopez, Potter 
2001, p. 11). This leads it to search for tendencies rather than universal laws. The search for tendencies 
gives more predictive latitude and nuance to multi-causal and emergent phenomena than the search 
for universal laws in an open system which are nearly always thwarted by the open nature of that 
system.  
 The second major component of the CR approach after ontological realism is epistemological 
relativism (Patomaki 2002, p. 8, Joseph, Wight 2010, p. 12). Human knowledge is considered transitive 
and socially constructed. Knowledge’s social determinants are manifold, everything from the language 
in which it is expressed, the scientific antecedents from which one progresses, cultural blind spots, 
normative purposes, funding, competition and jealousy in institutional contexts. Science is also 
historically bound, there is nothing guaranteeing progress, and the transitive knowledge of today can 
quickly become obsolete. Openness to change and challenge in epistemic communities is what 
validates scientific knowledge and constitutes higher reflexivity (Patomaki 2002, p. 1, Eagleton- Pierce 
2009). CR rejects two dichotomies common to positivist approaches. Hume’s “guillotine”, by which 
explanation of the intransitive is separated from normative discussion (Patomaki 2002, p. 25), and Karl 
Poppers’ assumption that explanation and prediction imply each other (Lopez, Potter 2001, p. 6). 
Rather they hold that knowledge is humanly interested and that “we can derive ethico-political 
judgements from truth-judgements.” (Patomaki 2002, p. 10). Further, it is possible to explain and 
describe objects in an open system, but prediction is much less likely and the two are not symmetrical. 
Despite all the limitations of fallible knowledge, CR holds that “knowledge cannot be reduced to its 
sociological determinant of production.” (ibid, p. 9). This is because, despite the fact knowledge is 
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transitive; the objects of knowledge are intransitive. This leads to a position of epistemological caution 
not relativist nihilism. It also leads logically to the Critical part of CR. It is in the space between 
intransitive reality and transitive knowledge that errors both factual and ideological, can be located 
(Lopez, Potter 2001, p. 14). If one did not have some concept of intransitive reality, it would be 
meaningless to speak of ideology, that is, a systematic distortion of communication which prevents 
one from perceiving intransitive reality. Indeed, interpretivists who limit their analyses to 
understanding are limited to describing belief systems and are unable to offer convincing evaluations 
of those beliefs. This was a trend in the study of Middle Eastern IR which was critiqued vociferously, 
and convincingly, by Halliday (2005). He argued  
it would be a mistake to swap an external, imposed set of categories for one based on a simple 
acceptance or ‘understanding’: for the vantage point of the regional actor may contain its own 
illusions, its own distortions of history and of text, its own warped animosities towards other 
peoples in the region. (ibid, p. 32) 
In CR terms, the existence of an intransitive reality outside of fallible and transitive knowledge means 
that one’s positionality does not, in and of itself, determine the correctness of one’s perspective. This 
is not to say there are not issues of access to expression or advantages to be had from certain 
marginalised perspectives. These insights also recommend an approach based on the Critical Theory 
tradition of ideology critique pursued in this thesis, for the detection and critique of ideology on a 
systematic basis, regardless of whether this ideology emanates from a western or regional source. The 
pursuit of purely interpretive analyses centred on epistemology, by contrast, run the risk of 
overlooking “old-fashioned deception and self-delusion.” (ibid, p. 33). CR holds that ethical principles 
are related to the nature of reality. Thus, whilst understanding is essential, one must move beyond 
this, using immanent and explanatory critique. This may mean that the social scientist critiques the 
understandings of lay actors (Patomaki 2002, p. 1). The heartening position of CR regarding 
knowledge, is that social science is possible because social relations are possible. These activities 
depend on meaning “an intransitive dimension of reality exactly as is molecular structure.” which 
human beings navigate daily (Lopez, Potter 2001, p. 13). Thus, “[Realism] does not demand a single 
scientific method. Rather it demands that scientific methods be appropriate to their objects.” (ibid, p. 
13). All this leads to the third aspect of CR, judgemental rationalism where, despite the fallibility of 
knowledge, it is possible to prefer some truth claims to others (Patomaki 2002, p. 9, Joseph, Wight 
2010, p. 12). With regard to the Middle East, this means that  
The ‘non-western’, the ‘subaltern’, the ‘non-hegemonic’ also need to be held to rational, and 
empirical, account. They too can mislead, lie, fabricate and, as the record of the Middle East 
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shows too well, kill, especially those whose discourse is contradictory to theirs. (Halliday 2005, 
p. 33) 
All of this leads to a particular approach to reflexivity and positionality in this thesis. Epistemically, this 
author acknowledges that they are neither Lebanese, nor a proficient Arabic speaker, but an aspiring 
academic from Britain from a white, working-class background. Does this hold implications for this 
author’s access to certain sources and their potential unconscious biases? Undoubtedly. Are there 
things which this author may have missed empirically or incorrectly interpreted? Almost certainly. This 
requires reflection on their own assumptions as they carry out work, this is a process this author 
consistently agonises over. However, the understanding that there is an intransitive reality external 
to all forms of fallible, intransitive human knowledge justifies the scientific endeavour of this thesis. 
Despite this author’s identity, it is possible for them to alight upon things in the intransitive structure 
of world order worth communicating. Higher reflexivity can only be achieved through openness to 
challenge from the scientific community, including Lebanese academics. If a Lebanese academic or 
Arabic speaker is able to add to, critique, or dismantle this work based on their unique skills and 
perspective and reasoned argument, this is to be welcomed for the advancement of social science. 
However, this author’s identity and positionality does not preclude them, a priori, from conducting 
(however fallible) social science research, any more than a Lebanese or Arab academic automatically 
makes correct analyses free from conscious or unconscious biases or factual inaccuracies. Identity too 
often functions as an ad hominum justification for discounting or circumventing certain arguments or 
positions. Considerations of access and language skills are, however, legitimate, and this is why they 
informed the selection of this case study. The STL is by nature a multilingual and multicultural 
internationalised space where meaning is negotiated between various identities and positionalities. 
The object of study in this thesis is not simply the minutia of Lebanese politics, but its dialectical 
operation with world order. The fact that there is no god’s eye perspective through which to observe 
these interactions does not imply that communication of meaning is impossible for the participants, 
or that a monolingual British social scientist cannot say meaningful things about it.  
 
Methodology 2: Research Strategy and Methods 
 
 This thesis’ research strategy can be characterised as hermeneutic structuralism (Morrow, 
Brown 1994, p. 24). It is hermeneutic to the extent that it seeks understanding of meaning but 
structural in the sense of wishing to describe and explain relational social power structures. The 
strategy is dialectical because “… from a critical perspective, both social psychological and macro-
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structural analytic moments are implicitly dependent on theoretical and empirical work focused on 
mediations …” (ibid p.220) with positioned practices as observable mediations of the dialectic of 
structure and agency. Raymond Morrow and David Brown (1994 p. 221) in identifying this research 
strategy, identify its key purposes as intensive explication and comparative generalisation. They state, 
“By the term [intensive] explication we intend the research logic of empirically lifting into view the 
underlying semantic, sociocultural, and structural relations that are constitutive of historically unique 
actors, mediations, and systems, respectively.” (ibid p. 212). This involves the “thick description” 
associated with a case study research design. Moreover, “Comparative generalization is a logic 
complementary to intensive explication. Here, the strategy is one of comparing the patterns disclosed 
through intensive explication across a finite set of historically comparable cases (actors, mediations, 
or systems). This step may be accomplished in order to make limited generalizations …” (ibid p. 212). 
This involves the making of historical comparisons which are appropriate for the investigation of 
historical structures. Thus, certain methodological commitments suggest themselves as part of this 
strategy, namely, qualitative, historical and discursive approaches. A qualitative approach’s primary 
purpose is to provide a thick description. The point of thick description is to investigate phenomena in 
depth, in context, with an emphasis on the complexity and intersections of the phenomena in situ. 
When paired with hermeneutic interpretation this implies that the meanings and understandings of 
actors is part of that context (Punch 2005, p. 144). In this regard, historical research which interrogates 
accounts of past events theoretically and empirically is ideal for providing another dimension of 
context to qualitative studies (Berg, Lune 2014, p. 315). It offers opportunities for both comparative 
generalisations and a way of escaping chrono-centrism (ibid p. 316). This strategy also favours a 
discursive understanding of “language as social practice determined by social structures.” (Fairclough 
2015, p. 51) where “The study of … discourse is concerned with the analysis of meanings in social life.” 
(Morrow, Brown 1994, p. 262). According to Ruth Wodak (2008, p. 3-4), discursive approaches share 
a concern, inter alia, with natural language of actors in situ, large basic units of analysis (Texts and 
Discourses), and “focus on dynamic (socio) cognitive or interactional moves and strategies.” and social 
contexts of “language in use”. This thesis adopts these approaches as part of its research strategy. 
Fundamentally, the central question of such a strategy is “what concepts are required to understand 
the data available and to bring into focus the processes or mechanisms that are really at work?” 
(Ackroyd, Karlsson 2014, p. 21). In this project we have identified the concepts associated with the 
Lebanese state-society complex in chapter two, those associated with the structure and discourse of 
ICL in chapter four, framed historically with  recourse to the 1860 commission in chapter three and 
the critical analytical concepts in the present chapter for application to a theoretically identified 
specific case in chapters five and six. This is all done in order to “synthesise from the available ideas 
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and relevant data an account of what is happening to key social mechanisms and processes” (Ibid, p. 
21). This focus on “key social mechanisms” is what justifies a non-representative study, such as this 
one, as discussed below under sampling.  
 
Research Design: Case Study 
 
The objective of a case study research design is to offer thick description of a phenomena, where 
complexity and context are explicated (Punch 2005, p. 144). However, due to the boundary of real 
cases being fuzzy, a firm and explicit boundary must be established by the researcher to make the 
project manageable (ibid, p. 144). The central case study in this project is the STL, specifically the 
testimony of Walid Jumblatt. The contextual boundary is established by supplementary discussion of 
the 1860 European intervention in Syria. Both of these are discussed apropos of the key concepts and 
phenomena identified throughout this thesis. The case study seeks to develop both comprehension 
of the immediate case and of theory. With recourse to the ontology of historical structures, the 
research supplements the STL case study with historical context of the European intervention of 1860, 
which is considered as a potential constitutive antecedent to the STL and as an example of the wider 
phenomena of ICL and world order politics intersecting and impacting on the Lebanese state-society. 
Thus, taken together, we can make limited comparative generalisations. Stephen Ackroyd and Jan C. 
Karlsson (2014, p. 31) note that, generative mechanisms and causal explanations are often best 
identified through intensive case study investigation, but that 
there will be variations in the way a generative mechanism works itself out in given situations. 
Comparative research helps to clarify both the nature of a mechanism and the range of 
variation in both process and outcome that can occur. 
The key purpose of historical comparison in chapter three is thus to identify the variations and 
continuities in mechanisms identified in the thesis regarding the STL, with one eye on future 
emancipatory potential development and the likelihood of conservative or creative structural 
elaboration. Figure 3 demonstrates how the thesis focuses analysis on the mediations of the STL and 
the European Commission for Syria of 1860. Bold italics indicate the type of analysis carried out in 
each instance. Two-way blue arrows indicate posited relational structures between mediations and 
their respective world orders and regional contexts. Two-way green arrows indicate the dialectical 
reading of historical structure taking place between the nineteenth century mediation, the twenty-
first century mediation, and likely alternative futures given the propensity for structural reproduction 
or transformation. 
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Sampling and Data Collection 
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Figure 3 Theoretical Model of the STL in Historical Structure and Analytic Strategy 
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Critical theory and CR’s mode of investigation and analysis is based on a relational conception of 
structure where “Social structure refers to internal and external relations of a positioned practice” 
(Patomaki 2002, p.117). The purpose of empirical investigation in Critical Theory and CR therefore 
becomes to elaborate concrete relations and interactions between concrete actors in positioned 
practices to identify causal elements which are sufficient, but not necessary, for the production of a 
result. This stands in contradistinction to the compositional definition of structure common to 
statistical categories which search for formal relations of similarity and dissimilarity between 
categories established by the researcher (ibid, p.117). This latter approach, which is often associated 
with the methodology of positivism, requires that for the formal categories represented to be valid 
and reliable, they must be representative of an overall population which they are taken to represent. 
However, this representativeness question is moot for text selection in critical, qualitative research, 
as its aim is not analysis of formal relations between formal categories across large populations of 
quantitative data or even to make a representativeness claim, but rather a claim about causal 
mechanisms which exist in the world and produce tendencies and results.  
One can render the difference thus; that positivist methodology is concerned with samples 
which are representative relative to some overall population. CR, conversely, is concerned that the 
sample or text-selection’s absolute size, quality and relevance mean that the concrete actors and 
social relations which are posited can be adequately analysed to identify generative mechanisms (or 
their absence). Thus, “sampling is guided by theoretical rather than probabilistic considerations.” 
(Berg, Lune 2014, p. 238). As Morrow and Brown (1994, p. 251 emphasis added) note, intensive case 
study research designs analyse “small numbers of cases in terms of a great number of individual 
properties. The primary question becomes that of explicating the operations of causal processes and 
meaning structures in a single or limited number of cases.” In this thesis, four court transcripts were 
selected because of the key witness participating, Walid Jumblatt. This was done on the basis that this 
individual has been central to Lebanese politics for decades and represents a political dynasty which 
stretches back to feudal times, thus interacting with processes and structures of clientelism, 
sectarianism, consociational democracy and memory operationalised in chapter two. Moreover, he is 
a former militia commander who benefits from the Lebanese amnesty law (the only one of this group 
to attend the STL). Thus, theoretically, he sits at the interstice between elite Lebanese political 
practices and world order within the mediation that is the STL and this is why his testimony has been 
selected for intensive explication. This reflects the meta-theoretical view that  
Contrary to the view of many positivists, it is the well-chosen and well-made case study, rather 
than the statistical inference, that is often crucial in the development of scientific knowledge, 
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especially in applied subjects such as biology, medicine and social science. (Ackroyd, Karlsson 
2014, p. 24) 
Thus, operationalised concepts and phenomena from chapters one and two in addition to the 
historical and comparative framing of chapter three and the review of the ICL literature on the STL in 
chapter four, all inform the intensive CDA techniques of chapters five and six and constitute the overall 
qualitative, historical and discursive approach of this thesis. Throughout the thesis, all these elements 
are brought into dialogue. As a result of the CR ontological emphasis on emergent, intransitive reality, 
this thesis identifies and synthesises ideas from a variety of sources and utilises this knowledge to 
select a fairly narrow but deep case study for intensive explication through CDA techniques utilising 
“a great number of individual properties” (Morrow, Brown 1994, p. 251). This case’s narrowness is 
offset by historical comparison for verification of generative mechanisms and variation in historical 
structure. In reflecting on this kind of intensive case study, Ackroyd and Karlsson (2014, p. 25) note 
the case in natural science of malaria where, statistical inference was unable to account for the 
generative mechanism by which it was transmitted. It was Ronald Ross’ intensive case study approach 
which finally explicated the statistical correlation of malaria with water and insect presence.  
[this] research, which is taken to have definitively solved the problem of the cause of malaria, 
was published in the Lancet on the basis of the identification of the malarial infective agent in 
… two mosquitoes. As far as is known, nobody suggested that the research was invalid or that 
the real cause of malaria had not been found on the grounds that the two mosquito cases 
were unrepresentative.   
Similarly, the approach of this thesis is warranted and justified as an investigation into the generative 
mechanisms present in the theoretically informed and intensively analysed case of Walid Jumblatt’s 
testimony at the STL. It is further justified by application of comparative generalisation to trace the 
development and presence of these mechanisms and their function historically.  
 The data identified for collection is, as follows: STL court transcripts compiled by the tribunal 
and available via the STL website’s electronic archive. This secondary data from primary sources is rich 
in detail of the social interactions of key actors and reflects real speech in context which is ideal for 
CDA (Wodak 2008, p. 3-4). This data is richer than any primary data which could have been obtained 
through, for example, interviews since the key actors would be bound by secrecy laws while the case 
is live. Moreover, potential guardedness by participants is somewhat circumvented as their purposes 
(to give evidence on Hariri) are different to the researcher’s purposes (analysis of hegemony, ideology 
and historical structure). A thorough critique of the transcripts by someone on these esoteric subjects 
could not have been in their minds when they were engaged in these activities, but they embody them 
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(sub)consciously through their speech.  As previously mentioned, the four transcripts (470 pages) in 
which Walid Jumblatt addresses the court have been selected for the reasons expounded. This forms 
the central case study data subjected to intensive CDA techniques. Historical comparative 
generalisation will be carried out by discussion of this data in comparative ways with secondary 
sources detailing the politics surrounding the 1860 European Commission for Syria in order to discuss 
the development of world order(s) and the role of international law as a tool of hegemony or 
legitimacy across time. The data collection methods in all cases can be described as unobtrusive in the 
sense that data collection is “independent of the processes that produced it.” (Berg, Lune 2014, p. 
288).   
 
The CDA of Norman Fairclough 
 
The CDA procedures this thesis employs are taken from the 3rd edition of Norman Fairclough’s 
work, Language and Power (2015). Underpinning this approach is a meta-theoretical position of CR 
and a theoretical position of Critical Theory interested in the conceptions and manifestations of 
power, ideology, hegemony and common sense, which this chapter has set out, and is therefore 
compatible theoretically and methodologically. Therefore, what remains is to set out the approach to 
language and the procedures which this method employs.  
In Fairclough’s CDA, language and society share an internal relation whilst remaining 
irreducible to each other (emergent) (ibid, p. 56). As a result of this, the order of discourse is not a 
separate phenomenon from social order, but rather social order viewed through the prism of 
language. A text is considered a product of wider discourse which consists of the social processes of 
production and provides cues for social processes of interpretation of the text (ibid, p. 57). The formal 
properties of a text are considered as traces of the processes of production and as cues to the 
processes of interpretation. However, interpretation is not a transparent process where meaning can 
be read directly from formal properties. Interpretation only arises from the interaction of the cues in 
the text with what Fairclough terms Members Resources (MR); the cognitive and social resources and 
procedures inside actors’ heads which allow them to understand meaning. These include, inter alia, 
frames, scripts and schemata for things, relations and activities respectively (Ibid, p. 168-170). These 
are all culturally and ideologically variable. The types of discourses and practices drawn upon from the 
social, institutional and situational order of discourse position and constitute the subject (ibid, p. 62). 
However, despite this structurally deterministic aspect, agency is possible through the creative use of 
discourse types and practices to create novel subject positions.   
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Fairclough makes a distinction between power in discourse and power behind discourse. 
Power in discourse generally relates to control by powerful participant(s) of the contents of discourse 
(knowledge and beliefs), the types of relations between participants and/or the subject positions they 
can occupy (ibid, p. 75-76). Power in discourse can be expressed overtly through interruption or 
directive speech acts, such as orders or questions, or covertly, such as through requests. Power behind 
discourse is to do with the structural aspects of social order and the access restrictions this places on 
certain groups and individuals (ibid, p. 83). This can manifest through the exclusivity of certain 
institutions on some arbitrary basis or other. Whatever the manifestation, the point is to remain 
sensitive to the question of who has access to certain spaces and discourses.  
Fairclough links the interpretation of discourse to common sense and ideology through the 
idea that ideological common sense refers to the unreflective acceptance of discursive conventions 
(ibid, p.102). As stated earlier, meaning is not transparently extracted from formal features of text but 
is a result of the combination of textual cues with MR. This is what Fairclough refers to as coherence. 
Thus, coherence is something which is achieved rather than simply being an objective property. 
Coherence might be achieved through the interpretive procedure of automatic gap filling where the 
social knowledge is so common sense that spaces in text are unconsciously filled in the process of 
interpretation (ibid, p. 104). At the other end of the spectrum, the implication of the cues in a text 
might not be common sense and may need a conscious process of inferencing to make sense of. This 
might be so if the interpreter does not have the same cultural or ideological MR as the one addressing 
her.  
Fairclough provides a three-stage guide to his version of CDA, which consists of a description 
phase, interpretation phase and an explanation phase. In the description phase, the formal features 
of the text, which constitute the traces of the production process and the cues actors draw upon in 
interpretation, are highlighted. The interpretation phase Fairclough describes is where “the analyst 
must draw upon her own MR (interpretive procedures) in order to explain how participants draw upon 
theirs.” (ibid, p. 176). Self-awareness and intention are what distinguishes the analyst’s use of 
interpretation and that of the participants. The explanation phase comes full circle and uses theory to 
explain what is happening in the text’s formal features and the interpretations of participants (ibid, p. 
176). Fairclough’s three phases are broken down into discrete sets of questions to be asked of the 
texts under analysis. However, he is at pains to stress “- it is a guide and not a blueprint.” (ibid, p.129). 
Here, this author has created a table to demonstrate the conversion of these general questions into 
codes or specific questions to aid in the analysis of court transcripts of Walid Jumblatt at the STL, which 
contribute to the understanding of the case study of the STL and comparatively to historical structures 
of world order. This thesis uses Fairclough’s blueprint extensively during the description phase, but 
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rather less with regards to the interpretation and explanation phases. The reason for this is that the 
theoretical and empirical concepts and frameworks developed in this thesis are better equipped to 
provide interpretation and explanation of Lebanon and world order than Fairclough’s general guide 
of British society. What has been retained from Fairclough’s phases are those aspects useful for 
analysing the text or those which overlap with the concerns of the overall approach set out in this 
chapter. For example, the questions surrounding the determinants and effects of discourse, how they 
are (re)produced or used creatively in the explanation phase is directly related to how we assess the 
development of historical structure a la Cox. Interpretation and explanation phases in the analytical 
chapters five and six largely draw upon the concepts set up in chapters one, two, three and four of 
this thesis to interpret and explain outcomes in the STL transcripts.  
Terminology 
1. Experiential Values – Traces and cues to contents of participant’s MR (Knowledge and beliefs).  
2. Relational Values – Traces and cues to the nature of the social relationships of participants.  
3. Expressive Values – Traces and cues to the speaker’s evaluation of some part of reality. 
4. Sentence Subject (the actor) – S 
5. Sentence Verb – V (action, state or occurrence) 
6. Sentence Object (object on which the actor acts) – O 
7. Sentence Compliment (attribute of the actor) – C  
8. Sentence Adjunct (extra information not necessary for the sentence to be grammatically 
complete) – A  
9. Simple sentence – 1 clause  
10. Complex sentence – 2 clauses and above. 
 
Descriptive Phase General Questions Analytic Questions or Codes for identification in 
the text.  
What are the experiential values of words?  1 a. Oppositional Re-wording (Re-wording with 
an explicitly or implicitly differing ideological 
framework) 
1 b. Over-wording (The use of literal repetition of 
words, synonyms or hyponyms which indicates 
preoccupation of the speaker with that 
phenomena or concept) 
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What are the relational values of words?  2 a. Euphemisms (Non-direct vocabulary used to 
avoid negative assessment by others) 
2 b. Formal Vocabulary (Formal vocabulary which 
is not technical and could be exchanged for plain 
language e.g. luncheon. Taken as an indication of 
relational power)  
2 c. Informal Vocabulary  
2 d. Polite Vocabulary (Taken as an indication of 
relational power)  
2 e. Technical Vocabulary (Formal vocabulary 
which is technical and therefore non-replaceable 
with an informal term e.g. statute) 
What are the expressive values of words?  3 a. Negatively valued Vocabulary (Culturally and 
Ideologically context dependent) 
3 b. Positively valued Vocabulary (Culturally and 
Ideologically context dependent) 
What metaphors are used?  4 a. Metaphors ‘[…] a means of representing one 
aspect of experience with another […]’ (ibid, 
p.136). Can be used ideologically.  
What are the experiential values of Grammatical 
Features?  
5 a. Negation (Negative grammatical form of 
sentence e.g. ‘It is NOT’. Often used to contradict 
opponents in the intertextual context) 
5 b. Passive sentence structure - OVS   
5 c. Event or non-directed action – SV (Subject 
acting without an object of action) 
5 d. Attribution process – SVC (A subject’s 
attributes are explicit) 
5 e. Action process – SVO (A Subject is shown to 
be acting on a given object) 
5 f. Agentless passive process – OV (A process 
occurs with no subject or agency) 
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All of interest with regards to what participants 
and processes are revealed or concealed through 
grammar.  
What are the relational values of Grammatical 
Features?  
6 a. Declarative sentence – SV … (Speaker as 
giver of information, less powerful relation) 
6 b. Grammatical Question - Use of ‘what, why, 
when, where, how’ and through sentences 
beginning with linking verbs V (Speaker as asking 
for information, a powerful relational position) 
6 c. Imperative sentence– VO or VA (Speaker 
making a request for action, a powerful relational 
position) 
6 d. Obligations and Permissions – Modal 
Auxiliary Verbs; May, Might, Must, Should etc. 
(Related to respect and politeness, relationally 
significant) 
6 e. Is the pronoun ‘We’ used? (inclusive or 
exclusive?)  
6 f. Is the pronoun ‘You’ used? (inclusive or 
exclusive?)  
  
What are the expressive values of Grammatical 
Features?  
7 a. Categorical commitment to proposition as 
true or false through negation and linking verbs 
e.g. Is/ Is not. (Indicates certainty on a given 
topic) 
7 b. Assessment of probabilities – Modal 
Auxiliary Verbs e.g. May, Might etc. (Indicates 
uncertainty or nuance) 
How are simple sentences linked together?  8 a. Logical connectors (Divided into adversatives 
e.g. but and causal e.g. therefore indicating what 
the speaker expected or did not expect, what 
their common sense is and how they view the 
world) 
50 
 
8 b. Complex sentence coordination (2 or more 
clauses connected through a coordinate 
conjunction. Indicates both clauses are deemed 
important)  
8 c. Complex sentence subordination (2 or more 
clauses connected by a subordinate conjunction. 
Indicates one clause is backgrounded as an 
afterthought) 
8 d. Intra-textual connections (References to 
previous parts of the text providing coherence) 
8 e. Inter- textual connections (References to 
texts outside the one being analysed which form 
part of the discourse)  
8 f. Text – situational connections (References in 
the text to the situation it is part of e.g. court 
hearing)   
What are the interactional conventions?  9 a. (Re)formulations – Of one participant’s 
language in the words of another  
9 b. Ambiguity or silence (Discursive tactic of less 
powerful participants resisting those with 
relational power) 
9 c. Control of contents or topic of discourse 
(Power in discourse to determine the topic and 
relevance often through asking questions) 
9 d. Enforcement of explicitness (Often used by 
powerful discourse participants) 
9 e. Interruptions (Disruptive use of power in 
discourse) 
9 f. Turn-taking conventions  
I, self-selection?  
II, Non-self-selection.    
 
What larger scale structures does the text have?  10 a. Are there predictable elements in a 
predictable order?  
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Interpretive Phase General Questions Analytic Questions or Codes for identification in 
the text. 
What is the situational context and discourse 
type?  
1 a. What are the markers of power and social 
distance? (Referring to relational formal features of 
the text) 
 
1 b. What is going on in this situation?  
I, What Schemata (activities)  
II, What Scripts (purposes)  
III, What Frames (topics)  
 
1 c. Who is involved (in what subject positions?)  
 
Note: As the analyst, this author is drawing on MR 
gained through the researching and development 
of concepts in chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4 to inform this 
interpretation rather than simply common sense.  
What are the intertextual contexts and 
presuppositions present?  
2 a. Inter-textual context  
I, Negation as rebuttal to inter-textual text 
II, Presupposition cued by ‘the’ definite article and 
subordinate clauses 
 
2 b. Speech Acts 
I, Direct Speech Acts  
II, Indirect Speech Acts  
 
Note: As the analyst, this author draws on MR 
gained through the researching and development 
of concepts in chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4 to inform this 
explanation rather than simply their common 
sense. 
 
Figure  4: Codes for CDA analysis of transcripts 
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Source: Fairclough, N. (2015). Language and Power 3rd edition. 
 
Explanatory Phase  
The explanatory phase is interested in structures as relations of power, in processes as practices of 
struggle and in the dialectical interaction between social order on the one hand and discourse and MR 
on the other (See figure 5). Of central importance is the question of whether social structure is 
reproduced conservatively or creatively and for positive or negative effects. “Reproduction is for 
participants a generally unintended and unconscious side-effect … of production and interpretation … 
The objective of the stage of explanation is to portray a discourse as part of a social process, as a social 
practice … determined by social structures.” (ibid, p. 172). Explanation also draws more explicitly on 
relevant theory, and for the purposes of this thesis, this refers to the concepts elaborated in chapters 
one, two and four particularly. Nevertheless, Fairclough provides three important analytical questions 
for the explanation phase.  
1. Social determinants: what power relations at situational, institutional and societal levels help 
shape the discourse?  
2. Ideologies: What elements of MR drawn upon have ideological character?  
3. Social Effects: How is this discourse positioned in relation to struggles at the situational, 
institutional, and societal levels? Are these struggles overt or covert? Is the discourse 
normative with respect to MR or creative? Does it contribute to sustaining existing power 
relations, or transforming them? 
With regard to the position of the analyst, Fairclough notes that during the phase of interpretation 
the analyst is doing essentially the same thing as the participants and that this is the only access which 
the analyst has to the MR which is inside participants heads (ibid, p. 175). There is only one difference, 
but an important one; that the analyst is reflexively self-aware when undertaking interpretation, 
which the participants often are not. During the phase of explanation, the gap between analyst and 
participant widens when the analyst draws explicitly and systematically on theory to offer 
explanations. 
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Nvivo computer assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) is utilised for analysis in this 
thesis. Nvivo is a tool for data analysis. This software allows codes (See figure 4) to be created and for 
sections of relevant text to be connected to that code so it is identifiable as a particular phenomenon. 
One advantage this offers is that the same section of text can be attached to as many codes as one 
wishes. This author has also made use of the query feature, to allow for the systematic coding of 
particular words across all relevant documents simultaneously. This has two advantages. The first is 
that it saves a large amount of time which would be spent doing this manually. The second is that it 
ensures consistency. It is important to recognise that Nvivo is a tool and not a method. Where Nvivo 
has not been able to assist in the procedure of the CDA method, it has been set aside for more 
traditional techniques. This is the case with grammatical features for which manual techniques were 
required. Chapters five and six now apply this methodology to the transcripts of Walid Jumblatt from 
the 4-7th May 2015 and use this, in dialogue with material from chapters one, two and four, framed 
for historical comparison from chapter three, the threads of which are drawn together in the 
conclusion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Societal 
determinants  
Institutional 
determinants  
  
   
Situational 
determinants  
Societal effects  
Institutional 
effects  
Situational 
effects  
MR MR Discourse 
Figure 5: Model of Explanation  
Source: Fairclough, N. (2015). Language and Power 3rd edition 
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Chapter Two:  The Lebanese State-Society 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter consists of a discussion of four social phenomena which typify the Lebanese state-society 
complex according to the literature; clientelism, sectarianism, consociational democracy and memory. 
Clientelism and sectarianism are often discussed interchangeably with the concept of confessionalism 
in the literature. However, this thesis takes the approach of considering them as separate phenomena 
for conceptual clarity and then thinking about how they interact and exist within a causal complex 
afterwards. These phenomena are discussed under one heading because of the key debate relating to 
the relative responsibility of each for different types of violence. Given the centrality of violence to 
the concerns of this thesis, it makes most sense to discuss these phenomena dialogically. Often, the 
literature also discusses a confessional or sectarian system which appears to consist of these 
phenomena combined within the state structures of consociational democracy. Once again, for the 
sake of conceptual clarity, emphasis is laid on consociational democracy which will allow one to 
consider it in isolation and as part of a wider state-society complex. However, after separate 
consideration of these aspects, their dynamic interaction is considered towards the end of the 
chapter. Finally, the chapter considers the importance of memory in Lebanon. These elements will 
inform the way the thesis considers the interaction of the STL with Lebanon (See chapters five & six).  
 
Clientelism and Sectarianism 
 
Are Knudsen’s (2010, p. 2) article in Mediterranean Politics begins with the stated aim of addressing 
two questions; “how prevalent were political assassinations in post-civil war Lebanon; and what made 
Lebanon vulnerable to this form of political violence?” It aims to analyse political violence in the post 
war period, supplementing studies conducted regarding the civil war period itself. A content analysis 
of primary and secondary data of assassinations and attempted assassinations in Lebanon since 
independence in 1943 is conducted. This was necessary due to the lack of official statistics on the 
subject in Lebanon. This tabulation of assassinations provides the context of discussion of Lebanese 
pre-war clientelistic society and a demonstration of the widespread and historical nature of political 
assassinations in Lebanon. Knudsen defines Lebanon’s clientelistic society though reference to key 
terms. Firstly, reference is made to the Za’im (pl. Zu’ama), the feudal bosses which populate the higher 
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echelons of Lebanese society across sectarian affiliations (ibid, p. 2). He then outlines the enforcement 
and conscription role of the Qabadays. The bottom rung in the typology belongs to the clientele, that 
is, ordinary Lebanese who will seek patronage for a certain service from the powerful Za’im. In return 
the Za’im expects his clients to reciprocate, particularly through voting correctly in elections which 
secure the interests of the Za’im. The Qabaday’s role is thus to enforce the arrangement. With this 
typology in mind, Knudsen makes the argument for a “functional link between clientelism and 
violence.” (Ibid, p. 6). However, this violence is not simply exerted in a vertical fashion by the Zu’ama 
via their Qabadays on to their clientele, but also horizontally against rival Zu’ama. As a specific case 
for examination, Knudsen highlights the case of Akkar Za’im, Mohammad Al Aboud’s assassination in 
1953, citing Michael Gilsenan’s (1996) study of the clientelistic society of rural northern Lebanon.  
A curious anomaly arises between the two accounts. In Gilsenan’s work the typology is 
different; those at the top of the class structure are referred to by the Ottoman Turkish honorific Bey. 
Similarly, the middle ranking class are referred to as Aghas, also a term of Turkish origin.  Finally, “the 
landless of the plains and foothills , the fellahin, are for the most part direct personal subjects of the 
lords power, poor sharecroppers and agricultural labourers” (Ibid, p. 13), thus providing a more 
specifically socio-economic description of those at the bottom of Lebanese feudal society. Michael 
Johnson (2001) offers clarification, firstly by highlighting the different systems present in rural and 
urban contexts and then by suggesting differences pertaining to regional practices. In the first instance 
rural bosses obtain honour and standing through demonstration of complex genealogies and 
narratives pertaining to their family origin going back as far as the seventeeth century (Ibid, p. 25). 
City bosses emanate from notable families of the city who came to prominence in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries but who gradually attained the title of Za’im once they had successfully engaged 
in local and/or national politics. With reference to regional differences, Johnson also draws on 
Gilsenan’s study and makes it clear that the use of Turkish honourifics is a local phenomenon practiced 
in the northern most province of Akkar, even though similar patterns of landlord feudalism existed in 
different areas by another name (Ibid, p. 42).  Thus, the main understanding that can be garnered 
from Johnson of these taxonomies, is that in many rural areas it related to an essentially feudal landed 
system. On the other hand, as Johnson puts it “The urban merchants and financiers might have been 
rich, but they did not hold a monopoly of economic resources in the way landlords did in relation to 
land … just as there was a free economic market, so there was a market in political leadership”  
(Johnson 2001, p. 40). On this understanding, the clientelist system described by Knudsen accounts 
for both a neo-feudal rural sub-type and more proto-liberal urban one. 
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 There is an apparent disagreement when scholars discuss the degree of responsibility for 
political violence which resides with the pre-civil war clientelist system in general and the Zu’ama in 
particular. On the one hand, despite its inherent violence, the clientelist system afforded a social order 
which imparted a kind of stability over a substantial period. This view is present in the work of Michael 
Johnson. Johnson makes his case about clientelism by arguing three points. Firstly, that the Maronite 
and Sunni Zu’ama of Beirut were responsible both for the independence of Lebanon in 1943 and for 
the return to peace and development for a decade after the 1958 short civil war (Ibid, p. 5). Secondly, 
that the 1975 war was generated by exogenous factors, such as the presence of armed Palestinian 
groups, rather than the clientelist system per se (Ibid, p. 6). In conclusion, he states that, conceptually, 
a distinction should be made between Zu’ama feuding on the one hand and wholesale sectarian 
conflict on the other (Ibid, p. 16). This is central to Johnsons theorising of violence in Lebanon. The 
crux of Johnsons argument rests on the practice of mediation. For Johnson this is a defining feature of 
the feud, a social relation in which violence is permitted, but with a sense of proportionality in order 
that it does not threaten the social order and does not transgress certain societal norms, such as the 
harming of women which was seen as Haram (Forbidden) (Ibid, p. 64). Johnson contrasts this limited 
blood feud violence with the violence of sectarian conflict. Indicative of this latter form of conflict is 
ethnic cleansing, massacres and, significantly, crimes of a sexual nature such as rape or genital  
mutilation, in an effort to humiliate and annihilate the sectarian other. Moreover, Johnson makes the 
case that evidence from the civil war suggested that the majority of these crimes were perpetrated by 
forces which were confessionally homogenous, such as the Maronite militias during the Karantina 
massacre or the Druze during the War of the Mountain. In essence, Johnson argues that “It would 
seem that a single community, convinced of its moral superiority and with a strong sense of solidarity, 
was more likely to impose communal punishment on a large scale” (Johnson 2001, p. 62). By contrast, 
perpetrators of these kinds of crimes, he argues, were rarely inter-sectarian alliances such as the LNM. 
The argumentative and evidential trajectory presented by Knudsen on assassination 
contradicts Johnson’s claim that Zu’ama feuding and confessional conflict are materially distinct. 
Knudsen’s differing perspective on the issue of political violence in Lebanon may be a function of his 
paper’s topic, which is specifically to do with the development of assassinations in the twentieth and 
early twenty-first centuries. A cursory glance at Knudsen’s table of assassinations demonstrates a 
disturbing propensity for this kind of violence among the elite. These conflicts can rightly be termed 
feuds and yet the attempts on the lives of high ranking politicians, ex-prime ministers and heads of 
political parties, make Johnson’s assertion that feuding does not by its nature upset the social order 
look suspect. One might ask whether any society with an instituted practice of assassinations and 
honour based vengeance amongst its elites and populous can be stable. Though Knudsen does not 
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implicate all Zu’ama to the same extent, he describes the process by which traditional Zu’ama politics 
became transformed in the modern state by their creation of political parties and ultimately, militias 
(Knudsen 2010, p. 6). In the run-up to the civil war Knudsen argues that, “political violence was 
instituted through the creation of militias … The Zu’ama were the political centre for the creation of 
militias and the rallying point where members of confessional groups sought protection and 
leadership.” (Ibid, p. 7 emphasis added). This statement comes much closer to direct implication of 
Zu’ama in sectarian homogenization, militarisation and ultimately conflict. Whilst there may be truth 
in the argument that this was a result of the stimulus of the PLO operating from Lebanese territory as 
Johnson contends, it still does not absolve the Zu’ama of their responsibilty for this process and 
ultimately the civil war in which this issue formed the pretext under which nationalist leaders of 
different stripes could pursue their visions of a purified Lebanon. In addition to establishing that 
Zu’ama politics was directly implicated in the formation of militias, and that in turn these militias were 
the groups which conducted violence, feudal, sectarian or otherwise, during  the bitter civil war; it also 
contends that the war changed the character of these assassinations as the maelstrom of conflict 
provided ample motivation and opportunity for the skills and technologies of assassination to become 
diffused, especially, under the direction of foreign militaries and intellegence agencies. This embued 
a bitter legacy of car bomb assassinations in contemporary Lebanon (Ibid, p. 18).   
The cases of Kamal Jumblatt and Bashir Gemeyel illustrate the relationship between feuding 
and sectarian violence well. Both of these assassinations occurred during the civil war which allows 
one a view of the nature of the emotions involved among sectarian groups when their Zu’ama are 
assassinated.  Kamal Jumblatt was the leader of the left wing revolutionary pro-palestinian, pan-Arab  
LNM at the outbreak of the civil war, which opposed the Maronite Christian establishment and its 
various militas (Hazran 2010, p. 165). Jumblatt was assassinated in March 1977 (Johnson 2001, p. 62) 
by unidentified gunmen (Knudsen 2010, p. 3). The response from many of Jumblatts sect, the Druze 
(heterodox Sevener Ismaili Muslims), was to massacre Maronite Christians in retaliation. Bashir 
Gemayel by contrast, was the youngest son of Pierre Gemeyel Sr, founder of the influential right wing 
Maronite Chrisitian party and militia the Phalange. Bashir rose to prominence as leader, not only of 
the Phalange militia, but the umbrella military command for Christian right wing forces in Lebanon, 
the LF (Johnson 2001, p. 66). It is important to note that in attaining this postion and consolidating his 
power, Bashir mercilessly destroyed his Maronite Christian rivals, in particular he perpetrated the 
Massacre of Ehden (July 1978), allegedly using forces led by a young Samir Geagea, in which Tony 
Farangieh, son of former president Suleiyman and leader of the Marada Brigade, was killed along with 
his wife, daughter and approximately forty others. In addition, he prosecuted a campaign against 
another former president, Camille Chamoun, again by targeting his son Dany and his milita, the Tigers. 
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This time the son was allowed to live, although that cannot be said for the 150 civilians killed in the 
assaults on Safra and Amsheit (Khalaf 2002, p. 241). Bashir Gemayel was assassinated in a bomb blast 
at the Phalange party headquarters in 1982 just before his assumption of the post of president 
(Johnson 2001, p. 36). He had been targeted before, in one such incident his baby daughter was killed 
in a car bomb. Though responsibility for this event was never fully established, Suleyman Farangieh Sr 
considered this a satisfying instance of revenge (Fisk 2001, p. 76). Similarly, upon hearing of the demise 
of Gemayel himself, Farangieh only regretted that it had not been he who had done the deed (Johnson 
2001, p. 37). Despite this lurid background, the confessional Christian militias, like the Druze, did not 
proceed to consider guilt, but embarked on two massacres in the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra 
and Shatila which featured all the associated hallmarks of sectarian massacre enumerated by Johnson 
such as rape, sexual mutiliation and humiliation (Ibid, p. 9 & 225). In both cases then, assassinations 
which arose from particularly modern, internationalised and deadly feuds led directly to sectarian 
retribution based on pre-existing sectarian frames and scripts (See chapter one).  It is commonly 
suspected, if not universally accepted, among academic sources that both Kamal Jumblatt (Hirst 2010, 
p. 121) and Bashir Gemayel (Johnson 2001, p. 225) were assassinated on behalf of the Syrian regime 
of Hafez al-Assad, possibly by members of the SSNP. These examples at least, indicate that 
assassinations are connected causally, and constituively through common societal norms, to acts of 
sectarian massacre and ethnic cleansing. Moreover, these acts are perpatrated against, in the 
language of Samir Khalaf (2002, p. 1-21), “surrogate victims”, whereby the guilt of the perpatrator is 
at best assumed, at worst irrelavant, and relegated to secondary importance behind the desire for 
cathartic violence.  
The arguments and insights of both Knudsen and Johnson with regard to clientelism, 
sectarianism and violence have aspects to recommend them. With the former, it is demonstrable 
historically that violence was integral to the clientelist system, that feuding and assassination gradually 
became more pronounced, and that the Zu’ama were responsible for the formation of many militas; 
the principle anntagonists and perpatrators of sectarian violence during the civil war. Similarly, 
Johnson’s view that clientelist feuding and sectarian violence should be considered conceptually 
distinct, owing to their differing scale and to the nature of the violence seems convincing. However, 
Johnson’s inference that conceptual distinction or differing origin equates to non-causality within  a 
causal complex (See chapter one) is subjected to severe pressure once one highlights the recurrent 
theme and historical instances of assassinations and massacres located closely in temporal and spatial 
terms.   
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Nizar Hamzeh provides a longer historical typology of clientelism which extends the typologies 
enumerated above. Hamzeh’s (2001) paper Clientelism, Lebanon: roots and trends has two interlinked 
hypotheses. Firstly, he claims that “despite the establishment of modern Lebanon, clientelism has 
evolved and persisted along with other ‘modern’ forms of participation.” (Ibid, p. 167). Secondly, he 
asserts that the clientelist systems’ penetration of state and society restricts the development of 
rational and universalistic policies and reduces citizen partcipation in politics to a superficial affair. He 
analyses the relationship between clientelism and the Lebanese political system, to discuss the 
development of different forms of clientelism over time and finally in order to speculate on how 
clientelism might develop in the future. Conceptually, Hamzeh defines clientelism as a social 
relationship which is dyadic, hierarchical and usually personalistic (Ibid, p. 167). His historical typology 
of clientelism in Lebanon demonstrates that within the core strictures of what constitutes clientelism, 
at least five different forms and modes are identifiable from the eighteenth century up to the present; 
patrimonial, Zu’ama, political party, militia and Islamist (Ibid, p. 170). In this account, patrimonial 
clientelism starts at least as far back as the eighteenth century in mount Lebanon with the Iqta system, 
a hierarchical feudal structure based primarily on the relationship between lords and peasants. 
Landowning lords (muqata’jis) would allow peasants to work the land for them in exchange for 
security and protection. Land was administratively divided into muqata’as (districts) run by notable 
families. Hamzeh argues that the mode of the relationship between the landed peasants and the 
families was based on personal loyalty to a family name. Cooperation rested upon what he calls mutual 
“perceived vulnerability” which involved the “exchange of support for protection.” (Ibid, p. 169). 
Hierarchy in the Iqta system was not restricted to the relationship between peasants and noble 
families, but was also a feature of the relationship between families. The most numerous families at 
the bottom of the structure were the Muqata’ji families who ran the districts. Above them however 
were the Sheikhly families and above them the princely titled Amir’s. Within mount Lebanon the 
feudal structure was presided over by the leading Amir family, which in the late-eighteenth and early-
nineteenth centuries was that of the Shehabs. Hamzeh also higlights how the internal hierarchy 
related to the wider context of Ottoman suzerainity, namely that the responsibility for mount Lebanon 
was divided between the three Ottoman vilayets of Damascus, Sidon and Tripoli. The Amir of the 
mountain had to have his contract with the Sultan ceremonially renewed each year by the Pasha of 
one of these cities. The diadic, patron-client relationship was therefore present outside the mountain 
and went all the way to Constantinople and found its ultimate expression in the supreme authority of 
the Sublime Porte. There are two observations to be made here. Firstly, the clientelistic relationship 
with the Sultan constituted, if not an international relationship in the modern sense, certainly an intra-
regional and inter-cultural instance of clientelism. Secondly, the whole iqta system, from the peasants 
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in Lebanon to the Sultan in Constantinople, constituted a pyramid structure premised on a single 
patron. Clientelism in this phase seems to have only one ultimate patron, and all other patronage 
relationships were subservient to it, fed into it, reinforced it, and were mediated in its name. Hamzeh’s 
observations about the Iqta system also have significance for wider debates in the literature regarding 
sectarianism and nationalism. Simply put, this debate is between a “primordial” school, who see 
sectarianism as pre-modern and hardwired in Lebanon  (Salloukh, Barakat et al. 2015, p. 3), and a 
“post-culturalist” school who, to a greater or lesser extent, see processes of modernisation 
constructing sectarian identity (Ibid, p. 3).  Hamzeh states that the Iqta system relied on the hereditary, 
patrilinial assumption of patronage duties by the feudal family of a muqata’a over a religiously 
heterogenous group of peasant clients whose loyalty was based on family, not sectarian, affiliation. In 
short he argues that, before 1841, the Iqta system was non-sectarian, placing him within the post-
culturalist camp. On this account, clientelism in Lebanon, as a social structure, pre-dates sectarianism.   
Hamzeh’s historical typology goes on to outline Zu’ama clientelism as the form which became 
dominant at the beginning of the twentieth century. His discussion of the hierarchical structure of 
Zu’ama clientlelism mirrors closely the discussion elaborated at the beginning of this chapter, but he 
makes a few choice observations about the rationale and modes of Zu’ama clientelism. Firstly, he 
observes that, in the sense that politics was still a hereditary and family oriented affair, it was akin to 
the preceding patrimonial form. The new families differed from the old in their lack of grand 
genealogies, the fact they owed their influence to the modernising efforts of the Ottoman state and 
French mandate authorities, and the fact that the patronage they provided depended on their 
intermediary role between nascent Lebanese state institutions and their clients. These aspects seem 
peripheral to Hamzeh, and indeed though the particular form may have changed, patrimonial lords 
followed some similar practices. The aspect of change that Hamzeh is at pains to draw out as marking 
a fundamental change, is that, in addition to kinship loyalty, sectarianism became more important as 
an organising principal for the Zu’ama  (Hamzeh 2001, p. 171). This places Hamzeh somewhat closer 
to Knudsen than Johnson on the proximity of Zu’ama and sectarianism. Indeed, Hamzeh mentions 
Johnsons thesis that the Zu’ama at local levels suppressed sectarianism among their clients for their 
own rational self interest in political and economic stability (Ibid, p. 171). However, Hamzeh concurs 
with Knudsen that the civil wars of 1958 and 1975 both featured Zu’ama engaging in sectarian 
violence, and thus, that they bear a large responsibility for it. To reinforce the point about Zu’ama 
collusion with sectarianism, Hamzeh notes their political activities. Firstly, he argues that the Zu’ama 
were obliged to make confessional arguments if they wanted to be elected because, despite some 
exceptions, the majority of electoral districts were confessionally homogenous. Moreover, in order to 
remain effective as patrons, they needed election to ministerial posts in order to provide patronage 
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(Ibid, p. 171). Here we see a glimpse of how clientelism and sectarianism interact within a confessional 
concosiational democracy such as Lebanon. Intra-sectarian feuding and conflict is incentivised 
because ministerial positions, sources of patronage, are handed out by sectarian quota (See Salamey, 
Payne 2008). Meanwhile, because electioneering takes place largely among homogenous voters, 
sectarian rhetoric, or at least arguments formulated in sectarian terms, are encouraged.  
Hamzeh next discusses political party formation, which he argues took very different 
directions depending on their position on the political spectrum. Firstly, he presents the Maronite 
Christian parties of the right as maintaining the core tenets of Zu’ama clientelism, a leader from a 
notable family, the propogation of sectarian arguments and the maintainence of a vertically based 
patronage system. To these familiar aspects he adds the influence of nationalist ideology (Hamzeh 
2001, p. 173). Given that the purported aim of these parties was the defence of the status quo in 
Lebanon (Khalifa 2001, p. 131), this continuity should not be surprising. Even here, we might wish to 
question the veracity of making a clear distinction between sectarianism and nationalism given that 
both are forms of identity politics which might possess an internal relation (See chapter one). This 
makes the difference between party directed and Zu’ama clientelism even more negligable, reducing 
it simply to a matter of size and institutional organisation. With regard to the secular left parties, 
Hamzeh argues that they did in many cases become heterogenous, that their patronage networks 
partially changed toward becoming horizontal not vertical, and that most importantly they “invoked 
ideological programmes independent of any specific act of clientelistic exchange.” (Hamzeh 2001, p. 
173). Though political parties can become a powerful platform for making collective claims on material 
resources, or for creating the basis for new identities, leftist political parties ultimately failed to 
become more inclusive or to generate a new non-clientelistic mode of political engagement.  
With the beginning of the civil war of 1975 Hamzeh states that the Zu’ama and political party 
forms of clientelism were marginalised by the rise of militias who engaged in “repressive clientelism”, 
which more than any other form utilised “unrestrained corruption and extortion” (Ibid, p. 175). The 
actual networks of patronage in his account receded to include only the members of the militias vis-
a-vis their patron, and reduced citizens to the status of victims. Moreover, some militias effectively 
annexed state organs in order to fund themselves (See Hourani 2010), thus undercutting traditional 
forms of patronage. Hamzeh claims that this form more than any other, was beholden to international 
patrons. With regard to the relationship between Zu’ama, party and militia clientelism, he states  
Although some militias were still controlled by sons of traditional Zu’ama-  
Amine Jummayyil’s Phalange, Dani Chamoun’s Tigers militia and Walid Junblat’s Progressive 
Socialist Party militia – others like the Sunni Murabitoun (Sentinels), the Maronite Lebanese 
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Forces, the Shia Amal (Afwaj al-Muqawamah al-Lubnaniyyah), and the Party of God 
(Hizbullah) were led by figures who had arrived recently on the political scene. (Hamzeh 2001, 
p. 174)  
This statement is worth analysing because it typifies some common ontological and epistemological 
problems epitomised by the use of typologies.  
With regard to the former probem, there is an important omission from the key militias active 
at the outset of the civil war of 1975 (excluding the Palestine Liberation Organisation, due to their 
Palestinian, rather than Lebanese, identity), that of the Marada Brigade of Sulayman Farangieh Sr. 
Farangieh was the president of Lebanon at the time of the outbreak of war and came to the presidency 
by using his son Tony and their militia to storm parliament and force a resolution in a dispute over the 
election of 1970 (Fisk 2001, p. 76). Frangieh’s rise to power involved an alleged involvement in the 
massacre of the rival Douaihy family at Meziarah Maronite church near Zghorta in 1957 (Fisk 2001, p. 
67, Mugraby 2008, p. 185). Farangieh was accused of the murders but never convicted due to the 
general amnesty in Lebanon after the 1958 short civil war and his self-imposed exile in Syria (Mugraby 
2008, p. 185). This sort of deadly internecene feuding and hereditary inheretence of family power 
marks the Farangiehs out as the archetypical Zu’ama family and their central political role in the 
formation of the LF running up to the civil war marks them as a major omission in Hamzeh’s account. 
There are two anomolous examples of non-traditional militias mentioned which are somewhat 
misrepresented, the Murabitun and the LF. The former, whilst not led by a “traditional” za’im was led 
by Ibrahim Qulaylat, former Qabaday to rival Sunni zu’ama Sa’ib Salam and Osman Dana and veteran 
of the 1958 civil war (Johnson 2001, p. 56). Thus, whilst the Mourabitun were not led by a “traditonal” 
Zaim, they were led by a man who was intimately familiar with, and was a product of, the clientelist 
system and thus cannot be said to be entirely divorced from clientelism and zu’ama politics. The latter 
example of the LF is an anomolous one because in the early phases of the war  (1975-76) the LF was 
an umbrella organisation for many major Christian militias; Phalange, Tigers, Tanizim and Guardians 
of the Cedars (Maasri 2009, p. 26). However, under the influence of Bashir Gemayel and his 
internecene conflicts with the other Christian militias, it became essentially an extension of the 
Phalange, incorporating the weaker militias. After Bashir’s assassination, his ex-leutenants (or, 
perhaps, Qabadays) Samir Geagea and Elie Houbeika rebelled against the Phalange to assert the 
independence of the LF and then proceeded to squabble with eachother over its leadership. In this 
sense, it can be argued that they were very much a product of the clientelist system.  
Highlighting the potential issues with the empirical particulars of the above quote is not 
intended as pedantry, but rather as instructive. They potentially highlight ontological and 
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epistemological problems of reification (See chapter one). The common assumption of a fixed 
category of Zu’ama, Qabaday or any other categorisation have two interlinked problems, namely, a 
privilaging of structure over agency and an implicit conception of subjectivity as unitary natural and 
preconstituted. Both aspects are clearly present in both Hamzeh and Johnsons’ discussion of Ibrahim 
Qulyat. Hamzeh describes Qulyat as a newcomer, not a Za’im, becasue he did not hail from one of the 
“traditional” Zu’ama families; Johnson does something similar when he consistently describes Qulyat 
as an “ex-Qabaday” rather than a Za’im (Johnson 2001, p. 124). Qulyat did however become the 
patron within his militia, he was in effect a de-facto Za’im. So why then is there a tendency in some 
literature to deny him the recognition of de-jure Za’im? First, to critique Hamzeh’s categorisation of 
Qulyat we need to deconstruct what he means by “traditional”. As described earlier, Hamzeh defines 
Zu’ama clientleism in his typology as those families which came to prominence as neuveau riches in 
the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, somewhat displacing the preceding patrimonial 
form. This is an account shared by many other scholars (See Johnson 2001; Khalifa 2001; Chorev 2013). 
Thus, even by his own standards, these Zu’ama families he refers to as “traditional” were in the last 
century, newcomers themselves. They had imposed themselves on the patrimonial structure by 
utilising new resources and configurations of power available as the Ottoman state modernised and 
integrated with the world economy. However, despite the fact that Qulyat was exercising his agency, 
indestinguishable from a Za’im, in the civil war, scholars were reticent about granting him recognition 
because he did not have a certain pedigree. This problem eminates from scholars being unwilling to 
transgress their own reified typologies and categories in theory, even when Qulyat was busy 
transgressing these distinctions and asserting his agency in actuality. Thus, the accounts of Qulyat and 
others like him tend toward determinism through reification of their scholarly typologies. Zu’ama and 
feudal families were newcomers at some point, but subsequently perpetuate the myth of the 
permenance of their power, status and family name. Whilst it is impossible to avoid using typologies, 
their heuristic nature must be born in mind lest one unwittingly mirror the rationales and normative 
outlooks of zu’ama.  
This is an issue which is pertinent to this thesis which deals with Rafik Hariri who was born in 
Sidon to a modest family and has no Zu’ama geneology (Blanford 2006, p. 13-39). He was the first in 
his family to make significant amounts of money or have an impact on the Lebanese political scene. 
He shunned violence in favour of business and became part of the Lebanese diaspora in Saudi Arabia 
during the civil war where he made his fortune (Ibid, p. 14). Nevertheless, there are many indicators 
of Zu’ama status and behaviour from Hariri’s life (and death). Hariri acted as the client of King Fahd of 
Saudi Arabia in Lebanon, an internationalised dyadic relation of patronage (Baumann 2012, p. 129). In 
the wake of the Israeli invsion of 1982 demolition teams began “cleaning up” which “… involved the 
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destruction of some of the district’s most significant surviving buildings and structures … without 
recourse to official institutions, on what critics argued were false pretenses and in total disregard for 
the then-existing (1977) plan for reconstruction …” (Makdisi 1997, p. 667). This was directly attributed 
to Hariri on behalf of his patron, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia (Baumann 2012, p. 130). At the same time, 
Hariri’s construction company OGER Liban commissioned plans for the redevelopment of Beirut and 
were arguably turning this vision in to a fait accompli by further clandestine demolitions in 1986 and 
1991. In 1991 OGER, managed to appropriate the public CDR and thus the primary state planning body 
came under the direct control of Hariri’s private construction company (Makdisi 1997, p. 670). In 1991, 
law No 117 was passed by decree which, inter alia, stipulated that the establishment of a real estate 
company designed to “reorganise” properties in the war damaged centre of Beirut would be 
establishable, but only with the agreement of the council of ministers chaired by the Prime Minister 
(Mugraby 2008, p. 181). In addition, the council of ministers could appropriate property by decree and 
offer remuneration through a category of judges not attached to the judiciary, leaving property 
owners with no recourse to law (Ibid, p. 181-2). Reinoud Leenders (2012, p. 62-64) provides some 
evidence for the problematic, damaging and potentially corrupt nature of these “appraisal comittees”. 
The first category of issues he identifies are to do with their indeterminate status as public or private 
institutions. He notes that the Lebanese Higher Judicial Council itself ruled on the 21st of February 
1994 that the committees did not form part of the judiciary (ibid, p. 63). This, he argues, makes the 
legality of the decisions issued by judges participating in these committees, and their mere 
participation itself, questionable (ibid, p. 63). In 1992, Hariri became Prime Minister and, as Mugraby 
notes (2008, p. 181- 182) 
Only one company claimed the benefit of this law [law 117]: Solidere … Solidere was launched 
with fanfare under the open patronage of Prime Minister Hariri, its founder and largest 
shareholder. It held itself to be the company and it is clear that a whole public law was 
originally designed to serve it.  
In the event, property owners, leaseholders and tennants had their property appropriated in a direct 
transfer of title and deed from the land registry to Solidere on the word of Hariri’s political ally, Fouad 
Siniora (Ibid, p. 183). Law 117 stipulated that the shares offered to property owners by the appraisal 
committees should be related to the value of the original property (Leenders 2012, p. 62). However, 
some property owners claimed that their property was undervalued (ibid, p. 64). Leenders presents 
several pieces of evidence which suggest these claims are valid. Firstly, the committee judges often 
failed (or were unable due to continued demolitions) to conduct site visits (ibid, p. 64). Moreover, 
Solidere assessments were used in lieu of site visits, a problem given Solidere’s economic interest in 
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acquiring property as cheaply as possible (ibid, p. 64). Lastly, many assessments commenced before 
the final plan for reconstruction was unveiled which may have caused the price of property to rise 
(ibid, p. 64). All of this framed in a context where the committee judges’ wages were eventually shown 
to be paid by Solidere, rather than the state, creating a direct conflict of interest (ibid, p. 64). Another 
notable land grab made by Hariri utilised similar methods to appropriate, without compensation, the 
land on the Al Amine Mosque society which had been using donations to purchase land for a mosque 
in martyrs square since 1950 (Mugraby 2008, p. 184). By the 1990’s, the society was opposing the 
redevelopment project of Solidere and thus 
On 20 August 2002, Presidential Decree No. 8572 was issued under the signatures of President 
Lahoud, Prime Minister Hariri and Minister of the Interior Elias al-Murr, dissolving the 
association. Based on this decree, the ownership of the real estate was administratively 
transferred to the Islamic Awqaf Department that reports to the office of the prime minister, 
a de facto expropriation. (Ibid, p. 184) 
Hariri proceeded to build the Al Amine mosque on this land and his body is now entoumbed next to 
it. Whilst never a militia commander, Hariri apparantly showed no qualms about causing harm to those 
below him for his benefit and that of his clients, or, more generously, in his pursuit of his vision of a 
reconstructed Lebanese entrepot. Whilst Hariri and his supporters presented his projects as the 
antithesis of sectarian clientelism and couched it in neo-liberal terms acceptable to the IMF and World 
Bank, the appropriations and corrupt colonisation of public institutions for molopolisation, personal 
wealth and cronyism is largely similar to the colonisation by the Phalange of state institutions during 
the years of militia dominance (See Hourani 2010). In this way, this behaviour displays similarity to 
that of the repressive militia clientelism identified by Hamzeh, but without guns. In addition, the 
pursuit of electoral success through sectarian patronage, the creation of a political party as a personal 
vehicle, the apparent heredity of the Hariri name through his son Saad, and the veneration he receives 
as a martyr from ordinary Lebanese all point toward designation as a Za’im. This thesis will maintain 
the heuristic that Rafik Hariri constitutes a Za’im within the wider spectrum of what that entails. 
Indeed, Hannes Baumann (2012, p. 134) has argued that, owing to the scale of his personal wealth 
and the national scale of his philanthropic ventures, Hariri should be considered a ‘super Zaim’.  
 The final and potentially most important epistemological problem with typologies is 
highlighted by Ussama Makdisi (2000) in The Culture of Sectarianism; Community, History, and 
Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon. The thesis of his book is that the culture of 
sectarianism in Lebanon, is a product of modernity, not a tribal or primordial phenomenon. Makdisi 
investigates the changes taking place between the late-eighteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries, the 
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violence arising from the period of Egyptian occupation and withdrawal (1831-1840) and particularly 
the conflict of 1860. Key explanations for the elaboration of sectarianism are found by Makdisi in the 
extension of European cultural hegemony into the mountain, spearheaded by missionaries and travel 
writers, in an atmosphere of Ottoman indifference to its underdeveloped periphery and the 
modernizing Ottoman reforms of the Tanzimat, in particular the Gulhane decree (themselves a 
response to European hegemony). Makdisi provides a useful definition of sectarianism as 
“deployment of religious heritage as a primary marker of modern political identity” (Ibid, p. 6). Makdisi 
is quite unoquivical about how religion became a “primary marker”; he states that, from the middle 
of the eighteenth century, European travellers and missionaries developed a typology of people in 
Lebanon based on their religious sect, they produced knowledge in these terms and developed a self 
referential discourse which explained the Lebanese communities in this way (Ibid, p. 23). Makdisi’s 
case is that these supposedly objective, scientific, enlightment discourses had more to do with 
“European fantasies” and oreintalist biases than with reality. This is exemplified, in the idea that 
Lebanon was a mountain refuge perennially under threat from Ottoman Islamic despotism. Moreover, 
similar to Hamzeh, he notes that the primary identity marker before this was family name; whether 
you belonged to the nobles (and clergy) or the fellahin (Ibid, p. 38). Makdisi’s methodology follows 
from the work of Edward Said, particularly his work on Orientalism, and by extension it fits broadly 
with Foucauldian perspectives on knowledge, power and modernity. Thus, Makdisi constitutes a 
critical approach to epistemology which appreciates that typologies can constitute reality and become 
a resource for the expression of power through knowledge. Moreover, it demonstrates that 
meaningful reasons for (inter)action can become causes in themselves.  
 Whilst this “gentle crusade” of missionaries and writers was occurring, Makdisi shows how 
the international and regional environment began to change and how the dialectical relation between 
the two began to fundamentally alter society in Mount Lebanon. Firstly, missionary movements were 
reflective of, and agents for, the increasing European presence in the Ottoman Empire generally and 
the Levant in particular. He mentions the capitulations, unequal trade agreements between the 
Sublime Porte and European powers which allowed the latter to be subject to their own laws in 
Ottoman territory (Ibid, p. 21). He elaborates on the way in which European imperial rivalry, 
particularly that of Britain and France, began to create a new geography of identity in mount Lebanon 
where “… the French increasingly traveled, resided, and felt most comfortable in the Maronite parts 
of Lebanon, whereas the Protestant travelers explored and recommended the hospitality of the 
Druzes with increasing vigor.” (Ibid, p. 24). This naturally followed from European typologies which 
were based on religion, the assumption of inherent differences between communities and blindness 
to any notion of organic hetrogeneity in culture and society in the mountain. Therefore, intervention 
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by European state or non-state actors entered through the vector of religious sect. More concretely, 
Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt set in motion changes which threatened the integrity of the Ottoman 
Empire. In the power vacuum left by the departure of the French, Muhammad Ali Pasha became ruler 
of Egypt and by 1831 he had conquered greater Syria, defeated the Ottoman army and advanced into 
Anatolia. Thus between 1831 and 1840 mount Lebanon found itself under the military occupation of 
Muhammad’s son, Ibrahim Pasha. Makdisi considers this to be the point at which the Iqta system in 
mount Lebanon was irrovocably changed, as these events gave rise to the Ottoman Tanzimat which 
would attempt to modernise the empire which ensured that the European great powers would 
increase their activities within the empire (Makdisi 2000, p. 51). The Egyptian occupation ruptured the 
pyramid hierarchy of the Iqta because the maronite Amir Bashir Shehab and some Maronite Sheikhs 
and commoners collaborated with Ibrahim, even taking up arms against the Druze, whilst many Druze 
Sheikhs resisted in the name of the Sultan, some suffering exile as a result (Ibid, p. 53). In addition, the 
Ottomans were forced to initiate a European alliance to defeat Muhammad Ali, further cementing 
European involvement in its affairs. Thus, the defeat of Ibrahim and his retreat from Syria in 1840, 
created a power vacuum in addition to the contradictory messages of the gulhane decree, which 
promised both a respect for traditional prerogatives and equality for all Ottoman citizens. In this 
context Makdisi (2000, p.62) states  
The fluid political situation of 1840 allowed the indigenous elites to make new political claims 
that invoked mythologized sectarian pasts. Their petitions and letters that spoke of an 
historically Christian or Druze Mount Lebanon revealed an incipient culture of sectarianism in 
its moment of production.  
Makdisi’s concern here is with an elaboration of how sectarian discources began to reconstitute the 
identity of the mountain’s inhabitants in times of politcal upheaval and reform. However, if we 
consider clientelism, as defined by Hamzeh as relationships of a dyadic and asymmetrical nature, we 
see that the key shift is of a social and political universe in which the Sultan is the only ultimate patron,  
to one in which international and then regional powers begin to impose themselves as potential 
sources of patronage. Furthermore, as Makdisi (2000, p.61) illustrates “The point of contact and 
collaboration between the Great Powers and the local elites was communal.” Thus, the logic of 
clientelism, which had always expressed itself regionally whilst maintaining a rigid hierarchy and 
stability, took on a chaotic and sectarian form as more patrons established themselves at the regional 
level. More fundamentally though, assumptions of sectarianism by Europeans eventualy contributed 
to the constitution of that reality in Lebanon, or, at the least, its activation and politicisation from a 
latent state.    
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 These upheavals ushered in a period in the mid-nineteenth century which was to see 
unprecedented escalations in violence,  international intervention and ultimately a nascent form of 
nation-building in Lebanon. The attempt to return to a nominal status quo after the Egyptian 
occupation failed almost immediately, with clashes between Druze Sheikhs attempting to restore their 
privilages and Christian fellahin who would no longer be ruled by Druze Sheikhs. The issue of whether 
the Christian fellahin refused to submit because their overlords were Druze Sheikhs or Druze Sheikhs 
is difficult to determine, however, the Christian fellahin of Kisrawan did evict their Maronite Sheikhs, 
the Khazins (Ibid, p. 97). It is likely that both elements played their part as religious discources of the 
newly empowered, assertive Maronite clergy mixed with enlightenment French revolutionary 
discourses around emancipation, freedom and equality. This represented one of the first instances of 
a recurring phenomena in Lebanese politics and society which Samir Khalaf (2002, p. 98) identifies as 
the tendancy to move from issues of “divisible goods” to “indivisible principles” during conflicts, which 
gives them an intractable quality. Thus, the violence of 1841 around Dayr al-Qamar was serious 
enough that the emirate of Qasim Shehab, was abolished and replaced by a system devised externally 
by the Great Powers and the Ottoman Empire as they vied to pursue their divergent interests; the 
system of the two qa’immaqamiyas (Districts). This first solution, in 1842, split the emirate in two, 
‘Christian’ north and ‘Druze’ south, a solution which totally overlooked the demographic realities of 
the regions (Ziadeh 2006, p. 57). As the restive Christian populations of the southern qa’immaqamiya 
continued to protest at Druze overlordship, and violence continued, the Ottoman official Shakib 
Effendi arrived to update the system by grafting on to each region an administrative council 
representing sectarian minorities. Though the British agent Richard Wood had first suggested a 
confessional power-sharing solution four years previously, this was the first time that one had been 
instituted. One can thus clearly see the DNA of the modern Lebanese state, with its esoteric mix of 
sectarian powersharing, clientelist politics and their “internationalisation”.   
 
Consociationalism 
 
The particular makeup and development of Lebanon’s political system has attracted considerable 
attention from political scientists concerned with the nature of divided, fragile and/or post-conflict 
states, particularly with regards securing democratic practices and managing conflict between 
communites. Of particular note is the large literature on consociationalism. The consociational 
literature was not originally concerned with Lebanon particularly, but considered it a useful case study, 
for comparative political theory and for theory-building (See Lehmbruch 1974). However, scholars 
began to apply this model to understand Lebanon’s particular development and consequently brought 
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more Lebanon specific knowledge to bear upon it (See Dekmejian 1978). Thus, there are now two 
parallel but overlapping trends; the Lebanon as case study for theoretical elaboration in political 
science approach (See Drake, A., & McCulloch, A. 2011) and the consociationalism as an explanatory 
concept for analysis of the Lebanese political system (See Salamey, Payne 2008). Consociationalism 
has now permiated some of the academic work on Lebanon and is often a part of the conceptual tool 
kit required to understand it (See Hamdan 2012, p. 39). Consociationalism refers specifically to power 
sharing arrangements in divided polities. An influential definition by an influential theorist of 
consociationalism, Arend Lijphart (1969, p. 216), identifies it as “government by elite cartel designed 
to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy.” In Lebanon, this 
elite cartel was first forged by the Maronite and Sunni elite in 1943 with reform of the 1926 
constitution and verbal “national pact” (Salamey, Payne 2008, p. 453). The former was drawn up under 
the French league of nations mandate authorities which instituted a political “hegemony” of 
Maronites over other confessional groups and the ultimate executive power and veto of the French 
high commissioner (Ziadeh 2006, p. 94, 114). The independence constitution reallocated the powers 
of the French high commissioner to the President of the Republic. Meanwhile, the verbal “national 
pact” between representatives of the Maronite and Sunni “pragmatist” elite represented by Bechara 
El-Khouri and Riad El-Solh, agreed to divide executive and legislative positions in government between 
the different sectarian groups according to population based on the 1932 census. This census showed 
a Maronite majority of 54% (Salamey, Payne 2008, p. 455). Thus, the Maronites got the Presidency, 
the Sunnis the Prime Ministership and the Shia followed by attaining the speakership of parliament in 
1947 (Ziadeh 2006, p. 118). The legislature, executive and public office positions were distributed on 
a 6:5 ratio in favour of Christians vis-a-vis Muslims. A tacit system developed from this, whereby 
particularly prestigious jobs were claimed by sectarian communities as their sole prerogative, either 
with the consent of other sects or with some claim they were “divinely” inherited (Ibid, p. 118). 
However, as Ziadeh (2006, p. 119) points out, the most powerful office in the land was by far the 
Maronite Presidency, which inherited the right to dismiss the Prime Minister and rule by decree from 
the French high commissioner, leading to a lingering feeling of ‘Ghubn’ (injustice) among other sects. 
The Taif accords, which finally ended the 1975-1990 Civil War, and the concomitant constitution 
essentially retained this system whilst updating the parliamentary ratio to a 50:50 split and 
transferring executive powers from the Maronite president to the council of ministers overseen by 
the Sunni Prime Minister.  
 In addition to this kind of “grand coalition”, Lijphart (1995, p. 276) later argued that an “ideal-
type” consociational democracy should employ mutual veto, proportionality and segmental 
autonomy. Mutual veto on important issues is something which has been introduced ad hoc 
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depending on the relative balance of power after an election and the practical need to create 
functioning governments of “national interest” (See Oxford Research Daily Brief Service 2014). 
However, in one important case, veto power has been refined and institutionalised (though often 
violated). Marie Joelle-Zahar (2012, p. 66) notes that this process began in the 1958 short civil war 
which was triggered largely by President Camille Chamoun’s attempt to join the US-led Baghdad Pact, 
violating the foreign policy neutrality agreed upon in the “National Pact” by Khouri and El-Solh at 
independence. The Taif constitution of 1989 rectified this by requiring that a parliamentary vote on 
foreign treaties and declarations of war was required, wresting this executive power from the 
Maronite Presidency. Veto power has led to the virtual paralysis of state institutions in the recent past 
as most substantive issues have been hostage to polarised positions.  
With regards to proportionality, the picture is less clear. Lebanon’s sectarian division of seats 
in parliament is still based on the 1932 census carried out under the French mandate authorities. The 
key problem with this is that it no longer, if it ever did, represents the demographic reality. It has more 
to do with allaying the fears of Christian marginalisation. As such, the system remains rigid, the key 
example of this is that the approximately 400,000 Palestinians in Lebanon are not politically 
represented or properly socially integrated, a problem potentially ready to be emulated by a new 
generation of Syrian refugees. However, the fact that a census is used at all allows authorities and 
supporters to claim that the system is proportional. Imad Salamey and Rhys Payne (2008, p. 470) argue 
that the system is not truly proportional and that it constitutes “quotated confessionalism”. In their 
view, only once seats and government positions are apportioned by vote share, will the system truly 
attain the status of consociationalism. One might add that only once the Palestinian community are 
given the vote will it by entirely democratic and inclusive.  
Finally, segmental autonomy is probably the most rigidly implemented aspect of the 
consociational ideal type in Lebanon whilst also being one of the most injurious to personal liberties. 
The main issue is that sectarian segments may be autonomous, but individuals and groups are not 
able to exercise full autonomy in creating new, non-sectarian “segments”. As Paul W. T. Kingston 
(2013, p. 88) notes in his study of Lebanese civil society, the greatest expression of this segmental 
autonomy is the power of the sectarian religious institutions in matters of personal status law; 
marriage, divorce, inheritance and child custody. Kingston elaborates how the French mandate 
authorities, in their desire to secure alliance with the patriarchal, clientelist and sectarian elites of the 
country, struck a deal in which the central state would not intervene in matters of personal status. 
This ensured that sub-state religious institutions retained tight legal control of their communities, 
especially of women and children. Kingston (2013, p. 88) notes, “Particularly consequential ... in 
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Lebanon has been the use of this institutionalized power to police the movement across communal 
boundaries, especially with respect to cross-communal marriage [the restriction of which] freeze 
Lebanon’s sectarian divisions in place.” Maintenance of the personal status regime not only reflects, 
but constructs, Lebanese society as segmented and under control of sectarian/religious elites. Lijphart 
(1995, p. 275) argues that, regarding segmental autonomy, self-determination rather than pre-
determination is preferable. Though he is primarily talking about self-determination of ethno-
sectarian segments through proportional representation, he also specifically states that secular 
individuals and parties should be extended the same rights (Ibid, p. 285). This would make sectarian 
identity optional rather than obligatory and loosen the grip of religious authorities. 
 Opening space for secular identity is highly difficult in Lebanon given “the absence of a civil 
personal status law regulating the family affairs of Lebanese electing to marry outside sectarian 
affiliations and courts.” (Salloukh, Barakat et al. 2015, p. 33). Bassel F. Salloukh et al. (2015, p. 32-33) 
note, similar to Kingston, that the institutionalisation of this sectarian personal status regime, along 
with the consociational system in general, trace their lineage to European interventions in the mid-
nineteenth century, through French colonial rule, to the present. Nevertheless, they note that 
Lebanon has seen some changes in the recent past, first with an initiative begun by Talal El-Husseini 
in 2007 allowing one to expunge sect from ones’ state records by exploiting an already existing decree 
allowing one to move sect (Ibid, p. 36). This encouraged many Lebanese to leave their sect without 
signing up to another, creating a de facto civil identity in the liminal space. It is worth recalling that in 
1975 at the outset of the Lebanese civil war, identity papers were used by militias of both sides to 
identify civilians for murder (Fisk 2001, p. 79). Thus, an administrative act becomes somewhat radical 
in the fight for emancipation from violence. Some Lebanese used this liminality as a basis to create de 
facto civil marriages from 2012, in effect, inviting legislators to catch up.   
Prominent members of the sectarian/political elite, including Saad al-Hariri, Jumblatt, and 
Aoun, and also President Suleiman, favored adopting a civil marriage law. The Prime Minister 
Najib Miqati avoided the debate altogether, arguing that it is inappropriate to consider this 
sensitive issue with the country passing through a difficult political crisis. Most intriguing was 
the reaction of the country’s religious elite, however. The Council of Maronite Bishops argued 
that religious and civil marriages may coexist, while the Higher Islamic Shi‘a Council and 
Hizbullah denounced civil marriage in no uncertain terms, as did the Sunni Mufti Mohammad 
Rashid Qabbani. He declared every Muslim who enters into a civil marriage to be a sinner, 
who was bound to be denied proper Muslim burial rites. (Ibid, p. 37) 
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It is interesting to note this phenomenon, given the supposedly all-encompassing narrative of Sunni-
Shia antipathy driving the Middle East in the twenty-first century. It points to the existence of an 
entrenched personal status regime within this particularly sectarian, clientelist, consociational system 
in Lebanon. At present Lebanese personal freedom and politics are still over-determined by religious 
institutions and sectarian elites. Thus, consociationalism has become entrenched in the academic 
discourse on Lebanon owing to its ability to describe empirically many of the power-sharing and other 
institutions of the country. However, it should be noted that with consociationalist scholars, 
consociationalism is not always simply an empirical description, but a normative “call for 
consociationalism”(Salamey, Payne 2008, p. 451). This may not at all be desirable and a nuanced 
empirical understanding, with a normative view to emancipation from structures of domination and 
violence, is privileged in this thesis. Consociationalism in Lebanon was instituted through colonial 
interventions based on conceptions of primordial stable identities and which have constructed the 
reality of sectarianism. Consociational scholarship which emphasises a conservative reliance on the 
“elite cartel” are likely to be damaging in the Lebanese context given this elites proclivity for clientelist 
practices and sectarian politics. 
Bassel F. Salloukh, Rabie Barakat, Jinan S. Al-Habbal, Lara. W Khattab, and Shoghig Mikaelian’s 
(2015) study The Politics of Sectarianism in Post-War Lebanon conceive of consociational politics as 
simply the political layer of a deep “sectarian system” through which sectarian elites maintain control 
of “sectarian fiefdoms” within the Lebanese state-society where sect functions as an extended 
“clientelist network”. Rather than place their faith in the sectarian elite, they note that the 
consociational, sectarian system maintains an unjust “political economy” through an “ideological 
hegemony”, which makes “… it difficult for most people to even think of viable alternatives to the 
political economy and ideological hegemony of the sectarian system.” (Ibid, p. 3). This analysis also 
brings in to view the ways in which, despite differing origins, sectarianism and clientelism have 
converged to produce a consociational and sectarian system in Lebanon. This is how, from the 
perspective of Lebanese civil society, issues such as civil marriage take on an emancipatory impetus 
and are “… but one battle in a long struggle to undermine the institutional edifice assembled to 
reproduce sectarian subjects.” (Ibid, p. 37).  
  From the perspective of world order, Marie Joelle-Zahar (2012, p. 64) notes the propensity for 
“patron seeking behaviour” in the relations between Lebanese consociational factions and foreign 
powers. Her explainations eminate from a conception of the Lebanese state-society as weak and soft. 
The state is weak in the sense that it aquiesces to clientelist and sectarian parties and leaders. 
Moreover, society is conceived as soft due to its receptiveness to transnational ideologies. This 
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prompts Joelle-Zahar to posit that the reasons for this weakness and softness come from what she 
calls “credible commitment problems”, “framing”, and the negative repercussions of foreign 
intervention on domestic institutional rules. The first set of problems means that the state connot or 
will not deter sub-state actors from using force against the state or against other sub-state actors. 
Neither can it assure communities that they will not be marginilised in the political system or that they 
will be physically protected from sub-state groups, the state itself, or foreign powers (Ibid, p. 67-70). 
This leads to the second tendency, whereby factions attempt to attract foreign patrons to their causes 
in order to balance against other domestic factions with which they have a security dilemma. This is 
done, Joelle-Zahar argues,  through ‘framing’ their domestic rivals as the common enemies of their 
faction and of the potential patron-state, intimating an overlap of interests (Ibid, p. 71). Finally, she 
contends that, if and when, intervention is solicited from an external patron, this intervention has 
further undermining and destabilising effects, particularly on the constititutional consociational 
safguards which are meant to ensure the Lebanese state can assure its various factions. This has the 
effect of initiating further rounds of patron seeking behaviour from the other factions. In regards to 
intervention, Jolle-Zahar looks at both Syrian and Western variants. When Syria became the guarantor 
of Lebanese stability after the signing of the Taif agreement, it was primariliy Maronite factions which 
opposed its role, represented by general Michel Aoun who launched, and lost, a military campaign 
against Syrian forces in 1990 and subsequently went into exile in France. Due to Maronite hostility to 
its role, Syria proceeded to impose selective justice in order to emasculate the LF by imprisoning Samir 
Geagea, whilst a blanket amnesty was instituted for the other wartime Zu’ama (Blanche 2012, p. 157). 
Syria then made plans for elections in 1992 which the Maronite factions boycotted, stating that 
elections would be invalid under the Taif constitution if their community was not represented (Zahar 
2012, p. 71). In 2000, electoral district boundries were redrawn in order to minimise the effectiveness 
of the Maronite vote.   
Joelle-Zahar argues that the U.S. and France demonstated they were no less willing to 
undermine the basis of consociational assurance and cooperation for their own strategic ends (Ibid, 
p. 79). The main mechanism for the increased western activism in the early 2000’s was the UNSC in 
which the U.S. and France drafted resolution 1559 calling for all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias 
to disarm, thus increasing the insecurity of Hizballah and the Shiite community. In addition Joelle-
Zahar notes that the West supported the outcome of the 2005 election despite reports of “vote 
buying” on behalf of March 14th candidates (Ibid, p. 75). Thus, the March 14th government of Fuad 
Siniora felt empowered to refuse March 8th a minority veto which would have helped assure them 
that they would not be marginalised. This became salient when Shia ministers resigned from the 
cabinet in November 2006 over alleged complicity of March 14th with Israel in the 2006 war and March 
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8th objections to the STL. The remaining unrepresentative government was the one which approved 
the statute of the STL, violating Taif constitution principles of confessional representation and 
consensus on issues of national interest and foreign policy (Ibid, p. 77). A minority vote and a 
concomitant national unity government was only acheived after the stalemate erupted into open 
violence in May 2008. This government was in turn brought down in January 2011 as a direct result of 
the STL’s issuing of indictments to Hizballah members. Joelle-Zahar provides an elegant realist-
constructivist account of the dynamics which reproduce and perpetuate inter-factional security-
dilemmas and foreign intervention. However, the binary representation of states along a weak-strong 
axis has the problematic tendency to promote fixes which increase the strength of the state in a region 
prone to authoritarianism. Hanna Ziadeh (2006, p. 167) argues the contradiction of the weak Lebanese 
state is to provide some measure of pluralism, civil society and press freedom, despite its flaws. Whilst 
increased strength through promotion of the productive economy and underdeveloped regions, and 
provision of civil rights and duties might be desirable, they are prone to corruption, unless 
constitutional checks and balances exist, are respected and enforced. Strength in this sense must be 
contrasted with a crude strength of the military and intelligence institutions.  
The assumption of a weak state or state failure in Lebanon, in both academic and official 
discourse, has been challenged recently by scholars with an interest in the Lebanese state, its relation 
to society and its production of sovereignties and forms of governance where traditional accounts 
contend there should be none. The empirical work has addressed a broad range of institutions, 
regimes and state-society relations, from financial and security arrangements to Palestinian refugee 
camps (See Hourani 2010, Kosmatopoulos 2011, Fregonese 2012, Stel 2014, Muawad, Baumann 
2017). Jamil Mouawad and Hannes Baumann (2017) contend that, theoretically speaking, the weak 
state assumption relies on the Westphalian determination of relative weakness vis-à-vis other states, 
and the Weberian understanding of the state’s power vis-à-vis sub-state societal actors. They note 
that this often leads to the consideration of the Lebanese state as “… irrelevant, or absent” (ibid, p. 
66). Sara Fregonese (2012, p.656) notes the dire consequences of the Weberian ideal model which 
posits a state’s sovereignty as largely identified by its possession of “a monopoly on the legitimate use 
of violence within its territory” (Biersteker and Weber 1996, p. 14 quoted in Fregonese 2012). These 
dire consequences not only arise from a theoretical description of the state, which is by no means 
universal, but more importantly from the normative argument that this should reflect state-society 
relations, and if it does not, militarised violence and foreign intervention are justified in imposing this 
reality (ibid, p. 656).  An example of this kind of argument can be found in the work of Nikolas Gvosdev 
(2011) of the U.S. Naval War College. Fregonese (2012, p. 656) notes that these approaches tend to 
consider sovereignty in a zero-sum way “as either managed by the state or totally absent … [justifying] 
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the need for military intervention to ‘strengthen’ sovereignty.” Contra this position, Fregonese 
proposes a theory of the Lebanese state using the concept of hybridity, where sovereign functions are 
achieved through complex state-society relations, institutions and regimes which do not conform to 
rigid state-society distinctions (ibid, 657).  
This approach better describes empirically what sovereignty looks like in the Lebanese 
context, as well as serving the normative purpose of undermining supposed remedies which rely on 
military intervention. The concept of hybridity relates to this thesis in several ways. Firstly, in 
Fregonese’s work, and that which follows it, it is largely a concept necessitated by mainstream IR 
approaches which impose rigid distinctions between state and society, sovereignty and anarchy, 
legitimacy and illegitimacy. The approach in this thesis is one of following the injunction to study state-
society complexes empirically as idiosyncratic, rather than by applying an ideal type. Thus, these 
approaches arrive at a similar place for similar purposes, namely, to unsettle inaccurate and damaging 
mainstream categories. Secondly, it is important to note that the language of hybridity arises, not only 
in these political accounts, but also in the legal literature on Lebanon and the STL. Considering the 
distinctions, similarities and potential internal relations of these forms of hybridity is a contribution 
which this thesis can make to the discussion. As Fregonese points out, mainstream academic and 
diplomatic approaches consider conditions of political/military hybridity in state-society relations as 
evidence of a lack of sovereignty. However, in the discourse of International Criminal Law (ICL) on the 
STL, the creation of hybrid legal institutions like the STL (hybrid because they contain some mixture of 
national and international law and/or personnel) are touted as the means through which incomplete 
Lebanese legal sovereignty can be fulfilled (See chapter four). Thus, despite appearance to the 
contrary, agents of world order do not oppose all forms of hybridity, legal forms of hybridity 
emanating from world order and international society are to be welcomed as the disinterested 
solution to the supposed lack of legal sovereignty in Lebanon (despite the apparent contradiction 
which arises when local laws are displaced by internationally formulated ones contra the text of the 
STL statute, see chapter four). Hybridity arising from some constellation of domestic state-society 
improvisation are to be decried as the antithesis of sovereignty. However, the purported answer to 
these problems, in both cases, involves intervention. In the first case, military intervention is touted 
as the answer to undesirable state-society hybridity to restore sovereignty, in the latter, the 
imposition of hybrid tribunals is allegedly a mode of sovereign completion. Fregonese (2012, p. 659) 
argues “we should see Lebanon as a constellation of hybrid sovereignties”; it is in this spirit that this 
thesis adds a type of hybridity to the discussion by transgressing the law/politics distinction, drawing 
attention to the dynamics of conflict between world order, state and social forces, highlighting the 
historical antecedents of legal intervention, hybridity and colonialism in Lebanon, and the common 
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denominator of seemingly contradictory approaches to sovereignty and hybridity, namely, power. 
This thesis thus seeks to make a modest contribution to the emerging literature on the Lebanese state.  
Hanna Ziadeh’s (2006) study Sectarianism and Intercommunal Nation-Building in Lebanon 
traces the constitutional development of Lebanon via “sectarian ruptures, communal compromise and 
constitutional continuity.” (Ibid, p. 11). As his particular interest is modern nation-building in the 
Middle East, he selects the violence of 1841 and the concomitant creation of the qa’immaqamiyas 
1842 and the nizam of Shakib Effendi 1845 as the starting point of his study. This is becuase they 
provide the first texts which constitute a basis for the legalistic demarcation of space, creation of 
powersharing institutions, and formalisation of limited local decision making and partial international 
recognition (Ibid, p. 55). Ziadeh applies this methodology to four more ruptures and texts, to trace the 
development of the Lebanese state; the civil war of 1860 and the establishment of the Mutasarriffiyya, 
World War One and the creation of Grand Liban in 1920, World War Two and the Republic of the 
National Pact, the Civil War of 1975-90 and the Taif constitution of 1990. This highlights the mutually 
constitutive processes of violence, external intervention and rounds of nation-building. However, 
Ziadeh’s central concern is the highlighting of a central contradiction which appears in all of these 
documents; the simultaneous acceptance that sectarianism is normatively undesirable, whilst writing 
it into the constitution and leaving it open for resolution at a later date. This contradiction, in Ziadeh’s 
view, leads to instability, insecurity and violence. The two logical solutions which present themselves 
are either to secularise the constitution forthwith or alternativley, to accept sectarian representation 
as a permanent and inalienable feature of the Lebanese state-society and give it a permenant place in 
the constitution. Ziadeh’s argument on practical and ethical grounds opts for the latter, arguing that 
the Lebanese penchant for communal powersharing has developed to become more truthful about 
its purpose; to balance the interests of the sub-state communities with that of the central state vis-a-
vis other communities. This moves him to argue that  
With the ‘second independence’ from Syria, Lebanon can more than ever stake a claim for its 
right to be itself; always diminutive, openly communal, often contested – and yet less, 
compared with many of its Arab neighbours, constructed and dependent on the efficiency of 
a state oppression machine in the hands of a well organised minority. (Ibid, p. 168) 
This is an important counter argument, especially for those coming from a western, ostensibly secular 
modernist perspective in which the knee-jerk reaction is to consider sectarian power-sharing and 
identity anathema. Indeed, Johnson makes a similar argument about the clientlist system, namely 
that, though it was violent, it performed a function which westerners should not condescend toward. 
These are important insights which should be considered carefully and balanced against the benefits 
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of the secularisation of politics in concrete situations and always with a view to strategic attainment 
of emancipation from violence and oppression. 
 
Memory  
 
 The last phenomenon salient for both the exposition of this thesis and the Lebanese state-
society complex is that of memory, particulalry of war and violence. Literature dealing with Lebanon’s 
collective memory spans many disciplines and approaches; Literary Theory (Cooke 1987), Sociology 
(Khalaf 1994), Political Science (Barak 2007, Larkin 2012) Anthropology (Haugbolle 2010, Volk 2010, 
Knudsen 2016) and Social Psychology (Licata, Klein et al. 2012). In history too, memory plays a role. 
Makdisi (2000) elaborates how under Ottoman rule the Lebanese political class were subject to a dual 
regime of retribution and forgiveness in times of rebellion. The latter amounted to an amnesty and 
official forgetfullness in which transgressions were obliterated in return for renewed fealty to the 
Porte. As the changes associated with modernity set in and the nature of political violence changed 
from an elite affair of limited feuding to sectarian mobilisation, Makdisi argues that Ottoman 
peacemaking retained this particular element. Thus, in his reglement of 1845, Sakib Efendi instituted 
this formulation with the Lebanese elites through the principal of mada ma mada (let bygones be 
bygones) (Ibid, p. 86). It is interesting to consider the amnesties which the Lebanese politician-Zu’ama 
granted to themselves after the short civil war of 1958 and the long civil war of 1975-90 as part of an 
extended trajectory (See Mugraby 2008). In these cases too, an official formula was used, that of la 
ghalib la maghlub (no victor, no vanquished) (Haugbolle 2010, p. 70). It is the latter conflict, and the 
more contemporary concerns associated with it, which have generated the largest body of literature 
in recent years, intersecting as they do with wider academic and policy concerns around justice, peace 
and reconciliation. 
 The prevailing political reality of Syrian hegemony after the Taif accords consisted of warlord 
amnesty, integration and a reconstruction project led by Rafik Hariri which physically obliterated 85% 
of the buildings in downtown Beirut creating a literal and metaphorical tabula rasa (Volk 2010, p. 108) 
leading to accusations that the political establishment was persuing a policy of official amnesia, rather 
than one of truth telling and reconciliation. One manifestation of this was official discourses of la 
ghalib la maghlub. Another was the (mis)appropriation of the “war of others” discourse which implied 
the civil war was, in fact, no more than a set of proxy wars fought on Lebanese territory which the 
Lebanese themselves took little part in and were merely victims of (Barak 2007, p. 53). The Lebanese 
sociologist Samir Khalaf (1994) argued that Lebanese society was largely complicit in amnesia as it 
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understandably wished to forget the war. It is the theme of amnesia, official or otherwise, which has 
become a central concern for most scholars interested in collective memory in Lebanon. It has, 
however, come under sustained critique. Oren Barak (2007, p. 50) critiques the notion on the basis 
that distinct civil society actors subverted official amnesia both during and after the war. Moreover, 
he asserts that the concept of collective memory itself might be problematic given the distinct 
experiences, identities and interests of different sub-state groups. This leads him to differentiate 
between state, political society and civil society when wishing to analyse differing modes for 
remembrance of the war. Sune Haugbolle (2010, p.8) in his study War and Memory in Lebanon uses 
the concept of “memory cultures” in place of “collective memory” in order to indicate the 
heterogeneity of memory. The memory cultures he identifies begin with a diffuse group he terms 
“memory maker”, which coalesced before the civil war ended through cultural productions in various 
media. These memory makers were of the “creative class” and potentially constituted marginalised 
but, in some respects, privilaged sets of voices (Ibid, p. 9). These memory makers critiqued the 
amnesiac Lebanese state-society after 1990. In varying ways, they promoted a discourse empowering 
the voices of victims and challenged heroic discourses of sectarianism and violence.  
Simultaneously, Haugbolle (2010, p. 10) identifies a political society which continued to 
produce “hagiographic” accounts of the war and of their political identity and community. This type 
was bound up with the deep-seated cultural motif of the martyred leader, which still symbolically 
demarcate the different quarters of Beirut, post-war. Haugebolle demonstrates that, between and 
within these categories, there was complexity of difference and contradiction. For example, some 
“memory makers” focused on the  officially acceptable figure of the Lebanese civilian victim, but some 
produced more daring works focusing on militia fighters. Similarly, the various sectarian memory 
cultures obviously differ in the specific martyrs and symbols they eulogise, but remain similar to the 
extent that they use these symbols at all. The issue of memory overlaps with central issues for the 
Lebanese state-society, particularly nationalism and therapy. Haugbolle argues nationalism is clearly 
linked to memory (and selective forgetfullness) in any society and is part of forging collective national 
narratives and identity. Even with difference, there has to be enough of an inter-subjective overlap of 
memory in order to maintain national cohesion. With regard to therapy, Haugbolle notes a propensity 
among his Lebanese intelocurors, shortly after the war ended, to speak of a “hiatus of history”, where 
war in times of peace seemed unreal or where peace in times of conflict feels similarly abstract and 
distant. These symptoms mirror what Samir Khalaf (2002, p. 232-233) terms the  
scars and scares of war (which) have left a heavy psychic toll which displays itself in pervasive 
post-stress symptoms and nagging feelings of dispair and hopelessness. In a culture generally 
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averse to psychoanalytic councelling and therapy, these and other psychic disorders and fears 
are more debilitating. 
Haugbolle attempts to theorise some of the traits he observed with reference to affect, symbol and 
trauma. Simply put, this relates to how experiences are integrated into the narratives of individuals 
and communities. As Haugbolle notes, trauma occurs when events are of a magnitude or nature that 
they cannot be positively integrated into this narrative. As he argues, this impells many into amnesia 
or to seek nostalgic half-memories; either of pre-war Lebanon, anti-war activities during conflict, or in 
the cloistered sectarian hagiographic and heroic narratives of the war (Ibid, p 73). The retreat into 
sectarian enclaves is clearly detrimental to the possibility of a future Lebanon free of conflict and 
Haugbolle makes some interesting observations about this particular strain of cultural production. 
Firstly, he notes that it is allowed to perpetuate through a sense of embarrassment, and concomitant 
amnesia, in wider Lebanese society about the uncivil violence which afflicted Lebanon for so long. 
Thus, he states that  
Talking about the war may have been shameful for everyone in a public context, but inside 
the smug intimacy of their sectarian memory culture, people allowed themselves to entertain 
any measure of nostalgic and self vindicative notions of the past. (Ibid, p. 182). 
Whilst it is important to remember that this research took part in the era before the assassination of 
Rafik Hariri and the Independence intifada, the danger of self-referential, self-rightous narratives 
which might later be used as justification for violent action is still a real concern. Indeed, a U.N. 
Economic and Social Commission for West Asia (ESCWA) focus group report on sectarian tensions 
among youth after this period noted distinct trends associated with self-victimization in the present, 
self-rightiousness and selective memory of the civil war, and powerful manichean self-other 
dichotomies which “reinforce narratives and myths that demonize and dehumanize the other.” 
(ESCWA 2009, p. 15-16). What this report also highlights, and what subsequent research has begun to 
focus on, is what Craig Larkin (Larkin 2012, p. 56) has described as “post-memory”, namely a situation 
in which people who did not experience traumatic events directly do so vicariously through private 
family discourses, political party propaganda and sectarian inscriptions of public space. Larkin’s focus 
on post-memory forms part of a scholarly move away from considering the origins of sectarian identity 
and politics and toward the ways in which sectarianism is reproduced across generations, particularly 
through memory making (Ibid, p. 43).  
 A final, but important, aspect of memory cultures and post-memory is martyrdom and 
subsequent memorialisation. Knudsen (2016, p. 2) has argued that the proclivity for creating and 
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memorialising martyrs in Lebanon arises from the excessive numbers of victims of violence, among 
both the Zu’ama leadership and the civilian population, and the concomitant dearth of justice and 
accountability. On this account, impunity accounts, to a large degree, for the culture of martyrdom. 
Knudsen (2016, p. 1) argues that “All the Lebanese sects engage in the iconography memorialising 
slain leaders and cadres.” This universal practice of the Lebanese is, nevertheless, largely sectarian in 
nature where slain sectarian leaders with brutal war time records are memorialised (selectively) within 
their own communities and reviled without (Ibid, p. 2-3). He argues, furthermore, that martyrs are 
used to “bolster the credentials of present-day political leaders” (Ibid, p. 7-8) and therefore 
memorialisation and memory becomes a source of political and social capital. An important instance 
of this is Kamal Jumblatt, the late father of Walid Jumblatt leader of the PSP, who has been “… turned 
into [his] sect’s only martyr, metonymically representing all of the Druze community.” (Ibid, p. 9). 
Moreover, given the context of the cross-sectarian cedar revolution as a result of his death and his 
susequent laying to rest in a multi-confessional space (martyrs square), Knudsen (2016, p. 7, 10) 
argues Rafik Hariri has bucked the sectarian trend of martyrdom and has become a locus of national 
memorialisation and an inter-faith saint.  
Martyrdom, Knudsen (2016, p. 2) notes, was previously a response to impunity and a 
recognition of the reality that “The truth will be contested and justice denied due to lack of evidence 
and the politicisation of the judiciary.” However, memorialisation of Hariri was and is accompanied by 
demands for truth and, in this way again, Hariri stands as a separate case. This leads him to argue that 
“… seeking the ‘truth’ behind Hariri’s murder will metonymically represent the truth for all [Lebanese 
victims]” (Ibid, p. 8). It is very useful to consider the ways in which Hariri has become a national martyr 
transcending narrow sectarian memorialising and the ways in which the quest for truth regarding his 
martyrdom has been symbollically attatched to those of all Lebanese martyrs. However, as Craig Larkin 
(2012, p. 56) reminds us, nationalism and sectarianism are not necessarily “antithetical”. Moreover, 
the pursuit of truth for Hariri as representative of justice for all Lebanese has the problematic tendency 
to assume that international justice is less politicised than national. This narrative might also serve to 
perpetuate a class-based differential between the weight accorded to Zu’ama victims and normal 
civilians along with the marginalisation of claims for justice for civilians, as an end in itself. As chapter 
three and four both demonstrate, the pursuit of justice for Zu’ama and its suppression for non-
Zu’ama, is a very long tradition in Lebanon. Finally, whilst the scale and appeal of Hariri beyond his 
immedite sect point to potential as a national martyr, this potentially overlooks the divisions over 
justice for Hariri both political (March 8th and March 14th) and sectarian (tendency for Shia 
representation and monopolisation by parties opposed to the STL). This last aspect potentially 
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amounts to flase universalism, despite the undeniable expansion of Hariri’s memorialisation beyond 
his own sect. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed the concepts of clientelism, sectarianism, consociationalism and memory 
whilst providing some historical context to the Lebanese state-society. This has been done with a view 
to understanding, explaining and (re)contextualising the discourse analysis carried out in this thesis. A 
key finding of the present chapter is that clientelism predates sectarianism in Lebanon. Moreover, the 
violence associated with these phenomena differ in scale and type. Nevertheless, it was also found 
that, ontologically, these phenomena, and their associated forms of violence, now exist within an 
institutionalised sectarian system in which clientelist assassination often cause, or make more likely, 
sectarian massacre or conflict. Thus, the dynamics of clientelist and sectarian violence are best 
conceived as consisting of a nexus of clientelist-sectarian violence. Consociationalism is the form of 
power-sharing designed to deter and assure through an elite cartel in Lebanon which has its roots in 
the colonial nineteenth century. It is problematic in that it sits atop a sectarian system in which 
sectarian identities are reproduced and secular identities are marginalised through empowerment of 
sectarian elites and religious institutions at the expense of the state, thus generally precluding the 
emergence of non-sectarian societal segments. The consociational mechanism of veto designed to 
assure and deter is an interesting case which has only been applied partially and often violated in 
Lebanon. This is a recurring theme to be considered in the analyses ahead.  
The question of amnesty for wartime Zu’ama and amnesia regarding victims in addition to the 
culture of martyrdom were identified as key aspects of memory in Lebanon which have often reflected 
and reproduced the sectarian divisions of society. Moreover, martyred leaders are often 
instrumentalised to enhance the social capital of Zu’ama. Current scholarship on memory emphasise 
the plurality of memory in Lebanon through memory cultures and their inter-generational, 
reproductive quality through emphasis on post-memory in conditions of official and unofficial 
amnesia. These concepts are used throughout this thesis in the following chapters and analyses to 
understand and explain outcomes. These concepts will also be considered in chapter four which 
provides a critical review of the ICL literature regarding the STL. From this perspective we might ask 
to what extent these unique aspects of Lebanon’s state-society are understood and described in this 
literature and how they might be affected by the unique dynamics of ICL and world order. 
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Chapter Three: The STL in the historical structure of world order 
 
Introduction 
 
In chapter two, this thesis outlined a heuristic of the Lebanese state-society complex by 
operationalising key concepts.  In chapter four, ICL literature pertaining to the STL is reviewed and the 
structural constraints and discourses particular to this ad hoc, hybrid institution, their origins and 
development, are elaborated. Chapters five and six utilise these analyses to interpret and explain the 
power in and power behind discourse at the STL during the testimony of Walid Jumblatt. This chapter’s 
purpose is to frame these discussions, providing an outline of the contemporary ICL system and 
historical context of the European Commission for Syria of 1860. Apropos of the methodology and 
theory set out in chapter one, the purpose of this approach is to examine the morphogenesis of the 
historical structure as it pertains to both ICL, the Lebanese state-society complex, and their dialectical 
interactions over time. This is done with reference to key mechanisms and their functioning in differing 
contexts. The key question of this approach is whether historical structures of world order have been 
elaborated consciously or unconsciously, conservatively or transforming, towards human 
emancipation from violence and inequality or away from it, and what the potentials are for future 
development given these structures and tendencies.  
The structures under examination are the principles of the legal stratification of sovereignty, 
the relationship between the executives and judiciaries in these cases, the relationship between 
intervention and destabilisation, the principles of worthy victimhood and access to justice, the 
principles and degrees of inclusivity and exclusivity between contemporary and historical tribunals 
and commissions in Lebanon, and the historical link and development between legal interventions and 
consociationalism.  This guiding concern is pursued with a view to the satisfactory answering of the 
thesis research questions in the conclusion. The added benefit of this approach is to question the 
chrono-centrism in the accounts of the STL particularly, or ICL in general. Particularly, the question of 
whether rupture or continuity inherits between the post-colonial and colonial world orders is central. 
It will also facilitate an analysis of where development (progressive or regressive) has taken place over 
time.  
 
Contemporary ICL in world order 
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The STL is a hybrid institution in that it utilises national and international judges and a mix of national 
and international law (Cerone 2012, p. 50). The exact nature of this hybridity is discussed in more 
detail in chapter four. However, certain differences between the STL and other hybrid tribunals, 
specifically the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia (ECCC), were organised as a treaty signed between the national government concerned and 
the UN (Ibid, p. 50-51). By contrast, the treaty between the Lebanese government (or the March 14th 
aligned elements of the government) and the UN could not be signed, and it was thus brought into 
being by the UNSC using its Chapter VII prerogatives (see chapter four). Thus, in this sense, the STL is 
more like the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), established through the chapter VII powers of the UNSC on the 
basis that these crimes were threats to international peace and security. However, the STL is different 
to these ad hoc courts in that its statute stipulates that it is to apply the national definition of 
terrorism, not a core international crime like the aforementioned ad hoc tribunals. Early suggestions 
of the inclusion of a core crime of crimes against humanity in relation to the entire string of political 
murders was allegedly rejected because “The U.S. feared that the inclusion of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction would lead to difficult questions as to why its 
temporal jurisdiction did not extend to the [2006] armed conflict with Israel” (Cerone 2012, p. 55). 
Moreover, this would have been against the interests of the Zu’ama in Lebanon who were former 
warlords. Given the core narrative aim of ICL as ending impunity (reflected in the language used by 
the UNSC which justified the establishment of the STL) abrogation of the 1991 amnesty for such crimes 
would have been a distinct possibility or its continuation would have been highlighted more obviously 
as a theory-practice contradiction. The limitation of jurisdiction to the national crime of terrorism then 
also has the effect of backgrounding previous crimes and criminals and presenting a legitimate face in 
which the rest was forgotten in light of this most recent and serious crime through its framing as 
terrorism. It was this fear of core crime jurisdiction which led to the quid pro quo in which the U.S. and 
Russia excluded abrogation of immunity for foreign, that is Israeli and Syrian respectively, officials 
(ibid, p. 55). Thus, it seems, impunity is at the heart of the STL, not as something to be ended but as 
something actively pursued through jurisdictional limitations and structural mechanisms of world 
order. However, even this picture is confused when one considers, as we do in chapter four, that 
Lebanese domestic law was interpreted by the appeals chamber of Antonio Cassese to apply to an 
extant core international crime of transnational terrorism in 2011 (Ambos 2011, Gillett, M., & 
Schuster, M. 2011, Saul 2011, Ventura 2011). As social science, it is beyond the purview of the present 
study to comment on the legality of this and similar moves. Moreover, objections on the basis of 
legality seem futile given that international law is designed by, and for, the powerful. Instead, the 
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purpose of the present study is to note the effects of power and how they are hegemonically 
legitimated. The explanation proffered here is that the late Antonio Cassese wished to enact his dream 
of a core crime of transnational terrorism and this aligned with the global agenda of the war on 
terrorism and, more specifically, the breakdown of the U.S.-Syria historic bloc. Another is that, by 
deeming the Lebanese crime to be a core one, the appeals chamber pre-empted any future potential 
arguments that the UNSC misused its chapter VII powers in the creation of an international court for 
a domestic crime, the combination of which is unique to the STL. Whatever the case, the fingerprints 
of political power are all over the jurisdiction of the STL. This is further reflected in the STL’s RPE 
discussed in chapter four, which apparently facilitated the 2011 decision as pre-emptive and bespoke 
for certain decisions and, by extension, Hizballah (Gillett, M., & Schuster, M. 2011, p. 994). Cassese 
made explicit ICL’s traditional view of the relation between politics and law, namely, that the latter is 
unable to comment on the former, particularly when it comes to UNSC decisions or vetoes (Cassese 
2012, p. 501). This perspective found its ultimate expression in the 2012 Decision on defence motions 
discussed in the next chapter, which shielded the UNSC from judicial review of its actions which were 
also facilitated by RPE that precluded challenges to legality and legitimacy (See Alvarez 2013, Burgis-
Kasthala 2014, Matthews 2014, Nikolova, Ventura 2013). As described in the next chapter, this 
decision relied on legal positivist rather than interpretive approaches in contra-distinction to the 2011 
decision. The common denominator appears to be protection and legitimation of the UNSC’s actions 
and prerogatives. This pattern is arguably furthered in the 2015 trial chamber decision not to allow 
WikiLeaks cables as evidence, as is discussed in chapter six (Re, Nosworthy et al. 2015). Apropos of 
our analysis in chapter five, we will also see that the hybridity of the STL has allowed its management 
committee to remain somewhat opaque regarding the source and proportion of funds which the STL 
has, and will, receive.  
 As early as 2005, the first UNIIIC report under Detlev Mehlis indicated official Lebanese and 
Syrian involvement in the Hariri assassination (Nashabe 2012, p. 255). It was under these conditions 
that four Lebanese generals were arrested by Lebanese authorities on behalf of the UNIIIC for nearly 
four years. Subsequently, no indictments were levelled against them or Syrian officials. In interview 
with Michael Young, Mehlis has intimated that the non-prosecution of Syrian officials was due to the 
Syrian-Saudi rapprochement culminating in the 2010 Saad Hariri visit to Damascus and his subsequent 
recantation of his accusation towards Bashar, a policy backed by the UN (Knudsen 2012, p. 228). 
Whatever the case on the Syrian side of the equation, Leaked U.S. diplomatic cables from 2007 
indicate that Mehlis’ successor, Serge Brammertz, was warning both the Lebanese and U.S. 
governments that the evidence against the Lebanese generals was unreliable in 2007. In the words of 
the cable itself “The four were arrested because of the testimony of witnesses who later recanted, 
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their testimony now thoroughly discredited.” (N/A [Wikileaks] 2007). The rationale for keeping the 
four detained after this period appears to emanate from both the U.S. and Lebanese governments 
(ibid). For Lebanon, it was their (alleged) position that it could not release the generals as this would 
be interpreted to mean that they had been detained or released politically (Ibid). Perversely, 
therefore, the Lebanese required that the STL take them and release them so domestic politics would 
be satisfied it was an objective decision according to the cable (ibid). This perception would be in line 
with the ideological and hegemonic notion that world order is apolitical. U.S. ambassador Feltman 
(presumably Jeffry D. Feltman), according to the cable, allegedly took the position that, despite 
Brammertz’s opinion on the evidence, “Syria's Lebanese allies would score an enormous victory, 
should the four generals be released now.” (ibid). These positions appear to account for the generals’ 
incarceration for two additional years. Whatever their sins as members of the Lebanese-Syrian 
apparatus, their continued incarceration appears to have been political and arbitrary. Moreover, it 
gives lie to the alleged juxtaposition of an apolitical, legal world order imposing itself on a 
dysfunctional domestic political scene in Lebanon, a trope discussed in more detail in the following 
chapter. Instead, due to the internationalised dynamics of clientelism, it was politicised from top to 
bottom, with only a distinction of appearance rather than substance between domestic and 
international politicisation. Brammertz is alleged to have been pressured into acting against what was 
lawful and just by the U.S. and Lebanese governments, indicating that the proximity of the UNIIIC to 
the UNSC compromised its objectivity and resulted in arbitrary detention (N/A [Wikileaks] 2007). 
Moreover, if Mehlis is correct, the prosecutors were pressured for political reasons in the opposite 
direction on behalf of Syria after he left. Whether it was Mehlis who was pressured to pursue Syria or 
Brammertz who was pressured to drop the Syria enquiry, or both, the proximity of the investigation 
to the UNSC appears to be a compromising factor in its independence. Arguments that the UNIIIC 
upheld the “highest legal standards” (Wetzel, Mitri 2008, p. 97) need to be considered critically in this 
light.  
 The STL exists in a context of world order in which the UNSC is central and international 
tribunals are created, like the STL itself, on an ad hoc basis with major input from the UNSC. The major 
exception to this rule is the ICC. The ICC is a permanent international court established by the Rome 
statute of 17th July 1998 with jurisdiction over established core international crimes of war, crimes 
against humanity and genocide. These jus in bello considerations were supplemented by the jus ad 
bellum core crime of aggression at the first Review Conference of the Rome Statute in Kampala 2010, 
which is due to come into force on 17th July 2018 (International Criminal Court 2018). The ICC operates 
primarily by the sovereign principle of pacta sunt servanda, namely that states are only obliged to 
abide by treaties their governments have signed. This is a key legal element of sovereignty. In this 
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case, state parties to the statute give jurisdiction to the ICC over their territories and their nationals 
beyond their borders, but only in the event that national jurisdictions are unable or unwilling to 
prosecute them (Ibid). Of the five permanent members of the UNSC, only Britain and France have 
signed and ratified the Rome statute (United Nations Treaty Collection 2018). 
 The U.S., for its part, has varied in its support for the ICC from the Clinton administration to 
the present. William A. Schabas (2004, p. 712) notes  
In 1994, when the International Law Commission presented its report on an international 
criminal court to the General Assembly, the United States was well-disposed to the proposal. 
In a general sense, the International Law Commission draft provided for an international 
criminal court that fit neatly within the Charter of the United Nations and that was, 
accordingly, subordinate to the Security Council. 
This subordination, as originally conceived, would have provided for a UNSC veto on prosecutions, a 
prosecutor which was entirely dependent on UNSC referral of crimes, a situation in which the 
definition of aggression was left to the UNSC and referrals to the ICC which required the consent of 
the state party of nationality and territory (Ibid, p. 715-718). This last element means, in effect, that 
upon committing alleged crimes in the territory of a country, this country’s referral would have to be 
seconded by the country whose nationality the perpetrator belonged to in order to be actioned. In 
other words, this was a judicial mechanism entirely dependent on the UNSC executive. However, in 
the process of drafting the statute, a group of middle powers and developing states managed to secure 
changes to these provisions which diluted the domination of the ICC by the UNSC. Thus, the UNSC 
cannot veto prosecutions, only defer them based on a resolution which has to be repeated every 
twelve months. Moreover, the prosecutor was given discretion to pursue crimes independent of UNSC 
referral with judicial, rather than political, oversight of its activities. Aggression no longer depends on 
identification and referral of the UNSC, but can also be pursued at the prosecutors’ discretion, referral 
by a state party or even by a non-state party who is willing to subject its own conduct to the jurisdiction 
of the court. The states which secured these progressive alterations stated that the original 1994 draft 
provision was a “serious encroachment upon judicial independence.” (Ibid, p. 715).  
Thus, these dilutions of UNSC power were pursued with the express liberal principle of judicial 
independence from the executive, which means it differs from all the ad hoc (ICTY, ICTR) and hybrid 
(ECCC, STSL) tribunals which preceded it, and stands in marked distinction from the STL whose UNIIIC 
investigators and prosecutor, along with its personal, temporal, local and subject-matter jurisdiction, 
are all dependent on the UNSC. Moreover, the ICC is funded on a means tested basis from signatories 
to the statute, which goes some way towards ensuring states such as Saudi Arabia cannot fund 
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international tribunals whilst refusing to submit themselves to their jurisdiction, in line with basic 
principles of equality before the law (International Criminal Court 2018). However, the ICC is not 
perfect in this regard. Its general character as a treaty-based organisation is overridden by the ability 
of the UNSC to refer cases to it. Therefore, permanent members of the UNSC who have not ratified 
the ICC or paid towards its maintenance can nevertheless refer others to the court. Moreover, owing 
to the primacy of chapter VII prerogatives, states which are not party to the statute themselves, but 
who are also not permanent members of the UNSC, can find themselves before the court. This 
happened with Sudan and Libya (International Criminal Court 2018). It also means that, as with the 
STL, Israel is effectively shielded by its non-ratification of the Rome statute on the one hand, and the 
near impossibility of its referral from the UNSC given the U.S.’s demonstrable historical pattern of veto 
protection on behalf of Israel, on the other hand (Dag Hammarskjöld Library 2017). One need not be 
pro-Ghaddafi or Bashir to recognise that there is impunity at the heart of the ICL system, and that it is 
structural and instrumental. Indeed, what appears to be a tiered sovereignty can be discerned 
between those who are UNSC permanent members and others. Permanent members enjoy de jure 
non-intervention in their sovereign affairs (assuming that they refrain from referring themselves to 
international jurisdictions) and need only be expected to abide by treaties they have deigned to sign, 
whilst other states can find themselves referred to international jurisdictions they never signed up to.  
This is one manifestation of Anthony Anghie’s (2005, p. 2) insight that third world sovereignty 
has particular structural weaknesses. It is also important to note that the systematic use of veto by 
permanent members to shield non-permanent members effectively renders them immune, as has 
been the case with the U.S.-Israel or is now happening with Russia-Syria (See Dag Hammarskjöld 
Library 2017). Thus, a middle tier of most favoured clients appears in the contemporary structure of 
legal world order, with de facto structural protection from UNSC patrons.  
 The administration of George W. Bush was particularly hostile to the ICC. It sponsored UNSC 
resolutions 1422 in 2002 and 1487 in 2003, ostensibly to protect peacekeepers on signatories’ 
territory with the threat of withdrawal of peacekeeping forces if the resolutions were not passed 
(Schabas 2004, p. 701). This was backed up by bilateral efforts to shield U.S. forces and the (in)famous 
American Service Members Protection Act which allowed for the U.S. to use force to free American 
personnel indicted by the ICC and which has never been repealed (Ibid, p. 701, 710). John Cerone 
notes that the SCSL was supported by the U.S. as an ad hoc and hybrid alternative to the ICC and that 
“In general, as hostility toward international institutions increased, the U.S. began to show increasing 
support for hybrid institutions”(Cerone 2012, p. 51). Hybrid institutions can therefore be viewed as 
the product of cynical attempts to maintain impunity for oneself and ones’ most favoured clients and 
undermining the advance of voluntary universal jurisdiction, as much as they are about promoting 
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local attempts to bring wrongdoers to justice. Given the Bush administrations’ controversial invasion 
of Iraq, the abuses of Abu Ghraib, the use of extraordinary rendition and other reprehensible 
behaviour, it does not appear that the objection to a permanent, independent, court was either 
philosophical or benign. In the case of the STL, it was not simply impunity procurement, but the active 
desire to weaponize a jurisdiction against its enemy in an ongoing conflict. Whilst the Obama 
administration moved back to “principled engagement” (Ibid, p. 52) with the ICC, its rather 
questionable aim at the Kampala meeting was to  
narrow the definition of the crime of aggression, and to limit its personal scope of application 
… while it was unable to secure agreement on giving the Security Council the exclusive power 
to trigger aggression prosecutions, the U.S. did succeed in obtaining an exemption for 
nationals of non-States Parties, even when their conduct occurs on the Territory of States 
Parties. (Ibid, p. 52) 
It seems that the U.S. is very keen on the principle of pacta sunt servanda for itself but also on the 
centrality of the UNSC and its chapter VII prerogatives in ICL. The reasons are obvious and nefarious; 
structural advantage.  
Similarly, in 2017, Britain, a signatory of the Rome statute, led efforts to check the advance of 
the crime of aggression being activated at the ICC arguing for “greater clarity” (Bowcott 2017). Owen 
Bowcott states that the crime of aggression was not to be applied retrospectively by the ICC, 
presumably in line with the nullum crimen sine lege prohibition on ex-post facto prosecutions, and 
thus Tony Blair and other New Labour initiators of the Iraq invasion would not be prosecuted. 
Nevertheless, he notes the UK government was keen to establish that the new provision would not 
automatically apply to those already signed up to the Rome Statute and that ratification of this 
separate crime should remain separate (Ibid). In a preface to this, an attempt to prosecute Tony Blair 
for the crime of aggression through the UK courts by an ex-Iraqi general was advanced arguing that  
the crime had been accepted by Sir Hartley Shawcross QC, the UK’s attorney general in the 
1940s, at the time of the Nuremberg trials of Nazi war crimes. There is already, therefore, an 
international crime of aggression involving any invasion or military occupation by one country 
using force illegally against another (Ibid) 
The British judges, relying on positive law, dismissed this claim because there is no explicit crime of 
aggression legislated under English law. The same argument, needless to say, did not work for the 
Nazis. This situation is in marked contrast to the STL in several distinct ways. The first is that whilst 
aggression at the ICC cannot be read back in time to criminalise past behaviour, the crime of 
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transnational terrorism at the STL is seemingly retrospectively applied to past behaviour as is 
described in detail in the following chapter. The second is that, despite the long-established 
characterisation and acceptance of aggression as a core international crime, the UK judges relied on 
the principle of sovereignty of English law to argue there was no liability in the UK. In contra-
distinction, the STL ruled that the Lebanese courts, and others, routinely read their laws in line with 
international provisions (See chapter four). Thus, they justify the importation of the transnational 
terrorism definition into Lebanese law. This is yet another way in which the sovereignty of the 
developing world is structurally weaker compared to UNSC permanent members, allies and former 
colonial powers for whom there is the natural assumption of legal and national sovereignty overriding 
ICL. Indeed, a major justification for the STL, as discussed in detail in the following chapter, was that 
Lebanese sovereignty was somehow incomplete (Burgis-Kasthala 2014, p. 251- 252). This justified ICL 
overriding the consociational system. The STL which is set up to further the sovereignty of Lebanese 
law, as we shall see, actually undermines it by opining that domestic provisions are always read to 
conform with (or are superseded by) the international.  
The acquiescence of many legal practitioners to this state of affairs and the amount of their 
energy expended in the ideological rationalisation and legitimation of tiered sovereignty and 
systematic impunity is demonstrated by John Cerone (2012) in his discussion of the legitimacy of the 
STL. After dispatching the legal objections to the court centring on sovereignty by noting the accepted 
override powers of Chapter VII, Cerone deals with legitimacy issues. An important one which is raised 
is the charge that the temporal jurisdiction of the STL was limited to exclude the 2006 war on Israel’s 
behalf (ibid, p. 57). Cerone points out that the ad hoc tribunal was created for assassinations and thus 
this justifies the limitation (ibid, p. 57). This tautology does not explain why the UNSC decided that 
one crime was a threat to peace and not the other and thus why a tribunal was created for one and 
not another. Cerone attempts to deal with this problem by discussing selectivity. He states “On one 
level, all justice is selective, both in the international legal system and in domestic legal systems. In no 
legal system is every crime prosecuted … Prosecutorial discretion is a common feature of legal systems 
around the world.” (Ibid, p. 59). The tautological rationalisation given by Cerone is one we will see in 
in the ICL literature on the STL, namely, that these exclusions are incidental when they are, in fact, 
instrumental and systematic. There is, after all, a large difference between not pursuing a case because 
of lack of evidence and not pursuing a case because you or your clients might be implicated. This tactic 
seems to be central to the mystification of power structures and, therefore, their hegemonic 
legitimation. These tautologies and rationalisations can also be detected in Cerone’s (2012, p. 60) 
characterisation of the ICL system as suffering a “lack of central authority and absence of a universal 
justice system; its relatively fragile and immature institutions …” to explain selectivity, particularly as 
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it pertains to the creation of ad hoc courts. Here, selectivity is simply “a consequence of the political 
nature of the decision to create a court in a system where courts are not a given” (Cerone 2012, p. 
60). Interestingly, this characterisation of the international system mirrors the political Realist IR 
representation of the international as anarchic on the basis of a lack of central authority, rather than 
ordered and structured. Cerone’s own account of U.S. policy undermining permanent international 
courts it cannot control and promotion of hybrid courts through its structural power at the UNSC, in 
addition to U.S.-Russian collusion to protect most favoured clients, facilitated by their position as 
UNSC permanent members, completely contradicts this characterisation and shows it to be a 
reification. In this tautology, structurally empowered actors use said structural power to undermine 
universal principles which Cerone then justifies based on the reality these actions create. However, 
Cerone assures us, the U.S. considers these ad hoc courts as courts and not simply tools. Indeed,  
It is because of this recognition of the independence of courts, and the understanding that 
courts as independent organs will take on a life of their own, that the U.S. has been careful to 
front-load jurisdictional limitations that will restrict the scope of who can be prosecuted. (Ibid, 
p. 62 emphasis added) 
This Orwellian newspeak could be produced by any tyrant interested in justifying self-preservation 
and would have us equate judicial independence with executive power determining jurisdiction on a 
self-proclaimed, instrumental, ad hoc, basis. Indeed, Cerone encourages one to consider the U.S. 
loading the dice of justice in the pursuit of impunity, as a sign that it respects judicial independence.  
In summary, we have established that the current world order of law is dominated by the 
UNSC, its Chapter VII powers and the power of veto accorded to permanent members. Sovereignty, 
and the pacta sunt servanda vision of law, is undermined by this system, for good or ill, creating a 
multi-tiered sovereignty in which sovereign non-intervention is the preserve of the UNSC permanent 
five and their most favoured clients who gain structural advantage through threat or act of veto. 
Impunity in the form of sovereignty is thus central to this world order and those that benefit from that 
system often employ ad hoc and hybrid tribunals to pursue cases in which a, there is not a “national 
interest” or b, interests are pursued by weaponised tribunals against enemies, as in the case of the 
STL. The main movement away from this manifestly unjust system is found at the ICC which operates 
based on treaty with an independent prosecutor. Whatever its faults, this contains an emancipatory 
potential and is, as we shall see, a historically unique development. Nevertheless, potential for co-
optation remains in its backdoor to UNSC referral in which non-signatories to the ICC, immunised by 
UNSC veto power, can refer other non-signatories before it without even contributing financially to 
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its maintenance. Intimidation is also present, particularly through the non-repealed American service 
members protection act.  
 
The Historical Structure of World Order: The European Commission for Syria 1860  
 
The following outline is not meant to be exhaustive, rather it is meant to highlight important features 
to facilitate comparison between the STL and the European intervention in Syria of 1860. Through 
such a comparative analysis it is hoped that features of continuity and difference between these 
institutions, and the world orders from which they emerge, will be identified and aid in a fuller 
understanding of their origin, trajectory, and prospects for peace. First, a sketch of the overall position 
of the Ottoman Empire (of which Mount Lebanon and the Syrian interior were part) vis a vis the 
European Great powers up to, and during, the nineteenth century is presented. This is then 
supplemented by discussion of how the European Great Powers, particularly through the prism of law, 
viewed themselves and the Ottomans. A summary of how these developments impacted politics in 
Mount Lebanon is then provided, and an account of how these developments led to the 1860 civil war 
in mount Lebanon and the subsequent Ottoman response and European intervention. This frames the 
analyses in chapters five and six and facilitates comparative analysis at the end of chapter six and the 
conclusion. All of this is pursued with Cox’s aim of tracing the “coherence of minds and institutions 
characteristic of different ages.” (Cox 1981, p. 133) and, potentially, across ages.  
 From the sixteenth century, European powers attained special agreements with the Ottoman 
Empire known as capitulations (Fawaz 1994, p. 23, Rodogno 2012, p. 29). These agreements were 
originally legal and commercial privileges for European trade and diplomatic communities operating 
in the Ottoman Empire. The first state to obtain these concessions was France, followed thereafter by 
other European powers. As Davide Rodogno (2012, p. 20) notes, the original capitulations allowed 
European communities to “organize themselves according to their own laws, except where disputes 
arose with Ottomans, and as long as their behaviour was not offensive to Muslims.” Alongside these 
privileges, there evolved a de facto system of European patronage for local, usually Christian, 
minorities. For the French, their protectorates were the various Catholic communities, including the 
Maronites of Mount Lebanon. Russia promoted itself as the defender of the Orthodox communities 
and Britain, presumably lacking from large indigenous populations of Protestant proteges, cultivated 
followings among that meagre community along with Jews, Orthodox Christians, Sunnis and the Druze 
(Fawaz 1994, p. 23). As European powers became relatively more powerful than the Ottomans during 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and, as they renewed the capitulations, the privileges 
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reserved for European communities were extended to their local, largely Christian, proteges, making 
this protection de jure (Rodogno 2012, p. 29). In the late eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire 
suffered military defeats at the hands of European powers culminating in Napoleons’ invasion of Egypt 
in 1798 (Ibid, p. 23). These defeats had the effect of highlighting the near impotence of the Ottomans 
in the face of modern European armies. The Ottomans were forced to turn to another European 
power, Britain, to eject Napoleon and thus the general strategy for the Ottomans became playing one 
great power against another for survival. The Europeans considered the weakness of the Ottomans a 
potential flashpoint for their own internal conflicts over its potential spoils, giving rise to the so-called 
Eastern Question. This question was how to manage Ottoman decline without giving rise to a general 
European war.  
Meanwhile, the power vacuum left by the French after their defeat of the Egyptian rulers 
(Mameluks) led to the rise of Mohammad Ali as ruler of Egypt (Rafeq 2005, p. 242). Ali engaged in 
modernisation reforms, agricultural, industrial and military, along the lines of the European powers, 
leading some Europeans to consider him an “enlightened despot” (Ibid, p. 242). This led to his 
increasing power, relative to his nominal Sultan in Constantinople. Eventually, Ali sent his modern 
Egyptian army, under the command of his son Ibrahim, to conquer greater Syria in 1831, with his 
conquest of Anatolia only blunted by Russian and Austrian intervention (Rodogno 2012 p. 23). In 
response to these pressures and crises, the Ottomans instituted a set of reforms from 1839 to 1876 
known collectively as the Tanzimat (Fawaz 1994, p. 22, Makdisi 2000, p. 10, Rodogno 2012, p. 25). 
These reforms sought centralisation and rationalisation of administration, as well as the granting of 
equality between Muslim and Christian subjects which had previously been subject to the millet 
system which constituted a two-tier society based on the division of Muslims and non-Muslim “people 
of the book”, namely, Jews and Christians (Traboulsi 2007, p. 3-4). These non-Muslims were subject 
to a specific tax (jizya) and barred from certain governmental professions and military roles, in 
exchange for religious freedom (Ibid, p. 4). Leila Tarazi Fawaz (1994, p. 22) notes that “The Tanzimat 
provided the legal basis for their [non-Muslims] growing influence by making all Ottoman subjects, 
regardless of religion, equal before the law”. Ussama Makdisi (2000, p. 9-11) argues that the impetus 
for these reforms arose from both the Ottomans and the Europeans, but for slightly differing purposes 
namely, the strengthening of loyalty, modernisation, and staving off intervention in the former case, 
and the creation and empowerment of Christian clients in the latter. However, the nominal equality 
promulgated by these laws did not counterbalance the material advantages and advances of the 
largely Christian minorities over their Muslim neighbours by virtue of their positions as European 
proteges, particularly when Great Britain, in typical colonial style, imposed free trade on the Ottomans 
and devastated local Muslim business (Traboulsi 2007, p. 15). In a relatively short time, Muslims, 
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Sunnis in particular, had gone from hierarchically dominant within a theocratic order, to nominally 
equal and materially disadvantaged.  
 The European self-image during the nineteenth century was characterised by related, near 
synonymous, self-referential terms. Europe was taken to be largely synonymous with “secularised” 
Christendom. Europeans tended to view Christianity as a superior religion and/or moral system which 
underpinned their superior civilisation. Rodogno (2012, p. 49) relates that this common belonging of 
Christian civilisation gave rise to the concept of a family of nations, that is, the realm in which 
international law and mutual recognition prevailed between states by this common membership. The 
doctrine central to international law and politics to govern this family of nations was that of 
sovereignty. Sovereignty was defined by the principle of non-intervention by one state in the internal 
affairs (economic, political, legal, religious or otherwise) of another (Ibid, p. 21). Anghie (2005, p. 33) 
notes that the central theoretical problem of positivist international law during the nineteenth century 
was how legal order could be established between independent, sovereign states. However, he 
observes that this sovereignty was a uniquely European attribute and that non-Europeans generally 
possessed no legal standing in front of a sovereign European state. Thus, questions of imperialism and 
colonialism were a matter of policy rather than legality (Ibid, p. 34). Thus, “When facing the external 
world, Europe was a historical, political, and cultural unity. However, this external unity fractured into 
separate, secular states when it came to internal matters.” (Rodogno 2012, p. 49). After the 
Napoleonic wars, the institution of sovereign non-intervention was, for a time, strengthened through 
the Concert of Europe, the leading institution of the family of nations. Rodogno (Ibid, p. 19) relates 
that the concert was defined by five rules 
(1) only the five great powers, the pentarchy, should decide great European questions …; (2) 
no power should wage war in Europe for territorial gain or promote revolution or unrest 
within another great power’s territory or sphere of vital interest …; (3) no international 
question of vital interest to a great power could be raised without its consent ; (4) if a major 
problem did arise, no powers could refuse an international conference or exclude any other 
great power from it; and (5) direct challenges and confrontations between great powers had 
to be avoided at all costs – mainly by referring the quarrel to the concert. Since decisions had 
to be voluntary, unanimity rather than majority rule prevailed in European meetings … 
Thus, at the apex of world order, the European family of nations was presided by its five great powers 
and ruled by European laws regarding sovereign non-intervention. The remainder of humanity was 
deemed to be semi-civilised or barbarous, and on that basis, legitimate targets for intervention, 
military invasion, or colonisation (Ibid, p. 48). The Ottoman Empire occupied a liminal and 
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contradictory space in this hierarchy. This was a function of Eastern Question power balancing on one 
hand and its Islamic, and therefore allegedly inferior status by European standards, on the other. At 
different times it was, therefore, both in and out of the Family of Nations. It was admitted following 
the Crimean War in 1856, on condition that it improve the lot of Christian subjects, but was never 
accorded the right of sovereign non-intervention as evidenced by two European interventions during 
this time. One of these was the 1860 intervention in mount Lebanon and Syria (Ibid, p. 46). By 1878, 
the Ottoman Empire was expelled from the family of nations and reduced to a European tutelage or 
“la Turquie est en tutelle” (Ibid, p. 47).  
Rodogno argues that the specific practice of humanitarian intervention by European powers 
in the Ottoman Empire arose because of this political context of the Eastern Question, the ideological 
and legal hierarchy of civilisation which rendered the Ottomans as outside European civilisation and 
therefore non-sovereign, and the presence of large Christian populations under “barbarous” rule. This 
last point is crucial, the humanitarian of nineteenth century intervention was a classic false universal, 
as the only humans worthy of European intervention were Christians under Muslim rule. The genocide 
of indigenous, non-Christian populations in European colonial empires was given the agentless passive 
term extinction and was not considered problematic. Neither was the killing of Christians or Muslims 
by European governments or the killing of Muslims by Christians in the Ottoman Empire (Ibid, p. 33-
34). Though the Christians who became the objects of European “humanitarian intervention” were 
often those self-same Christians who had been made proteges under protection of the capitulations, 
European observers failed to countenance the idea that their preferential treatment might constitute 
a reason for the increasing incidence of sectarian hostility and violence.  
 As we outlined in chapter two, Mount Lebanon before 1841 was characterised by the 
Muqata’ji system defined by a largely feudal hierarchy with peasants at the bottom presided by 
Muqata’jis, Sheihks and Amirs collectively referred to as Manasib or named persons (Traboulsi 2007, 
p. 4). From the seventeenth century this system was somewhat disrupted by the emergence of a 
merchant class with commercial ties to European powers, particularly among Christians, and an 
increasinlgy assertive Maronite clergy. The nuances and details of this history are impossible to relate 
here and what follows is necessarily a simplified version of what can be found in greater detail and 
precision elsewhere (Salibi 1988, Fawaz 1994, Makdisi 2000, Khalaf 2002, Traboulsi 2007, Harris 2012). 
As we noted in chapter two, this system, by and large, had as its nominal head the Ottoman Sultan, 
regardless of the intrigues of warring families and scheming Ottoman governors. Fawaz Traboulsi 
(2007, p. 4) notes that during the Muqata’ji era, Mount Lebanon’s Christian and Druze communities 
occupied different social locations reflective of wider millet restrictions. The Maronites were overly 
represented among peasants, financiers and artisans, and the Druze were largely a feudal warrior 
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culture. The former were numerically superior and, whilst in the north of Mount Lebanon Christian 
commoners were ruled over by Christian Manasib, the southern districts were somewhat mixed with 
large Christian commoner populations ruled over by Druze Manasib. Whilst the primary social bond 
remained patrimonial clientelism, this was less problematic, when ideologies of equality and religious 
nationalism became prevelant, this was a recipe for sectarian violence. Samir Khalaf (2002, p. 73) 
relates that one vector through which these ideas were transmitted was thorugh the Maronite Church, 
which had begun to establish an autonomous position for itself and open its doors to clergy from the 
common classes. Thus, locally, the Maronites developed an ideology of equality and confessional 
solidarity or nationalism, derived from European thought (Ibid, p. 73) whilst simultaniously colonial 
power began to conceive of the Ottoman Empire “not so much as a multiethnic and multireligious 
territory but as a Muslim state with large “minorities” of Christians scattered in various cities and 
provinces.” (Makdisi 2000, p.10). Indeed, this demonstrates how nationalism is at root a theory of 
ethnic homogeneity and, thus, its logical outcome is ethnic cleansing in heterogenous areas. 
Nevertheless, the commoners revolt of 1820 was largely a multireligious, multiclass, revolt against the 
Maronite Amir, Bashir Shihab II (Ruled 1788-1840) and his repressive tax policies (Traboulsi 2007, p. 
10-11).  
 As noted in chapter two, a fundamental break came in 1831 when Ibrahim, the son of 
Muhammad Ali of Egypt, invaded Syria and requested Amir Bashir Shihab II assist him in his conquests. 
This, the Emir did. This had several important effects. The first was to alienate the Druze Manasib who, 
by turns, were either in exile or rebelled against Bashir and Ibrahim. Secondly, it was a truly 
internationalised conflict with the Maronite Amir supporting the Egyptians who were, in turn, 
supported by France. This alliance was facing off against intermittant resistance from the Druze 
Manasib, the Ottomans the British and the Austrians. Thus, as we previously noted, the clientelist 
structure, which had always had at its head the Ottoman Sultan, now had two options backed by 
foreign European powers. Moreover, it was during this time that Bashir, at the behest of Ibrahim, 
armed four thousand Christian mountaineers and used them to fight the first Druze Manasib-led 
rebellion in 1838. As Traboulsi (Traboulsi 2007, p. 12) notes “It was the first time that the inhabitants 
of the Lebanese territores had confronted each other on a sectarian basis.” When Ibrahim’s policies 
of conscription, corvee labour, repressive taxation, and disarmament became too much for the 
Christians, they rebelled along with the Druze in 1840, finally ousting Ibrahim with the help of the 
British, Austrians and Ottomans. Bashir was exiled. Dependent on Europeans, the Ottomans 
promulgated the Gulhane Decree in 1839, which instituted religious equality between Ottoman 
subjects as well as respect for tradition (Makdisi 2000, p. 57). This gave rise to what Makdisi refers to 
as “restoration politics” in which, both modernity and tradition were invoked by local actors seeking 
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advantage (Ibid, p. 57). The Maronite church sought the restoration of a Maronite Shihab Amir, 
Maronite commoners sought equality, and Druze lords sought their traditional lands, peasants and 
privilages, (Ibid, p. 58- 61). Thus it was that Bashir Shihab III was inaugurated and the Druze Manasib 
returned to their lands to peasants who resisted them and a ruler who was similarly hostile. In 1841, 
the Druze Manasib deposed Bashir III and the emirate ended in violence which became increasingly 
sectarian. The Austrians, British and Ottomans devised a system known as the Qa’im maqamiya in 
1843 which divided Lebanese by territory and by sect. It divided the north, under a Christian leader, 
from the south under a Druze leader. The proverbial fly in this ointment was that the south contained 
large numbers of Christian peasants whom the Maronite church argued should be under the authority 
of the north, while the Druze Manasib contended that they should control the entire mountain by 
virtue of their class status under patrimonial clientelist logic (Traboulsi 2007, p. 24- 25). 
Notwithstanding the further intervention of the Ottomans under Shakib Effendi in 1845, violence and 
discord followed culminating in the 1858 Kisrawan commoners rebellion in which Christians in part of 
the nothern Qa’im maqamiya ejected their Christian Manasib and established a short-lived peasant 
republic. Thus, in the north, Christian peasants were ruling themselves and in the south many Christian 
peasants railed against the reimposition of Druze feudal lords. Increasingly, the designation of Druze 
Sheikhs or Druze Sheikhs became conflated. Traboulsi (Traboulsi 2007, p. 30) observes that the 
Christian rebels “amalgamate[d] the sectarian with the social”. The dynamics between the Europeans 
and their proteges in the development of this amalgam is highlighted by an account related by Ussama 
Makdisi (2000, p. 86- 87) of an incident in Kisrawan in 1845 related by Turkish soldiers. On their mission 
to disarm the commoners they came upon a Christian on horseback who was allegedly rude, 
disobeyed the curfew and incited the commoners before escaping. Upon his arrest he told the guards 
that his brother was a protégé of the French consul. The French consul duly ordered a frigate to move 
to threaten the Ottomans until he was freed. It is important to note that the Ottoman soldiers were 
attempting to impose millet system class strictures upon the Christians who were nominally meant to 
be equal citizens under the Tanzimat (Ibid, p. 87). Thus, an unjust class system from the Ottoman 
authorities and an unjust sectarian protégé system from the Europeans made for this heady cocktail.  
 The violence of 1860 dwarfed what had come before and was a product of this convergence 
of factors. There are different accounts of who started the war, Christians (Fawaz 1994) or Druze 
(Traboulsi 2007). What appears certain is that it began with random assassinations, moved through 
to a phase of pitched battles, looting, and ethnic cleansing, and ended with the rout of Christian forces 
and the massacre of Christian civilians creating a profound humanitarian crisis. Makdisi (2000, p. 118) 
notes  
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At least two hundred villages were destroyed in the resulting sectarian conflict. Thousands of 
villagers were maimed and killed in what amounted to a savage campaign by both Christians 
and Druzes to purify the land and to militarily resolve the contradictions of reform.  
Just as this war in Mount Lebanon was winding down, the Muslims of Damascus revolted and, with 
some Ottoman irregular soldiers, carried out a terrible massacre upon the Christians of that city 
despite the efforts of other Ottoman soldiers to maintain the peace (Fawaz 1994, p. 79-100). Some 
Ottoman garrisons had disarmed and herded Christians into safe zones in Mount Lebanon, only to be 
left to the mercy of the victorious Druze, and massacred (Ibid, p. 72), a chilling histrocial echo of which 
is found in Jumblatt’s testimony related in chapter six in which Syrian troops stood idle in the face of 
Druze massacres of Christians in 1977, after the assassination of Kamal Jumblatt. Fawaz (1994, p. 101) 
reports, however, that the news of these crises were not welcomed in Constantinople where the 
breakdown of order and the threat of European, especially French, intervention motivated a swift 
response. Fawaz (1994, p. 101-108) relates that the Porte took the following action: instructed city 
govornors that massacre was to be avoided at all costs, wrote to European ambassadors promising to 
restore peace, punish the guilty and render justice, appointed Fuad Pasha as Envoy Extraordinary to 
Syria invested with all the executive powers of the Sultan, 15,000 troops and the meagre resources of 
the Ottoman treasury, and dispatched them to Lebanon before the massacre of Damascus occurred.  
 As the Ottomans anticpated, it was France that made the first moves towards intervention 
(Ibid, p. 108). Napoleon III was aligned with French public opinion in Christian solidarity and the 
interests of defending his proteges. It was his foreign minister, Antoine Thouvanel, who first suggested 
a European intervention consisting of a multilateral commission reflecting the concert and a mixed 
naval force to monitor the coast (Ibid, p. 109). Thouvanel presented this intervention as a continuation 
of 1842 and, thus, not a hostile move. The British, for their part, were in the tricky position of having 
a colonial policy of supporting the Druze whilst public opinion was firmly on the side of fellow 
Christians (Ibid, p. 111-112). They initially resisted French moves for intervention, but reconsidered 
after the Damascus massacres out of fear of a French-Russia alliance. Thus, whilst the French settled 
on the necessity of European troops to bring order, in addition to the commission and the concert 
fleet, the British pushed for coordination with the Ottoman authorities and the limitation of the 
intervention. The consequent compromise limited the number of European troops to 12,000, only half 
of which would be French. The remaining 6,000 would be made up of concert forces and provided 
only if needed (Ibid, p. 113). Intervention commander Charles De Beaufort d’Hautpoul was to 
coordinate with the Ottoman extraordinary commissioner in Syria, Fuad Pasha. The duration of the 
intervention would be limited to six months. Beaufort had been the chief-of-staff of Ibrahim Pasha 
during the Egyptian occupation of Syria and was thus intervening in a conflict he himself had helped 
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prepare the ground for, through his previous military activities (Ibid, p. 114). His opinions very much 
matched the interests of the French leadership, just as he had supported the Egyptians years earlier, 
he now supported the Maronites and favoured severe punishment for the Druze.  
 The intervention thus reflected the interests of the various parties, the Ottomans who wished 
to exercise their sovereignty and minimse European involvement who were supported to some extent 
by the British who wished for the Ottomans to maintain territorial integrity and resist French designs 
through support of the Druze. Similarly, France wished to promote the interests of its clients, the 
Maronites. The European Commission itself consisted of representatives of the concert pentarchy. As 
one might expect, the dual thrust of European intervention and Ottoman reaction resulted in some 
cooperation and some obstruction. In broad terms, Fuad Pasha managed to monopolise the 
intervention into Damascus which he prioritised so as not to allow the Europeans access to the interior 
(ibid, p. 139). Here, he relied on Ottoman military commissions presided by himself and using lists 
provided by Christians as a basis for prosecutions. Whilst he could often keep European consuls and 
visiting members of the European Commission out of the trials of high ranking Muslims in Damascus, 
his military tribunals in Beirut were open to European observation and interfence (Ibid, p. 148). The 
European Commission, in conjunction with Fuad, was involved in determining reparations. In tribunals 
of special import, the sentences of the condemned were massively influenced by the personal and 
national interests represented by Fuad and the other European commissioners (Ibid, p. 151). Fuad is 
known to have intentionally frustrated Beaufort’s initiatives, through deception and misinformation. 
He was particularly keen that Beaufort not attack the Druze. Beaufort’s troops were contained in 
Mount Lebanon for the most part, Fuad had Ottoman camps raised next to French in order to impose 
authority, and the French were restricted to reconstructing houses and sterilising villages. Beaufort, 
frustrated by Fuad, often acted as an ad hoc sixth commissioner, but the British commissioner Lord 
Dufferin had been given explicit instructions that Beaufort was not to be allowed to communicate with 
individual commissioners but only the commission as a whole (Ibid, p.126).  
The reestablishment of administration began quite ad hoc as the French and Ottomans 
established local committees to oversee the reconstruction of villages (Ibid, p. 173). The trials of Druze 
Manasib occurred at Ottoman military tribunals but the sentences were passed on for review to the 
European commission, in a hybrid arrangement. Predictably, the British and Ottomans pushed for 
leniency, arguing that both parties to the conflict had been aggressors, somewhat sidelining the 
greivous massacres of Christian civilians at Deir al-Qamar and other places towards the end of the war 
when they posed no military threat. Equally predictably, the French, supported by the Prussians and 
Russians viewed the Christians largely as the victims, despite the many provocations of Christian 
leaders towards Druze populations. Overall, the Druze Manasib had many of their sentences 
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commuted. Dufferin actually threatened Fuad with repercussions if the Druze were treated too 
harshly, and he did this explicitly for reasons of state (Ibid, p. 195). A common theme of the tribunals 
were lenient sentences for higher status individuals, this occurred in the closed sessions of the Muslim 
notables of Damascus (Ibid, p. 142) and for the Druze Manasib of Mount Lebanon (Ibid, p. 187). The 
patrimonial logic of impuity is expressed by Fawaz (1994, p. 142) “the humiliation of arrest was itself 
sufficient punishent”. Whilst the old problem of availability and reliability of evidence and questions 
of command responsibility both accounted somewhat for this difference, it is beyond doubt that 
leniency was often experienced by the higher social classes. Similarly, when the Ottomans had first 
brokered a peace between Druze and Maronites before the arrival of the Europeans, they had 
originally spoken of “oblivion of the past”  in line with the tradition of amnesty and amnesia (Ibid, p. 
193). The presence of the European tribunal had ensured that this did not happen entirely. The 
reorgansation of the mountain reflected the now entrenched sectarian logic and the internationalised 
patron-client dynamics in its set up. The Mutasarrifiyya of Mount Lebanon established a non-Lebanese 
Christian must be governor, appointed by the Porte. An administrative council consisting of Lebanese 
religious sects was to assist the governor, four Maronites, three Druze, two Greek Orthodox, one 
Greek Catholic, one Shia and one Sunni (Ibid, p. 217).  
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Chapter Four: The Special Tribunal for Lebanon in the Context of International 
Criminal Law 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter first reviews some general literature on international tribunals and transitional justice to 
contextualise the STL and this thesis. It then reviews the more specific ICL literature pertaining to the 
STL, analysing the literature chronologically so one can trace both the key events in the development 
of the tribunal and the changing approaches and concerns of scholarship. A selection of key law 
literature regarding establishment and key decisions from 2007 to 2012 are reviewed. Given the 
volume and diversity of legal scholarship on a multitude of issues surrounding the STL, this literature 
review focuses on three key events: the establishment of the STL statute in 2007, the 2011 Appeals 
Chamber decision on applicable law, and the trial and appeals chamber decisions on competence de 
la competence in 2012 which includes, inter alia, whether the STL has power of judicial review of UNSC 
decisions. Attention is also paid to the sub-disciplinary approaches of this scholarship, namely, 
whether it fits within an ICJ, TJ or CLS tradition, and what this means for the type of scholarship 
produced. The chapter then concludes with a synthesis and critical analysis of both the scholarship 
and the key decisions and how this structures the STL. This will inform the context of the CDA carried 
out in chapters five and six. Legal scholarship can educate the uninitiated in things which are 
rudimentary for practitioners and inform on the key debates within the field on the STL. Review of its 
literature can also tell one how au fait legal scholars are with the historical and political context they 
operate within, and what implications this has for their practice.  
International Criminal Tribunals 
 
Donna Arzt (2006) writes that, from the Nuremburg and Tokyo tribunals established by the Allied 
victors of World War Two to try Axis war criminals, it took 48 years for more international criminal 
tribunals to be established. This watershed moment arrived in 1993 with the establishment of the ICTY 
and was enabled by the end of the Cold War (Ibid, p. 226). The key argument of the paper is that two 
key objectives of ICL are the “consolidation of democracy” and the “triumph of the rule of law” in post 
conflict states and that the “perception” of tribunal’s legitimacy among a populace is key to these 
objectives (Ibid, p. 226). The article takes two examples, the ICTY and STSL, as case studies to explore 
legitimacy along the three categories of “… perceptions of overall legitimacy, perceptions of tribunal 
impartiality, and the effect of public perceptions of the tribunals on the reconciliation process.” (Ibid, 
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p. 226). The paucity of available data is highlighted and lamented by Arzt, who conducts secondary 
research using surveys and interviews conducted by local scholars. Her conclusions are that more data 
should be collected on this topic and that the perception of justice is important for the successful 
operation of ICL tribunals (Ibid, p. 235). This work is distinct from this thesis in several ways. Firstly, 
the case study is different and, although there is space for limited comparative generalisation given 
that these tribunals all inhere within the same ICL system, this thesis also provides fine grained 
information and analysis on the Lebanese context and the esoteric nature of the STL as a latter, and 
particularly politicised, example of a tribunal. Moreover, Arzt’s conception of legitimacy as perception 
follows that of mainstream ICL (as will be demonstrated throughout this chapter and the thesis 
generally) in contradistinction to the Habermasian definition of legitimacy as practice employed here. 
The latter definition is what gives this thesis the analytical purchase to critique ideology and explore 
hegemonic exercises of power in ICL. Historical and structural analyses generally, and the employing 
of CDA specifically also distinguish this thesis from Arzt’s work. As will be presently demonstrated, 
slogans such as “triumph of the rule of law” sound impressive, but the critical questions concern which 
laws triumph in what context, with what consequences for sovereignty, and do these laws apply 
equally?  
 Adel Maged’s (2008) article concerns Arab and Islamic Sharia perspectives on the ICL system. 
The central argument of Maged’s article is that ICL has failed to address atrocities in the Arab world 
and that, to address this, “… it is imperative that “voices of reason” accurately convey to the West the 
attitudes of the Arab people towards this system.” (Ibid, p. 477). The article does this firstly, by 
illustrating the compatibility of Sharia and ICL, and secondly, by elaborating the scepticism of Arab 
peoples and governments (Ibid, p. 477). Maged finds that Islamic legal scholars consider ICL as 
politically compromised and that the answer is an “… independent and impartial international criminal 
justice system free from political interference.” (Ibid, p. 506). Maged argues, in particular, that the ICC 
could form the locus of a non-politicised, independent ICL (Ibid, p. 506). He also makes a striking 
recommendation to Arab states which is worth quoting at length  
 The Arab States should work on drafting national legislation defining international crimes, 
and determining their punishment. This should take place whether they ratify the ICC Statute 
or not because it safeguards a state’s sovereignty over international crimes committed on their 
territories in all cases. (Ibid, p. 507 emphasis added) 
The significance of this quote is that Maged is recommending that national Arab legal codes be aligned 
with ICL in order to maintain sovereignty, presumably to avoid intervention in the form of Chapter VII 
invocations from the UNSC. This speaks to the discussion of tiered sovereignty in this thesis in general, 
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the interventionist nature of ICL, and illustrations of how international legal definitions supplant 
Lebanese definitions at the STL in this chapter. As was discussed in the last chapter, when confronted 
with international definitions of aggression, English judges feel quite secure in rejecting them on the 
basis of the sovereignty of English law. Arguments such as this from Maged indicate a hegemonic 
colonisation of the mind in which intervention is always a possibility, and ICL disciplines societies which 
exist in the lower tier of sovereign differentiation. The historical and structural aspects of this system 
are highlighted in this thesis, in contradistinction to Maged’s article. Maged’s insight that ICL is 
selective and politicised is a finding shared by this thesis and explored throughout, as is his 
acknowledgement of the uniqueness of a permanent ICL court in the ICC. However, this thesis is more 
pessimistic regarding the ICC’s prospects for attaining independence. As illustrated in the previous 
chapter (and throughout this thesis), the causal mechanism for selectivity, jurisdictional 
jerrymandering and politicisation is ICL’s link to the UNSC and its chapter seven powers of tribunal 
creation and referral and its veto inoculation of permanent five members and most favoured clients. 
The ICC is still subject to these mechanisms. Any attempt to overcome these obstacles must, 
therefore, focus on displacing the UNSC as the guarantor of ICL. This thesis is also sceptical of the 
argument that reasoned elaboration of Arab grievances to the West regarding the unfairness of ICL 
would be enough to change such a system. As is illustrated throughout this thesis, UNSC Pentarchy 
powers are quite aware of their strategic use (and undermining) of ICL. Indeed, as the historical 
discussion in the last chapter demonstrates, the system of tiered sovereignty was designed explicitly 
for that reason.  
 Yuval Shany’s (2013, p. 5) article discusses several international tribunal’s, the ICTY, ICTR, 
ECCC, SCSL and the ICC, use of domestic criminal law to buttress the “perceived legitimacy” of those 
tribunals among host communities. The theory utilised here draws on what Shany considers core IR 
theories of realism, liberalism and constructivism, which have integrated accounts of perceived 
legitimacy as leading to acquiescence of states to international norms due to a “compliance-pull” (ibid, 
p. 6).  The (perception) legitimacy focus of the article is justified by the author by the assumption that 
“It is hard to explain states' willingness to cooperate with the [ICC)] Court in such extensive and 
expensive ways, without invoking the concept of legitimacy” (Ibid, p. 7). This article is similar to the 
majority of ICL articles discussed in its utilisation of perception legitimacy which has been noted 
elsewhere, is distinct from this thesis approach to legitimacy, and shall not be laboured further. 
Moreover, Shany’s utilisation of IR is limited to the mainstream approaches, which share certain 
characteristics (system maintenance bias, underdeveloped understanding of structural power, lack of 
a theory of ideology). The present thesis, in contradistinction, applies a Critical Theory approach which 
overcome these lacks. Shany cites state cooperation with the ICC as justification for an investigation, 
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but this may not translate in the Middle East and the STL context, given the lack of ratification among 
Arab states (as detailed above by Maged), Israel, and the most powerful UNSC permanent members. 
Notwithstanding the objection that cooperation with the ICC is overstated, the notion that 
(perception) legitimacy is the only way to explain compliance also seems assumed, rather than 
demonstrated. Other explanations, for example that less powerful states have a material interest in 
international relations governed by the rule of law, are excluded. There is apparently an idealist 
convergence between mainstream ICL and IR liberal and constructivist accounts. In both, legitimacy is 
an idea which, if it is perceived, is held to exist and the question of ideological hegemony is “thrust 
them beyond the very bounds of the thinkable.” (Eagleton 2007 p. 27). Needless to say, this thesis 
takes the opposite view and applies a CDA method to interrogate power in, and behind, discourse.  
 Shany (2013, p. 25) finds that in these tribunals (which notably omit the STL) domestic criminal 
law is usually utilised with the explicit intention of overcoming the lack of a specific criminal liability 
under international law (as a gap filler) or that the tribunal’s purpose is to provide a forum for the 
realisation of local law, rather than an imposition of the international. It is also noteworthy that Shany 
(2013, p. 25) finds that application of existing domestic definitions avoids potential legitimacy crises 
about “… developing new international criminal standards through judge-made law”. These 
observations become salient in the context of this chapter on the development of the STL, its statute, 
key judicial decisions and controversies over applicable law. In summary, these relate to the statutory 
stipulation that the STL was to apply the Lebanese definition of terrorism, the judicial decision 
surrounding the circumvention of this domestic definition through the creation of an international 
core crime, and the judicial ruling that domestic Lebanese laws are always read in conformity with 
international laws. The remainder of this chapter, thus, establishes the STL as an outlier to Shany’s 
findings and, in addition, reflects critically on the exercises of power through methodology which 
allowed this to happen.  
 Johann Soufi and Sophie Maurice’s (2015) article deals with the mechanism for international 
tribunals, a mechanism which deals with the legacy issues of particular ad hoc ICL tribunals. They focus 
on the ICTY and ICTR mechanisms to “consider their achievements in light of their mandates.” (Ibid, 
p. 545). The article does this by laying out the history of tribunal completion, their issues and how this 
led to the mechanism’s creation by the UNSC. This is followed by an analysis of the “structure and 
main function” of the mechanism (ibid, p. 545). The article finds that the issues which arose for the 
ICTY and ICTR at their conclusion and the subsequent development of their mechanisms, will be 
common to other ad hoc tribunals and to trials at the ICC (Ibid, p. 564). It is in this context, the article 
makes its contribution. As is discussed in more detail later in this chapter, this article relies on the core 
narrative and purpose of ICL, of ending impunity. Namely, it asserts that the ICTY and ICTR were 
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significant contributions to this purpose (ibid, p. 545). Whilst this may be true within the strictly 
delimited and ad hoc jurisdictions of those tribunals, this thesis utilises historical and structural 
analyses along with immanent critique to interrogate whether the ICL system itself has structural 
impunity at its heart. In this chapter, we will discover one rhetorical and ideological device employed 
in ICL, namely, the “some justice is better than none” discourse, which serves the function of 
mystifying structural power through the implication, explicit or implicit, that case selectivity is 
incidental, rather than systematic.  
Transitional Justice 
 
TJ can heuristically be conceived as a theoretically “holistic” approach to justice conceived as 
“restorative” in societies transitioning out of authoritarianism and/or violence (See Williams, M. S., & 
Nagy, R. 2012). In practice this can mean that ICL prosecutions might only form part of an overall 
package of measures (for example, truth-telling, reparations or memorials) designed to restore peace. 
Moreover, because of the normative goal of restoring peace rather than simply pursuing punishment, 
TJ analyses focus more on the wider socio-political environments which justice mechanisms function 
within. It is important to note that TJ can be identified as a distinct approach to ICJ scholarship, but 
can also relate to the practices, institutions and regimes concretely established to achieve peaceful 
transition. The STL does not include mechanisms for truth-telling, reconciliation or other such TJ 
approaches. Similarly, as we shall see in the review of literature which follows in this chapter, 
scholarship writing about the STL from a TJ perspective are few. A full engagement with all the issues 
associated with TJ processes, an assessment of whether this would be desirable in the Lebanese 
context and methods for successful realisation is somewhat beyond the purview of this thesis. Given 
these realities, one might question why discussion of TJ, however brief, is warranted. However, the 
question of TJ cannot be entirely avoided. As we discussed in chapter two, the issue of memory 
cultures in Lebanon is prominent, as is the deeply engrained historical process of amnesia, amnesty 
and, as we shall see during chapters five and six, the spontaneous reactivation of memory with violent 
consequences. This suggests on a very superficial level, that elements of TJ approach, particularly 
universal truth-telling, might represent, under the right circumstances, a route to a more lasting 
stability under a more unified memory culture. This thesis deals much more with the structural and 
historical reasons why this possibility cannot be countenanced in this instance, the history of 
Pentarchy (historical or contemporary) imposed partial and politicised justice in Lebanon, and the 
ways in which memory is engaged with concretely in the discourse of the STL. Nevertheless, it would 
be remiss not to acknowledge the importance of TJ, and its notable absence at the STL. Therefore, a 
brief review of TJ literature will help frame these tangential discussions. 
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 Pablo De Grieff (2012, p. 31) argues that the TJ field has been undertheorized and offers his 
own normative and theoretical framework. He identifies the core elements of TJ processes and argues 
for a holistic approach. By this, he means not that the context is holistically taken into account, but 
rather that the approach must include all the elements associated with TJ. He is, in effect, arguing 
against selective and for comprehensive application (Ibid, p. 33). An interesting aspect of this 
conception is that, not only are reconciliation and justice explicit aims of TJ, but so is democracy (Ibid, 
p. 65). It is very easy to be sympathetic to the idea that TJ cannot be classified as such if it is selectively 
applied. Selectivity is critiqued extensively within this thesis, particularly as it pertains to structures of 
world order and partisan internationalised interventions. Similarly, as we discussed in chapter two, 
Lebanon has engaged in some actions associated with TJ, particularly memorial building, but has also 
employed a policy of amnesty and amnesia, arguably leaving the ground open to hagiographic 
sectarian memory cultures which remain a threat to peace. Nevertheless, there appears to be 
something somewhat utopian and inflexible about developing a framework and ascribing to universal 
validity in all circumstances. It is arguably more profitable to investigate specifics of a country’s 
situation and then make an argument about the requirement for particular aspects of TJ like truth-
telling to overcome particular issues, rather than discounting partial applications. This type of 
selectivity stands in contra-distinction to the jurisdictional jerrymandering critiqued in this thesis. 
Moreover, the case study of Lebanon bucks the general liberal ideological underpinnings of De Grieff’s 
normative approach, given that Lebanon is a consociational democracy, and is no less prone to civil 
conflict for it.  
 These kinds of critiques are present in the work of Catherine Turner (2013, p. 193) who 
employs a Derridean deconstruction of the antinomies and binaries in the discourse of TJ. This aligns 
well with the critique made above regarding simplistic distinctions between authoritarianism and 
democracy and equally applies to other categories. Turner concurs with De Grieff that TJ has been 
undertheorized, but her deconstructive analysis renders De Grieff’s normative framework contingent. 
Among the binaries Turner problematises is “… the distinction between victim and perpetrator that 
shapes the boundaries of political inclusion and exclusion in transitional contexts.” (Ibid, p. 194). This 
is an important deconstruction given that in the messy reality of civil and internationalised conflict, 
the identity of victim and perpetrator can easily inhere in a single individual or community. This 
becomes salient in the testimony of Walid Jumblatt in this thesis, which contributes empirical evidence 
of this reality. Turner critiques the distinction between law and politics, aligning with the central 
critique of CLS more widely (Ibid, p. 208). As she does so she highlights that TJ is no more immune to 
this way of thinking than mainstream ICL, but she argues these distinctions “can no longer withstand 
scrutiny” (bid, p. 208). Whilst Turners Derridean approach to the deconstruction of epistemic 
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categories is useful, its post structuralist approach does not approach issues of structural, historical 
and ideological power. The current thesis presents such an approach to contribute to the literature.   
 TJ literature also includes more empirical accounts of these processes. For example, Cyrus 
Samii (2013, p. 219) conducted a primary research survey to understand public support, or lack 
thereof, for the Burundian TJ process. Samii finds that there is, overall, a lack of support for the TJ 
process and asks, “Why would large numbers of those entitled to accountability and truth express a 
preference to ‘forgive and forget’?” (ibid, p. 219). The principle reasons explored are fear of renewed 
violence and calculations associated with the post-war political settlement and balance of power. Of 
these, Samii finds that the latter of these considerations is foremost in the minds of Burundians (Ibid, 
p. 230). Distinctions abound between this thesis and Samii’s research; the country case, the types of 
tribunal and internationalisation in each case, the methods used, to name a few. However, there is 
some complementarity in identifying generalisable inclinations towards amnesia among post-conflict 
societies. However, one key distinction worth highlighting is that the present research, through its 
application of CDA, is equipped to consider amnesia and forgetfulness, not simply as instrumental 
considerations and concerns as Samii does, but as ideological and discursive elite strategies with deep 
historical roots in the Lebanese context.  
   
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1757  
 
UNSC Resolution 1757 of 30th May 2007 which established the statute of the STL, and thus formally 
created it, precipitated a flurry of academic articles from scholars of ICJ and TJ. These articles differed 
in particulars, but were generally concerned with questions of legality, legitimacy and jurisdiction. A 
technical legal question was addressed by Bardo Fassbender, a Professor at the University of St Galen 
and former advisor to “the Legal Counsel and Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations on the 
subject of “Targeted sanctions of the UN Security Council and Due Process of Law”.” (University of St 
Gallen 2015). His paper examines the circumstances and legality of UNSC Resolution 1757 which 
established the STL statute. He proceeds by analysing secondary data of primary sources to address 
the question of whether the UNSC intended to enforce a treaty-based tribunal using its powers under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Chapter VII of the UN Charter deals with breaches of international 
peace and security and the powers which the UNSC has at its disposal to reinstate them in times of 
crisis. The hypothesis of the paper is that Chapter VII powers do not include the ability to impose a 
treaty which “… is an agreement based on the concurrent consent of two or more parties to be bound 
by the terms of the treaty” (Fassbender 2007, p. 1094).  
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The process of establishing the court began with a written request from the then Prime 
Minister of Lebanon, Fuad Siniora, to the UN Secretary General on the 12th December 2005 requesting 
a “tribunal of an international character” (Siniora 2005). This prompted negotiations between 
representatives of the UN and elements of the Lebanese government between 31st May and 7th July 
2006 (Fassbender 2007, p. 1093). However, ratification of a treaty constitutionally requires agreement 
between the three major branches of the Lebanese government, namely the President, the council of 
ministers led by the Prime Minister, and the Parliament, persuant to article 52 (Republic of Lebanon 
1926 [2004]). Indeed, responsibility for negotiating treaties falls, in the first instance, to the President 
(Mugraby 2008, p. 189). Though Siniora had the backing of the majority in Parliament, the Speaker of 
the House Nabih Berri refused to convene parliament for the vote. In addition, the cabinet itself was 
depleted by the walkout of all six Shia Ministers. Finally, the President of the Republic, Emile Lahoud, 
refused to ratify it (Fassbender 2007, p. 1091). In this context of deadlock, the UNSC invoked its 
Chapter VII powers to establish the STL through resolution 1757. To be clear, Fassbender does not 
argue that the UNSC does not have the power to create a tribunal, indeed he states plainly that the 
UN Charter grants the UNSC this right. However, he takes specific issue with the fact that the UNSC 
offered an ultimatum to the Lebanese Government to sign the treaty or face the fait accompli of a 
UNSC resolution. Fassbender argues that this amounts to political pressure which is not within the 
UNSC’s powers. In the system of pacta sunt servanda states should not be compelled to sign treaties 
(ibid, p. 1094).  
Fassbender observes that this overzelous approach was framed as an “effort to present its 
measures as ultimately based on the will of the Lebanese people, [however] the Council, in fact sided 
politically with the Lebanese Government” (ibid, p. 1092). This observation is theoretically interesting 
as it highlights just how much the UNSC favoured the appearance of a consensual treaty over a 
coercive resolution, to the extent indeed that they were willing to threaten coercion in order to 
procure consent. Moreover, it seemingly highlights an instance of false universalism (See Chapter one) 
through the political siding of the UNSC with “the Lebanese Government” (Ibid, p. 1092). Fassbender 
concludes his review of these practices by arguing that resolution 1757 is legal because the draft treaty 
was used as a blueprint for the resolution not a treaty imposed through chapter VII, which would be 
illegal. However, he states it “should remain a one-off phenomenon” because of the “threat” of 
unilateral imposition (ibid, p. 1105). The significance of one-off phenomena or exceptions has been 
highlighted in recent critical scholarship (See Matthews 2014) as, inter alia, indicating the location of 
sovereignty through the famous dictum “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception” (Schmitt, C. 
[Schwab, G. Trans]. 2005, p. 5). In this case, therefore, the UNSC is sovereign as it decides the 
exception under which, the law of treaties and a nominally sovereign countries’ constitution, can be 
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overridden. Morover, the distinction between using the agreement and the statute as a blueprint for 
resolution 1759 or of using 1759 to push through the agreement is arguably semantic and largely 
meaningless. Indeed, a fellow ICJ scholar and STL supporter later wrote quite unabashedly that “On 
May 30, 2007, the Security Council acted under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter to adopt the agreement 
between Lebanon and the United Nations and to execute the agreement's annex, the statute of the 
new tribunal.’ (Gardener 2011, p. 95). Despite its largely semantic and meaningless nature, the effect 
of Fassbender’s conclusion, that 1757 was ultmately legal due to the fact it did not enforce a treaty, is 
substantively a legitimating move in favour of UNSC action. Fassbender’s article is notable for its 
highlighting of the partiality of the Lebanese delegation led by ex-Prime Minister Siniora. This is not 
an insight which is reproduced in other ICJ scholarship, but only re-emeges in the CLS scholarship on 
the STL.    
 A Lebanese perspective on questions of Legality is provided by Choucri Sader, a judge who 
was part of the Lebanese delegation to the UN negotiations on the statute (Sader 2007, p. 1083). He 
engages with a different debate surrounding constitutionality. He identifies article 20 (Republic of 
Lebanon 1926 [2004]) as the locus for scholars challenging the constitutionality of the STL (not article 
52 as in Fassbenders account), as it “stipulates that judicial power shall be exercised by the courts 
formed in compliance with the law.” (Sader 2007, p. 1084). These critiques argue that by establishing 
a foreign tribunal, the sovereignty of the Lebanese is violated, breaching this article. Sader gives this 
argument short shrift and notes that the article only provides that the tribunals should be established 
by law, not that they should be Lebanese (ibid, p. 1084). He shows that there are precedents under 
the French Mandate for “mixed tribunals”, (mixed French and Lebanese judges) which were in 
operation between 1923 and 1946 (pre-independence). Moreover, he points to a civil war era “mixed 
tribunal” (Syrian and Lebanese judges) in operation between 1978 and 1983 established to prosecute 
crimes by and toward the (largely Syrian) Arab Deterrent Force. These examples are interesting for 
many reasons, not least because Sader is attempting to assuage the fears that Lebanon will lose its 
sovereignty by pointing to examples of mixed courts which were associated with some form of foreign 
domination and intervention. Moreover, it is theoretically pertinent to consider how the development 
of the Lebanese state, constitution and jurisprudence under the French mandate and Pax-Syriana 
might leave a historical residue enabling the easy formation of mixed courts and to what extent the 
presence of such courts are an indication of domination. However, as a question of positive law, Sader 
makes his point, there appears to be nothing in article 20 which says a tribunal can only be composed 
of Lebanese judges.  
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 Lebanese lawyer and scholar Nidal Nabil Jurdi’s (2007) article on the STL drew attention to a 
more theoretical question. This question arose from the observation that “... the STL is unique in being 
an international tribunal exercising jurisdiction solely on the basis of crimes drawn from a domestic 
source – the provisions of the Lebanese Penal Code (LPC)” (Ibid, p. 1126). Particulalry, he focuses on 
article 314 LPC, which defines the offence of terrorism. Until relatively recently, international 
jurisprudence had failed to define and apply an international crime of terrorism and so the notion of 
an international tribunal such as the STL applying a domestic crime of terrorism opened up interesting 
possiblities. For Jurdi, the question was whether the STL could theoretically provide precedent for the 
development of an international crime of terrorism based on Art 314 LPC (ibid, p. 1125). The 
secondary, normative, question was whether this would be desirable and what the strengths and 
weaknesses of the Lebanese conception of terrorism were. He examined in detail the material and 
mental elements of the crime under Art 314 LPC, he also highlights the international political pressure 
which resulted in early proposals for the inclusion of the core international crime of crimes against 
humanity, being dropped (ibid, p.1126). Indeed, he argues that the “widespread” and “systematic” 
nature of the bombings and murders, including that of Hariri, indicated such a crime could be detected 
(ibid, p. 1126). This is a view shared by Sader who was present at the negotitations and was in favour 
of including crimes against humanity alongside domestic crimes of terrorism (Sader, 2007 , p. 1086). 
When, comparing the Lebanese conception of terrorism to the nebuleuse international one, Jurdi 
draws upon the theory of the late Antonio Cassesse; former President at the ICTY and President of the 
STL from 2009 until his death in late 2011. In drawing the comparison, Jurdi notes that in Cassesse’s 
international concept of terrorism a transnational element is required, wearas, in the Lebanese 
version, there is no such requirement (Jurdi, 2007, p. 1131). This discussion is interesting in light of 
the controversial interlocutory decision on applicable law 2011 made by the STL Appeals Chamber 
under Cassesse which claimed to identify just such a transnational element in the Hariri assassination. 
This decision is discussed later in this chapter.  
In the final analysis, Jurdi proposes that the Lebanese definition suffers from two major 
problems, firstly, that the establishment of an ideological motive for violence is not required, 
rendering the law excessively broad. Secondly, though the list of means included in Art 314 of creating 
a public hazard which would be considered terrorist is not exhaustive, it does exclude some specific 
means, such as guns (ibid, p. 1130). In concluding, Jurdi states that given the invocation of Chapter VII 
for its establishment, the STL’s powers may exceed those of treaty based tribunals such as the SCSL. 
As an international court he thought it likely that the practice of the court, in particular the use of Art 
314, could have an effect on the coalescence of an international crime of terrorism. The level of 
influence he believed would be dependent on the particular approach of judges in regard to RPE and 
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their general approach (ibid, p. 1131). It is worth noting, that this speculation was based on the 
understanding that “The STL will rely solely on domestic provisions to prosecute the crimes under its 
jurisdiction …” (Ibid, p. 1131). Thus, while the development of the crime might relate to the practices 
of the Chapter VII empowered judges, Jurdi still did not countenance that they would apply anything 
other than the Lebanese definition of Terrorism.  
 Jan Erik Wetzel and Yvonne Mitri’s (2008) substantial and oft cited article, canvassing the STL’s 
legality, legitimacy and prospects, made the argument that “the legal framework of the Special 
Tribunal distills the “best practices” of prior tribunals.” (ibid, p.81). As well as spelling out these 
practices, the article also deals with many of the arguments opposing the STL. One of the institutional 
innovations the authors highlight is the succession of the office of the prosecutor from the UNIIIC, 
essentially unifying the roles of investigator and prosecutor. They highlight a concern that the origin 
of the UNIIIC in UNSC Resolution 1595 means that it is essentially a creature of the UNSC and, as such, 
does not offer enough independence for the office of the prosecutor. More specifically, these 
criticisms address the issue of the rights of detained persons. This is especially pertinent to the 
detention of four Lebanese Generals allied to Pax Syriana who were incarcerated without charge by 
the Lebanese authorities under instruction from the United Nations International Independent 
Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) under suspicion of involvement in the assassination of Hariri for 
approximately four years. The generals were held based on what turned out to be false testimony and 
eventually released after the establishment of the STL in 2009, without charge (Nashabe 2012, p. 261). 
Thus, the lack of human rights safeguards and redress for people potentially detained indefinately 
without prospects for a trial was not merely an academic concern (ibid, p.97).  
The authors address this, stating that “the [UN]IIIC has continuously stressed its adherence to 
the highest legal standards available in order to ensure the admissibility found before a future 
tribunal.” (ibid, p.97). The rationale, it seems, is that the UNIIIC says its legal standards are the highest, 
therefore, this must be the case. This assessment seems uncritical to the point of  naivete or willful 
ignorance. It also appears to rest upon a conception of international law as hermetically sealed from 
the viscitudes of the political environment. Indeed, given that the generals had by this time been jailed 
for two to three years, and would ultimately be released without charge after four years of detention 
due to lack of evidence, one could surmise that, had the authors not prejudged them guilty, they 
would not have been as sanguine about such a long detention without charge.  
 In discussing jurisdiction, the authors note that the subject-matter covers the Hariri 
assassination and crimes similar in nature, gravity and connection between 1st October 2004 and 12th 
December 2005. They present what remains an important and convincing description of crimes and 
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inferred motive. They note that the attacks against March 14th Parliamentarians was steadily 
depleating the parliamentary majority enjoyed by that faction (ibid, p. 99). Indeed, they observe that 
victims included, among others  
a former prime minister, a sitting cabinet minister, other high profile politicians, including 
Members of Parliament, as well as influential journalists, most of them known for their explicit 
opposition to Syrian influence in Lebanon, as well as many members of the general public. 
(ibid, p.99-100)  
This led to a situation, they argue, where potential cases for the UNIIIC encompassed some 60 killings. 
It does not automatically follow from this that Syria was directly involved in these attacks as was 
assumed from the domestic to international level at the time and was reflected in the initial UNIIIC 
report (often referred to as the Mehlis report). However, it suggests, at a bare minimum, that the 
killers’ undertakings were on behalf of Syria and the “resistance”. Moreover, the sophistication of the 
killings, particularly Hariri’s, indicates military and logistical capabilities in excess of common criminals 
and assassins. The countervailing story of Israeli involvement, relies on the belief that, for a false flag 
operation, Israel was willing to murder numerous pro-Western, anti-Syrian figures, and weaken their 
parliamentary bloc and morale, simply to incriminate Syria, even after the presumed goal of such a 
strategy (the removal of Syria from Lebanon) had been achieved.  
Mention of Israel by Wetzel and Mitri is minimal, but quite telling. The first mention states 
only that the 2006 Israel-Hizballah war which, inter alia, led to the deaths of approximately 1,200 
people, will not be prosecuted at the tribunal (Wetzel, Mitri 2008, p. 82). No explanation is given to 
explain this fact. The second mention comes near the conclusion in which the authors deal with the 
various criticisms of the STL. The more “moderate” of these, express concerns about the fact that a 
tribunal was established for the Hariri assassination, but not for larger sets of potential crimes, such 
as the 2006 war or the Lebanese Civil War (ibid, p. 111). The authors reject this argument stating 
the fact that the latter two proposals seem entirely unrealistic at present should not detract 
from the assessment that a Tribunal aimed at the most recent problems could at least be one 
step towards reconciliation. For this time, the circle of violence may be broken by a neutral 
allocation of accountability. (ibid, p.111 emphasis added) 
This passage reflects implicit understandings, some common in the ICJ literature, which this thesis 
takes as points of departure in order to address its research questions. Firstly, the fact that the 
proposals are “unrealistic” is largely accepted as a fact and no normative reflection on the relationship 
of is and ought is offered. Related to this, is the fact that the authors do not feel the need to explain 
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or analyse the reasons why these proposals are “unrealistic”, the reasons are deemed so self-evident 
that they require no further analysis, or even mention. Presumably, the reasons are political. At the 
level of domestic politics, as we know from chapter two, the fact that both Lebanese elite political 
factions benefit from the 1991 amnesty law and include ex-milita leaders means that they would be 
unlikely to countenance core international crime investigations under any circumstances. With regards 
to the 2006 war, one has to assume that the only obstacle (apart from an unwilling Hizballah, which 
appears not to be an impediment to the STL itself) is political cover for Israel  from the U.S. veto at the 
UNSC, which has been consistantly used in this way and which renders hopeless any attempt to 
investigate Israeli crimes through UNSC mechanisms (See Dag Hammarskjöld Library 2017).  
Indeed, other scholarship has relayed the manner in which the U.S. leveraged its position as a 
permanent UNSC member in order to limit the jurisdiction of the STL exclude the 2006 war for the 
benefit of Israel (Cerone 2012, p. 55). In this light, the term “unrealistic” appears somewhat 
euphemistic. The second assumption is that the STL, whilst ignoring the vast majority of victims, can 
be “one step towards reconciliation.” (Wetzel, Mitri 2008, p. 111). This seems a curious belief and, 
indeed, it has no basis in an analysis of the Lebanese state-society, but seems to arise as a common 
sense understanding that some “justice” is better than none. The present thesis is unwilling to un-
critically accept this assumption and will assess it on the basis of scholarship regarding the Lebanese 
state-society and the structure of world order historically. Finally, neutrality refers to neutrality within 
the already established structures and procedures of a given tribunal and not to the mechanisms 
which make establishing those structures and procedures (im)possible. Even if we assume that value 
neutrality and objective application of law is possible within the STL, this conception of neutrality 
externalises the deeply political, non-neutral, hierarchical, and exclusionary mechanisms which allow 
the STL to exist in its specific form. CLS has long acknowledged that the ICJ penchant for insisting on a 
strong disciplinary division between politics and law has obfuscated the power relations inherent in 
these concrete relationships (Matthews 2014, p. 151). In contrast, this thesis is concerned with the 
analysis of the power relationships which enable ICL to apply to some and not other cases on a 
systematic basis.  
 Marieke Wierda, Habib Nasser and Lynn Maalouf’s (2007) article from this period presents a 
more critical analysis of STL establishment grounded more fully in the context of the Lebanese State-
Society. This is arguably because this article is written from a TJ perspective. This is evident 
immediately in a comparison of the bibliography of this article with those of the previous articles from 
the dominant ICL sub-discipline, ICJ. This TJ article contains multidisciplinary and human rights INGO 
scholarship on the manifold crimes and conflicts Lebanon has endured, whereas, ICJ accounts are 
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disciplinarily self-referential, largely citing statutes, precedential court decisions, or functionaries of 
the UN system or UNSC representatives or other law texts. Thus, ICJ is largely decontextualised from 
its site of operation. The TJ approach provides an alternative to the tendency in ICJ towards conceiving 
of a realm of law untainted by politics. Indeed, the article appears to live up to such expectations by 
offering the most comprehensive account of the Lebanese context of the articles discussed so far. 
Emphasis is placed on the scale and quality of violence, from the massacres of Damour and Karanitina 
in the early civil war, to the impact of the dual Syrian/Israeli occupations after 1990. In particular, 
discussion of the Israeli occupation of the south, which involved repeated IDF attacks on civilians 
(notably at Qana) and the operation of a proxy torture prison at Khiam (Wierda, Nassar et al. 2007, p. 
1069) stand out as an alternative narrative almost unanimously occluded in ICJ accounts. They 
additionally draw focus on the amnesty law of 1991 which led to “selective impunity”, punishing 
assassinations of political figures rather than large scale war crimes and crimes against humanity.  They 
argue this had the perverse effect, inter alia, of rendering the fate of approximately 17,000 missing 
persons, indefinately unknown (ibid, p. 1070). They argue that this law was not simply politically 
expedient, in that it allowed the historic bloc of Pax-Syriana to neutralise Samir Geagea by selectively 
prosecuting and arresting him, but actually created “two categories of victims: the political and 
religious elite whose assassination is considered ‘unpardonable’, and a second rate category that 
comprises the ‘ordinary’ people” (ibid, p. 1071). Interpreting this with reference to the literature 
discussed in chapter two, one can see that the privilage of Zu’ama elites over other citizens is still in 
evidence here.  
 However, this article retains a strong system maintainence bias. This is evidenced in its 
hypotheses, research questions, and ultimately conclusions. The hypothesis derives from the 
understanding that selective justice and selective impunity, with regards to the legacy outlined above, 
presents particular challenges to the “local perception” of the STL (Ibid, p. 1066). The research 
questions proceed to ask “What can the STL do to respond to these challenges to its legitimacy? What 
is it realisitic to expect in terms of the longer-term impact ... in Lebanon? What message should it 
communicate to the Lebanese public in performing its work?” (ibid, p. 1067). Notice that the research 
questions do not ask whether the local perceptions and fears about the STL are justified in any way; 
for example the fear that it may be politicised within Lebanon and instrumentalised by foreign powers. 
The authors omit this question entirely in favour of system maintenance questions about how best to 
secure legitimacy and change perceptions. The use of the word perception, in itself, is interesting. It 
implies an understanding of legitimacy which is dependent on perception, as in the Weberian model, 
rather than a substantive set of inclusive and deliberative processes as in the Habermasian model (See 
chapter one). This distinction leaves no room for the consideration of what concrete practices of 
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legitimacy look like, and fall back on a relativist conception of legitimacy being in the eye of the 
beholder. This approach ensures that questions of ideological falisty and deception are literally 
unthinkable. The purpose outlined in this article, to change the inter-subjective understanding in 
Lebanon, can be understood as a hegemonic project if one were to determine that its aim is to 
naturalise processes of domination. Part of the reason for this system maintainence bias might be a 
common sense understanding which this article shares with that of Wetzel and Mitri (2008), namely 
that some selective “justice” is better than none.  
The selective nature of the STL’s justice does not in itself detract from the need for an 
accountability mechanism in the case of the murder of Rafiq Hariri and indeed others killed 
through political assassinations. The problem in Lebanon’s past has been too little justice. On 
this ground alone it may be irresponsible to oppose this first justice measure. (Wierda, Nassar, 
& Maalouf 2007, p. 1073) 
As stated earlier, this thesis wishes to critique this assumption through analysis of the architecture of 
power present in the sphere of the Lebanese State-Society and that of world order. It is the 
underdevelopment of this latter element which also accounts for some of the system-maintenence 
bias present in this article. Indeed, though the authors deal descriptively with inconsistency in 
prosecuting the Hariri case compared to the “international communities” lack of interest in the 2006 
war, it fails to question the mechanisms of power in world order which systematically distinguish 
between worthy and unworthy victims on a political basis, a phenomena highlighted in mass media 
by Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky (Herman, Chomsky 1988 [2008], p. 75- 114). Similarly, the 
article mentions the Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT), but only as one of many other tribunals which have faced 
“legitimacy problems” and been accused of having been foreign plots by host societies. They state 
that the perception in the region, that the IHT was a U.S. entity, was unfair because American staff 
were only involved in the investigation, not the prosecution (ibid, p.1075). This must betray an 
ideological blindess to the fact that the constitutional order, political and military conditions which 
made the IHT possible were of American occupation, itself arising from unilateral invasion (potentially 
amounting to the international crime of aggression) in 2003 (See Davies 2005).  Indeed, it seems telling 
that none of these early articles mention the controversial Iraq invasion or its link to the deteriorating 
relationships between pro-Western and “resistance” alliance which heralded the murder of Hariri. Nor 
do they question the fact that the two principle states that initiated the invasion are permanent UNSC 
members. Nor do they reflect on how the structure of that organ might lead to systematic injustices 
and impunity for permanent members and their allies. Moreover, they do not reflect on the bitter 
irony that these actors, which had previously made arguments disregarding international law, were 
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now using it to pursue their enemies. It is these inconsistencies, particularly how certain actors are 
enabled through structures of world order to weaponise and target enemy actors with ICL, rendering 
some victims and perpetrators invisible, and the ideological complicity of liberal ICJ and TJ scholars 
and practitioners, which this thesis seeks to highlight and critique. It is for these reasons that it will go 
beyond the common sense understanding that some “justice” is better than none, to one which 
analyses the structural factors which, whilst ensuring justice for some victims, systematically denies it 
to others.  
 
Appeals chamber interlocutory decision on applicable law 2011  
 
 On 17th January 2011 the prosecutor submitted indictments to the Pre-Trial judge for 
confirmation. This prompted the Pre-Trial Judge to submit a request to the Appeals Chamber for a 
ruling on 15 questions of law (Gillett & Schuster 2011, p. 990). The Appeals Chamber published its 
interlocutory decision on 16th February 2011 (ibid, p. 990). This decision led to two symposiums in two 
prominent journals of international law, The Leiden Journal of International Law and the Journal of 
International Criminal Justice. The former constituted contributions from Professor Kai Ambos of 
Gottingen University (District Court Judge) with Barrister and Legal Scholar Professor Ben Saul. The 
latter comprised contributions from Matthew Gillett and Mathias Schuster, legal officers in the office 
of the Prosecutor at ICTY, with Manuel J. Ventura, Law Clerk to the Chief Justice of the Constitutional 
Court of South Africa and previously intern to President Antonio Cassesse at the STL. The primary 
reasons for the controversial nature of the decision is that it opined that there is, in existence, a 
customary international peacetime crime of terrorism and, moreover, that this can be used to 
interpret (or overrule) the Lebanese definiton of terrorism in Article 314 of LPC, which the STL statute 
identified as the applicable definition of terorrism at the STL. This raises both a potential contradiction 
between the statute of the STL and the Appeals Chamber on the one hand, and between international 
and Lebanese law on the other. Therefore this decision was one which the majority of the scholars 
discussed found troubling.  
The interlocutory decision on applicable law 2011 accepted that, as Jurdi had understood it in 
2007, the statute was to apply the national Lebanese definition of terrorism. However, having 
confirmed this, it then proclaimed that the Lebanese definition could be freely interpreted with 
reference to the customary international law definition of terrorism, utilising an interpretive method 
which applies interpretation to all texts, not simply specific statutory lacunae or unclear language, as 
is the case with legal positivism (Ambos 2011, p. 658). As Saul notes “... whereas the Lebanese law, on 
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its face, recognizes only certain stipulated methods of perpetrating terrorism (such as bombs), 
additional unspecified methods (such as guns or knives and so forth) are now recognized by importing 
the international customary crime (which is said not to be limited to enumerated means or methods).” 
(Saul 2011, p. 679-680). In addition, Ambos notes that the Decision interprets the means liable to 
create a public hazard, stipulated in Article 314 LPC, as including indirect, as well as direct, 
consequences such as the violent reactions of the supporters of assassinated leaders, not just the 
direct consequences of using bombs in a public space (Ambos 2011, p. 661). He argues that this is 
problematic as it potentially “leads to a limitless expansion of the offence.” (ibid, p. 661). Ambos 
(2011), Saul (2011) and Gillett and Schuster (2011) all problematise liability expansion with recourse 
to the nullum crimen sine lege principle rule of law, which provides protection from retroactive (post-
facto) punishment. Saul (2011, p. 680) is the most strident in his criticism as he argues “The effect of 
the Decision is really to criminalize new conduct and thereby to import a new offence into Lebanese 
law.” However, Ventura (2011) argues that the Appeals Chamber was quite within its rights to do this 
because Article 314 does not provide an exhaustive list of means. Accordingly, it was only Lebanese 
judicial interpretation which had limited the means defined as terrorism in Lebanese courts, not the 
LPC itself. This speaks to the identity of the STL itself which, as a hybrid ad-hoc entity, contains both 
international and Lebanese judges. Thus, he argues that the Decision does not expand the codified 
definition, but instead takes issue with the way it has been interpreted (ibid, p.1038). However, 
concerns regarding this aspect of the Decision have not gone away. Eric Stier (2014, p. 123) has argued 
that, whilst the means enumerated in Article 314 are not exhaustive, “… the act must be committed 
by a particular class of means—those inherently liable to create a public danger.” or as Ambos (2011, 
p. 661) puts it “... the means listed share a common characteristic ... once they are employed ... they  
cannot be controlled.” Given the discussion of the link between assassination and massacre explored 
in chapter two, the Decision rationale for interpreting uncontrollable means of creating public danger 
to include targeted assassinations, in the Lebanese context, is understandable. However, from a legal 
and human rights perspective, these indirect/intangible threats are ill-defined and do not equate to 
the uncontrollable means specified in the LPC Article 314. After all, there is nothing indirect about 
being the superfluous victim of an explosion. The upshot is that the decisions’ methodology imported 
new criminal liabilities from international law in to Lebanese and potentally applied this definition 
retroactively (against human rights principles).  
 The interlocutory decision on applicable law 2011 was also notable for the finding that there 
exists a customary international peacetime crime of terrorism. Ambos (2011) and Saul (2011) both 
argue, to differing extents, that the Decision is incorrect and that terrorism is not yet a customary 
crime. However, both Gillett and Schuster (2011) and Ventura (2011) argue that Ambos and Saul’s 
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approaches are too formalistic and thus restrictive of jurisprudential development of the law. Ambos’ 
(2011, p. 655-656) central arguments are that firstly, the Appeals Chamber’s discussion of terrorism is 
superfluous given that Article 314 LCC definition is unambiguous. Moreover, he states that the 
Decision is incorrect and that terrorism constitutes only a serious treaty-based offence but is not yet 
part of customary international law. The difference being that the former relates to suppression 
treaties which encourage/enable coordination of domestic jurisdictions whilst the latter affirm the 
conduct as liable for prosecution by truly international jurisdictions.  
 Whilst other scholars focus on multiple outcomes of the Decision, Saul’s article focuses solely 
on the Decision’s finding that terrorism is a customary international crime. He is also the most critical 
of the Decision of all the scholars discussed. Indeed he argues that, in addition to ignoring sources of 
law which might contradict the Decision’s finding,”... all the sources of custom relied upon by the 
Appeals Chamber – national legislation, judicial decisions, regional and international treaties, and UN 
resolutions – were misinterpreted, exaggerated, or erroneously applied.” (Saul 2011, p. 677). It should 
be noted that Saul states that he submitted an Amicus Curiae brief to the STL prior to the 2011 
Decision, but it was rejected as it was one day over the deadline. He describes the STL’s call for brief’s 
as “little publicised” (ibid, p. 677). In addition, it is clear from the references that both he, and the 
President of the STL Antonio Cassesse, released textbooks on terrorism in ICL in the 2000’s which came 
to opposite conclusions regarding the crime’s status. Saul clearly feels that his is the majority view, as 
he points out that neither the STL prosecution or defence, nor “... the majority of states and scholars ... 
recognise a customary crime of terrorism, with the prominent exception of one eminent jurist, 
Antonio Cassesse, who happened to be President of the Appeals Chamber...”(ibid, p. 678). Ambos 
(2011) supports this view. Thus, Saul examines the Decision’s use of sources in order to demonstrate 
the charges he levels at the decision. He criticises the method by which the Decision affirms the 
statutory restriction of applicable law to the LPC article 314 but then subverts this by finding that all 
states interpret their own legislation in line with the relevant international provisions (Saul 2011 
p.680). To summarise what is a lengthy critique, Saul analyses the sources the Decision relies upon; 
national legislation, UNSC resolutions, national judicial decisions, international treaties, regional 
treaties and UNGA resolutions. Simplifying further, Saul’s critique of the Decision’s use of 37 national 
laws revolves around the argument that there are fundamental conceptual differences between the 
laws cited, some of which are broad and some specific. The Appeals Chamber, following Cassesse, 
held the opinion that the customary crime of terrorism contains a transnational element. Saul points 
to the fact that few national sources cited provide for a transnational element, including Lebanon’s, 
undermining the Decision’s own rationale. He argues that the concepts are even more heterogenous 
if one considers the approximately 160 states not included. However, one of his most negative 
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observations is that the Decision drew upon national terrorism laws which transgress human rights 
law; Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Uzbekistan (ibid, p. 683). He states “It is problematic to say the least for 
the Appeals Chamber to seek to evidence custom by relying on national laws that violate existing 
international human-rights law. Such national laws are simply unlawful under international law” (ibid, 
p.684). The transnational element is interesting as the literature indicates its presence can be detected 
in two ways. Firstly, by empirical evidence of transnational activities or actors involved in the crime 
(Ambos 2011, p. 667). Another, seemingly exclusive indication, is the presence of international (UNSC, 
UNGA) condemnation (See Ventura 2011). This gives rise to a legal tautology which proceeds that this 
terrorist act is transnational and therefore the UNSC/UNGA labelled it as such. We know that the 
terrorist act was transnational because the UNSC identified it as such. In this formulation the evidence 
for the claim is the action itself and it includes no external criteria by which to review it as a truth 
claim. It is actually not a truth claim but a speech act. This highlights the centrality of the UNSC in ICL 
reasoning, namely, that the UNSC speech act of declaring something has the same, if not greater, 
status than that of a material condition. Whilst one might protest that the UNGA has this power too, 
it is ultimately subject to UNSC veto. Thus, in actuality, only those speech acts of the UNGA not vetoed 
by the UNSC become the basis for initiating tribunals. This explains why the repeated UNGA 
condemnations of Israeli actions, for example, are never institutionalised in this way. A good example 
of this phenomena for comparison with the STL case is that of UNGA resolution 123 of its 37th session 
in 1982. Here, it described the Israeli invasion of Lebanon at that time as including two of the most 
serious core crimes in international law, aggression and genocide (See Dag Hammarskjöld Library 
2018). Needless to say, despite their long establishment as core international crimes from Nuremberg 
onwards, these UNGA speech acts were never institutionalised in the manner of the STL.  
 Saul critiques each of the sources relied on in the 2011 decision through similar modes. For 
example, he criticises the Appeals Chambers’ use of UNSC resolutions 1373 and 1566, the so called 
terrorism suppression treaties, to define and identify an extant core international crime of terrorism. 
In his discussion of UNSC resolution 1373, he points out that this was not a criminal definition or 
liability for terrorism in the international sphere, but a post-9/11 inducement to states to criminalise 
and suppress terrorism nationally (Saul 2011, p. 685). In the ensuing rounds of criminalisation at the 
national level, heterogenous definitions proliferated which were cynically employed by many state 
authorities to compromise human and political rights (ibid, p. 685). With regard to 1373s’ successor, 
UNSC resolution 1566, he argued that, though it encompassed a human rights compatible definition 
of terrorism, it was non-binding and states generally did not revisit their laws after the UNSC resolution 
1373 round of legislation. Moreover, he argues that the definition contained in 1566, which reclassifies 
as terrorist, criminal acts which have the intent to intimidate populations or compel institutions, is 
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conceptually at odds with the crime identified in the 2011 STL Decision which has an open-ended 
means criteria (ibid, p. 686).  
The cumulative effect of the Decision’s methods of interpetation and findings, Saul argues, is 
that “… it is an example of a judiciary transforming itself into a global legislature, creating entirely new 
law and exceeding the accepted bounds of the judicial function.” (ibid, p. 678). This is a concern 
highlighted also in Gillett and Schuster (2011, p. 999) and Stier (2014, p. 127). Saul concludes that the 
2011 Decision is problematic for four reasons. He states that bad juducial decisions, not only 
undermine public confidence, but also “… take on a life of their own: the incantatory power of an 
international tribunal is such that what it says is the law, is the law...” (Saul 2011, p. 699 emphasis in 
original). Moreover, Saul is concerned about the human rights of defendents under what he sees as 
an ex-post facto application of a customary law (which he argues does not exist) to a crime in 2005 
“even if the conduct of such persons is morally abhorrent” (ibid, p.699). He argues that one of the 
weakest aspects of the Decision is that it determined that a customary crime of terrorism had 
coalesced, but that the decision could not pin-point when this had happened. He notes that it must 
have coalesced before 2005 to avoid the claim it was ex-post facto, but he is sceptical that this was 
the case. Lastly, he highlights broader issues arising from the tribunal’s use of case prescedent for 
repressive national anti-terror laws, legitimising them and offering encouragement to repressive 
regimes to label dissent as terrorism (ibid, p. 699). Saul’s article offers insight into the ways in which 
Decisions, in becoming case precedent, do not simply describe facts but constitute facts and enable 
speech acts. Moreover, it demonstrates the ways in which authoritarianism and security states can be 
strengthened, not only in the host state, but also in states globally, through the sources of legislation 
and case precedent drawn on and dialectically recycled. Finally, it hints at the power of activist 
judiciaries to pursue their vision of what the law should be at international tribunals. Arguably, more 
than many other disciplines, in law we find evidence of what Anthony Giddens (1987, p. 19) terms the 
‘double hermenutic’ whereby ‘The concepts and theories invented by social scientists ... circulate in 
and out of the social world they are coined to analyse.’ In the case of the 2011 decision it is even more 
pronounced, a Legal Scholar and practitioner, Antonio Cassesse, was enabled through his positioned 
practice at the STL, to ensure his version of terrorism law became ‘true’, rather than another. 
  Both Gillett and Schuster (2011) and Ventura (2011) disagree with Saul. The former scholars 
accept that there might be some merit to the notion that the decision was superfluous, as Ambos 
(2011) argues. They argue, however, that the use of sources by the tribunal to suppliment, rather than 
override, the LPC was acceptable (Gillett & Schuster 2011, p. 1000). With regard to the Decision’s use 
of interpretive method, the authors (2011, p. 1007) argue that the use of a “line-of-best-fit” was the 
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most appropriate to take in the circumstances. This method sought common elements of a crime of 
terror present in the sources used in the Decision, rather than relying on the formal method of insisting 
on totally identical concepts. As Ventura (2011, p. 1032) states “... it [the Appeals Chamber] looked 
behind the words of the definitions themselves; substance and not form was determinative.” Thus, 
whilst Saul finds that, because national laws cited do not uniformly identify a “transnational element” 
in their concept of terrorism, the Decision is flawed, Ventura sees no such problem. Following the 
Decision methodology, Ventura (2011, p. 1035) finds it acceptable that the three elements of 
customary terror identified, can come from different sources. This he argues is a necessity, as 
terrorism in international law has been incrementally developed and has not had a historical 
watershed moment which other core crimes have had. It is morally unjustifiable for Ventura that this 
should allow terrorists to escape justice. Thus, whilst national laws might cite the need for an act 
intended to compel or intimidate an authority or population, it is only when read with international 
sources which expressly identify a “transnational element” that, the whole, forms the customary 
crime of transnational terrorism (ibid, p. 1030). Notice, that this assumes something approximating a 
rule by which national laws are applied with reference to international sources, normatively elevating 
international law above national law.  
 Gillett and Schuster (2011), whilst agreeing that the Decision was correct to follow a less 
formal route to establishing terrorism under customary international law, criticise the specific 
formulation. Inter alia they state that the use of the phrase “and so on” (a phrase also used in the LPC 
Article 314) with regard to enumarated means “leaves the ambit of this objective element vague and 
open to expansive interpretation.” (Ibid, p. 1010). In combination with other conceptual issues, the 
authors argue that “The Appeals Chamber’s definition potentially provides a powerful legal tool to 
governments wishing to quash and punish opposition and dissent. It can only be hoped that it will not 
be misused in this respect.” (ibid, p. 1011). Thus, they concur with Saul regarding the problematic 
nature of the decision for human rights. Prior to the conceptual problem, the authors also identify a 
potentially more fundamental problem arising from the development of the STL’s Rule of Procedure 
and Evidence (RPE). They outline the way in which the time between the STL’s opening in 2009 and 
the submission of indictments in 2011 was spent creating the RPE. They particularly draw attention to 
rule 68G RPE and its suppliment rule 176 bis; the cumulative effect of which is to introduce a procedure 
which allows the pre-Trial Judge to submit preliminary questions to the Appeals Chamber and for the 
Appeals Chamber to make final pronouncements, even before a case has come before the STL (Ibid, 
p. 992). This is the procedure which allowed the 2011 Decision to happen in the first place. The authors 
note that such an RPE rule is unique and potentially contradicts the statute which outlined the Appeals 
Chamber’s role as one of (unsurprisingly) hearing appeals from defendents and ruling on them with 
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facts of the case before them (ibid, p. 993). Instead, the authors point out that the RPE allow the 
Appeals Chamber to pronounce on law in the abstract, which they oppose. It is this procedure which 
opens up the STL to being accused of transforming into a legislature. The authors identify two core 
problems arsing from the RPE. Firstly, they note the disinfranchisement of the Trial Chamber which is 
not consulted in this process and which is reduced to applying the law which the Appeals Chamber 
decided upon, rather than developing it during trial with the facts of the case in front of them (ibid, p. 
993). Secondly,  
the rule amendments were passed just in time for the submission of the STL’s first indictment 
to the Pre-Trial Judge. This leaves the court open to criticism that the Judges acted in their 
quasi-legislative capacity with one specific case in mind and that it was already a virtual 
certainty that the Pre-Trial Judge would make use of the discretionary procedure to enable 
the Appeals Chamber to pronounce on the law. (ibid, p. 993- 994) 
These analyses and insights are useful for a critical project as they address the structure and formation 
of the court which has enabled certain actions and do not simply see structure as given. In addition, it 
suggests a power relationship within the STL, where a subservient pre-Trial Judge and activist Appeals 
Chamber have extended their power over the Trial Chamber. Finally, it does raise the question of 
whether the STL had particular adversaries in mind when it was pronouncing on the law in the 
abstract. The view that the RPE was designed to target is further supported by the fact that prominent 
Lebanese Judge, Ralph Riachi, wrote of his support for in absentia trials that were enabled by the RPE 
which he himself was involved in writing. As Muhamad Mugraby (2008, p. 189) notes 
Judge Riashi had been a key Lebanese negotiator on behalf of the Lebanese Ministry of Justice 
and had conducted discussions with the office of the secretary general over the drafts for the 
proposed Hariri court instruments. Riashi’s conduct of negotiations on behalf of the minister 
of justice was obviously in blatant violation of the constitutional rule of separation of powers 
and of the constitution that plainly gives the president of the republic exclusive power over 
the negotiation of international agreements. 
Thus, these rules too, regardless of merit, might well have been tailored for a particular adversary in 
the context of a domestic political conflict in which Judge Riachy was a partisan actor. It is notable 
that, Muhamad Mugraby is a Lebanese human rights lawyer but his oft-cited 2008 article The 
Syndrome of One-Time Exceptions and the Drive to Establish the Proposed Hariri Court, in contra-
distinction to the majority of ICJ literature, appear in the journal Mediterranean Politics, which is 
generally associated with area studies, political science and IR. This should not be a surprise to the 
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extent that Mugraby has been an activist against the politicisation of the Lebanese judiciary for many 
years and has suffered harassment by Lebanese authorities which has even prompted Amnesty 
International to release a public statement condemning his treatment (See Amnesty International 
2008). Thus, when Mugraby makes the argument that the STL contributes towards an already existing 
system of selective justice in Lebanon, he is someone who has credibility and yet who is strangely 
marginal from the institution itself and to the ICJ discourse conducted in its primary journals.  
 
Decision on the Defence Challenges to the Jurisdiction and Legality of the Tribunal 
2012 
 
 In May 2012 the defence teams in the central cases at the STL (Ayyash et al.) in a preliminary 
motion challenged both the legality and jurisdiction of the tribunal. This related to the law consituting 
(UNSC) and constituted (STL) actors, respectively (See Matthews 2014). In response, the Trial Chamber 
released a Decision, followed three months later by an Appeals Chamber Decision (ibid, p. 138). Both 
chambers rejected the motion, but in different ways. This precipitated further scholarly interest, with 
articles in the Journal of International Criminal Justice by Professor Jose Alvarez (2013) with Mariya 
Nikolova and Manuel Ventura (2013). It also featured in an edited collection Critical Approaches to 
International Law by Christine Schwobel in chapters by Michelle Burgis-Kasthala (2014) and more 
directly by Heidi Matthews (2014).   
The challenges mounted by the defence amounted to claims that Lebanese sovereignty was 
violated, either through improper imposition of a treaty (See Fassbender 2007) or the 
unconstitutionality of UNSC resolution 1757. Similarly, the defence challenged the UNSC 
interpretation of the Harriri assassination as a threat to international peace and security and therefore 
argued that the UNSC had abused its power by establishing the STL in response. They further 
submitted that the potential extradition of the defendents to such a selective tribunal would 
compromise their human right to be tried in a tribunal legally constituted (Alvarez 2013, p. 12; Burgis-
Kasthala 2014, p. 257). Alvarez (2013, p. 4) argues that the RPE rule 90(E) did not provide for this kind 
of fundamental challenge, but only for jurisdictional challenges which contest the content of 
indictments. This is striking given that these challenges had been presaged, either in whole or in part, 
from before the STL’s establishment by both critics and non-critics (See Fassbender 2007, Mugraby 
2008, Nashabe 2012, Abboud, Muller 2012, Abboud, Muller 2013). Why fundamental challenges to 
legality were not written into the STL RPE seems somewhat questionable, given their completely 
predicatable nature. Alvarez (2013, p. 4) explains that the relevant RPE was constructed to reproduce 
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rule 72(D) from the ICTY and ICTR. 72(D) was a response to a legality and jurisdictional challenge and 
Decision made in the case of Dusko Tadic at ICTY, to prevent the repetition of the same challenge by 
multiple defendants after it had been dealt with in the Tadic Decision in 1998. However, he critiques 
this on the basis that the Ayyash et al. challenges were “not simply a rehash of those asked and 
answered by the Tadic Tribunal” (ibid, p. 9). In considering whether to answer the defence motions, 
the Trial Chamber argued that the motions were improperly conceived as they related to legality 
questions and not jurisdictional questions. This line of reasoning was based on the conception of a 
seperation of these concepts (Nikolova & Ventura 2013, p. 616). Moreover, the Trial Chamber argued 
that the inherent competence de la competance of the STL to review its legality did not extend to 
reviews of, inter alia, UNSC actions (ibid, p. 616). However, it agreed to review aspects of the 
challenges in so far as guaranteeing the defendents their right to a trial in a tribunal constituted 
lawfully. In the Trial Chamber’s Decision, it held that the STL was lawfully created precisely because 
Chapter VII gives the right of creation to the UNSC (Ibid, p. 617). However, the Trial Chamber refused 
to engage in reviewing the UNSC in its determination of a threat to international peace and security 
or the creation of the STL as a correct response (ibid, p. 617). 
The Appeals Chamber, in considering the Trial Chamber’s decision, agreed with it on the point 
that the UNSC had not imposed a treaty with resolution 1757, but had acted with Chapter VII powers 
which were its prerogative and that the STL had no remit to review the UNSC (Ibid, p. 617). This was 
based on the positivist argument that neither the Statute, nor the UN Charter, explicitly provide the 
STL with powers to review the UNSC (Alvarez 2013, p. 6-7). It held that the Trial Chamber had 
tangentially reviewed the UNSC by reviewing the human rights aspects of the defence motions and 
that it should not have addressed even this truncated element (ibid, p. 7). STL President David 
Baragwanath (who replaced Antonio Cassesse after his Death in 2011) offered a partially dissenting 
opinion to his colleagues in the Appeals Chamber on the basis that “Since the (STL) Statute entitled 
the accused to a fair and expeditious trial, the rules could not be interpreted so as to have the opposite 
effect.” (Nikolova & Ventura 2013 , p. 618). Both Alvarez (2013) and Nikolova and Ventura (2013) 
critise the Appeals Chamber Decision. Alvarez (2013) argues that the refusal to even hear the defence 
motion is problematic for the legitimacy of the STL and hopes that the Trial Chamber’s Decision is the 
one followed. This moves him to argue that it “seems motivated less by the law than by timidity and 
fear.” (Alvarez 2013, p. 10). The result, he argues, is that the Appeals Chamber has elevated the UNSC 
beyond any questions regarding the lawfulness of its actions and that we are already seeing the result 
of such a conception in cases referred by the UNSC to the ICC. He argues that the cases of Sudan and 
Libya show that selective jurisdiction only over certain people, in a certain time period, with the costs 
imposed on ICC parties rather than the UN, is now becoming the norm and the Appeals Decision 
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shields this kind of action (ibid, p. 11). Nikolova and Ventura (2013, p. 626) argue that the Appeals 
Decision undermines legitimacy and empowers those who consider the STL politicised. Both articles 
are unhappy that the Decision contradicts the Appeals Decision in Tadic, which did incidentally review 
and affirm UNSC use of Chapter VII powers. They consider the Appeals Decision to be a “retrograde 
decision” as a consequence (Alvarez 2013, p. 11).   
This Decision is also interesting to the extent that it garnered attention from scholars of Critical 
Legal Studies (CLS) towards the STL for the first time. These works demonstrate critical theoretical 
concerns in their approach. For example, Michele Burgess-Kasthala (2014) engages in a reflexive meta-
analysis of the epistemic community of ICL scholars and lawyers, which none of the other work in this 
chapter finds remotely necessary. She does so with recourse to a theory of identity which emphasises 
narratives (ibid, p. 247). The narrative of ICL she identifies revolves around a liberal vision of historical 
progress which extends itself globally. She also notes that the colonial roots of ICL are disavowed 
through emphasis of “rupture,” not continuity (ibid, p. 248). However, she argues that the binaries of 
civilized/barbarian typical of this era have been replaced in the post-colonial world by binary 
oppositions of ostensibly a-political, functional legal institutions, on the one hand, and politically 
disfunctional (failed) states, on the other (ibid, p. 249). She identifies the core narrative goal for ICL as 
“ending impunity.” (ibid, p. 250). Theoretically, the chapter argues for an ideational and institutional 
focus, thus positioning the institution of the STL and the ideas it promotes more fully within the 
Lebanese context of its operation. Morevoer, the system-maintenance bias and un-critical, unreflexive 
nature of ICL scholarship is problematised.  
Utilising the central premise or suspicion of CLS that “law is nothing but politics all the way 
down.” (Matthews 2014, p. 151), Burgess-Kasthala outlines three narrative devices which have been 
applied to the STL; internationalisation, depoliticisation and naturalisation (Ibid, p. 247).  Whilst 
internationalisation is premised on inadequacy of national institutions, depoliticisation invokes the 
binary of apolitical international law and politicised locality (ibid, p. 247). From here certain 
relationships and modes of interaction become naturalised. Applying this to the 2012 Decision on 
defence motions, she notes that arguements about the violation of Lebanese sovereignty and 
constitutional processes were dealt with by STL President Baragwanath through the argument that 
UNSC statements on terrorism made the tribunal unexceptional, despite being the first to try this 
crime (ibid, p. 257). She states “The pre-eminence of UNSC action emerges not only from the UN 
Charter itself, but also the Lebanese Constitution …” (ibid, p. 258). Once this process of 
internationalisation took place, she argues, it precluded any arguments based on sovereignty or 
constitutional processes. The imposition of the familiar law/politics binary was the method by which 
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the STL depoliticised its existence and selectivity, by refusing to review the political power of the UNSC. 
The appearance of neutrality with regard to Lebanese politics is also paramount according to Burgess-
Kasthala. This critical approach is useful in understanding the processes of power relations expressed 
in STL Decisions and overlap to a large extent with the analyses contained in this thesis.  
Questions pertaining to the alleged colonial/post-colonial “rupture” identified by Burgess-
Kasthala are extended and addressed by a comparative historical analysis of the European Commission 
for Syria in this thesis (See chapter three). This thesis differs from Burgess-Kasthala’s work to the 
extent that it draws on Gramscian and Frankfurt School Critical theories concerning ideological 
hegemony, but in its overall critical concern with reflexive meta-analysis of the operation of epistemic 
communities, institutions and ideologies through violation of disciplinary boundaries, its analytical and 
normative purpose is very similar. This is reflected in the bibliography which includes both Legal 
scholarship and key multidisciplinary scholarship on Lebanon’s state, society and history. This makes 
it unlike ICJ approaches (which acount for the vast majority of legal scholarship on the STL), which are 
largely diciplinarily self-referential and hermetically sealed from multidisciplinary scholarship.  
  The ICL narrative identified by Burgess-Kasthala (2014, p. 255) that the draft UN treaty which 
was not ratified in 2007 was a domestic failure necessitating a UNSC Chapter VII resolution becomes 
questionable when one looks at the literature pertaining to the Lebanese state-society complex. 
Indeed, it is arguable that the constitution did not fail, but performed exactly as planned. The 
consociational checks in the Lebanese political system have been developed to pre-empt confessional 
conflict and to counteract the international patron-seeking behaviour typical of the elite. This is not 
an abstract theory, but one borne out of the historical experience of the 1958 civil war, which was 
induced by President Chamoun’s attempt to violate the “national pact” by signing the U.S.-led 
baghdad pact. From this time, the constitution was amended to ensure that only if the will of the main 
communities, embodied by the President, Prime Minister and Speaker, was behind a treaty, could it 
be signed. In the case of the STL, the President refused to ratify, as did the speaker of the house. This 
should not be read as an endorsement of consociationalism, indeed, from a Critical Realist (CR) 
perspective, consociationalism reproduces antagonisitic communities in the long term. However, in 
the short term, it does function to regulate confessional relationships and conflict and, more 
importantly, this has been developed through domestic Lebanese experience and bloodshed. 
Therefore one might question the right, or the wisdom, of top-down UN institutions subverting these 
constitutional provisions when they do not agree with the outcome. Moreover, description of the 
functioning of consociational checks and balances as state or institutional failure is incorrect and 
reflects a lack of contextual knowledge on the Lebanese state-society. It is in the forced establishment 
126 
 
of the STL, as Burgess-Kasthala identifies (2014, p. 255), that one detects the false universality applied 
when characterising the consociational system as dysfunctional or the Lebanese as unified in their 
approval of the UNSC exercise of its chapter VII powers. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Scholarship on the formation of the STL in 2007 clearly understood the statute to mean that 
the applicable law was to be the Lebanese Penal Code (LPC). In none of the literature reviewed was 
there an assumption that ICL would trump the LPC. Nor was there an assumption that an core 
international crime of terrorism existed. The 2011 Decision on applicable law clearly subverted these 
expectations and, given that none of the academic literature on the 2007 Decision thought there was 
an international crime of terrorism, it is hard to see how anyone in Lebanon in 2005 could have known 
that this was an international crime. It seems not unreasonable to infer that the imposition (and 
retroactive creation) of an international criminal law of transnational terrorism was more to do with 
pursuing the global agenda of the war on terrorism and the long held dream of a much respected, 
ailing member of the ICL community, Antonio Cassese, than it did with ending impunity. 
 
The 2012 Decision on defence motions completes the picture when considered with the earlier 
literature. Given that the Appeals Chamber in this decision was the same (with the exception of its 
president) as the one which issued the 2011 decision on applicable law, it is interesting to note the 
differences in its approach. In the earlier decision the Appeals Chamber employed an unorthodox 
intepretive method and was applauded in some quarters for avoiding methodological formalism 
(Gillett & Schuster 2011; Ventura 2011).  This allowed it to interpret multiple sources freely to state 
that there was, in existence, a customary international crime of terrorism. Moreover, it allowed it to 
make an argument that Lebanese law should be read in compliance with international provisions 
whenever possible, despite no formal rule existing to back up this assertion. Thus, the STL imported 
international definitions into Lebanese law and bypassed the statute. With the 2012 decision, the 
Appeals Chamber relied on positivist arguments, leading Alvarez (2014, p. 300) to refer to them as 
“these positivist judges”, in order to opine that they had no right to subject the actions of the UNSC 
to judicial oversight, arguing they had not been formally given a mandate in their statute to do so. 
What explains this methodological about-face in just the space of a few months? It could be the 
change of president. However, if one considers the political effects of the decision outcomes with 
respect to host-state and world order, things become clearer. The 2011 decision, aided by unique RPE, 
allowed the Appeals Chamber to pronounce on the law, in effect legislating. At the same time, the use 
127 
 
of interpretation allowed it to assert the primacy of international law over national law which was 
now expected to interpret its domestic provisions in line with international definitions. Meanwhile, 
the 2012 decision, in the words of Heidi Matthew’s (2014, p. 148) anointed the UNSC as “global 
sovereign”, unfettered by legal oversight of its political powers. The outcome can be summarised thus; 
that the cumulative effect was to empower international law at the expense of national and to 
empower the UNSC at the expense of international law and national law.  
Power thus flows upward, from the Lebanese state-society to international legal institutions 
and from there, to the UNSC. The retention and expansion of UNSC power over the mechanisms of 
law, domestic and international, and their subsequent impunity from justice, is the common 
denominator of these methodologically disperate decisions. Review of this literature also reveals a 
spectrum of ICL scholarship. At one end is ICJ which accounts for the majorty of ICL scholarship on the 
STL and which utilise hermetically sealed and disciplinarily self-referential bibliographies to apply legal 
reasoning to positive law and modes of interpretation. Anything which can be classified as a critique 
in ICJ arises from this narrowly applied, self-referential disciplinary space. Political context of the host-
state is generally underdeveloped. Moreover, reflexive meta-analysis of the discipline, its links to and 
exercises of power, and its assumptions, are totally excluded or naturalised. The TJ approach explored 
here has a more open bibliography and a more contextual analysis of the historical and political 
background of Lebanon. However, it appears to retain a system-maintenance bias and an approach to 
legitimacy which treats it as a perception rather than a practice. This may reflect its maintence of the 
key narratives which Burgess-Kasthala (2014, p. 250) identifies within Liberal ICL narratives, that it is 
naturalised as unwaveringly progressiving towards ending impunity. CLS apparantly exists on the other 
end of the spectrum where political context, both of world order and regional are analysed. The 
bibliographies of CLS reflect, similarly, multidisciplinary engagement. CLS appears to also take as part 
of its mandate, a reflexive meta-analysis of the the activities of the epistemic community of ICL within 
world order in general, and in the STL case in particular. Both TJ and CLS are vastly outnumbered in 
ICL accounts of the STL by ICJ accounts.  
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Chapter Five: Walid Jumblatt’s evidence 4-5th May 2015 
 
Introduction 
 
Chapters five and six analyse four days of evidence given by veteran Lebanese politician, Walid 
Jumblatt, in his capacity as a witness to the STL in May 2015. The transcripts are subjected to the CDA 
method elaborated in chapter one, with the purpose of highlighting any structures of ideology and 
power present. The importance and role of Jumblatt, in both the STL specifically and Lebanese politics 
generally, is an overtly stated theme in the testimony. To better understand and critique this 
discourse, however, a slightly wider introduction to the man is offered here to contrast the 
introduction given at the STL itself. His war record is only very tangentially touched on and thus we 
must understand what the potential alternative discursive renderings of Jumblatt might be, 
particularly MR which frames him as a warlord. This is not to single out Jumblatt or to imply that the 
alleged crimes he has been associated with are worse than other Lebanese Zu’ama. Indeed, in some 
cases they may be less serious and the fact that he put his head above the parapet at all by coming to 
the STL is, in some ways, commendable. Rather, it is to demonstrate that it is impossible to know much 
with certainty under the present conditions of amnesty/amnesia and it also serves to destabilise the 
representations of Jumblatt given at the STL. Jumblatt is the only member of this wartime Zu’ama 
class to have graced this tribunal and therefore, he has been selected for analysis due to his mere 
presence. 
 
Kamal Jumblatt  
 
 The STL’s introduction to Jumblatt starts with prosecutor Mr Cameron describing him as “a 
figure of considerable significance and force in Lebanese politics for many decades.” (The Prosecutor 
versus Ayyash et al. 2015a, p.2) which utilises value neutral formal vocabulary. Indeed, what the force 
and significance constitute is left to the audience’s divergent MR. The introduction emphasises the 
prescribed focus of the STL and the ways in which Jumblatt’s evidence will contribute to this case. 
Repetition of hyponyms is used to draw attention to the social relationships which matter in the STL’s 
context, “He was a friend, confidant, and most particularly ally of the late Prime Minister Hariri.” (ibid, 
p. 2 emphasis added). Cameron then enumerates the topics Jumblatt is to elaborate for the STL; 
President Lahoud’s extension, the adoption of UNSC resolution 1559, the anti-Syrian coalition, Rafik 
Hariri’s role, and their mutual assessment of the chances of their own assassination (ibid, p.2-3). This 
all serves to focus attention towards the STL’s purpose and delimits the possible questions which can 
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be asked and the possible representations of Jumblatt in the hearing. This is a function of the limits of 
the STL’s loci, temporis and personae which were arrived at, not incidentally, but instrumentally as 
discussed in chapters three and four. Thus, the delimitation of the discourse type in this way is an 
example of power behind discourse. This is supplemented when Presiding Judge David Re states “I just 
need to get some personal details from you.” (ibid, p. 4), these details are dispassionate and formulaic; 
name: Walid Jumblatt, date and place of birth: Beirut 1949, nationality: Lebanese, occupation: leader 
of the PSP and Lebanese MP (ibid, p. 5). This checklist evokes MR relating to form-filling for official 
purposes and implies formality and factuality. This innocuous checklist implies objectivity where, in 
fact, it belies the political choices which have been made regarding what to include and not.   
 The next part of the introduction forms part of the initial questioning by Cameron of Jumblatt. 
Cameron attempts to set the parameters of the interaction “I'm going to, in a very brief way, take you 
through some of your background before asking you some different kinds of questions.” (ibid, p. 5). 
After noting Jumblatt’s attendance of the AUB, his attainment of “a bachelor’s degree in political 
science and public administration” (ibid, p. 5), his first job as a journalist at An-Nahar newspaper he 
begins questioning him about the PSP and Jumblatt makes his first considerable contribution, initiated 
through an interruption. Thus, Jumblatt challenges the structure of the interaction and imposes his 
own priorities on to the situation. One notes that after this initial interruption Jumblatt settles into 
the subservient script for questioning (until he is questioned by the defence team). One explanation 
is that Jumblatt takes a moment to acclimatise to the situation he is in, another is that this particular 
information and its framing is important to Jumblatt. “I was elected as the leader of that party after 
the death of my father in 1977. After the murder of my father in 1977, I was elected to head this 
party.” (ibid, p. 6). This statement is riven with repetition which indicates that these concepts are 
important to Jumblatt. Three of the repetitions are literal; elected, party and father. The first also 
possesses positive value in a liberal ideological framework and triggers MR regarding democracy. The 
democratic credentials of the PSP are a point of contestation later during defence interrogation and 
it is interesting that he emphasises it this early on. Party and father are important to Jumblatt for 
obvious reasons which shall not be laboured.  
The use of the synonyms leader and head are also self-evident but become legitimised as they 
are used in tandem with elected. This becomes an interesting juxtaposition to his description of the 
Syrian regime. Interestingly, the Syrian president was elected via a referendum for life (Blanford 2006, 
p. 6). Is this much different from the way Jumblatt has been elected to lead the PSP since 1977? Most 
importantly though, his use of the hyponyms death and murder serve as a sort of self-correction 
through which he emphasises the negative nature of his father’s demise, for while death is looked on 
as undesirable in most ideological frames, murder, however defined, is usually seen as totally negative 
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and is, at base, a legal term. Here, a theme is appearing. The STL is sitting to solve an unsolved elite 
assassination and here is another one just like it. The theme of Rafik Hariri and Kamal Jumblatt as 
national martyrs is one which Jumblatt embellishes throughout his evidence and here is the kernel of 
that idea from the start. The murder of a father is also something which naturally elicits sympathy and 
may also indicate a psychological need of Jumblatt’s to discuss, indeed testify, the murder of his father, 
after being unable to speak about it candidly or publicly during his alliance with Syria. Like most of 
Jumblatt’s statements, the grammar is of the declarative sort amounting to categorical commitment 
to the truth of the propositions. There is very little qualification or equivocation in Jumblatt’s discourse 
throughout these hearings and in this instance, at surface level, it leaves one with little doubt that he 
was elected leader of the PSP and that his father was murdered. This grammatical mode establishes 
him as an authoritative provider of information, particularly to those with patriarchal MR who value 
decisiveness over nuance.   
 Cameron attempts to establish the nature of the PSP as “a socialist party which opposes 
sectarianism in Lebanese politics and enjoys wide support from the members of the Druze 
community” (ibid, p. 6). Jumblatt reformulates this by emphasising “there is a big difference between 
the emergence and the creation of the party and what had happened now.” (ibid, p. 7.); namely that 
the parties’ original purpose had been to cut across vertical, sectarian distinctions and to reach out to 
other communities, which it did for a while, until the civil war circumscribed its reach. Once again, 
Jumblatt deflects questions about himself into discussions of his father. Specifically, the “ambition”, 
“determination” and “dream” (ibid, p.6-7) of Kamal to create a non-sectarian regime. The first two 
words are, in usual parlance, considered positive attributes. The dream metaphor is interesting on two 
levels. The first is the way in which dream conjures a romantic and even mystic imagery regarding his 
father, which is a recurring theme in Jumblatt’s discourse, particularly in relation to Kamal (and later 
Hariri’s) martyrdom. The second way becomes clear in its second usage by Jumblatt “the environment, 
the general atmosphere, did not allow me to carry on the dream of Kamal Jumblatt.” (ibid, p. 7). In 
this formulation, dream implies Kamal’s idealism and is juxtaposed to the necessity of Walid’s political 
realism. This is also a theme which resurfaces in the testimony and, in this instance, has the quality of 
a man pointing to the structural constraints upon his agency. This is significant in light of 
counternarratives concerning Walid Jumblatt, for example, Kamal Dib (2004, p.2) argues that he has 
“warlord status” by virtue of being “in control of thousands of militia men” and residing in a “historical 
palace” or in light of the “300,000 displaced civilians” created by his forces during the 1983-85 war of 
the mountain or the bombardment of east Beirut around the same time where Robert Fisk (2001, p. 
486) relates “In the streets, Christians showed me a seven-year-old girl lying dead beside her doll, an 
old man beheaded by a rocket fin.” In these circumstances, it is understandable why a discourse 
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emphasising structure and minimising agency begins emerging and how the somewhat common-
sense idea of realism obfuscates some of the ethically questionable actions taken by Zu’ama forces 
during the war. It is interesting to note that Dib (2004, p. 250) also makes a similar distinction, stating 
“After the murder of [Kamal] Joumblatt, the leadership fell to his son, the less doctrinaire but more 
Machiavellian Walid.” Note that the realism implied by Jumblatt himself implies a structural 
imperative, wear as Dibs’ vocabulary, Machiavellian, carries a decidedly more negative value 
judgement.  
 When questioning commences and Cameron asks Jumblatt “can you describe for me your 
relationship during the 1990s with the Syrian regime as the leader of the Druze community?” (The 
Prosecutor versus Ayyash et al. 2015a, p. 9). Jumblatt again brings focus back to the topic of his father’s 
assassination in 1977. His reply is characteristically declarative and categorical “It is the Syrian regime 
that assassinated Kamal Jumblatt” (ibid, p. 9), he leaves no room for doubt and he repeats and defends 
this assertion throughout his testimony. The answer continues with an adversative conjunction 
connecting the clauses 
but based on my conviction, that I belong to the Arab nationalism, and based on the threats 
that were surrounding Lebanon back then, I had no choice but to go to Lebanon [as  
interpreted] and to seal a deal, a political settlement, with those who assassinated Kamal 
Jumblatt. (ibid, p.9)  
Using the adversative but indicates Jumblatt believes his interlocutors would not expect him to ally 
with his fathers’ killers, and indeed this seems counterintuitive. However, he does lay out his reasons: 
Arab nationalism (ideological system of ideas) and threats (perceived material conditions). Arab 
nationalism relies on presuppositions of the audience and participants, as it has not yet been defined 
in the testimony. It relies therefore on the divergent MR of observers. Nevertheless, he overtly 
identifies with this position several times in what amounts to a speech act of declaration. This is likely 
a genuine gesture and, also, has the effect of displaying the correct identity to Lebanese and non-
Lebanese Arabs. Amongst a Western audience it is certainly a more acceptable modern identity than 
one based on religion given the dominating concern of Islamist extremism, and signals that he is a 
potential western ally. Arab nationalism can act as a sort of placeholder here in which relevant 
audiences can insert their own meanings. In terms of threats, these are identified as “a conspiracy” 
and “the Israelis” (ibid, p. 9). Jumblatt uses a negation “I had no choice” (Ibid, p. 9 emphasis added). 
Presenting his statement in the negated form like this has the effect of neutralising anyone in the 
intertextual context who might say that he did have a choice. Its use also serves to reduce his agency 
and choices and to emphasise the structural constraints which lead to a mono-logical conclusion, 
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namely his alliance with his father’s alleged murderers. Arab nationalism seems to invoke a script 
whereby Israelis and Zionism are so antithetical that they must be opposed always, and in solidarity 
with other Arabs, however those Arabs abuse you. Here we have the incipient creation of Pax Syriana, 
the hegemonic order which allowed the Syrian regime to establish its domination of Lebanon.  
The historic bloc being forged by Hafez appears to be achieved through subtle coercion and 
anonymous assassination of rivals. There seems to be an understanding here that these coercive 
practices are best left implied given that legitimacy and consent matter in the construction of 
hegemony. The forging of this bloc also relies on the ideological undergirding of Arab Nationalism, 
Jumblatt’s attested reason for joining Pax Syriana. We must also bear in mind that Pax Syriana, the 
local hegemony of Syria over Lebanon, was only achieved through its (eventual) successful integration 
into global American hegemony at the signing of the Taif accords. Syria was internationally recognised 
as bringing order to Lebanon and even cooperated with the U.S. in their 1990-1 war on Iraq in a quid 
pro quo (Kerr 2012, p. 32). Ironically, it was the 2003 Iraq war which undermined relations. Pax Syriana 
did not last long after the withdrawal of American support. The dynamic is one in which the major 
regional and global powers which constitute patrons come to an agreement by which dialectically 
related local and global hegemonies are forged and stability prevails, even if it is an exploitative 
stability. Arguably, the American-Syrian historic bloc was forged through instrumental considerations 
but never developed as mutually recognised ethico-political leadership, leading to its ultimate 
downfall.  
Jumblatt is then questioned about the grounds upon which he believes the Syrian regime 
murdered his father during which he gives this account.  
I still had some hair left on my head, he [Hafez Al-Assad] was surprised and he said, "You look 
a lot like your father." He was very surprised. And then we sat down and he started talking 
and talking … I didn't feel anything. I was surprised. I was looking at him from time to time: 
This is the man who ordered the killing of a prominent intellectual from this eastern part of 
the world, Kamal Jumblatt. (ibid, p. 14) 
Some of Jumblatt’s vocabulary relates to emotional state, surprise and feel. Other cues include 
positively valued vocabulary prominent and intellectual and repetition talking and talking and surprise. 
Grammatically, the sentences consist of complete, declarative sentences which represent categorical 
statements. The only negation in the text is “I didn’t feel anything.” (ibid, p. 14, emphasis added). 
These features are evocative of trauma which expresses itself as surprise and through Hafez talking 
and talking. What Hafez actually says is a distant significance to Jumblatt who is lost in his own 
thoughts “This is the man … ” (ibid, p. 14). This is compounded by the negation, as it is unusual for a 
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person to literally experience nothing emotionally, unless one has been subjected to a trauma. In the 
situation Jumblatt describes, the schema is a meeting in Damascus with the frame of creating an 
alliance. There is a tacit frame here in which Jumblatt is surrendering. Hafez occupies the subject 
position of host, superior leader, and victor. Jumblatt occupies the subject position of guest, 
subordinate leader and loser in relation to Hafez. The location of the meeting is an interesting 
indicator of superiority, being a guest in someone else’s house can be intimidating rather than 
welcoming. Hafez’s alleged line “You look a lot like your father.” (ibid, p. 14) takes on a chilling aspect 
considering Jumblatt’s belief about the identity of Kamal’s murderers. It appears as an indirect speech 
act, both a threat and a warning to Jumblatt to remain loyal to Syria. In relation to the STL, he occupies 
the position of victim to these events as well as witness. Jumblatt displays a desire to testify to his 
Father’s death and accuse his murderers in this public space (despite this being beyond the jurisdiction 
of the court).  
He also arguably displays trauma prompting sympathetic MR. This may not be a simple, factual 
testimony, but might constitute a cathartic, psychotherapeutic discourse type whereby Jumblatt can 
engage in a talking cure or simply obtain some recognition of his loss. Interestingly, recognition is a 
key aspect of TJ processes, indicating that, despite the punitive nature of the STL, some processes of 
memory and recognition are unavoidable. Jumblatt’s insistence from the beginning of bringing his 
father’s death to the centre of attention is at least partially explicable by this need. It makes one 
wonder whether Jumblatt has had any official psychotherapy to help him deal with what must be 
intense psychological strain and suffering. Indeed, this reality presents us with a very complex picture. 
Victims and perpetrators are commonly presented as a binary which implies mutual exclusivity. In 
complex situations like civil conflict, however, both subject positions can be found in the same 
individual.  
Though the STL is allowing this testimony for its evidentiary purposes, the fact remains that 
Jumblatt is being allowed something here which non-Zu’ama Lebanese victims of the civil war have 
never been offered, the chance to testify about what the loss of their loved ones means to them, to 
accuse their killers, demand information or give their version of events. Jumblatt has access to this 
platform to do just that. He also offers a script in which Kamal is referred to positively as prominent, 
an intellectual and significantly Kamal Jumblatt, not by an alternative framework like warmonger or 
simply my father. Referring to him by his full name de-emphasises Kamal’s relation to the witness and 
instead emphasises his script in relation to the audience as a historical figure. It implies that the loss 
was not Jumblatt’s personally, but indeed was all of Lebanon and the world’s and is bound up with 
the myth making of martyrs associated with the Zu’ama class. It is quite probable that many Lebanese 
without Jumblatt’s genealogy, but who were traumatised and bereaved in the war by the Jumblatts 
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or their allies are watching this performance. There is no platform for them at the STL to obtain 
recognition.  
We noted in chapter four that many scholars of ICL and TJ considered a wider investigation of 
historical crimes in Lebanon to be “unrealistic” and identified a logic of “some justice is better than 
none”. There, it was inferred that unwillingness to countenance such investigations was designed to 
shield powerful interests with powerful patrons at the UNSC who control the mechanisms of ICL, 
namely the Lebanese Zu’ama elite and Israel. This inference is further justified upon analysis of the 
opinions of the late president of the appeals chamber of the STL, Antonio Cassese 
many ask publicly why an international tribunal has been established to look into a string of 
terrorist attacks in 2004-05, while no tribunal has been created to deal with the 2006 short 
war in south Lebanon …  As a judge, I can only answer that these are choices made by 
politicians. (Cassese 2012, p. 501 emphasis added) 
This statement comes closer to highlighting the structural features of world order which systematically 
marginalise some victims. However, it is, ultimately, a telling moment of ideological mystification, 
rationalisation, naturalisation and hegemonic legitimation. It obviously comes closer to highlighting 
structural features by naming Israel and its alleged crimes in the same complex sentence as crimes 
allegedly committed by Hizballah. However, the second complex sentence mystifies by talking in vague 
terms of the choices made by politicians. The structural elements of the UNSC, permanent seats and 
veto are left obscured along with the politicians making these decisions and the basis for which the 
decisions were taken. The rationalisation and naturalisation occur in the preface of the second 
complex sentence As a judge. This amounts to a strategic demarcation between law and politics on 
epistemological grounds which serves to rationalise why Cassese is unable to ask (certain) political 
questions. It also serves to naturalise this, making the argument that lawyers are uninterested in 
political questions and are themselves a-political whilst simultaneously naturalising the Judge or 
Lawyers role in perpetuating impunity. In Eagleton’s (2007, p. 28) terms, this does not challenge the 
basis for these questions as much as “thrust them beyond the very bounds of the thinkable”, thus, 
hegemonically legitimating the current world order.  
In CR terms, we are being asked to grant epistemological categorical distinctions between the 
disciplines of politics and law as though they are ontologically distinct in the real world. This is an 
ideological move par excellence and a discursive strategy designed to avoid uncomfortable questions 
regarding structural power and complicity. We also detect here the theory-practice contradiction of 
an agent of ICL, whose attested purpose is to end impunity, arguing that the structural and systematic 
impunity of some is unquestionable on some arbitrary, epistemic basis. We can also identify the “some 
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justice is better than none” discourse as ideological to the extent that it constitutes “systematically 
distorted communication” (Habermas 1970, p. 205) and “meaning (or signification) [which] serves to 
sustain relations of domination.” (Thompson 1984, p. 4). It implies that the delimitation of this 
particular case was incidental rather than instrumental, thus mystifying the structures of power which 
pre-determined these results for particular interests on a systematic basis. This discourse serves as a 
rationalisation for the ICL and TJ communities in their acquiescence to UNSC power and as a 
hegemonic legitimation of the structurally determined and instrumental use of ICL to marginalise 
victims of serious crimes. The logical result of the “some justice is better than none” discourse is what 
we have here, a perverse situation at an institution of ICL where a potential war criminal can testify 
his trauma but none of his victims can. Moreover, the structural class features are prominent and 
explicable as a function of this ideological hegemony, it is not incidental that it is a za’im who is 
empowered to come and discuss his trauma, nor is it incidental that assassination/terrorism (rather 
than more generalised war crimes or crimes against humanity) is the focus of the STL in general, or of 
Jumblatt’s testimony, in particular. Rather, it is the power behind discourse at the STL where the 
zu’ama are empowered to have crimes which affect their class examined, and the wholesale crimes 
they committed ignored. The STL reproduces, rather than challenges this structure.  
 
Pax Syriana  
 
Jumblatt’s evidence turns towards his relationship with Syria. This evidence details the development 
of the relationship from the time of Hafez Al-Assad’s regime to that of his son Bashar from the year 
2000 onwards. Jumblatt emphasises that he had friends within the Syrian regime of Hafez, namely 
Vice-President Abdel-Halim Khaddam and General Hikmat Chehabi  (The Prosecutor versus Ayyash et 
al. 2015a, p. 15). Khaddam resigned in 2005 and has since been an opponent in exile to President 
Bashar Al-Assad. Chehabi resigned in 1998 on health grounds and died of natural causes in 2013. 
Jumblatt describes a situation in which the Lebanese military and intelligence institutions were 
annexed and controlled by Syria. The head of the Lebanese Army in the immediate post-Taif era was 
Emile Lahoud. Jumblatt states  
Prime Minister Hariri was prime minister, Elias Hrawi was president of the Republic. They were 
unable – even in their capacity as prime minister and as president of the republic, they were 
unable to have any sort of influence on the Lebanon army. How can you imagine a republic or 
a country whose president and prime minister are incapable of giving an order to the Lebanese 
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army. The Lebanese army was fully under the control and command and supervision of the 
Syrians through Emile Lahoud and the security apparatuses. (ibid, p. 16)  
Jumblatt utilises technical vocabulary regarding the architecture of secular states, prime minister, 
president, republic. Indeed, there appears to be a discursive convention that, when the Lebanese 
president is referred to, he is referred to as president of the Republic. This relies heavily on coherence, 
both intra and inter-textual to realise that the Republic which is referred to is Lebanon. This 
presupposition seemingly has a counter-hegemonic bent, it is used to emphasise that Lebanon is a 
state, independent from Syria or others. For Lebanese, this use of Republic draws upon MR, which 
relates to the national Martyrs of Lebanon’s founding and the emergence of the Republic after 
decolonisation. It also draws on MR which views Lebanon as an oasis of democracy in a region beset 
by authoritarianism. It draws on a unifying nationalist discourse which is cross-sectarian. The exact 
relation of Republic to the consociational polity in Lebanese minds is likely as divergent as their own 
MR and it may be that the former obscures the latter. Jumblatt uses a rhetorical question to draw on 
the MR of participants, questioning whether through the frame of Liberal governance they would find 
it acceptable for the armed forces to be unresponsive to civilian government. This has the potential 
to activate MR relating to liberal conceptions of separation of powers, statehood and democracy in 
any observer who holds these perspectives, whether these are completely acknowledged, or not. 
Invoking liberal MR in this way is powerful rhetorically and has the strategic potential to appeal to 
immediate interlocutors at the STL, western states and audiences, and a spectrum of Lebanese 
democrats and nationalists. It also creates a binary opposition within this frame to Syria. He finishes 
using repetition of synonyms, control, command and supervision to emphasise the lack of freedom. 
This whole section prefaces the causal conjunction “Therefore” (ibid, p.16) through which he frames 
the beginning of his resistance to Syria. This leads him to an oppositional rewording of the Syrian 
presence in strong terms, “we called it at the time Syrian tutelage but that was wrong, it was simply a 
Syrian occupation.” (ibid, p. 18). This cuts straight to the heart of the legitimacy of the Syrian presence, 
for while a tutor can arguably claim legitimate power, an occupation is more readily associated with 
domination.  
 In discussions regarding Syria, there emerge the themes of (personal) friendship and margin 
of manoeuvre. Friendship constitutes an important relational structure between Lebanese and Syrian 
personalities. For example, when Emile Lahoud is touted as a possible President in 1997, it is through 
Khaddam and Chehabi that Jumblatt, Hariri and president Elias Hrawi could delay his accession (ibid, 
p. 22). Lahoud’s election as President the following year is also achieved because of his close relations 
with Hafez and Bashar Al-Assad (ibid, p. 19). It is the loss of these relationships, and the attendant 
margin of manoeuvre, which typifies the move from Hafez’s reign characterised by cooperation to 
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Bashar’s reign characterised by conflict. The marginalisation of Khaddam and the exile of Chehabi 
under Bashar, and their replacement by more hostile characters such as Brigadier General Rustom 
Ghazaleh, served to undermine the Syrian-Lebanese historic bloc, losing the consent of key actors and 
ensuring Bashar’s increasing need to turn to coercion. Friendship on its own, of course, is not enough, 
but must interact with positioned practices within the relational structure. For example, Jumblatt 
describes how his closest friend in the regime, General Chehabi, was entrusted with managing his 
“file” (ibid, p. 49). Thus, Chehabi could relay preferable reports regarding Jumblatt to Hafez and shield 
him from negative ones. For these reasons, this friendship can properly be described as clientelistic. 
The question of the extent to which these friendships could be said to overlap with clientelistic 
relations is not straight forward, however. Certainly, the relationship between Lahoud and Bashar fits 
the patron-client model through Lahoud obtaining the presidency and term extension through 
Bashar’s support (ibid, p.84). On the other hand, people of a similar rank, such as the Zu’ama Jumblatt 
and Hariri, appear to enjoy mutual respect of their domains and strategies (ibid, p. 57). This is not to 
say that these individuals do not possess their own clientele at different levels, only that friendship 
and clientelism are related, but non-synonymous, phenomena. It does present us with a potentially 
important insight however, that the president of the SAR constituted one of, if not the, most powerful 
za’im in Lebanon, and that hegemony over Lebanese clientelistic relationships was Bashar’s likely goal 
(in the manner of a modern Ottoman Sultan).  
 When discussing the way in which Syria imposed Lahoud, Jumblatt makes an additional 
statement.  
 We have the sea, we have Israel, we have Syria as our borders; however, we did not want to 
be attached to Syria, in the shadow of Syria. And allow me to add, please, regarding the Ba’ath 
party, the Arab socialist Ba’ath party with its totalitarian ideology, we in Lebanon, Jordan, 
Palestine, et cetera, according to this party we are part of this Arab nation. So according to 
them we as an entity, as a Republic of Lebanon, we do not exist. They respect a certain 
management of Lebanon, administration of Lebanon, but they did not recognize Lebanon as 
a country. They organized the relations, but they used to look at Lebanon as one of the Syrian 
provinces or governorates. That's why we were not only facing a security regime; we were 
also facing and challenging a political ideology that did not recognize the others. (ibid, p. 24) 
This section begins with strong uses of the pronoun we. It is clear from the context that the we refers, 
in the first three instances, to Lebanon. The fourth use of we does not explicitly diverge from this, 
giving the impression that Lebanon as a whole does not wish to be attached to Syria. This is a false 
universalisation, given that Jumblatt’s testimony details that the country was divided on the issue of 
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Syria. The false universalisation of Lebanese opinion is common occurrence both domestically, as in 
this case, and through world order, such as in the invocation of chapter VII powers to establish the STL 
(UN Press Release 2007). This is the original sin of actors who then create doomed policy on this basis. 
Attempted hegemony through universalisation in Lebanon is unsuccessful and usually leads to 
domination followed by reaction. The use of the negation “did not want to be attached to Syria” (ibid, 
p. 24) speaks to this, as it rebuts these voices in the intertextual context. In conjunction with the 
metaphor of shadow, this presents a negative frame and script for Lebanese-Syrian relations. Indeed, 
at a physical level, shadow implies something bigger than yourself, a threat. Jumblatt then embarks 
on a tangent, recognising the authority of the STL through his use of polite vocabulary and request for 
permission “And allow me to add, please” (ibid, p. 24), which forestalls any potential objection on 
relevance.  
The use of technical vocabulary is balanced both positively and negatively. Particularly, 
totalitarian ideology occurs in a cluster of concepts Arab, Socialist and party. The use of this phrase 
imbues the other vocabulary with negative connotation, it invokes MR related to the excessive control 
of soviet states rather than “democratic socialist parties in the Western culture.” (ibid, p. 8). This is a 
nuanced distinction which one would not expect to find in strongly right wing or cold war discourse. 
This is how Jumblatt defines the Ba’ath party. His continued use of the pronoun we here, which allows 
him to simultaneously identify with, and make an argument about, the definition of Arab nationalism 
to a wider Arab audience. Jumblatt has an ideological antagonism towards the Ba’athist notion of a 
singular Arab nation. This is evidenced in his negations, “we do not exist.” and “they did not recognise 
Lebanon as a country.” (ibid, p. 24). This is topped off with a strong Subject Verb Conjunction (SVC) 
sentence which gives his assessment of the situation in characteristically categorical terms with regard 
to the dual threat of the security regime and the political ideology of the Syrian Ba’ath party. The 
theme of singular centralising Ba’ath style Arab nationalism being contested by a pluralistic vision of 
Arab nationalism, is one which Jumblatt promotes and it seems to be a function of the perspective of 
a middle eastern minority group.  
 
The turn of the Millennium  
 
The year 2000 was a watershed. The death of Hafez and Bashar’s succession as president of the SAR, 
the Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon, and a reconciliation between key Maronite and Druze 
politicians, and their emerging opposition to the Syrian presence in Lebanon. All of this signified 
change. The reconciliation appears to manifest through Jumblatt’s partial support for Patriarch 
Nasrallah Sfeir’s call for Syrian withdrawal and the visit of former president Amine Gemayel and Sfeir 
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to Jumblatts’ home in Mokhtara in 2000 and 2001, respectively (Ibid, p. 34, 38 & 92). Sfeir was 
Patriarch of the Maronite church during the latter stages of the civil war and Amine Gemayel became 
president of the Republic during the war after the assassination of his brother Bashir. He was also the 
leader of the Phalange party and militia, Jumblatt’s principle war time adversary. Together, they 
represented two institutional pillars of the Maronite community, the Patriarchate and the Presidency. 
Jumblatt makes a distinction between his own call for partial Syrian withdrawal, and Sfeir’s call for a 
full one. Jumblatt uses the Taif agreement as a basis for his demands (ibid, p. 34). In Jumblatt’s 
discourse, the Taif functions as a repository of norms and a resource for strategic legitimisation of 
one’s arguments. Jumblatt uses Taif to distinguish his (and Hariri’s) position from both pro-Syrians and 
UNSC resolution 1559.  
The successful extension of Lahoud’s presidential term, backed by Bashar and the adoption of 
1559 marked a decline in relations between the pro- and anti-Syrian Lebanese factions. It was in the 
run up to this crunch vote in which Bashar’s new head of intelligence in Lebanon, Rustom Ghazaleh, 
went to visit both Jumblatt and Hariri. Ghazaleh had taken over from former head of intelligence in 
Lebanon, Ghazi Kanaan, a member of Hafez Al-Assad’s old guard. Kanaan died of a gunshot wound to 
his head in October 2005 in mysterious circumstances after being interviewed by UNIIIC head, Detlev 
Mehlis, as a potential witness and/or suspect in the assassination of Rafik Hariri. From Jumblatt’s 
evidence, we learn that on the 25th August 2004, Ghazaleh visited him, the day before a scheduled 
meeting with Bashar (ibid, p. 64). Jumblatt relates that Ghazaleh was interested in whether Jumblatt 
was going to vote in favour of Lahoud’s extension. Jumblatt replies “I will not approve it.” (ibid, p. 64) 
to which Ghazaleh allegedly replied “Are you with us or against us?” (ibid, p. 65). Ghazaleh often 
employs grammatical questions, seemingly to impose authority. It has the function of positioning 
Ghazaleh as the requester of information which, as we see in the STL generally, distinguishes superior 
relational positions. It also has the function of controlling the topic of conversation and nominating 
the next speaker. In this instance, it also presents a binary choice to Jumblatt in which there is no 
nuance. There is an important intertextual connection to this statement. Only three years previously, 
the then President of the U.S., George W. Bush, made a similarly (in)famous statement after the 
September 11th attacks to Congress “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.” (BBC News 
2001). This binary forms part of the discourse of the war on terror which, in 2003, led Syria’s Ba’athist 
neighbour, Iraq, to be invaded by Bush’s coalition of the willing, subjected to regime change and 
occupied. This was clearly a time of existential insecurity for many actors and this type of totalitarian 
discourse was seemingly in vogue.  
Jumblatt’s meeting only took 10 minutes. We are told, however, that Ghazaleh met Hariri the 
same day and an audio recording of this meeting is played in court. Ghazaleh opens with superfluous 
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formal language “Tomorrow His Excellency the president wishes to see you.” (ibid, p. 69 emphasis 
added) which has the effect of emphasising the relational hierarchy between Bashar and Hariri. This 
is reinforced by the summons speech act. Hariri responds “Tomorrow?”. Ghazaleh answers and then 
asks a question of his own “Yes, at 10.30. Why are you laughing?” (ibid, p. 69). This last question has 
the effect of making Ghazaleh the selector in the interaction and making the request of Hariri for 
information, asserting dominance. The question also serves as a speech act of reprimand, it chides 
Hariri for his lack of seriousness and in effect is an instance of direct control by Ghazaleh of Hariri’s 
expressions and signals a refusal to be light-hearted. If it is accurate that Hariri laughed (it is not 
recorded in the transcript) this could be a sign of nervousness, but it might also be interpreted as an 
act of defiance. Laughing in the face of self-important formality immediately emasculates it. It could 
be viewed as an act of rebellion and as a sign that Hariri does not wish to recognise Bashar’ authority. 
Even if it was not intended as such, it is more than possible Ghazaleh saw it this way.  
Ghazaleh: Who told you that? 
Hariri: The president of the republic. 
Ghazaleh: The president doesn't know! 
Hariri: Well, the president called, he called [ unclear] and said if he was, I mean if. . . he is 
busy before noon so if we could hold the cabinet meeting in the afternoon. I said no. 
Ghazaleh: The president does not know. 
Hariri: Ok, ok. . . it does not matter. . . ten thirty? (ibid, p. 70) 
Ghazaleh once again opens with a grammatical question controlling the topic, demanding 
information and selects Hariri. Hariri does little more than provide this information. Ghazaleh then 
selects himself to deliver a categorical, declarative SV sentence in its negative form The president 
doesn't know! which provides a direct contradiction to Hariri’s explanation and amounts to a speech 
act of accusation and enforces explicitness from Hariri. Hariri’s reply is grammatically disjointed and 
repetitive as well as indistinct through unclear speech. It appears this is a reaction to the pressure 
Ghazaleh is putting Hariri under, particularly the implication that Hariri has a source of information 
which he should not have and the attendant suspicion with which Ghazaleh views him. The accusation 
is seemingly confirmed in Ghazaleh’s next line where he repeats the statement in slow deliberate 
(non-contracted) vocabulary. Hariri’s last line here attempts to placate Ghazaleh, Ok repeated seems 
to have the function of acquiescing to the other participant’s view of reality. It does not matter is a 
challenge to Ghazaleh’s suspicion but also serves to exonerate himself of any wrongdoing whilst also 
remaining ambiguous about where he attained the information. The last part deflects attention 
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towards something technical, the place of the meeting, which had been a concern of Ghazaleh’s and 
thus gives the appearance of compliance.   
Hariri: … How is the family? 
Ghazaleh: Fine. . . 
Hariri: Are you staying tomorrow? 
Ghazaleh: I want to see what you will do tomorrow. 
Hariri: And when is Nabih going? 
Ghazaleh: Nabih is going at noon, afternoon. 
Hariri: Aha, it means everyone. 
Ghazaleh: And what is your answer? 
Hariri: Well we will see. . . 
Ghazaleh: Are you prepared. . . 
Hariri: What does the president have, what does his Excellency president have. . . 
Ghazaleh: What are you going to do? 
Hariri: Let us see what the president has to say; doesn't he want to talk to us?  
(ibid, p. 70-71)  
Here, Hariri attempts to control the discussion by asking a grammatical question of something 
informal and personal. Perhaps it is an attempt to connect with Ghazaleh on a personal, informal level, 
but it appears that Ghazaleh will not be distracted from his mission. His reply is one word and leaves 
a gap (silence) in the participant selection in conversation. This can be interpreted as an awkward gap. 
Hariri selects himself and asks another question to avoid such an awkwardness. He asks Ghazaleh if 
he is staying, a brave stab at polite small talk. Ghazaleh immediately takes the opportunity to become 
forthright, informing Hariri he is there to observe him. All the time, control of the topic is being 
competed over. Hariri sidesteps this through yet another grammatical question, only tangentially 
connected to what Ghazaleh’s overt interest is, namely which way Hariri plans to vote. Thus, Hariri is 
using ambiguity, the position of the weak, to contest Ghazaleh’s power in discourse. Ghazaleh answers 
the question regarding Nabih Berri’s [Lebanese Parliament Speaker and Syrian Ally] attendance and 
Hariri seems to understand the importance of this meeting, aha, it means everyone. Ghazaleh seizes 
on this moment to self-select to ask Hariri yet another forthright grammatical question about whether 
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he will vote for Lahoud’s term extension. Hariri resists indirectly once again using ambiguity. This 
resistance is more direct and Ghazaleh counters by interrupting Hariri asking a question to control the 
topic. Hariri then interrupts Ghazaleh in turn, indicating that this discourse has truly become a 
conflictual contest. Hariri asks a grammatical question to control the topic and demand information 
of Ghazaleh for the first time, he also self-corrects, copying the formality of Bashar’s title his Excellency 
president, presumably to make sure he remains respectful, even as the discursive contest with 
Ghazaleh takes place. Ghazaleh is not dissuaded and interrupts again to ask the question for which he 
is trying to extract an answer. The schema here is straightforwardly a meeting, however, the frames 
and scripts here are somewhat confused and conflictual. Ghazaleh is there with the authority of Bashar 
and with a mission to find out which way Hariri will vote. Hariri tries to engage Ghazaleh on a personal 
level which is rebuffed by the former. This leads to a conflictual script in which Hariri resists revealing 
his intentions. Though the interactional conventions are confused due to their conflictual nature, Hariri 
seems to be in the position of the less powerful participant as he relies more on ambiguity.  
 Jumblatt relates that mere months before this interaction, Hariri had been summoned to 
Damascus to have Bashar tell him “I am the one who rules here, no one rules other than me” (ibid, p. 
59). Moreover, Jumblatt asserts that after this event, he and Hariri agreed that they would oppose the 
extension (ibid, p. 62). In these circumstances, it is difficult to see how Hariri thought that his ambiguity 
would be a) interpreted by Ghazaleh as anything other than a rejection of Lahoud and b) interpreted 
by Bashar as anything but a direct challenge to his interests. Either way, the meeting which followed 
between Bashar and Hariri became infamous. Jumblatt alleges the words of Bashar were “Lahoud is 
me and I am Lahoud. I want you to extend. And if Chirac wants to get me out of Lebanon, I will break 
Lebanon, I will destroy Lebanon” (ibid, p. 82). Grammatically, Lahoud and Bashar are attributes of each 
other in these SVC sentences. This makes what had hitherto been an implicit relation (and the reason 
Hariri and Jumblatt were resistant to Lahoud in the first place) explicit and openly dominating. 
However, it is uncertain why Hariri was unable to anticipate a hostile reaction. Nevertheless, analysis 
of the interactional conventions between Ghazaleh and Hariri does suggest that the two were 
antagonistic. It suggests that Ghazaleh occupies a more powerful position and moreover seeks to use 
that power to extract acquiescence and information from Hariri who is resisting from a subservient 
position. When Jumblatt asserts that Ghazaleh was hostile to Hariri and that this hostility was 
reflective of Bashar’s own, this analysis tends to support both assertions in light of the topic of 
conversation and the conflictual interactional conventions between Hariri and Ghazali. 
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The Qornet Chehwan gathering 
 
After the recording, questioning and evidence turns to the eventual passing of Lahoud’s extension and 
the simultaneous passing of UNSC resolution 1559. Jumblatt mentions an opposition group led by the 
Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir. Cameron asks, “May I ask, Mr. Jumblatt, prior to the extension of 
President Lahoud, what were your relations with the group that you referred to a moment ago as 
Qornet-Chehwan?” (ibid, p. 92). It is interesting that Cameron prefaces his grammatical question with 
a request using a modal auxiliary verb May. He does not usually do this, and it could indicate that he 
knows discussion of the Maronites is uncomfortable for Jumblatt. The polite, apologetic nature of this 
questioning merits a moments reflection. Here is an agent of ICL being mindful of the positive 
reputation of an alleged perpetrator of war crimes through politeness at an ICL tribunal. It is the power 
behind discourse which has placed Jumblatt and Cameron in positioned practices of prosecution 
witness and council respectively rather than some other arrangement. We can infer that this invokes 
a collaborative schema of extracting evidence relevant to the Hariri case, which is facilitated by frames 
that avoid discussion of crimes not directly relevant which the witness may have perpetrated. The 
interactional conventions between Cameron and Jumblatt show that Cameron is in the dominant 
position and Jumblatt acquiesces to this by limiting interruptions and answering questions directly. 
Nevertheless, Cameron feels the need here to make a request, even if only in form and not substance. 
Jumblatt states  
They were excellent. They were excellent because these relations, the meeting -- the 
conversation started in 2001 when the Patriarch Sfeir came to the mountains, to Mokhtara, 
and we had this historic reconciliation to forget the -- and heal the wounds of the civil war 
which started in the 1970s and stayed up until 1991. The relations were excellent, they were 
excellent and they became even closer subsequently (ibid, p. 92) 
This answer features four distinct instances of overwording, a high concentration. Firstly, the positive 
vocabulary Excellent is repeated four times when referring to his relations with this group in SVC 
structure which make truth claims as to their positive attributes. The purpose of this overwording 
seems to be for emphasis on the positive and factual view of these relations. The fact it is repeated 
four times seems quite suspect due to its excessiveness. Secondly, a relationship of hyponymy is set 
up these relations, the meeting, the conversation, indicating his preoccupation with these phenomena. 
The third overwording mountains and Mokhtara is also a relation of hyponymy where the latter is a 
location in the former. The fourth instance is most important for an analysis of Ideology. Here, a 
relationship of equivalence is set up between forget and heal (it is unclear whether these phenomena 
are set up as synonyms or hyponyms). This relationship of equivalence is curious. In literal terms, 
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forgetting and healing are distinct activities which do not comfortably or unproblematically occupy 
positions of synonymy or hyponymy in language. This relationship overlaps the ancient Zu’ama 
discourse and modern practice of amnesia described in chapter two. It is ideological to the extent that 
it is an idea in the service of power, particularly the power of those Zu’ama who have questionable 
war records such as Jumblatt who benefit from the amnesties imposed after serious violence. There 
is a pause between forget and heal, which indicates two discourse types and audiences coming in to 
contact. The first phrase is for the socialised Lebanese audience for which the idea of forgetfulness of 
crimes is common sense, not in the sense of universal acceptance, but simply hegemonic dominance 
of the idea. However, Jumblatt must realise he is in a place of ICL which has a stated purpose, the 
ending of impunity. Jumblatt pauses and is seemingly aware of the incompatibility, indeed, the theory-
practice contradiction, which this constitutes. Thus, he uses the more acceptable vocabulary heal to 
cover his Freudian slip.  
 The lack of true equivalence is highlighted when one considers what is being forgotten or 
healed, namely “the wounds of the civil war” (ibid, p.92). Here, the lack of synonymy and hyponymy 
are obvious. To forget these wounds is not the same activity as to heal these wounds. Arguably, what 
has happened in Lebanon goes further than this and constitutes less a forgetting and more of an 
igoring of wounds. Talk of forgetting is therefore ideolgically false. No one has forgotten, what they 
mean is they ignore perpatrators and victims alike. The healing of wounds might take several forms 
depending on whether these were physical or psychological, they might be punitive, compensatory or 
truth-telling or some combination, but it is highly doubtful that official reconciliations by Zu’ama and 
continued amnesty and offical amnesia has addressed any of these. This ideological Zu’ama 
framework which sets up a false equivalence between forgetting and healing employs the ideological 
aspects of naturalisation and mystification. In the first instance, these practices are well established 
and draw on common-sense aspects of Lebanese MR established since at least the Ottoman era. In 
the second instance, this discourse implies, falsely, that wounds are healed when Zu’ama and preists 
reconcile for instrumental purposes. The STL and its agents are in a perfect position to challenge these 
mystifications and naturalisations as they provide an extra-cultural perspective from which to view 
these practices as not universal or common sense but highly particular and ideological. However, it 
does not. Cameron ignores these falsities and, therefore, by default, the STL reproduces and 
universalises these discourses which encourage impunity leading to a distinct theory-practice 
contradiction for the STL as bearer of ICL, that is, the theory/purpose of ending impunity (UN Press 
Release 2007) is contradicted by an institution which allows an alleged perpetrator to expound a 
theory of forgetfulness of war crimes which amounts to an institution of impunity within its walls, 
without challenge. The public and open nature of the STL means that it is not only failing to challenge 
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this discourse, but is transmitting it to Lebanon, the region, and the world. The failure to challenge 
this institution of impunity and its transmission and reproduction amounts to an ethical failure and a 
reinforcement of the hegemony of this dangerous idea in Lebanon.  
 
Constitutional ammendment and UNSC resolution 1559 
 
After the constitutional amendment passed and UNSC resolution 1559 was adopted, there emerges a 
Lebanese front of resistance, a coalition around Jumblatt, Patriarch Sfeir, Amine Gemayel and Rafik 
Hariri (although Hariri’s role is somewhat contradictory and ambiguous). This culminated in the so-
called Bristol one, two and three meetings at the Bristol hotel in Beirut (The Prosecutor versus Ayyash 
et al. 2015b, p. 24). The transcript of the 5th May 2015 is largely concerned with the coalescing of this 
movement and Hariri’s role within it. During these discussions, a distinct theme emerges with respect 
to the opposition’s relationship to world order, particularly resolution 1559. Judge Braidy asks 
Jumblatt about the causal relationship between the constitutional amendment and resolution 1559 
“would Resolution 1559 have been passed if the extension was not adopted?” (The Prosecutor versus 
Ayyash et al. 2015a, p. 90). Jumblatt responds  
I think that if the extension of President Lahoud's term was not adopted, we would have never 
seen Resolution 1559 see the light or voted. This was an international resolution that was 
imposed on us and it had nothing to do with our own plan. (ibid, p. 90)  
In the first half of this answer, negation is used both in reference to the extension and 1559. The 
complex sentence between if and voted is typified by subordination, that is, it utilises the subordinate 
conjunction if to lay emphasis on the main clause “we would have never seen Resolution 1559 see the 
light or voted.” (ibid, p. 90). In conjunction, these textual features indicate that neither the extension 
nor 1559 were desirable and the latter is emphasised in order to address the Judge’s question but 
potentially also to emphasise Jumblatt’s distaste for 1559. Indeed, the second half of the answer 
seems to reinforce this impression through use of negatively valued vocabulary imposed and through 
negation “it had nothing to do with our own plan.” (ibid, p. 90, emphasis added). In contradistinction 
to the first complex sentence, this complex sentence uses a coordinate conjunction and to 
demonstrate that both of these ideas are important, namely that it was internationally imposed and 
had nothing to do with them. Thus, the Schema of judicial question sets up the frames of the extension 
and 1559 and enquires about the nature of a script in which there is a linear causal relationship from 
the former to the latter. Jumblatt’s reply uses these frames but, whilst he concurs regarding the script 
of linear causality, he is at pains to emphasise the non-democratic, non-inclusive, top-down manner 
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in which 1559 was imposed. In Habermasian terms, 1559 could hardly be legitimate given that part of 
its purpose was to disarm subaltern groups without consultation with the populations whose security 
this would potentially effect. Thus, we have seeming confirmation that even the Lebanese opposition, 
who should be closest to the UNSC in opposing Syria, were excluded from the decision-making 
process. Resolution 1559 appears, quite unproblematically, as a form of domination.  
 Continuing to discuss the implication of the resolution on May 5th 2015, Cameron utilises many 
U.N. press reviews in order to guide his questions. The following is a direct quote from a White house 
statement “It is not a victory for democracy. It does not reflect the will of the Lebanese people. It was 
forced on them by an occupation force,” (The Prosecutor versus Ayyash et al. 2015b, p. 3). This 
statement is totally made up of SVC grammatical sentences, making categorical claims as to the nature 
of the vote to extend Lahoud’s mandate. Used with negations, this is seemingly rebuffing positive 
vocabulary and claims by pro-Syrians in the intertextual context in their positive incarnation. The last 
sentence appears in the positive form and utilises negative vocabulary forced and occupation. We 
know that Jumblatt shares these understandings with the U.S. and yet when he is asked whether this 
is typical of the U.S. position he answers “I was not aware in advance of the intentions or the opinions 
of the U.S. regarding this issue. I was not aware.” (ibid, p. 3). Here, Jumblatt uses ambiguity through 
answering a slightly different question than was asked. He seems to do this in order to reformulate 
his answer for a specific purpose, to head off particular antagonistic discourses. The use of negation 
in SVC categorical sentences to state he was “not aware in advance” (ibid, p. 3) indicates he was 
heading off critics in the intertextual context who might say he was aware, or working with, the U.S..  
We know that accusations of treachery and collaboration with Israel were discourses 
expounded about Jumblatt during these conflicts and it seems that he is still sensitive to these 
accusations (ibid, p. 23). The theory-practice contradiction of the U.S. highlighting the illegitimacy of 
democracy under conditions of occupation after having invaded and occupied Iraq two years 
previously and installing “democracy” is obvious. In destabilising and threatening the Middle East, 
President George W. Bush made his brand toxic to Arab Nationalists, even ones opposing Ba’athism. 
What is more, the equivalence of Lahoud’s extension and the forcible, non-consensual nature of 1559 
is not recognised. What is more striking, is that UNSC resolution 1757 which established the STL was, 
as noted in chapter four, imposed through a Chapter VII invocation by the UNSC. Thus, it seems, that 
the pattern of the imposition of foreign interests, whether it is Syria or the “international community”, 
is something which persisted well beyond resolution 1559, and indeed constitutes one of the main 
structural experiences of Lebanon in world order. These particular interests are always in support of 
one or another political camp and are universalised in discourse in order to legitimate. The STL is the 
result of a partisan imposition as much as the extension of Lahoud or 1559. The question of whether 
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Jumblatt views resolution 1757 with as much disdain as 1559 is an interesting one and one which, 
unsurprisingly, is not addressed directly. 
The common-sense assumption by the Bush II White house was that democracy is something 
which happens at national level and presumably has a certain formal process. By contrast, they did 
not embody democratic or legitimate practice in their international relations or at institutions of world 
order, particularly through UNSC resolutions effecting entire populations without any consent, or 
even, instrumental coordination with local forces aligned with their position. Democracy as a practice 
is presumed to occur inside states, while the great powers at the UNSC fail to act democratically by 
including all concerned parties in decision-making. This is arguably a theory-practice contradiction in 
which democracy is represented as a universal good but then ignored in favour of great power politics 
globally. Moreover, here we see the disintegration of a global historic bloc, which at one time had 
aligned the interests of the U.S. and Syria in the latter’s hegemony over Lebanon. The Lebanese 
Zu’ama, by and large, had also been integrated into the Pax Syriana historic bloc. The constitutional 
amendment and 1559 marked the breakdown of this historic bloc and a move from a hegemonic 
relationship to a conflictual and coercive one. Lebanese with aspirations of independence are thus 
caught between these dominating forces.  
Furthering this theme, Judge Nosworthy asks the question “Was there a feeling in the Lebanon 
that the Arab countries were being targeted and pressure was being placed on them from the 
international community?” (Ibid, p. 7). It is interesting that Nosworthy employs the definite article 
before mentioning Lebanon which invokes MR relating to old fashioned, even colonial, descriptions of 
Lebanon. Indeed, designation of the Lebanon as a region within a wider polity (such as the Ottoman 
Empire or greater Syria) is exactly what Lebanese nationalists like Jumblatt resist through their 
designation of the Republic. The latter is seemingly to remind interlocutors that Lebanon is a polity in 
its own right. Similarly, use of the phrase international community is arguably euphemistic, as it serves 
to obscure power structures which ensure only small segments of this overall community get to 
influence particular issues, especially when discussing the UNSC and its resolutions. Applying the 
Habermasian definition of legitimacy again, we see that only fifteen member states of the UN can vote 
in the UNSC and only five of those have the power of veto and a permanent seat (UN Press Release 
2007). Whilst a community can technically be either authoritarian or democratic, this vocabulary 
invokes generally positive values through MR providing the mystification that an entire interested 
community is deciding an issue when, in fact, the opposite is the case. This expression international 
community inheres in media and political discourse and thus forms part of common sense which 
imparts a hegemonic, inter-subjective image in the minds of individuals with very little critical, 
accurate or descriptive purchase. For example, an accurate reformulation would be was there a feeling 
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in the Lebanon that the Arab countries were being targeted and pressure was being placed on them 
from the United States, western powers and their regional allies, both militarily and through their 
structural control of the UNSC? It is unclear whether these ideological phrases are used intentionally 
or through common sense assumption. Regardless, Jumblatt answers the question  
When Resolution 1559 was adopted, and at least from our side, the side of Qornet-Chehwan, 
my own camp, and my friends and allies, we viewed this resolution as something threatened 
Arab security, but we always had a position of principle and that is to commit to the Taif 
Agreement, the Taif Agreement meaning a staggered withdrawal of the Syrian forces pursuant 
to Taif. (ibid, p. 8)  
The answer contains technical vocabulary referring to resolutions but also the legal phrase pursuant. 
The latter phrase seems to double as a strategic use of legal vocabulary to buttress and legitimise 
one’s own political preference. Thus, politics and law interact ontologically despite the hard lines 
drawn epistemologically by many practitioners. In Habermasian terms, the Taif accord offers greater 
legitimacy given that it was agreed upon explicitly by elected Lebanese politicians and tacitly by Syria 
and other states at the time. Moreover, the staggered withdrawal and time limitation stipulated with 
reference to Syrian forces in Taif is reproduced in the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and 
Coordination Between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Lebanese Republic which was signed and 
ratified by both governments (United Nations Treaty Collection 1992). Positive vocabulary is used to 
refer to friends and allies just after reference is made to Qornet-Chehwan, but the link is not explicit 
and is left to the divergent MR of observers to infer. An adversative but is used to join two equal 
clauses namely, the threat to Arab security from 1559 and their commitment to Taif. The adversative 
demonstrates a relation whereby 1559 is an impediment to Taif and that commitment to Taif 
happened despite 1559. This binary is reinforced using negative vocabulary threatened when referring 
to 1559 and the use of positive vocabulary when discussing Taif, namely, principle. The latter can refer 
to both a technical or ethical maxim, evidencing instrumental and normative rationality. Indeed, 
Jumblatt invokes this maxim repeatedly in the texts to distinguish 1559 from Taif and distance both 
himself and Hariri from the former. It is possible that this is deception, but in this forum, Jumblatt 
seems to perceive association with 1559 as toxic and it is hard to imagine him not viewing it as such 
at the time. Thus, 1559, aside from any moral considerations, was instrumentally and strategically 
flawed because it was a brazen instance of domination. Its attempt to attach international interests 
(the disarming of Hizballah and the Palestinians) on to the domestic interest (Lebanese independence) 
was so overt that it would never have been possible for it to become the basis of a new hegemonic 
common-sense or historic bloc, alienating important sections of the Lebanese opposition. This seems 
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to have been a function of a top down process through which the opposition were not consulted 
regarding its content.   
 Thus, the adoption of 1559 seemingly caused the opposition some problems. Cameron quotes 
a passage from a U.N. press review dated 11th October 2004 in which a pro-Syrian politician, Nasser 
Kandil, is quoted “there are two political divisions now in the country: 'Those who support the 
nationalistic option endorsed by Syria and those who back Resolution 1559” (ibid, p. 49). The first 
sentence offered by the reporter is a paraphrasing of Kandil’s words and presents an SVC sentence 
stating the attributes of Lebanon two political divisions and does so categorically. The direct quote 
provides the details of this division through use of a co-ordinating conjunction and giving equal weight 
to both clauses and reinforcing the idea that there is a binary split between nationalism and 1559. 
Thus, it appears that the pro-Syrian discursive strategy was to present a frame in which 1559 and the 
opposition were synonymous as were pro-Syrians and nationalism. Moreover, this was presented as 
a relation of mutual exclusivity. This move has the effect of undermining the opposition’s legitimacy 
which it could otherwise have garnered from Taif. If France and the U.S. were intending to support 
the opposition through this resolution, it in fact had the opposite effect.  
 
Grudges, revenge and pettiness 
 
Whilst discussing the increased pressure on the members of Jumblatt’s party by the Lebanese-Syrian 
security apparatus, Cameron quotes Sfeir again, in what the news article states is, “a gesture of clear 
solidarity with Jumblatt.” (ibid, p. 16). Sfeir is reported to have said “What is good for man everywhere 
is to rise above grudges, revenge, and pettiness, and to try to spread peace around himself, especially 
if he is in a position of power.” (ibid, p. 16). The first thing one notices about this statement is the 
extent to which it relies on the MR of the reader. How is one to connect the alleged gesture of 
solidarity with this somewhat vague statement about grudges? The answer can only be through 
interpretation and the background knowledge that the writers and speakers assumed their audience 
possess. Starting with the formal features, grudges, revenge, pettiness, constitute negatively valued 
vocabulary with which Sfeir has a preoccupation indicated through this overwording of concepts with 
relations of hyponymy. The counterpoint to this negative vocabulary is peace, which is evidently 
positively valued.  Potentially, the negative vocabulary performs a euphemistic task, this is indicated 
by the generality of the statement and the lack of clear referents. Euphemisms are usually a “word 
substituted for a more conventional or familiar one as a way of avoiding negative values” (Fairclough 
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2015, p.135). What we have here are potentially negative vocabulary used to conceal even more 
negatively valued phenomena.  
The grammatical structure of the statement is a complex sentence consisting of two SVC 
clauses connected in a relationship of subordination. The statements are categorical, it is a statement 
about the common-sense assertion that grudges and other negative behaviours should be eschewed, 
a statement which appears universally true as a function of its generality. The fact that the 
subordinate, backgrounded clause is the one regarding men in positions of power is interesting. This 
afterthought depends on the audience possessing MR which already presupposes this as a common 
sense truth. Presuppositions are an indication of hegemonic ideology (ibid, p. 164).  Thus, the question 
becomes, does this presupposition function as an idea in the service of power? If the answer is yes, 
then one can identify this statement as ideological. At this point, however, the statement is so general 
and so disconnected from the journalist’s account, namely that this is a clear statement of solidarity, 
that what is being presupposed is being obscured. To identify this, we must move back to the 
overwording at the beginning of the statement. What does Sfeir mean by grudges, revenge and 
pettiness? Coherence here seems to depend on the MR in the heads of the observers and the 
intertextual context of common experience. The only interpretation which makes this statement 
coherent is one whereby the grudges, revenge and pettiness referred to are those arising from the 
Lebanese civil war, in this instance between the Druze and Maronites, of which Jumblatt and Sfeir are 
leaders, respectively. If we infer this to be Sfeir’s meaning, then grudges, revenge and pettiness 
become euphemisms for war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. Similarly, their 
negative balance displaces positive formulations such as truth and justice and in this way the justice-
seeking subject is conflated with those of vengeful sectarianism. With this coherence in place, the 
subordinate clause “especially if he is in a position of power.” (The Prosecutor versus Ayyash et al. 
2015b, p. 7) presupposes that the role of leaders (naturalised as he) is even more important in moving 
beyond pettiness to spread peace. In effect, this legitimises the system of Zu’ama amnesty and 
amnesia. It diminishes and demeans those who would demand justice and minimises these crimes to 
trivialities. Whilst of course it is obvious that the holding of grudges is a negative force in Lebanon, 
Sfeir rhetorically attaches this to the legitimate search for justice to shut the latter down. This 
potentially creates the conditions in which grudges are cultivated in silenced and marginalised 
hagiographic spaces.  
The statement can also be viewed as one in which the Patriarch is heading off critics 
(potentially from his own Maronite community) of his alliance with Jumblatt. Like the earlier 
interaction in which Cameron was required to bring up Jumblatt’s relationship with the Maronites, 
Cameron, and the STL by extension, fail to challenge or even be curious regarding Zu’ama accounts of 
151 
 
the war or their discourses of forgetfulness. It manifests in this example by Cameron avoiding asking 
for direct clarification of what Sfeir means by grudges, revenge and pettiness and allows the MR of the 
observer to fill this void. Once again, Cameron is somewhat bound by the structure of the STL and his 
positioned practices within it (although he chooses not to use his agency creatively). Once again, the 
power behind discourse which provides impunity for friendly Zu’ama is in play and once again this 
contradicts the very core of what ICL is allegedly about. Once again, rather than challenge the Zu’ama 
discourse of forgetfulness, the STL is happy to transmit it and further its ideological hegemony in 
Lebanon.  
 So far, we have seen a discourse around memory which emphasises forgetting as healing and 
remembering associated with grudges, revenge and pettiness and contrasted with spreading peace. 
On the surface, these two accounts of how to achieve peace appear contradictory. In the first, 
forgetfulness is emphasised which, in everyday parlance, is a passive occurrence, a failure to recall. 
The second account, by contrast, presents a force of will in which one must consciously “spread peace 
around himself” (ibid, p. 16). Below surface appearance however, both accounts encourage active 
forgetting (or ignoring) of past trauma. This active forgetting appears to be favoured of Zu’ama 
ideology, ostensibly it brings peace and cooperation between former foes. The following statement is 
Jumblatt discussing the attempted assassination of Marwan Hamade. Hamade is a prominent member 
of the PSP, Walid Jumblatt ally who had served in several cabinet positions over the years and was MP 
for the Chouf district. He notably voted against Lahoud’s extension in 2004. The attempt happened as 
tensions with Syria increased in late 2004 and the scene of angry supporters outside the hospital 
where he was being treated.  
They were puzzled and surprised and angry. They wanted to know what had happened to 
Marwan. And here allow me to digress a little bit. The crowd remembered, they remembered 
at the time the assassination of Kamal Jumblatt at the same moment. The Lebanese people 
did not forget and will never forget. The Lebanese people have an ongoing and a strong 
memory. Even if politics imposed on me in 1977 to make a compromise with the Syrian 
regime, but our supporters knew that there were times of need when we needed to do things. 
But at that moment they remembered again Kamal Jumblatt. (ibid, p. 37) 
This statement opens with overwording; puzzled, surprised, angry. It is very similar to the vocabulary 
Jumblatt uses to describe his emotional state upon meeting Hafez after the death of his father. These 
concepts appear to have a relation of synonymy puzzled, surprised but also include the emotional 
state this induced, anger. By contrast, Jumblatt’s statement about himself simply repeated surprise 
and explicitly denied an emotional response “I didn't feel anything.” (The Prosecutor versus Ayyash et 
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al. 2015a, p. 14). This dissociative response was highlighted earlier as something potentially related to 
trauma, given that a lack of emotional response to the assassination of one’s father would otherwise 
seem anomalous.  
However, considering Jumblatt’s discussions regarding memory, the other possibility is that 
this is an instance of active forgetfulness. This gives rise to a problematic best addressed by social 
psychologists regarding the relationship between trauma and active forgetting, does the former 
provide the ideal conditions for the latter and how does this relation change with the passage of time 
once the initial shock has worn off? Does the forgetfulness persist?  Jumblatt employs an agentless 
passive process VO sentence which simultaneously functions as an imperative request “And here allow 
me to digress a little bit.” (ibid, p. 37). This allows Jumblatt to acknowledge the superior position of 
the court and signals when he is offering thoughts which do not relate directly to the question asked, 
thus forestalling challenges to relevance. What follows this segue is two overwordings. The first of 
these is the literal repetition of remembered in relation to the occurrence of Kamal’s assassination. 
This message is reinforced through the second overwording, utilising negations to say something more 
profound and forceful “The Lebanese people did not forget and will never forget.” (ibid, p. 37). 
Jumblatt proceeds to triple reinforce the message of memory constancy in the following SVO sentence 
where the Lebanese are said to categorically possess “an ongoing and a strong memory” (ibid, p. 37). 
The contradiction between this assessment of the constancy of memory in Lebanon and the earlier 
discourse regarding the necessity to forget could not be plainer. He goes on to note the structural 
imperatives in 1977 through negative vocabulary imposed and the positivity of his own agency 
compromise. It appears that, despite his followers understanding of these conditions in 1977, in 2004 
“they remembered again Kamal Jumblatt.” (ibid, p. 37) and were no less angry for it. 
 So, we have arrived at a position of cognitive dissonance in which Jumblatt is acknowledging 
that forgetting trauma is both impossible and essential. The first thing to note is that the crimes being 
remembered here are assassinations of politicians and Zu’ama and the crimes which are being 
forgotten are largely civilian deaths caused by war. Here then, we have a class-based explanation for 
this contradiction. The deaths which Lebanese cannot forget (according to Jumblatt) are those of 
Zu’ama, conversely, there is a necessity to forget civilian deaths. The other explanation for this is 
instrumental. Here, any deaths can be ignored for instrumental purposes, whether it is of Zu’ama or 
civilian alike. This is clearly drawn out in the way Jumblatt, and his supporters, coordinated with the 
Syrians after his father’s death. However, what this statement demonstrates is that ignoring trauma 
for instrumental purposes does not equate to genuine forgetting by either Jumblatt or his followers. 
When the instrumental relationship is no longer expedient, this memory is fair game for Zu’ama to 
utilise instrumentally against the ally-turned-foe or is remembered spontaneously by the constituents, 
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potentially leading to the revenge so disparagingly referred to by Sfeir. This example also points to the 
key relationship between contemporary traumatic events and the reactivation of frames, scripts and 
schemata associated with previous traumas and their link to potentially violent emotional states.  
There is a sense in which trauma is forgotten until such time as it is politically expedient to 
remember, but there is also a sense in which emotions that have been actively forgotten are 
unleashed with potentially violent and irrational results. As we pointed out in chapter two, there is no 
guarantee that the objects of this violence are those directly responsible and Jumblatt bears this out 
in his concern for Khaddam when he visits Hamade at the hospital (ibid, p. 40). The propensity for the 
acquiring of surrogate victims has been established and can be explained by the utilisation of frames, 
scripts and schemata associated with previous events in times of traumatic uncertainty.  Finally, when 
Jumblatt attributes this strong memory to the Lebanese he does so in a way which implies a universal 
perspective which is fictitious. The rhetorical trick conflates his supporter’s memory with that of the 
Lebanese in general. It is certainly true that many Lebanese would remember Kamal’s death, it is nigh 
on impossible that they universally viewed it the same way.  So here, Jumblatt is memory-making 
rather than simply reporting on the recollections of the crowd. This reinforces his political and family 
brand, particularly among younger Lebanese who experience the death of Kamal as post-memory. 
This is what is achieved through Jumblatt’s constant association of Kamal with contemporary 
assassinations  
I said that there are some people when their time comes, especially if they are believers - and 
Rafik Hariri was a strong believer in God' s will - he sensed this danger … He was afraid, like 
my father when he returned to Lebanon and knew that his time had come. (ibid, p. 93) 
The way in which Jumblatt uses religious imagery whilst comparing Hariri and Kamal’s assassinations 
invokes frames of sainthood and martyrdom in which they possess supernatural senses of foresight. 
This does even more for the construction of these figures as martyred saints and underlines that  
Zu’ama have a highly contradictory relationship with memory in which forgetfulness and 
remembrance are constructed for instrumental purposes. The STL makes itself a conduit through 
which these representations are reproduced rather than challenged.  
 
The Second Bristol Hotel meeting 
 
After the attempt on Marwan Hamade’s life, Cameron directs questioning to the second Bristol Group 
meeting of the opposition. This meeting was distinguishable from the first due to the presence of Rafik 
Hariri’s representative in addition to the leader of the Phalange, Amine Gemayel (ibid, p. 101). 
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Cameron attempts to establish whether Gemayel was an “opposing combatant” (ibid, p. 101) to 
Jumblatt during the war. Jumblatt responds  
Unfortunately, we fought each other as various Lebanese communities for other people's 
interests, and as it was said by the famous article of Ghassan Tueini: It was other people's war 
on our own territory. Unfortunately, this is what happened.  
The first clause possesses an SVO structure indicating a process “we fought each other as various 
Lebanese communities” (ibid, p. 101) but the adjunct “for other people’s interests” (ibid, p. 101) 
changes the meaning of the entire process. This clause is stated as categorical truth. Jumblatt doubles 
down on this interpretation by invoking the discourse of Ghassan Tueini through a positively valued 
famous text, appealing to the intertextual MR and common-sense presuppositions of his Lebanese 
audience. It is noteworthy that Jumblatt often refers to the Tueini family and their newspaper An-
Nahar through positive vocabulary “Gebran Tueini is the son of Ghassan Tueini and he is also the 
descendant of a very prestigious and democratic institution in Lebanon, and that is An-Nahar 
Newspaper.” (ibid, p. 22, emphasis added). Thus, the audience is primed both textually and 
intertextually to consider this source as authoritative, either through genealogical descendent, general 
prestigious or liberal democratic scripts. This gives precedent to the last two clauses. These clauses 
appear in an SVC attribution structure, the first of which attributes the Lebanese civil war it using the 
linking verb was to being “other people' s war on our own territory.” (ibid, p. 101). This is a categorical 
attribute of the war in this representation which is reinforced by the second SVC clause which is 
definitive “this is what happened.” (ibid, p. 101). Here we see the theme of structural determinism in 
Jumblatt’s discourse obtain new heights in which responsibility for the Lebanese civil war and the 
interests being fought for had nothing to do with the Lebanese. The war of others discourse, thus 
rendered, proffers a script through which the Lebanese possess no agency vis-a-vis foreign powers. 
All one need do, to highlight the falsity of this claim, is to refer back to Jumblatt’s comments about his 
father from the first day of evidence.  
In the 1970’s, Kamal Jumblatt headed the nationalist movement which comprised all the leftist 
political parties in Lebanon that also wanted to change the sectarian regime. In 1975 the war 
in Lebanon broke out and it was a civil war, as you know. (The Prosecutor versus Ayyash et al. 
2015a, p. 6) 
Here, he admits that his father “headed the nationalist movement” (ibid, p. 6), which was one of the 
two initial sides in the civil war. He notes that, far from having no purpose but the interests of foreign 
parties, they had a domestic agenda to “change the sectarian regime.” (ibid, p. 6) and that the civil 
war broke out while his father was in command. Moreover, he reminds us that it was a civil war in 
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1975. Jumblatt avoids implying direct causality in his statement (for example, by connecting the first 
sentence with the second through the causal conjunction so). Instead, it is left to audience MR to 
interpret this causality which is easy for anyone with a knowledge of the origins and original 
combatants in the Lebanese civil war. Regardless, this account is totally contradictory to the war of 
others discourse which Jumblatt later propounds and, in fact, constitutes a theory-theory 
contradiction, that is, a contradiction in the accounts given as to the causes of the war. Moreover, this 
theory-theory contradiction is ideological to the extent that the war of others discourse externalises 
the causes and conduct of the civil war entirely on to foreign parties, shielding Zu’ama from 
association. It therefore functions to mystify and rationalise the origins, motives and conduct of the 
war which involve the Zu’ama specifically and the Lebanese generally.  
It was highlighted in chapter two that embarrassment functions to suppress honest discussion 
of the war and thus one could surmise that the war of others discourse finds fertile ground on which 
to establish itself. However, chapter two also established avoidance of this kind provides space for the 
propagation of hagiographic sectarian discourses which threaten prospects for peace. The STL appears 
passive once again, as a downright self-serving lie with the express purpose of furthering the ideology 
of forgetfulness and impunity is expounded within its walls and transmitted to Lebanon and the world. 
The sad irony is that Walid Jumblatt, through the invocation of this war of others discourse, effectively 
disavows the essentially noble and socialistic purposes of his father in opposing the fascism, 
exploitation and marginalisation of sectarian politics in 1975. This analysis is in no way meant to excuse 
the foreign interventions which transformed this largely binary conflict between right and left into a 
proxy sectarian affair after Kamal’s death.  
 
Interim Findings 
 
This chapter has identified several interim findings from an analysis of the first half of Walid Jumblatt’s 
testimony. Here they are summarised. This serves not only as a consolidation of what has been 
discovered but also as a guide and reference to the rest of Jumblatt’s testimony in chapter six and 
overall conclusions. In CR terms, these themes are separated into categories for ease of discussion but 
by now it has hopefully become evident to the reader that these phenomena exist in relation to one 
another within a causal complex.  
Remembrance and Active Forgetfulness  
The theme of memory is present from the beginning of the testimony in which the STL introduces 
Jumblatt in the most non-offensive way it can. It utilises checklists of uncontroversial attributes as 
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though he is applying for a job. This is arguably determined by the positioned practice which Jumblatt 
occupies within the STL, namely prosecution witness not defendant or contributor to a truth and 
reconciliation process. The memory of Kamal Jumblatt is a prominent feature of Walid Jumblatt’s 
discourse and manifests in particular ways for particular purposes. The first is the instrumental use of 
the STL as a place to testify the nature of Kamal’s assassination and the certainty with which Walid 
believes this was carried out by Syria. The second is the attachment of Kamal’s martyrdom to that of 
Hariri often using mystical or religious imagery. The former can be interpreted as both a convenient 
platform in which to put his father’s case before the court of public opinion, but it can also be 
interpreted as Jumblatt surreptitiously obtaining a form of therapy through the cathartic discussion of 
his traumatic past.  
 Jumblatt is also able to advance the Zu’ama monopoly and definition of memory. This is 
achieved through a discourse which renders healing and forgetting as synonymous as per the frame 
of amnesia. What also emerges is a practice of instrumental active forgetting in conjunction with 
instrumental processes of active remembrance often of the same event over time and always at the 
behest of Zu’ama politics. There is a distinct class element here in which, often, the crimes forgotten 
are those relating to the general populous but the ones remembered are ones with Zu’ama victims, 
unless the forgetting of crimes against Zu’ama is instrumentally advantageous. What is most 
concerning regarding this is the potential for the general populous to spontaneously remember things 
which they had previously actively forgotten with the potential for violence against surrogate victims 
never too far away. Thus, the STL leaves in place this complex of memory or indeed adds to its lob-
sided nature by only addressing one case. Amongst the general testimony, Jumblatt is engaged in 
memory-making, particularly with regard to Hariri and Kamal Jumblatt’s martyrdom and with regard 
to the civil war. The implications of Lebanese politics are that a) amnesia is never a complete process 
and memory can reassert itself in dangerous ways, intimating that the understandable impulse for 
forgetfulness might be counterproductive and b) the incompleteness of amnesia seems to favour the 
Zu’ama class who have disproportionate control of what gets remembered and when, to the 
detriment of normal victims and c) the STL perpetuates this monopolization of memory, reflective of 
its purposes under the gerrymandered system and thus it cannot function as a unifier of memory or 
reconciliation.   
 
Structural Power and Access to Justice 
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Cameron and the Judges of the STL are bound by the internal relationship between prosecution and 
prosecution witness to not antagonise Jumblatt or to question him on topics which are not relevant 
to the STL on the basis of its limited jurisdiction. What must be borne in mind always is that these 
limitations are not incidental, but politically instrumental and emanate from the interaction of the 
UNSC, the Zu’ama class in Lebanon and Israel (the objections of Syria and Hizballah being immaterial). 
This has the effect of leaving memory of prescribed but related events, a private matter. It was noted 
that Walid Jumblatt embodies aspects of both victim and perpetrator. This implies that a process of 
TJ based on universal truth telling might be more appropriate for dealing with Lebanon’s civil war past, 
though a thorough analysis of this question is beyond the scope of the present study which concerns 
the structural reasons this is unlikely to ever be achieved. The situation which exists is one which 
reproduces Zu’ama privilege with Jumblatt able to surreptitiously obtain recognition and access for 
himself, whilst normal Lebanese victims are systematically excluded from the proceedings (unless they 
happen to be the incidental victims of the Hariri bombing). The sinister side of this is that Jumblatt is 
covertly able to offer structural determinist arguments for behaviour, both personal and for the 
Lebanese in general, through the war of others discourse. This essentially grants a free pass to all 
actors, including himself. We are expected to accept his version of events, not probe too deeply, and 
most of all, not invite any non-elite victim’s perspective as an end in itself.  
 Thus, we arrive at the central ideological contradiction which repeats throughout these 
proceedings that a man who almost certainly was involved in what would be considered core 
international crimes is able to speak about his trauma due to the amnesty he enjoys but his victims 
are not. This is the very definition of impunity which ICL in general (Burgis-Kasthala 2014, p. 250) and 
the STL particularly (UN Press Release 2007) claim is what they wish to end, whilst in practice 
facilitating its systematic continuation. The implications for Lebanese politics are that certain 
categories of victims are systematically excluded, victims of the Israel-Hizballah war for example, and 
therefore a reconciliatory narrative is unlikely. Justice in a wider sense is thus unachievable.  
 
Domination 
 
Lebanon has been subject to both hegemony and domination since the civil war. A process of coercion 
through assassination but then also consent through a margin of manoeuvre was the strategy by which 
Hafez seemingly established the Lebanese-Syrian historic bloc. A key, and often overlooked, aspect of 
this was this regional hegemony’s dependence on global American hegemony. The gradual unravelling 
of this order occurred through the withdrawal of Israel from south Lebanon, increased 
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authoritarianism through the accession of Bashar Al-Assad, and the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq which 
led to a situation of more overt domination by Syria, but also by the UNSC. Fundamentally, the U.S.-
Syria historic bloc had never transitioned from instrumental hegemony to ideological hegemony. The 
ideological leadership of Syria was, and is, limited to the March 8th portion of the Lebanese and is 
rejected here by Jumblatt through his reformulation of Arab nationalism away from Ba’athist 
homogeneity, towards a plural vision. Jumblatt’s periodic acceptance of Syrian leadership through the 
years can be described as resting largely on instrumental calculations, apart from, perhaps, his 
recourse to Arab nationalism in resistance to Zionism after 1977. Here, in Jumblatt’s testimony, there 
appears to be a core of ideological acceptance of Hafez on the basis that an abusive Arab leader is still 
preferable to Zionism within the frame of Arab nationalism and so long as Israel remained a threat. 
When the threat no longer applied, however, Jumblatt’s ideological acceptance of those who he 
viewed as his father’s murderers was withdrawn.  
The eventual breakdown of the historic bloc resulted in the tug of war between the Syrian 
wish to extend President Lahoud’s mandate and UNSC resolution 1559. With regard to Jumblatt’s 
assertion that General Rustom Ghazaleh was hostile to Hariri as a reflection of Bashar’s own hostility, 
this view is supported in the analysis of Hariri and Ghazaleh’s conflictual discourse. Similarly, the UNSC 
attached international interests (disarming Hizballah and the Palestinians) to the limited goals of the 
domestic opposition (Syrian withdrawal). This was apparently done without consultation with the 
domestic opposition to Syria and, in fact, made their task much harder. The notion that the STL’s origin 
in UNSC resolution 1757 itself could be viewed as a continuation of these dominating processes, given 
that it over-rode (for good or ill) the domestic provisions of veto designed to ensure that divisive 
foreign policy matters should not lead to domestic antagonism, raises its head in an interesting way 
in chapter six. The implications for Lebanese politics are that all international patrons are guilty of 
sacrificing Lebanese peace and stability for strategic ends. In this light, it seems more prudent to avoid 
existential challenges to one or other alliance though adherence to the principle that foreign treaties 
should be subject to veto. This is much more valuable as a mechanism of stability, than ICL processes 
established ostensibly to deal with (some) of the ramifications of these crises after the fact and which, 
in actuality, represent weaponised interventions in those ongoing internationalised conflicts.  
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Chapter Six: Walid Jumblatt’s evidence 6-7th May 2015 
 
Introduction 
 
The transcript of the 6th May 2015 marks the culmination of Mr Cameron’s questioning of Jumblatt for 
the prosecution. Cameron takes Jumblatt through some press articles and then introduces a 
substantial audio recording of a meeting between the Syrian deputy foreign minister Walid Moallem 
and Rafik Hariri which took place at the office of the Prime Minister on the 1st February 2005, the day 
before the final Bristol meeting and thirteen days before the assassination of Hariri. The questioning 
of Jumblatt for the prosecution subsequently concludes and the judge directs Jumblatt to answer 
questions, first from the representative of the victims, and then to various defence council who 
question Jumblatt until the end of the 7th of May 2015.  
 
Hizballah  
 
Mr Cameron quotes a newspaper article from Al Mustaqbal, which describes a meeting between 
Jumblatt’s Qornet-Chehwan allies with Hizballah’s leader, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah (The Prosecutor 
versus Ayyash et al. 2015c, p. 11). Cameron asks Jumblatt “Did you know about this meeting between 
Secretary-General Nasrallah and these two members of Qornet-Chehwan at the time?” (Ibid, p. 13) 
Jumblatt responds  
No, but the agreement between us and Qornet-Chehwan was that we needed to have a 
dialogue. Nothing in Lebanon happens without dialogue, without dialogue with the others, 
regardless of their political opinions. The dialogue is a must. We cannot eliminate the others 
… Hezbollah and the bigger alliance behind them were in the end a part of the country. Their 
loyalty to Syria is one thing, but we cannot deny the fact that they were part of Lebanon, 
Hezbollah and other parties. We cannot deny the fact that they're part of Lebanon and we 
cannot disregard any of them. (Ibid, p. 14) 
The first sentence here is of an SVC sentence structure in which the positively valued vocabulary of 
dialogue is attributed to the aims of Jumblatt and Qornet-Chehwan. Indeed, dialogue is overworded 
four times in this passage and constitutes a preoccupation. The importance of dialogue is expressed 
in the second sentence categorically, through an action process SVO sentence, which is negated 
nothing. When Jumblatt says nothing happens in Lebanon without dialogue, he is not being literal. 
Rather, context and MR indicate this refers to the political process. The third SVC sentence drives 
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home the point by equating dialogue with necessity. The fourth sentence constitutes an SVO action 
process, which is negated and in which the verb eliminate also constitutes negatively valued 
vocabulary. Whether this is political or physical elimination is left unstated and he appears to leave 
this open to MR interpretations which likely incorporate both. In the next SVC sentence, Hizballah 
become an attribute of Lebanon. Jumblatt clarifies this position in the following coordinated complex 
sentence where the first clause asserting Hizballah’s loyalty to Syria is ameliorated by the adversative 
but which functions to reaffirm that Hizballah are part of Lebanon nevertheless. The second part of 
this complex sentence includes the negation we cannot deny for emphasis. The last sentence in this 
statement is a coordinated complex one in which the first clause repeats the negation we cannot deny 
to reinforce the message that Hizballah are part of Lebanon. The final clause is an SVO action process 
in which the negative verb disregard is negated by cannot. ln all, there are five negations in this 
passage. This indicates a systematic oppositional rewording and challenge to actors in the intertextual 
context.  
 The above speech invokes MR of consociationalism and addresses multiple actors in the 
intertextual context. The MR of consociationalism is drawn on heavily in the emphasis on dialogue, 
the recognition that one cannot eliminate or disregard political others and that political loyalty does 
not preclude inclusion. The frame of consociationalism is set up in which dialogue is the only realistic 
script. As we noted in chapter two, one of the principal purposes of consociational logic is to assure 
sub-state groups that they will not become politically marginalised or physically threatened and to 
dissuade patron-seeking behaviour. This is reflected in the negations of, disregard and eliminate. 
Therefore, within the superficial schema of giving evidence on a specific question, Jumblatt is 
seemingly also providing a schema of reassurance to Hizballah and their allies through the frames and 
scripts associated with consociational power-sharing. Moreover, it also functions to remind anti-
Hizballah factions that they should consider dreams of disregarding or eliminating Hizballah as folly. 
Finally, in light of the discussions of 1559 and the explicit problems this caused for Jumblatt and his 
allies, part of his audience is likely to be international actors. MR indicates this to be the permanent 
five UNSC members, particularly the Western bloc of the U.S., U.K., and France along with regional 
powers and allies, such as Israel and Saudi Arabia.  
Are Knudsen (2010, p. 18) argues that “The mafia-style killing of political opponents is not an 
aberration but better understood as a political discourse of violence.” Viewed in this light as a 
historical process, one can see a pattern in the unfolding of events, particularly as it relates to the 
undermining of confidence in the consociational system’s ability to assure its fractured political 
culture. In May of 2003 the U.S.’s coalition of the willing invaded Iraq and deposed Saddam Hussein 
and his Ba’athist regime. By October 2003 the U.S. congress passed the Syria Accountability Act, which 
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sought to curtail the Hizballah-Syria-Iran alliance through the threat of sanctions against Syria. These 
actions signal the disintegration of the instrumental historic bloc of the U.S. and Syria which had 
allowed for the regional Syrian hegemony over Lebanon. Nicolas Blanford (2006, p. 91) notes that 
open opposition to Syria’s presence by Lebanese politicians was precipitated almost immediately by 
this, which implies a causal relationship between the domestic historic bloc of Pax Syriana and the 
global historic bloc of Pax Americana; indeed, an internal relation which ensured that the removal of 
U.S. support for Pax Syriana altered its constitutive rules to the extent that it no longer existed.  
The dual enactment of President Assad’s Lahoud extension and UNSC resolution 1559 on 2nd 
September 2004  (The Prosecutor versus Ayyash et al. 2015a, p. 87, Knudsen 2010, p.13) can be seen 
as a further step in this conflictual discourse, the former attempting to maintain an ever more overtly 
dominating stance toward Lebanon and the latter barely concealing its purpose as the strategic defeat 
of Hizballah by other means. It was a month later, on the 1st October, that the assassination campaign 
against anti-Syria politicians and personalities begins with the attempted assassination of Marwan 
Hamade (Blanford 2006, p. 110). The escalation to assassination takes place after UNSC resolution 
1559 whose unique feature was to add the dismantling of Hizballah to the opposition demands for 
Syrian withdrawal. Notwithstanding Jumblatt, Hariri and Qornet-Chehwan attempts to reassure 
Hizballah that their disarmament was a domestic decision, it appears the assassins considered them 
complicit and/or a security threat through continued opposition to Syria. Whilst Syria withdrew in 
April 2005 and Hizballah entered parliament more fully to secure its interests, the assassination of 
March 14th ministers continued unabated. The 2006 Israel-Hizballah war constitutes a reversion to 
military methods by the west to achieve the aims of 1559 and the wider neo-conservative project for 
the remaking by force of the Middle East.  
Prime Minister Fuad Siniora meanwhile drew on the only relative power he had in his patrons 
and solicited the creation of the STL through resolution 1757. The STL very much constitutes part of 
this discourse of conflict and was but the latest example of the overriding of the consociational system 
which was designed to deter and assure sub-state groups. This is reflected most obviously in the STL’s 
loci, temporis and personae which effectively renders it weaponised. What else could explain the 
disinterest in the 2006 war or the original sin of the 2003 Iraq invasion, which precipitated this 
discourse of violence? This also raises the conceptual question of what it means to be politicised and 
this is a question which is addressed later in the testimony of Walid Jumblatt.  
Thus, we could also interpret Jumblatt’s assertion that elimination is not possible as directed 
at Hizballah who are, after all, indicted at the STL for eliminating a political rival. Indeed, Jumblatt is 
reported to have earlier opined that the systematic assassinations of anti-Syrian MP’s after the Hariri 
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assassination were designed to undermine their parliamentary majority in favour of pro-Syrians 
(Blanford 2006, p. 186). If Hizballah are proved to have killed Hariri, it would be a reasonable inference 
that they were responsible for the other murders too. In that case, this schema takes on the light of 
reminding potential Hizballah assassins that they cannot silence all their opponents and they would 
be better off pursuing politics through the consociational system. It functions as speech acts of both 
(re)assurance and warning. Throughout Jumblatt’s testimony he talks openly and stridently about the 
“killer and criminal regime” (The Prosecutor versus Ayyash et al. 2015b, p. 95) of Syria and repeats his 
assertions that he believes they killed both his father and Hariri. This is led by the prosecution 
questions, whilst mention of Hizballah is almost non-existent. Jumblatt never discusses Hizballah in 
this way and, despite their implication in the crime, Jumblatt tends to establish a binary between 
domestic and foreign actors, between the client (Hizballah) and the patron (Syria) in which the latter 
become the locus of negative values and the former are dissociated from negativity. On one hand, this 
is explicable by the real politik calculations of Jumblatt who must recognise that Hizballah hold the 
military balance of power and potentially are not above the expert assassination of rivals. However, 
this did not stop him opposing Syria when he deemed their interests as opposite to those of the 
republic. Thus, the explanation for this contradiction is likely the calculation that the integrity of the 
republic demands inclusion of the Shia Lebanese whose major representative is Hizballah.  
It must also be noted that Jumblatt is unequivocal in his accusation that Syria murdered both 
Hariri and his father and, at face value, it might be that he truly believes it was Syrian assassins, not 
Hizballah, who are the ones to be feared. The fact remains, however, that Hizballah have used violence 
openly in Lebanon to protect their interests and now in Syria too. The closeness of the alliance 
indicates that Jumblatt’s dissociation of one from the other reflects some political or psychological 
requirement of his, rather than being reflective of Syria and Hizballah’s actual status as atomistic 
entities with an external relation. The more likely scenario is that they possess internal relations and 
are now constitutive of one another in important ways.  
 
Representative for the victims 
 
Jumblatt states that 13th February 2005 was the last time he saw the Prime Minister alive and the 
questioning by Mr Cameron and the prosecution concludes. Questioning is then commenced for the 
representative for the victims, Ms. Abdelsater-Abusamra who says she represents 72 participating 
victims and states her intention is to question Jumblatt about the connection he made between his 
father’s death and Hariri’s. Presiding Judge Re immediately interrupts and asks her to clarify the 
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relevance of this approach (Ibid, p. 114). She states that it is relevant to expose “the intended purpose 
and the intended effect on the victims and on Lebanon's society from these assassinations.” (Ibid, p. 
114 emphasis added). The intended purpose and intended effect utilise the definite article and 
therefore indicate some inter or intra-textually defined concept. The context of the sentence indicates 
these concepts are to be defined in the answers elicited, therefore promising to establish them in later 
questioning. The definite article is also employed in conjunction with technical vocabulary victims. The 
pronoun these is used in conjunction with the negative technical vocabulary assassinations. The 
victims point intra-textually to the 72 mentioned by Ms. Abdelsater-Abusamra and inter-textually to 
other hearings or documents, past and future. It is obvious that the victims are defined solely by their 
victimhood in relation to the bomb which assassinated Hariri. This is presupposed and operates as 
hegemonic ideology to naturalise, universalise and mystify by implying definitiveness: the victims. In 
this presupposition, other victims are externalised and erased from the schema. It also naturalises 
and/or mystifies that recognition of their victimhood is entirely dependent on their proximity to an 
assassination targeting a high level, internationally connected, Za’im. These assassinations are an 
intra-textual link to the two assassinations she mentions but evokes MR of the assassinations of the 
war and post-war period. To be clear, this may not be Abdelsater-Abusamra’s purpose, but rather the 
effects of the power behind discourse at the STL which systematically limits the personae, temporis 
and loci and thus the victims considered.  
She goes on to elaborate “there is a pattern, in fact, that could be established, and Mr. 
Jumblatt is personally an immediate victim of a very similar political assassination, albeit 28 years 
older, but it's the same.” (Ibid, p. 114). Once again, we have use of the technical vocabulary victim, 
this time in direct relation to Jumblatt. Whilst Jumblatt is certainly a victim in this immediate case, he 
is also implicated in crimes which dwarf the one under investigation. Once again, the power behind 
discourse has determined that Jumblatt is treated as a victim and not as a perpetrator. It is worth 
stopping to consider how Jumblatt’s own victims might feel upon viewing the representative for the 
victims at the STL refer to their persecutor as a victim, and only a victim. Given the STL’s televised 
nature, it is almost inevitable that many will be watching, yet silenced. The class element is once again 
in evidence as the voiceless are non-Zu’ama and suffer crimes not related to the Lebanese elite 
(assassination) or of concern to the global agenda (terrorism) but to much wider populations (war 
crimes and crimes against humanity) which, by their nature, inflict many more victims. Nevertheless, 
this is how she develops her argument, discovering purpose and effect through establishment of 
pattern between the twentieth and twenty-first century crimes. There appears here to be the 
beginning of a combining of discourse types, one legal, one social science. In the former, a pattern 
might indicate the modus operandi of an individual or group, in the latter it might indicate the 
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historical structures and causal complexes of society. The combination of these discourse types might 
prove profitable but might also cause conceptual and logical confusion.  
Judge Re allows her to ask the questions but with the observation that it is, in his view, of 
“marginal relevance” and that the answer should be “brief” (Ibid, p. 114). She therefore commences 
by asking Jumblatt about the rumours spread regarding his father’s assassination in 1977. Jumblatt 
responds by stating that upon the death of his father rumours spread among the Druze of the Chouf 
that the Maronites had killed Kamal (Ibid, p. 115). He states that many Druze enacted a “revenge 
operation … on thousands of Christians in the villages around Mokhtara” (Ibid, p. 115) and that the 
Syrian troops stationed there did nothing to prevent this. Jumblatt states that his own role, along with 
some Druze Sheikhs, was to appeal for calm. When asked if the rumours were true or false, he re-
states that a Lebanese Judge created a file of evidence implicating Syrian intelligence, not the 
Maronites (Ibid, p. 115). Ms. Abdelsater-Abusamra then asks whether he remembered who spread 
the rumours to which he replies he does not. Abdelsater-Abusamra states that in looking at the 
assassinations of Hariri and Jumblatt she wished to discuss “the effect … on the victims and the 
society.” (Ibid, p. 117) and asks Jumblatt “Do you see a pattern in that -- in the effects of killing a 
political leader of the calibre of Rafik Hariri or Kamal Jumblatt, the effect on the victims and the 
people? What was the purpose of the murderers” (Ibid, p. 115). The first statement clearly reflects 
Ms. Abdelsater-Abusamra’s MR as containing a frame of assassination which includes some 
unspecified effects on Lebanese society (or particular groups). The second statement suggests these 
effects are instrumentalised by the assassins, rather than being incidental. Jumblatt somewhat misses 
these cues and answers by referring to the immediate effect and cause, namely, the assassination of 
an anti-Syrian figure, by Syria, for their obstruction of Syrian interests (Ibid, p. 117).  
Ms. Abdelsater-Abusamra’s focus on the massacres carried out after Kamal’s assassination 
strongly suggests that it is this kind of violent effect which concern her as effects on the wider society. 
Therefore, one can surmise that she was suggesting that assassins may desire this type of effect. These 
relationships are discussed in this thesis in chapter two as the causal complex of clientelist and 
sectarian violence. This model postulated that Zu’ama assassination of rivals was differentiated from 
sectarian violence, where the first is calculated and the second can often be reflexive (among other 
distinctions). It was concluded that, whilst the former was distinct in the types of violence performed 
it, nevertheless, often formed a causal complex with the latter. In the posited causal complex, the 
assassination of rivals which is targeted and instrumental can often trigger sectarian violence among 
sectarian and politically differentiated groups which often manifests in generalised violence and often 
against surrogate victims (Khalaf 2002, p. 1-21). Obviously, much depends on context, the 
assassination of Kamal took place in a context of civil war where state authority had broken down 
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where the main antagonists were the Druze and Christians. Therefore, the assumption that Christians 
were the perpetrators and the violent reaction were more likely. If Abdelsater-Abusamra had this 
conceptual framework in place, she would not need to fixate on who spread the rumours but might 
appreciate that rumours, whether intentional or spontaneous, can be the result of the (re)activation 
of frames, scripts and schemata associated with past conflict which offer explanations in fluid, 
indeterminate and fearful situations. It is possible that in a social context rich with distrust, a third 
party could easily manipulate these processes to encourage the breakdown of social cohesion on a 
sectarian and political basis. The key point is that assassination, whatever the motivation, increases 
the likelihood of sectarian conflict and violence. Unfortunately, Abdelsater-Abusamra was not able to 
articulate what she was asking about in these terms, partly because of the time constraints enacted 
through Judge Re's power in discourse and partly because she seemed to be approaching the topic ad 
hoc without systematic theoretical forethought. These constraints are manifest in her somewhat 
confused line of questioning where, having indicated the connection between clientelist and sectarian 
violence, its consequences for Lebanese social cohesion, and the potential intent behind this for the 
assassins, she asks “Do you think, Mr. Jumblatt, that the murderers were betting or wanted to create 
a sense of  hopelessness, abduction, silencing, taming, terrorizing the people, that they would feel 
hopeless that all their best leaders end up getting killed?” (Ibid, p. 117-118). Here she evokes a totally 
different set of emotions from the ones implied in her interest in Kamal’s death. This is not to say that 
these reactions could not be, paraphrasing Patomaki, one of the sufficient but unnecessary elements 
of this causal complex. Rather, the key mechanism or tendency she was on the cusp of identifying 
between elite assassination, its polarising effect on sectarian and political groups and its potential 
manifestation in sectarian violence, is not consolidated.   
This results in a confused and abrupt ending to her questioning where Jumblatt uses this new 
opening for a rhetorical flourish which appears to be aimed more at his domestic constituents than to 
answering questions on a factual basis  
If this is their intent, they have failed because after the death of Kamal Jumblatt we kept his 
journey, we took his journey, and we did not forget. Up to this day, we did not forget. And 
when Hariri was killed, most of the Lebanese were revolted, were opposed to that. They said: 
We will not forget. And they will not forget. (Ibid, p. 118) 
Here, Jumblatt overwords in three instances. The first instance is journey which doubles as a metaphor. 
The metaphor of journey implies teleological ending or destination. A journey also activates mystical 
MR with the spiritual implications which fits the image of Kamal as a martyr who possessed foresight 
and knowingly died for a cause. The pronoun we is used in conjunction with SVO action processes to 
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show that his faithful have stayed true to this path and, presumably, the destination. The first sentence 
here is very complex and made of 6 clauses. Four of these form subordinate pairs and the last two are 
coordinated. In the first pair, the first clause is subordinated if this is their intent. This subordination 
appears not to have ideological purpose, but rather has the function of prefacing an argument that 
they have failed. These are connected by a causal connector because to another subordinated clause 
after the death of Kamal Jumblatt. This backgrounding is questionable due to its basis in the idea that 
they kept his journey. This is an interesting statement for a man who has provided, by this point, three 
days of testimony on how his father was unable to overthrow the sectarian order and that he, himself, 
was obliged to abandon this quest and ally with his father’s murderers for the medium-term Arab 
nationalist cause. These are not value judgements, Jumblatt was clearly faced with a difficult set of 
circumstances in which he relied on real politik rather than utopianism to survive.  
However, Jumblatt has related in detail that the aims of his father around the abolishment of 
sectarianism were impossible to carry out. We must therefore presume that this journey, has changed 
somewhat in destination. The last coordinated clause relates that we took his journey and we did not 
forget. This illustrates once again the theme of the constancy of memory. There is an implied 
cohesiveness between remembrance and the ability to keep the journey. It demonstrates again that, 
when the time was right, the memory of Kamal was activated and used against Hafez’s heir. This is a 
recurrence of memory making by Jumblatt at the STL. Thus, the second instance of overwording is 
forget, which occurs in four instances and each one of them with a negation. Thus, this appears to be 
an oppositional rewording and rebuttal to those in the intertextual context who argue that they did 
forget and fail to keep the journey of Kamal. In the last three sentences, the constancy of memory for 
Kamal is attached rhetorically, once again, to that of Hariri. Thus, Jumblatt has managed to turn 
Abdelsater-Abusamra’s questioning, into an opportunity to reinforce the martyrdom brands of 
Jumblatt and Hariri through memory making. The analytical purpose of Abdelsater-Abusamra’s 
questions is apparently lost. This impression is reinforced in her seeming attempt to reformulate 
Jumblatt’s answer into something approximating the information she wished to illicit “Thank you, Mr. 
Jumblatt. So you mean what happened after Mr. Hariri' s assassination was predicted by the 
murderers? They predicted this reaction? Thank you.” (Ibid, p. 118.). Nothing in Jumblatt’s answer 
pointed towards an interpretation of the murderers predicting reactions and yet Abdelsater-
Abusamra seizes on this. This is clearly a function of the time constraints but also a failure on her part 
to properly define the concepts around which she wished to ask the questions.  
Abdelsater-Abusamra’s last ditch seizure upon prediction as a prerequisite for trying to define 
the intended purpose and the intended effects on Lebanese society of assassination opens the 
discourse again to the theory of Israeli or western involvement for, logically, if the results of the 
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assassination were entirely predictable, then Pro-Syrians would not have acted because Syria was 
expelled. For reasons explained earlier, this scenario is very unlikely. An emphasis instead on the link 
between assassination and sectarian violence could yield a nuanced account in which the former can 
lead to the latter. Potentially, this could be skilfully exploited by a third party to divide and dominate 
Lebanese sects through manufactured infighting (the assassination of Kamal Jumblatt) but also could 
be ineptly attempted and backfire (the assassination of Rafik Hariri).  
We noted in chapter five, Walid Jumblatt’s use of Kamal and Rafik Hariri to advance the 
martyrdom brand for political reasons. Whilst this would be of questionable relevance as the judge 
states, using them as comparative cases to examine the underlying structure of clientelist and 
sectarian violence in Lebanon as Abdelsater-Abusamra attempts to, is not. The potentially devastating 
effects of this relationship of violence is of central concern to the question of peace and stability in 
Lebanon. The violent emotions elicited at moments of assassination, as evidenced in Jumblatt’s 
testimony on his father and Marwan Hamade, are perhaps the main (or only) argument in favour of 
the STL’s selectivity of the Hariri case. This does not seem to be recognised by the participants apart 
from Ms. Abdelsater-Abusamra. It is unfortunate that she is constrained from exploring this theme 
further. One explanation could be that this strays too close, and makes too much of a causal 
connection between elite assassination/terrorism which are part of the selective, instrumental 
jurisdiction of the STL on the one hand, and the widespread crimes against civilians which are 
systematically externalised and the Zu’ama’s consequent power behind discourse, on the other. 
Another explanation might be that representative for the victims does not possess the relational 
power as a positioned practice compared with prosecution or defence when dealing with key 
witnesses, particularly in an ICJ punitive institution rather than a TJ holistic one. In future, 
collaboration between counsel and social scientists might be fruitful for the framing of more effective 
questions based on conceptual operationalisation which can avoid reinvention of the conceptual 
wheel. Social scientists can help to firm up concepts and posit causal relations so that council can avoid 
conceptual confusion.  
 
Defence questioning, the money trail and the Saudi connection.  
 
After Ms. Abdelsater-Abusamra concludes, questioning by defence council begins, starting with Mr. 
Aouini, council for Hassan Habib Merhi (ibid, p. 119). Whilst four men were indicted in 2011 for the 
assassination of Rafik Hariri, Mr Merhi was indicted slightly later in 2013 for allegedly being accomplice 
to the conspiracy (Special Tribunal for Lebanon 2018). His trial was merged with those of the other 
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defendants on 11th February 2014 (ibid).  Mr. Aouini begins his questioning by presenting an excerpt 
of a speech made by Jumblatt on the 14th February 2006 
the international tribunal will be financed by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The punishment 
will be implemented and the blood of dozens of martyrs will be done justice and they will 
receive justice. The mothers and siblings and sons of the gang formed of the four officers, … 
they will cry when the -- when this gang shall be punished and when they will be executed. 
(Ibid, p. 129)  
This section contains intertextual connections, that is, pronouns or definite articles which indicate 
concepts not defined in the text, but which point to other texts and draw upon the observers MR. The 
first intertextual connection is the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The MR which we can apply to this 
Kingdom is that its Wahabi based judicial system is (in)famous for imposing corporal and capital 
punishment. Moreover, it is the primary Arab rival to the Iran-Syria-Hizballah alliance, patron of the 
Hariri family, and the anti-Syrian forces in Lebanon. The second is the gang formed of the four officers.  
This refers to four Lebanese generals allied to Pax Syriana who were incarcerated without charge by 
the Lebanese authorities under instruction from the UNIIIC under suspicion of involvement in the 
assassination of Hariri for approximately four years. The generals were held based on what turned out 
to be false testimony and eventually released after the establishment of the STL in 2009, without 
charge (Nashabe 2012, p. 261). Given these intertextual connections, it is no wonder this section of 
speech contains an overwording which implies a relation of hyponymy between punishment, justice 
and execution. The positive vocabulary of justice, in this context, imbues its hyponyms, punishment 
and execution, with positive value. This is possible only because the discourse type drawn upon is that 
of non-liberal capital punishment conceptions of justice which disregard principles of fundamental 
human rights.  
Moreover, a discourse type of Zu’ama war rhetoric is at play in which the positively valued 
vocabulary blood of martyrs is invoked to justify the physical elimination of the enemy. The negative 
vocabulary gang serves to delegitimise the four officers through non-recognition of their former 
positions within the Lebanese state. The merging of non-Liberal justice discourse types with that of 
Zu’ama war rhetoric is interesting and indicates both, a connection between judicial and extrajudicial 
violence and how the UNIIIC was internally related to the discourse of conflict and violence in Lebanon 
in its de-facto partisan actions. Aouini asserts that this speech constitutes a speech act of threat 
towards both the generals and their families. Jumblatt replies “If you want to consider it a threat, you 
can consider it a threat.” (Ibid, p. 131). This reinforces the illiberal and arbitrary nature of the discourse 
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of justice propounded in this speech in which families are guilty by association. This echoes the general 
tendency of violence in Lebanon towards surrogate victims in times of stress and uncertainty. 
 Information relating to the funding of the STL is either scant or seemingly restricted by the 
STL. However, an unorthodox source of information is available in the form of U.S. diplomatic cables 
released by WikiLeaks. The question of Wikileaks arises in the testimony and is used by the defence 
to frame questions, although they are not allowed by the court to present them as evidence due to 
their unorthodox source and questionable provenance (Re, Nosworthy et al. 2015, p. 10). This 
approach was supported by the trial chamber in a decision which occurred after Walid Jumblatt’s 
testimony concluded on the 7th May 2015 (ibid). This decision acknowledges that the cables have been 
published in “The New York Times, The Guardian, Der Spiegel, El Pais and Le Monde.” (Ibid, p. 10). 
Despite this, the decision held that they did not prove the authenticity of the cables presented or the 
accuracy of what was purported to have occurred in the cables. The decision cites the necessity of 
high evidential standards to provide a fair trial as a reason for their non-admittance. One would be 
remiss in failing to note that this decision shields those the WikiLeaks cables might embarrass. This 
includes its own prosecution office’s predecessor. The UNIIIC is detailed to have held the four generals 
for a further two years after the evidence justifying their detention had been “thoroughly discredited” 
(N/A [Wikileaks] 2007). This was allegedly done with the encouragement of the U.S. government and 
the March 14th authorities based on political considerations and against the better legal judgement of 
the UNIIIC commissioner Serge Brammertz (Ibid). It is notable that, from chapter four’s analysis of the 
ICL discourse, only that scholarship self-designated as CLS utilised Wikileaks sources (See Burgis-
Kasthala 2014, Matthews 2014). Whatever the case, there seems to be no reason to hold to these 
Legal standards and this thesis applies only the journalistic ones. This approach is particularly 
justifiable given the paucity of records, particularly regarding funding of the STL.  
 Wierda, Nasser and Maalouf (2007, p. 1077) argued at the outset of the STL that its legitimacy 
would depend to a large extent on its ability to be a) transparent about its financial backers and b) 
obtain funding from diversified sources rather than countries which have a political stake, explicitly 
“the US, UK, France or other countries with significant involvement in the current situation such as 
Saudi Arabia.” (Ibid, p. 1077). On the STL’s website, information pertaining to finance is not 
forthcoming. A document named STL Close-up which can be located under the About the STL tab on 
the website, indicates simply that the STL receives 51% of its funding from voluntary contributions 
from states and 49% from Lebanon (The Public Information and Communications Section of the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon 2017, p. 2). The Annual Report produced by the STL president for the 
U.N. Secretary-General is only slightly more forthcoming. In its latest iteration, it states  
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Since 2009, 28 states have contributed to the Tribunal. This includes Lebanon’s contribution, 
and voluntary contributions or in-kind support from Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the European Union, Finland, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Russian 
Federation, Sweden, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, the United 
Kingdom, the United States of America, Uruguay and other states. (Hrdličková 2017, p. 41-42) 
Whilst this list provides some insight, it does not specify numbers. It also apparently includes two 
states which are not named (inferred by subtracting the 26 named states from the 28 total stated). 
However, this can be cross-referenced with U.S. diplomatic cables from just prior to the STL’s first year 
of operation. According to these accounts, there were, at this juncture, only 17 states contributing 
(N/A [Wikileaks] 2008b). All of these states are ones which are named in the official STL annual report 
which means that the accounts do not contradict each other. Another overlap occurs in the presence 
of unnamed states called regional states in the cable or other states in the annual report. There is only 
one other state named in the cable which is not mentioned in the annual report: Kuwait. If we infer 
that this is accurate and, furthermore, was entered in the public report under the heading of other 
states, this accounts for a total of 27 of 28 countries. Interestingly, an earlier diplomatic cable allegedly 
noted  
USUN Legal Adviser Willson and USUN/MR participated in an April 9 meeting of the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) Management Committee [which noted] the view of some 
Committee members that recent requests by certain contributors to the Tribunal to remain 
anonymous raised concerns over issues of transparency and accountability of Tribunal 
operations. (N/A [Wikileaks] 2008a) 
They continued  
Committee Chair Adams noted that the contributions of several states were listed under the 
heading, "Regional States," since these countries did not want to be identified by name.  USUN 
said the Committee should welcome the contributions from each and every Member State 
that was willing to provide funding for the STL. It remained the right and privilege of each 
contributing state to request that their donation be made anonymously. (Ibid) 
Thus, it appears that, in the event, the interests of state anonymity were placed before public 
transparency.  
One cable notes that the monies secured for the first year of operations amounted to 55 
million USD, with an additional 4 million USD spent by the U.S. on a “task force and advance team 
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work.” (N/A [Wikileaks] 2008b). The itemized contributions total 59,957,882 USD. The itemisation 
demonstrates that Lebanon is the greatest contributor at 28.7% or 17,185,572 USD. The U.S. 
contributes 23.3% or 14,000,000 USD. The third largest contributor(s) are regional states (or state) at 
16.7% or 9,999,975 USD. The Netherlands is fourth, at 8.9% or 5,362,766 USD (This is listed as in kind 
support and reflects its donation of a court building). Kuwait is the fifth largest contributor at 8.3% or 
5,000,000 USD. France contributes the sixth largest amount at 3.7% or 2,209,862 USD. Canada, the 
U.K., Italy, Germany and Japan all contribute approximately 1,000,000 USD or 1.7%. The other 
contributions fall under 1million USD and are statistically inconsequential. Hungary, for example, 
donates $10,000 or 0.02% (Rounding up). We can infer from our cross reference that the third largest 
contributor listed under regional states is actually one state. It is here that we can refer back to 
Jumblatt’s testimony, “the international tribunal will be financed by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia” (The 
Prosecutor versus Ayyash et al. 2015c, p. 129). It seems a reasonable inference that this missing state 
is Saudi Arabia, based on Jumblatt’s testimony, the political alignment of this state, the funds at its 
disposal, and its desire to remain anonymous. In this estimation, the STL gets 27% of its start-up cost 
from the UNSC veto empowered sponsors of resolution 1559 and a further 25% by GCC regional rivals 
to the Iran-Syria-Hizballah alliance. That is a combined total of 52% in the first year. In this light, it is 
no wonder that the funding structure of the STL is opaque. This reinforces the view that it is part of 
the partisan conflictual discourse, not a disinterested arbiter of justice, mostly due to its determination 
to conceal these facts.  
One could consider STL Judicial decisions as emergent from this funding structure, namely, 
not to allow leaked diplomatic cables as evidence, not to allow the Judicial review of UNSC decisions, 
the retroactive creation and application of a core crime of transnational terrorism and the application 
of jurisdiction which omits the 2006 Israel-Hizballah war or other local or regional crimes. Wierda, 
Nasser and Maalouf’s (2007) notion of financial transparency cannot be said to be satisfied. Their 
advocacy for diverse sources of funding is ostensibly met in the annual report’s enumeration of 28 
different states, but is fatally undermined by the cable’s account of the large proportion of sums from 
partisan parties. The revelation of sources of funding in the annual report and simultaneous restriction 
of itemised sums is seemingly a cynical instance of systematically distorted communication with a view 
to procuring consent for ideological hegemony. This is achieved by emphasising the diversity of state 
sponsors for the appearance of inclusion whilst it intentionally obscures the STL’s emergence as the 
result of the financial backing of major international actors with a partisan agenda. The STL could not 
hope to exist without the structural and financial power of the U.S., France, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, 
along with the significant support of the Netherlands as the historical centre of ICL. One need hardly 
point out the practice-practice contradiction of the funding of a tribunal based on principals of liberal, 
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human rights aligned, justice from a state with a human rights record as abysmal as Saudi Arabia’s or 
as averse to international judgment and equality before the law as the U.S.. It should be noted that 
there is no way to discern whether the proportions of funding remained the same or altered from 
2009 to the present as the cables do not go that far and the annual reports omit this data.  
Politicisation 
 
Mr Aouini notes that Jumblatt has previously questioned the impartiality of the STL. One of his last 
questions relates to this, “Did you think or do you still think that the Special Tribunal for Lebanon was 
or still is politicalized because this can have more than a meaning?” (Ibid, p. 136). The section of this 
question which occurs after because invites Jumblatt to reflect on what being politicised might mean. 
He responds  
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon to prosecute the perpetrators of the assassination against 
Prime Minister Hariri is not politicized. Back then we read and heard many media reports. I 
was replying to that. This is an independent tribunal looking for the truth, searching for the 
truth, away from political considerations. (Ibid, p. 136) 
The first sentence in this statement starts with a large subject The Special Tribunal for Lebanon to 
prosecute the perpetrators of the assassination against Prime Minister Hariri. It reflects many 
introductory descriptions to the STL in media, academia and the STL’s own publications. This gives it 
an air of formality and also describes in the title what its purpose is, and by omission, what its purpose 
is not. This first sentence is an SVC attribution in which the aforementioned subject has the negated, 
negative attribute not politicised. The statement is a categorical declaration which foregoes all nuance. 
This is not unusual for Jumblatt; indeed, this is his general mode of discourse. The next sentence is an 
SVO process followed by an SVC attribute which indicates both that he heard media reports and that, 
when he intimated politicisation at the STL, he was replying to that. The last sentence is also SVC and 
it imbues the STL with positive attributes independent and truth. Independence and truth invoke 
Liberal MR which value objectivity and the separation of powers; judiciary, executive, legislature. Thus, 
according to this account, Jumblatt’s suspicion of politicisation rested entirely on these media reports. 
Thus, the frame of STL politicisation is limited by Jumblatt to a single suspicion based on some specific 
media reports which he has evidently discounted the credibility of. He has further framed the STL as 
independent and truth-seeking in categorical terms. The negation in his answer can be read as 
rebutting both others and himself in the intertextual context who said that the STL is politicised. The 
formulaic description, the self-rebuttal and disavowal of previous information, in combination with 
the public nature of this testimony, amounts to a speech act of recantation.  
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As was implied in Aouini’s question, politicisation can have many meanings. The basic MR 
representations of politicised courts are show trials under non-democratic regimes which hand out 
politically pre-ordained sentences for political reasons. This is certainly the image Hizballah have 
drawn upon in their attempts to discredit the STL as an American-Zionist project. Another, slightly 
more subtle form, is evident in the conviction of Samir Geagea, former leader of the Lebanese Forces 
militia, by Pax Syriana after the Lebanese civil war. Here, authoritarian selectivity was involved where 
the majority of the Zu’ama class was guilty of some combination of war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and assassination, but a blanket amnesty was rolled out except for one individual. This 
selectivity was purely political, but this does not mean that Geagea was innocent. A third kind is 
indicated by the observations made in this thesis regarding the STL, what we might tentatively call, 
liberal selectivity. Here, we have observed that political conditions pertaining to the foundation of 
international tribunals and the consequent definition of their jurisdiction are systematically excluded 
from consideration by legal bodies (Cassese 2012, p. 501). Whilst high procedural standards might 
mitigate against the kinds of abuses seen in show trials, liberal selectivity could easily lead to similar 
outcomes as authoritarian selectivity in which one guilty party are investigated and prosecuted while 
others are not, on an unacknowledged, systematic, political basis. In authoritarian selectivity, this is 
the result of direct political pressure on the judiciary, in liberal selectivity, there is an ideological 
reification of politics and law as epistemologically and therefore ontologically, distinct. The 
consequence is the tendency towards a culture in which legal professionals cannot ask political 
questions pertaining to the functioning of the institutions they are operating, leading to theory-
practice contradictions around impunity.  
On closer inspection, the STL (and international law in general) are highly dependent on the 
UNSC, that is, the undemocratic executive which runs the world. In a domestic setting, no regime in 
which the executive established ad hoc tribunals for political enemies would be considered liberal. So, 
on this point, the liberal and authoritarian variants are synonymous. The particularly “liberal” aspect 
in ICL is the ideological reification of law and politics which allows liberal minded legal professionals 
to reconcile their liberal purposes with the authoritarian structure of the world order they serve. This 
constitutes sophisticated consent procurement under the (il)liberal world order. This reinforces the 
observation from chapter five, that positively valued liberal concepts such as democratic inclusion or 
separation of powers whilst being touted as universally beneficial are, in fact, advanced only so far as 
domestic politics whilst what is termed international politics remains authoritarian despite the 
nominal identification of this order as liberal. The reification identified in chapter one of levels in 
traditional IR between domestic and international order might go some way to explaining the 
174 
 
common-sense acquiescence of many supposedly liberal individuals to an illiberal world order which 
is dominated by a non-democratic executive and its ad hoc legal institutions. 
 
 
Corruption and Terrorism 
 
The 7th of May 2015 is the final day of questioning for Jumblatt and is given over entirely to defence 
council. Mr Korkmaz, council for Mr Badreddine (a military commander of Hizballah indicted for the 
death of Hariri who was killed in 2016 fighting in Syria), questions Jumblatt first, followed by Mr Hassan 
for Mr. Oneissi who questions Jumblatt until the end of the day. Mr Korkmaz raises the question of 
political corruption in Lebanon using a report on the topic conducted by the Dutch analytics and 
publishing house, Elsavier. He asks Jumblatt if he’s read it and what he knows about corruption. 
Jumblatt responds 
in Lebanon's history and unfortunately since the creation of Lebanon, there are accusations 
and counter-accusations among the Lebanese and Lebanese politicians, accusations of 
corruption. (The Prosecutor versus Ayyash et al. 2015d, p. 12) 
This sentence includes several adjuncts to the main sentence clause which makes it appear 
grammatically messy. There are three overwordings. The first is a relation of hyponymy Lebanon’s 
history and the creation of Lebanon. The second revolves around accusations, counter-accusations 
and accusations of corruption with the former two synonyms differentiated, not as concepts, but as 
relational frames and scripts, while the latter functions as a hyponym elaborating the type of 
accusations. In the third example, Lebanese and Lebanese politicians, the latter functions as a 
hyponym of the former. The overwording of accusations functions as a euphemism to the extent that 
Korkmaz is actually asking Jumblatt about corruption, not accusations. Thus, accusations functions to 
ameliorate negative values by reducing the phenomena corruption, to a possibility accusation. This 
means that it also serves as an ambiguity, to the extent that Jumblatt does not actually answer the 
question directly. Whilst Korkmaz requires only a general answer as to whether corruption exists in 
Lebanon, Jumblatt seems to construct a superfluous relational frame of undefined Lebanese in an 
antagonistic script, accusations and counter-accusations. Here, accusations of corruption are 
instrumentalised.  
As described in chapter two, clientelism pre-dates the establishment of Lebanon and traces 
its roots to the feudal system of patronage which has experienced many iterations alongside societal 
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change. Clientelism implies, by its very nature, corruption in the ideal modern sense because it 
encourages patronage based on personal relationships and wealth and/or access to goods and 
services by the patron for the benefit of his clientele. Thus nepotism, abuse of public positions, 
conflicts of interest and other issues are inherent to the structure of clientelism. In his response, 
Jumblatt refers only to accusations, not to the phenomena. Despite the mention of Jumblatt’s anti-
sectarian preferences and his father’s attempts to reform towards a secular national citizenship, the 
clientelist side of the equation is never directly addressed.  
 Korkmaz’s questioning addresses the rise of Sunni radical movements in Lebanon post-civil 
war and the areas in which they were most prominent “Akkar, Beqaa, north of Lebanon, Western 
Beqaa” (Ibid, p. 30) and he asks Jumblatt “did it [extremist Sunnism] really break out quite 
considerably in those areas according to you?” (ibid, p. 30). Jumblatt responds 
Back then, during that period of time, there was nothing called Sunni radicalism. Most of the 
Sunnis in Lebanon are moderate. They are not fundamentalists. And what do you mean by 
"extremist"? When you say "extremist," it is ambiguous. Now they use the term 
"fundamentalist. " But we can also characterize the others as being fundamentalists, but from 
my own point of view Sunnis are not extremist. (ibid, p. 30)  
This answer is replete with formal features. It includes an overwording of concepts with which 
Jumblatt is concerned, radicalism, fundamentalism, extremism all of which are negatively valued 
vocabulary, but which are combined with negations, reformulations, ambiguities and other features 
to constitute an oppositional rewording to the account given by Korkmaz. The first sentence, prefaced 
by an adjunct indicating temporality back then, is an SVC attribution process combined with a 
negation, indicating the non-existence of Sunni radicalism at that temporal and spatial moment. The 
following sentence is also an SVC sentence but in the positive form. Here moderation is attributed to 
the subject most of the Sunnis in Lebanon. Notice that the modifier most of is employed here which 
tacitly accepts that some Lebanese Sunnis fall outside of this attribute of moderation.  
The next is yet another negated SVC sentence in which they (read intratextually as most of the 
Sunnis in Lebanon) are absolved of the attribute fundamentalist. Thus far, Jumblatt has challenged the 
very premise of Korkmaz’s question; that there was Sunni extremism from 1992 onwards. The next 
sentence is a grammatical question which subverts the usual passive role of the witness. It also has 
the function of controlling the topic (or directing it elsewhere). The sentence is a complex one 
characterised by subordination. The first clause when you say “extremist” is subordinated to the main 
clause it's ambiguous. Thus, the presupposition is that the very use of the concept of extremism leads 
inexorably to the main proposition and negatively valued ambiguity. The next sentence, an SVO action 
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process appears to build on this idea. The use of the pronoun they indicates an intertextual connection 
given its apparent non-relation to any group or individual mentioned textually. It thus relies on the 
reader/listener’s MR for understanding. They would appear to constitute an ephemeral and 
generalised they which can relate to academics, journalists, politicians or lay persons with whom the 
cluster of concepts, extremism, fundamentalism and radicalism, have become common currency. The 
next sentence starts with an adversative but which treats the previous sentence as a coordinated 
clause. The clause which follows this adversative but is an SVO action process in which the pronoun 
we appears to denote a collective subject meaning anyone, rather than simply himself and Korkmaz. 
In this action process, the modal auxiliary verb can is used to indicate possibility and ability and is 
combined with the regular verb characterize which, by definition, relates to representation, not 
reality. The object the others being characterised is heavily reliant on MR as it consists of the definite 
article and does not appear to relate to a subject or object in the text, making it an intertextual 
connection. What the others are being contrasted with are the Sunnis, and thus, coherence seems to 
rely on contrast with other sects in Lebanon. However, the characterisation of fundamentalism might 
also relate more generally, within the frame of relativist interpretivism, to anyone one might disagree 
with or disapprove of. This interpretation appears to be borne out in the adjunct to the last clause 
from my own point of view after another adversative but where, despite the ability of one to 
characterise enemies as fundamentalists, he invokes a negated attribution process SVC in which Sunnis 
are not extremist. This last clause is an instance of ambiguity in that it addresses a general accusation 
which was not made by Korkmaz.  
 Thus, the Schema pursued by Korkmaz questioning the witness regarding the presence and 
location of Sunni extremism in Lebanon is subverted by Jumblatt into a schema of defence of the 
Sunnis of Lebanon as a whole, chiefly, through the introduction of a relativist interpretivist questioning 
of the concepts of extremism. This is necessitated by Jumblatt’s frame in which admission of the 
existence of Sunni radicalism equates to the total conflation of Lebanese Sunnis and radicalism. As 
noted, the chief way Jumblatt resists this is to employ relativist frames in which extremism is in the 
eye of the beholder and a script in which accusations of radicalism are instrumental but do not accord 
to any ontological reality. This relativist argument and representation are almost identical to the ones 
he employs to discuss corruption in which corruption is typified by accusations, rather than practices 
and exists as part of the instrumentalised discourse of the Zu’ama against one another. Thus, the 
instrumental use of corruption and radicalism in Lebanese political discourse is meant to assuage our 
fears that these things nevertheless, to a greater or lesser extent, exist.  
One of the biggest claims of Jumblatt is that Lebanese Sunni extremism did not exist back in 
the 1990’s or early 2000’s. This rationale is expressed further when Jumblatt states “We are talking 
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about 1999, 2000, 2004, this [Sunni extremism] was not a relevant question. This is a relevant question 
right now as a result of the wars in the Middle East.” (Ibid, p. 32-33). Thus, the frame of Sunni 
extremism is part of a script in which it arises only in response to Western intervention or war. 
Korkmaz, in response to the accusation of ambiguity, enforces explicitness from Jumblatt by 
rephrasing his original question more precisely “To enable you to answer my question … there are 
Jihadist movements or Salafist Sunni movements that were accused of being behind Mr. Hariri's 
bombing.” (Ibid, p. 31). Jumblatt can no longer claim that these concepts are ambiguous. To clarify, 
the Sunni Islamist movements in Lebanon, and globally, have a very specific lineage and ideology. In 
short, the intellectual lineage emanates from the thirteenth century scholar Taqi al-Din Ahmad ibn 
Taymiyya through the eighteenth century scholar Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab through to 
twentieth century Sunni Islamists such as Sayyed Qutb (Hamzeh & Dekmejian 1996, p. 218).  
Inter alia, and with variations in terms of strategy, the followers of these scholars pursue the 
establishment of religious theocracy, often with recourse to violence and domination of Muslims who 
are deemed to have deviated, and non-believers. The two primary lineages are the Muslim 
Brotherhood (Ibid, p. 220) and Al Qaeda (Haddad 2010, p. 552). Wahhabism/Salafism is also the official 
interpretation of Sunni Islam in Saudi Arabia. More concretely, several organisations following 
variations of this ideology have arisen in Lebanon. During the Lebanese civil war, a local franchise of 
the Muslim Brotherhood al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya arose and, in turn, gave rise to the spin-off Harakat 
al-Tawhid in 1982, both of which were involved in hostilities (Hamzeh, Dekmejian 1996, p. 219). Later, 
a major insurrection by al-Takfir wa-al Hijra was instigated and subsequently crushed by the LAF 
(Haddad 2010, p. 549). A destructive conflict wracked Lebanon nearly a decade later in 2007 when the 
jihadist outfit Fatah al-Islam made a final stand in the Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr El-Bared (ibid, 
p. 555). General Francois Hajj, who was responsible for the LAF victory, was subsequently assassinated 
for his efforts.  
Whilst Jumblatt’s assertion that Sunnis are not all extremists is true as a function of generality, 
his assertion that there was no such thing as Sunni extremism in Lebanon before the recent wars in 
the middle east is demonstrably untrue. At most, it can be argued (very convincingly) that the 
destabilisation of the western wars of the Middle East has offered opportunities and succour to these 
movements. This discursive strategy can be explained by his need to maintain relations with the future 
movement (Al-Mustaqbal) of Saad Hariri, and their patron Saudi Arabia. This externalisation also 
mirrors that which takes place in a more general way in the war of others discourse; these problems 
are external until foreigners bring them. This explanation is borne out in the following exchanges 
where Korkmaz asks Jumblatt  
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Now, you, yourself, Mr. Witness, you stated -- I mean, tell me if I'm wrong, but you expressed 
concerns with regard to the building up of Sunni militias through the Al Mustaqbal Movement, 
which was your ally at the time that was infiltrated supposedly by Jihadists. (The Prosecutor 
versus Ayyash et al. 2015d, p. 31)  
Jumblatt responds  
I have never said this. Al-Mustaqbal Movement is a moderate Lebanese movement that 
represents the majority of the Sunnis in Lebanon. (Ibid, p. 31)  
Jumblatt’s first sentence is an SVO action process which is negated and is both declarative and 
categorical in denial of holding such opinions. The second sentence is an SVC attribution process 
where the positively valued vocabulary moderate is attributed to Al-Mustaqbal. Ambiguity comes in 
to play here as Jumblatt, once again, answers a question which was not asked, namely he does not 
address the potential infiltration of Al Mustaqbal. Rather, he makes a blanket assertion regarding the 
moderation of the whole institution. Once again, this appears as a result of Jumblatt’s frame and script 
in which the admission of the existence of Sunni jihadism is equated with a conflation of the entire 
Lebanese Sunni community with extremism. It transpires that the source for Korkmaz’s questions are 
leaked U.S. diplomatic cables which, due to the STL’s ruling, cannot be used as evidence and thus 
Jumblatt is empowered to deny having held these opinions or concerns.  
 
Syrian Tutelage or Occupation?   
 
Korkmaz’s questioning eventually turns back to the Syrian presence from 1976-2005 in which he 
attempts to discuss the propriety of their presence and the mode of their interaction with the 
Lebanese. What emerges is a typology which includes the Syrians’ entry into Lebanon in 1976, the 
post-Taif accord and Brotherhood Cooperation and Coordination treaty era of 1991 and the end of the 
Syrian presence in 2005. Korkmaz questions Jumblatt as to whether it is true that the Syrian 
intervention in 1976 was at “the expressed request of the Henry Kissinger” (Ibid, p. 53) in concordance 
with the Lebanese government. Jumblatt responds  
That's right. At the time, that was the political compromise that allowed the Syrians to enter 
into Lebanon in order to undermine the leftist groups, and the only one that objected to that 
was Kamal Jumblatt with some minority, including, as I mentioned, Raymond Edde. (Ibid, p. 
53) 
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The first sentence here is a straightforward SVC attribution process which assents to Korkmaz’s 
account. The next sentence is a coordinated complex sentence indicating the equal standing of both 
clauses for Jumblatt. The first clause is an SVC attribution process where the extremely lengthy 
attribute the political compromise that allowed the Syrians to enter into Lebanon in order to undermine 
the leftist groups is attached to the agreement. This attribute utilises the causal connector in order to, 
which makes explicit the purpose of that agreement in Jumblatt’s view. The second clause is also SVC 
and renders Kamal Jumblatt a dissenter to this agreement and its purpose. The historic bloc which 
eventually established Pax Syriana was coordinated between Syria and the U.S. very early on. It is 
often presented that the U.S. acquiesced to Pax Syriana, along with other states, in a last ditch to end 
fifteen years of destruction in 1990-91. However, Jumblatt’s testimony demonstrates that without the 
Cold War collaboration of Hafez and Kissinger, the Lebanese war might have ended a lot sooner with 
a clearly defined victor. It demonstrates that a view of Syria as somehow counter-hegemonic or anti-
imperialist is wrong. It is quite capable of coordinating with Western powers to advance its own neo-
colonial and imperialist interests. Jumblatt reveals this underlying tendency towards colonial tactics 
of divide and rule by Bashar al-Assad when he first met him in which The first meeting was “weird. He 
was asking me where do the Druze live, where do the Christians live, as if he was an orientalist.” (The 
Prosecutor versus Ayyash et al. 2015a, p. 39).  
 The conversation continues and Korkmaz questions Jumblatt about the number of troops 
which Syria maintained in Lebanon from 1976 to 2005 and their funding. Korkmaz’s position can be 
summarised in the following statement/question 
the Syrians aren't an occupying force to the extent that they are occupying any land. No. They 
entered within the framework of a joint policy that they struck up with the Lebanese and 
which is enshrined in the cooperation agreement. Is that true or not? (ibid, p. 56)  
Though this passage is rendered as a grammatical question at the end is that true or not? The first part 
constitutes an argument. The first sentence features literal repetition of the negatively valued 
vocabulary occupying. The sentence is an SVC attribution process in which a negation is used to 
present the Syrians as other than occupiers. The negation is reiterated in the next single word negation 
No. The next sentence is a complex one with three clauses. The first clause is an SVO action process 
where the Syrians entered within the positively valued metaphor framework. The metaphor of a 
framework relates to legal provisions and the rule of law essential for legitimacy and invoking of 
Liberal MR. The following connected clause is also an SVO, but the action is backgrounded as a 
subordinate clause indicating a presupposition or an intentional de-emphasising. Thus, Korkmaz 
presupposes that the Syrians struck up this framework with the Lebanese. In this way, Korkmaz is 
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presenting an argument to legitimise, naturalise and mystify Syrian hegemony. These clauses are 
connected to a final one which is an SVC attribution process where the positive vocabulary framework 
is endowed with further positive value by the attributes enshrined and cooperation agreement. The 
negations serve as a rebuttal to Jumblatt in the intratextual context when he explicitly oppositionally 
reworded the Syrian tutelage as an occupation. The frame of occupation is replaced with that of the 
framework and cooperation agreements. Two things are interesting here. The first is that the 
subordinated conjunction relates to the circumstances under which the 1976 framework was struck. 
What is mystified is that it did not have the consent of all parties to the conflict and, in this sense, 
could not be legitimate in the Habermasian sense. Indeed, it was done on behalf of the government 
which represented the right-wing Maronite militias, thus not disinterested and not representative.  
Once again, we detect the presence of an ideological feature which recurs throughout 
Lebanese history and among different parties to conflicts, that of false universalism. This was also 
done as justification at the UNSC with regard to establishing the statute of the STL through resolution 
1757, it was done by Jumblatt in claiming the Lebanese did not want to be part of Syria in this 
testimony and it was done when the Syrians, the West and the Maronite parties presented the 1976 
intervention as on behalf of all Lebanese. Whist foreign and domestic factions continue to employ 
false universalism, it is unlikely that peace or durable stability can emerge. The second striking feature 
is that Korkmaz seems to retrospectively justify the Syrian presence from 1976 by reference to the 
Taif accord and treaty of brotherhood coordination and cooperation of 1991. This could be interpreted 
easily as systematically distorted communication aimed at the rationalisation and hegemonic 
legitimation of Pax Syriana and mystification of the possession and use of unequal power in bringing 
it about. Jumblatt notes this when he states 
Later on when the Taif Agreement was adopted, we sealed -- or some bilateral agreements 
were sealed between both countries. But prior to that - and here allow me to disagree with 
you - Syria did not enter Lebanon upon the approval of all the Lebanese. (Ibid, p. 57)  
Here we have a conflict of discourse types. Korkmaz is making an argument that legality flows from 
the government of a state, however constituted. Jumblatt is presenting a more Habermasian vision in 
which legality can be illegitimate if it does not include interested parties. From a purely practical point 
of view, inclusion of all parties in decisions such as this, irrespective of legality, is a prerequisite for a 
lasting peaceful solution. The failure to do so is an instance of false universalism.  
 
Challenging Patrimonial Clientelism and Memory-Making 
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The last defence questioning of Jumblatt is undertaken by Mr Hassan who appears to take a more 
adversarial tack than his predecessors. The interactional conventions of the discourse, which begin 
quite traditionally, become conflictual. The intensity of the interaction is reflected in the repeated 
interventions of the interpreters “Speakers are kindly reminded to pause between questions and 
answers.” (Ibid, p. 85). Hassan’s grammatical questions are concise, direct and fairly rapid. After 
confirming that Jumblatt inherited the LNM and PSP from his father, Hassan asks “during the 1980s, 
the situation changed somewhat and you have joined other political camps that were different from 
the ones that you have joined in the past; is this correct?” (Ibid, p. 83). Jumblatt responds “I never 
changed camp, except that the political circumstances and situation changed.” (Ibid, p. 83). This 
answer is categorical in its denial through negation. The second clause is subordinated, and thus, de-
emphasised. It is obvious that Jumblatt wishes to emphasise the main idea that he was always in the 
same camp and this is coherent with his earlier statements regarding keeping the journey of Kamal. 
In challenging this, Hassan is challenging the memory making which Jumblatt has been undertaking at 
the STL. 
Hassan moves swiftly to ask whether Emile Lahoud had removed a statue of Kamal Jumblatt 
from the Palace of the President at Baabda and sent it to Jumblatt’s Mokhtara residence. Hassan 
presses by stating that Lahoud said  
If a statue for Kamal Jumblatt must be placed at the residence of the president, also we need 
to put a statue for my father because he was the first one to bear -- brandish the flag of the 
independence (Ibid, p. 84)  
This purported paraphrasing of Lahoud begins with the logical connector if which functions to 
introduce a condition which must be met for a second clause to be correct. It also functions to 
subordinate the first clause and thus background it to the second we need to put a statue for my 
father. Thus, the presupposition of the conditional statue of Jumblatt is subordinated to the main idea 
that Lahoud’s father is deserving. The first clause contains formal and/or technical vocabulary 
residence of the president which draws on the intertextual MR of the audience. This MR indicates the 
location is symbolically intertwined with state power and the prestige of the Republic. This 
interpretation is borne out in the final subordinate clause which utilises a logical connector because 
and a cluster of formal bear, brandish and positive flag, independence vocabulary related to the frame 
of Lebanese nationalism. Both the first clause and the third clause are thus subordinated to the main 
idea; Lahoud’s father needs a statue. Moreover, the logic because is also presupposed, namely that 
Lahoud’s father was literally the first one to brandish the flag of independence and that this is a reason 
that he should have a statue. Whilst the argument purportedly put forward by Lahoud is couched 
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explicitly in nationalist frames, its implicit frames are those of patriarchal, zero-sum, clientelism. This 
is evident in the key scripts of the interaction, namely the promotion of one’s patriarchal genealogy 
to advance one’s standing and lower those of your rivals by comparison. These clientelist frames and 
scripts are linked to the nationalist frames and scripts of independence which, within the hegemonic 
MR of Lebanon, imbue gravitas. This is precisely the culture which generates petty jealousies, 
assassinations and promotes foreign patron-seeking. The short-termism, instrumentalism and zero-
sum nature of this petty Zu’ama behaviour is highlighted when Hassan ascertains from Jumblatt that 
their fathers were, in fact, political allies and friends.  
Hassan enquires further “President Emile Lahoud had taken this measure [removing Kamal’s 
statue] that upset you, maybe.” (ibid, p. 85). Jumblatt responds  
Yes, it upset me. It made me angry, but sometimes we get upset and that' s it. It' s over. You 
are reminding me of something that's silly. (ibid, p. 85-86).  
This response contains negatively valued overwording which is both literal repetition upset and a 
hyponym relating to emotional state angry. The first two sentences are SVO action processes where 
the sentence subject is Lahouds’ removal of the statue which resulted in upset and anger. The second 
sentence is connected by the adversative but to two other clauses which indicate that these negatively 
valued emotions went no further. Indeed, the pronoun we is invoked in a general sense to activate 
MR which indicates that humans often get angry and then let things go. This message is reinforced by 
the next SVC attribution sentence where the feelings are attributed the condition of being over. The 
last sentence attributes the negatively valued condition reminding me of something silly to the 
pronoun you. It is clear from the context that this refers to Hassan. The last formal feature of note is 
the uncharacteristically large reliance on informal contractions that’s and it’s. The main schema is one 
of Jumblatt answering a question in which he is challenging. The adversative but and the general use 
of we to universalise moments when anger passes are instances of this.  
However, Jumblatt admits to the emotional frame of anger at Lahoud’s actions and this anger 
appears to be still present in this through its terse tone. This is detectable in the very short sentences 
in combination with an uncommon amount of contractions that’s it, it’s over. It can also be detected 
in the negative vocabulary silly which is attributed to Hassan’s question and by extension, the 
questioner. The question almost seems to have been calculated by Hassan to illicit a negative 
emotional reaction from Jumblatt within the context of the questioning. Jumblatt makes a good show 
of not being bothered but his terse manner and attempts at delegitimising the line of questioning 
indicate he is triggered. It must be said that emotion relating to one’s dead father is quite natural. 
Arguably though, Jumblatt’s memory-making at the STL has demonstrated his penchant for promoting 
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the memory of Kamal as a historical figure in line with the theories of clientelism and memory 
operationalised in this thesis. Thus, Hassan’s calculated provocation seems to include historical insults 
to Kamal’s memory and their reproduction at the STL, which may have doubly infuriated Jumblatt. 
There is no neat dividing line between the emotions of a bereaved son and the functional aspects of 
genealogical memory-making and martyrdom brand promotion. Both appear to be elements within a 
causal complex.  
 
 
Jumblatt: Democratic Party Leader or Sectarian Za’im?  
 
As Hassan’s questioning continues, the interactional conventions between himself and Jumblatt 
becomes increasingly conflictual.  
 Hassan. Do you exercise democracy inside your party? 
Jumblatt. Please, come and join the party and you will see if we are democratic or not.
 Please, be my guest. 
Hassan. My question is to you, Mr. Walid. Is your party democratic, yes or no? (Ibid, p. 88) 
Hassan’s question is met with a highly irregular formal feature for this testimony, imperative sentences 
VO impelling the interlocutor to take some action. This is ameliorated by the use of polite vocabulary 
please and guest. The grammar indicates a speech act of command or challenge but the vocabulary 
implies a speech act of request or invitation. A combination of all of the above is not beyond question. 
MR relating to the phrase be my guest can relate to a declaration that the speaker has nothing to 
conceal. This stands out for the reasons elaborated above but also because it constitutes an instance 
of ambiguity to the extent that he has not actually answered the question. Hassan notices this 
ambiguousness and enforces explicitness with similar levels of politeness Mr. Walid. Thus, despite the 
politeness, we have here a conflictual script in which Jumblatt is in a somewhat contradictory power 
position in that he is using ambiguity, the position of the powerless, with imperative sentences and 
speech acts of command. Hassan’s veiled challenge to the legitimacy of his party through the frame 
of democracy is probably the reason Jumblatt feels he needs to be proactive in discourse. He must 
know that a party based on social democratic principles, but which has consistently stuck to the 
clientelistic logic of keeping chairmanship within the Jumblatt family is subject to the accusation of 
theory-practice contradiction. The overlap of democratic and clientelist legitimacy is what causes this 
discrepancy. It is not beyond the pale to envision a situation in which the loyal clientele within the PSP 
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continue to vote for Jumblatt as leader out of choice and loyalty. However, this is a point at which the 
PSP’s legitimacy is vulnerable and certainly invokes MR in the audience relating to Jumblatt the feudal 
warlord rather than Jumblatt the modern statesman. In reality, the constitution of the subject as both 
is likely and is dependent on context.    
 In due course, Hassan presents audio of a famous speech made by Jumblatt on 14th February 
2007 in Martyrs Square in which he called Bashar a whole list of negative vocabulary, some figurative 
“you whale vomited by the ocean” some seemingly literal “you criminal blood-shedder in Syria and 
Lebanon” (Ibid, p. 92). He rounded off the speech by stating “the international tribunal will come, 
bringing with it punishment, justice and a death sentence.” (Ibid, p. 92). This SVO action process posits 
that the positively valued subject international tribunal will bring other positively valued vocabulary 
justice, punishment and death sentence. These concepts form overwordings, indicating a 
preoccupation. These overworded concepts constitute a variation on those made in the earlier speech 
regarding Saudi Arabia’s funding and the four generals in this chapter. There, it was noted, that the 
positive vocabulary justice imbued its hyponyms punishment and execution with positive value and 
that this was only possible within a non-liberal frame of justice. Jumblatt seems quite comfortable 
invoking liberal and non-liberal MR, either strategically or as a representation of his inconsistent 
positions. This brings his genuine commitment to liberal concepts into question. Jumblatt may have 
been quite aware that the STL would not bring a death sentence but used it as a rhetorical device to 
embolden his supporters.  This illiberal frame of justice now constitutes an intertextual connection 
and recurring theme across his speeches. Judge Re self-selects to state “Mr. Jumblatt … you appreciate 
that international tribunals generally, although they might bring justice, don' t have a death sentence.” 
(ibid, p. 93). This sentence consists of three clauses. The first clause is an SV agentless passive process 
which subordinates the following clauses. The main idea is that Jumblatt appreciates. Interpretively, 
it is hard to gauge whether this is impelling him to understand or is a statement of fact, but it is not 
beyond possibility that both meanings are possible.  
The next sentence starts with the positively valued vocabulary international tribunal. This 
second clause is interrupted by a third which utilises the modal auxiliary verb might in conjunction 
with the positively valued vocabulary justice which highlights justice as equivocal rather than 
guaranteed. Completion of the second clause utilises negation within an SVO action process to 
designate death sentence as negative vocabulary within the liberal frame. The negation serves as a 
direct intertextual contradiction to Jumblatt. In keeping with his categorical and declarative style of 
discourse, Jumblatt simply replies “that is correct” (ibid, p. 93) which logically means he was either 
lying at the time or covering his misunderstanding presently. Hasan then self-selects and states “You 
read my mind, Your Honour … I'm not happy with these words. Not at all.” (Ibid, p. 94). The first 
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sentence is an action process SVO where the judge is reading Hassan’s mind or, more literally, 
presenting his argument. The use of the formal vocabulary your honour which serves as marker of 
power, in conjunction with this sentence, has the effect of lending Hassan said power. Both Hassan 
and Judge Re’s self-selections have constituted power in discourse which Jumblatt is obliged to accept. 
In this case, the power has been used to promote the frame of liberal justice at the expense of illiberal 
justice. The second sentence is of an SVC attribution process where the positive attribute happy is 
negated not and attributed to Hassan himself. This is quite unusual in the testimony so far where 
council rarely refer to themselves and when they do, they avoid appearing anything other than value 
neutral. Here, Hassan is openly attributing a negative emotion to himself relationally to the witness. 
Indeed, Hassan is building an accusation and treating Jumblatt more like a defendant.  
 This forms the preface to the most conflictual interactions of the testimony. Below is an edited 
version of these interactions. Jumblatt makes the point that March 14th politicians and personalities 
were being assassinated on a regular basis when he made this speech and that he made it as a political 
statement. He states that it is up to the STL to find the perpetrators.  
 Hassan.  If it' s not your job, why did you say –  
Jumblatt. Is it forbidden to have a political statement, to talk in politics? This is crazy. 
Here, Jumblatt interrupts Hassan and controls the topic of the conversation by asking a grammatical 
question. This appears to constitute an attempt by Jumblatt to impose some power in discourse in the 
face of the criticisms of Judge Re and Mr. Hassan. The negative attribute crazy is attached to the 
criticisms levelled against him.  
Hassan. … This is a piece of information that you were sending to thousands of people who   
were emotional. Weren't you afraid to see a kind of a catastrophe or a crisis and to see all 
these people face the Syrians with hatred and this will lead to a humanitarian crisis? 
Jumblatt. What kind of humanitarian crisis? We said that there will be an international 
tribunal who will identify those who killed Rafik Hariri. As to the emotions in my political 
statement, this is my right. Please do not interfere in my rights. 
Hassan. You are calling it a highly emotional political statement, but in law we call it 
incitement …  
Jumblatt. I' m not inciting on killing. What' s this? (Ibid, p. 94-95) 
Hassan’s first statement contains overwording of negatively valued concepts in relations of hyponymy, 
catastrophe, crisis, humanitarian crisis. These clearly form his preoccupation. The pronoun you is used 
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twice and designates Jumblatt as the one who is responsible for distributing information as well as 
addressing the grammatical question directly to him. Though the vocabulary information and emotion 
are technically value neutral, the intratextual context indicates that these are negatively valued in this 
case. The use of the negation weren’t to phrase the question is interesting in that the question would 
have worked just as well without it. MR of this kind of phrasing is required to make sense of this choice. 
Were you indicates a disinterested search for an answer in the affirmative or negative form and the 
majority of questions in this testimony have been phrased in this manner. Weren’t you as a negation 
highlights something which Hasan thinks Jumblatt overlooked and, moreover, should not have. The 
negation indicates an intratextual rebuttal to Jumblatt’s argument that his political reasons for 
presenting this wrong information justify the risk he took by doing so. The negative vocabulary of the 
overwording is supplemented by negative vocabulary of hatred. By asking the grammatical question, 
Hassan is controlling the topic and selecting Jumblatt to answer in the normal order of discourse for 
questioning a witness. Thus, he is exercising power in discourse by virtue of his positioned practice. 
The schema is one of questioning but there are also speech acts of accusation regarding wrong 
information to emotional people and of either being negligent or malicious in his lack of concern about 
how the crowd might behave.  
The frames and scripts are those of the nexus of clientelist and sectarian violence in which the 
violence and rhetoric of Zu’ama have the potential to cause spontaneous violence against (surrogate) 
victims. Theodor Hanf (1993, p. 279) reports that during the Chouf war of 1983, Jumblatt said to his 
troops “It will be a carnival … a bloody carnival.” This style of creative, violent and belligerent Zu’ama 
war rhetoric fits with the style of that reported in the Martyrs Square speech and indicates a regression 
to this belligerent war rhetoric. This sort of history could easily form part of Hassan’s MR but the power 
behind discourse in the form of amnesties and limited jurisdiction ensure that Jumblatt is in the 
positioned practice of witness, not defendant. Nevertheless, Hassan appears to use his limited agency 
creatively to bring a covert schema in which Jumblatt is treated as a defendant.  
 Jumblatt responds by asking a grammatical question which immediately subverts the order of 
discourse by controlling (or deflecting) the topic. The next sentence is a complex subordinated one. 
The first main clause is an SV non-directed action. The acting subject in this sentence is the pronoun 
we. Textually, this makes no sense given that we know that it was Jumblatt who made the speech. The 
kind way to interpret this is that there were other speakers who gave the same message at the same 
rally. The unkind way to interpret this is that the use of we dilutes Jumblatt’s responsibility for his own 
words. The object of the sentence, the crowd, is missing from this non-directed action. Instead, it 
connects to a subordinated clause where the positively valued international tribunal is said to identify 
the perpetrators of the negatively valued killing of Rafik Hariri. This backgrounded clause has the 
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function of minimising what Re and Hassan were chiding Jumblatt for; his incorrect assertion that the 
STL would bring a death sentence. The next sentence involves a preposition which constructs the 
subject of the subsequent SVC attribution sentence. Jumblatt repeats the vocabulary of Hassan  
emotion but couples it with the possessive pronoun my which switches the owner of said emotions to 
himself rather than the crowd.  
The subsequent sentence asserts categorically that rights are attributed to his emotions.  
Thus, the frame of the crowd has disappeared from his action in giving a speech and their emotions 
have been re-allocated to himself. His last sentence is a striking follow up to this assertion. It opens 
with polite vocabulary please to ameliorate but is followed by the negation do not of the negatively 
valued verb interfere combined in an imperative sentence VO amounting to a speech act of command. 
The negated negative do not interfere amounts to an oppositional rewording of Hassan’s criticism of 
his speech. Thus, the schema of Jumblatt answering a question is supplemented by one in which he is 
commanding Hassan to limit the scope of his enquiries in line with the power behind discourse which 
shields Zu’ama from questions regarding their conduct. This is achieved by jettisoning the frame of 
the crowd and the script in which he addresses them whilst co-opting the crowd’s emotions. This 
follows the now familiar pattern of the frame of Jumblatt as a victim, not a perpetrator, which is a 
function of the STL’s jurisdiction.    
 Hassan’s next statement sidesteps Jumblatt’s sleight of hand in which the emotions of the 
crowd were attributed to himself and strategically uses it to his own advantage. The first sentence is 
a coordinated complex one in which both ideas are given equal value. It opens with the pronoun you, 
which places agency squarely with Jumblatt. The first clause is an SVC attribution process in which the 
attribute calling it a highly emotional political statement is attributed to Jumblatt. This is followed by 
the adversative but, which facilitates the next SVO action process which oppositionally rewords 
emotional as the negatively valued incitement. The schema of questioning a witness is thus used again 
by Hassan to impose another schema which accuses Jumblatt as a defendant. This is signalled in 
particular by his use of legal frames and terminology which naturally implies the speech act of 
accusation.  
Jumblatt appears to understand this in his response which includes a categorical negation I’m 
not inciting and his grammatical question What's this? This could be interpreted as directed towards 
the Judges and council and to reflect his consternation at being in the position of a defendant rather 
than a witness. This interpretation seems justified by the timely interventions of Cameron and Re, 
both of whom determine that the questioning is inappropriate (Ibid, p. 95). Thus, Hassan has used his 
agency creatively and constitutes the only council to highlight the clientelist/ sectarian nexus of 
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violence which Zu’ama so often exploit in order to surreptitiously accuse Jumblatt of negligence or 
malice. He is, it goes without saying, precluded from addressing Jumblatt’s alleged actual crimes by 
the power behind discourse which has limited the jurisdiction of the STL and positioned Jumblatt as a 
witness. Nevertheless, Hassan is able to pressure Jumblatt on his violent rhetoric and the danger of 
violence until his accusation becomes too overt in his use of legal vocabulary incitement. At this point, 
the power behind discourse is enacted through Cameron and Re’s power in discourse, structurally 
constraining Hassan.  
 Judge Re asks Hassan if he has any more questions to add to which Hassan responds, “If this 
is enough to convey the meaning I was looking for to your Honourable Chamber, then I should stop at 
this moment in time regarding this topic.” (Ibid, p. 96). Judge Re notes that he does not understand 
what “convey the meaning I was looking for” means. Hassan replies “This is a common catchphrase 
among legal practitioners in the civil law system.” (Ibid, p. 96). Rather than appear bashful, Hassan is 
resolute and effectively reminds participants that the legal system of Lebanon is civil and, by 
extension, that the statute of the STL stated that the applicable law should be Lebanese. In this way, 
he highlights the 2011 decision on applicable law which effectively imported international definitions 
into the Lebanese system and subjugated its agency by ruling that its provisions are always read with 
(subordinated to) international definitions dominated by the common law system. In effect, this 
problematises the naturalisation which has taken place with regard to this exceptional decision and, 
by doing so, de-naturalises it and highlights it as a form of domination.   
 
Interim Findings   
 
The elaboration of the second half of Walid Jumblatt’s testimony in this chapter has presented further 
findings which are summarised and discussed here. Though the titles and content of these summaries 
differ somewhat in form and content to the ones presented at the end of the last chapter, upon 
reading, it will become obvious to the reader that they constitute developments of these insights and 
differing perspectives on these themes. All interim findings are then discussed using historical and 
comparative analyses. These all inform the conclusion which follows.  
 
Consociationalism, dissonance and relativism 
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Jumblatt’s testimony on Hizballah demonstrates a propensity for conciliation in marked contrast to 
the way he discusses Syria. This is curious given that Hizballah and Syria’s interests are closely aligned. 
The categorical way Jumblatt states that Syria murdered his father and Hariri and the pejorative way 
in which he designates them as totalitarian and criminal is nowhere to be seen in relation to Hizballah 
who he appears to have pre-judged innocent. Whilst Jumblatt is seemingly willing to risk the ire of 
Assad, he is not willing to do so with Nasrallah. A clue as to why is present in his discourse when he 
invokes the frames associated with consociational power-sharing. Here, dialogue is emphasised, 
elimination rejected, and Hizballah categorically designated as an inalienable part of Lebanon. This 
may be with a view to warning Hizballah against the (alleged) continued use of violence against 
Lebanese, as well as reassuring them that they will not be marginalised or eliminated. It also appears 
to function as a message to domestic and international elements that Hizballah are part of Lebanon 
and any denial of this or threat to Hizballah’s security would be counter-productive.  
Jumblatt appears to externalise his negative emotions on to Syria which allows him to absolve 
Hizballah so he can continue working with them in the consociational system. In reality, it is more than 
possible that Syria utilises local allies in Lebanon, including Hizballah, to carry out destabilising 
assassinations and bombings or that local allies take this upon themselves. The distinction between 
patron and client is not definitive and it is increasingly difficult to ascertain which is the tail and which 
is the dog. Having said this, the pattern of assassinations in Lebanon beginning with Marwan Hamade 
began after the imposition of resolution 1559 whose unique feature was to call for the dismantling of 
Hizballah with no recourse to Lebanese politics. This perceived existential threat emanating from the 
UNSC arguably undermined the consociational checks and balances designed to assure and could 
easily have led to a decision on the part of Hizballah to assassinate politicians who were perceived as 
Western collaborators. Jumblatt appears to work on the theory that if the various parties and sects 
can adhere to consociationalism, they can avoid conflict.  
 This dissonance when dealing with Hizballah is mirrored in his reluctance to discuss Sunni 
Jihadism and the potential infiltration of Future Movement militias.  The principal method through 
which he achieves this is resorting to relativist arguments about the inherent ambiguity of the concept 
of extremism. This is reinforced by a script in which accusations of extremism are used by all sides in 
confessional politics against opponents and an apparent fear that admitting Sunni extremism exists 
would be tantamount to accusing the entirety of Lebanese Sunnis. Thus, the instrumentalisation of 
the concept for political gain by different factions appears to preclude Jumblatt’s willingness to 
countenance its existence. This appears to be repeated in Jumblatt’s discussion of corruption. The 
obvious explanation for this is that he does not want to alienate Lebanese Sunnis and the Future 
Movement of Saad Hariri in the former and Zu’ama generally in the latter. Overall, Jumblatt is 
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positioning himself as the bridge between Hizballah and Future Movement and his medium is the 
consociational system. Dissonance and relativism allow him to overlook potentially problematic 
aspects of reality. Given Lebanon’s consociational structure, these kinds of coalitions are imperative 
for any kind of functioning government and Jumblatt is wise to position himself in this way. However, 
they are prone to sabotage by patrons and false universalism. False universalism by actors presents 
the Lebanese and their perspectives as definitive whilst, in reality, referring to their own allies and 
preferences. It is a trait shared by all parties to these conflicts over time and is one of the greatest 
factors undermining stable and peaceful relations. Consociationalism, by nature, divides people by 
sect and is injurious to personal freedom as part of a deeper hegemonic sectarian system. However, 
given the dynamics of patron seeking behaviour and the potential for instability and violence, 
consociationalism should be respected and protected in the short and medium term. Foreign powers 
should not enact policies of false universalism which undermine the system, such as resolution 1559 
or the Lahoud extension.  
Whilst a long-term goal of secular citizenship and intermarriage through the scrapping of 
personal status law would eventually undermine the sectarian aspects of consociationalism, in the 
short term, consociationalism is the only system which can prevent conflict and is, therefore, the least 
bad option. More importantly, it is for the Lebanese, free of foreign interference and interests, to 
abolish sectarian consociationalism for themselves, should they so choose. Foreign intervention and 
meddling reinforces the arguments for the necessity of this system by its supporters, making it difficult 
to break away from. The implications of these findings for Lebanon are further discussed in the 
conclusion.  
 
The nexus of Clientelist and Sectarian conflict and violence 
 
Both Ms. Abdelsater-Abusamra and Mr Hassan, to greater or lesser extents, touch upon the nexus of 
clientelist and sectarian conflict and violence which was discussed in chapter two. Both of these 
interventions were a product of their agency and both were somewhat impeded by the structural 
power behind discourse at the STL. Ms. Abdelsater-Abusamra was interested in the purpose and effect 
of the Hariri assassination and employs a comparative frame between Hariri and Kamal Jumblatt’s 
assassinations. Seemingly, she is attempting to understand the mechanics of the wider phenomenon. 
In questioning Walid Jumblatt, she draws focus on the rumours, revenge and surrogate victims after 
Kamal was killed. Though she does not say so explicitly, she has, in fact, alighted upon the nexus of 
clientelist and sectarian violence where assassinations of political leaders lead to the activation of the 
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frames and scripts of sectarian rivalry and potentially lead to conflict, violence and massacre. 
Unfortunately, she is unable to articulate it in these terms. This appears to be partially as the result of 
conceptual confusion which results in her emphasising prediction by perpetrators and the 
hopelessness of the victims, both of which undermine her own points. Thus, conceptual development, 
possibly through collaboration with social scientists might be fruitful for the framing of questions in 
these contexts. She is also constrained by, and demonstrates the effects of, the power behind 
discourse. These are manifested in her designation of the victims which are victims only in so far as 
they relate incidentally to the Hariri crime.  
Victims of other crimes in Lebanon have been systematically excluded. This structural power 
also leads her to describe Jumblatt as a victim. This is a reflection of the STL’s structural inability to 
consider Zu’ama protected by amnesties or Western allies as perpetrators and, once again, gives lie 
to the some justice is better than none argument that this is a first step among many disinterested 
steps. Thus, impunity is once again in evidence. Ms. Abdelsater-Abusamra is also constrained when 
Judge Re limits her time on the basis of her question’s “marginal relevance” (Ibid, p. 114). However, 
questions pertaining to the dynamics of the nexus of clientelist and sectarian violence are not marginal 
to Lebanese peace and stability, but central to it. Indeed, the main argument for establishing the STL 
through use of exceptional chapter VII powers and on its selective basis is the threat to peace and 
security posed by the assassination of a super-Za’im precisely because of this nexus. Otherwise, the 
selectivity of the STL is purely partisan. The limiting of questions concerned with the nexus thus 
suggest that instrumental, punitive and hegemonic concerns are higher on the agenda than 
understanding and preventing the dynamics of violence associated with this nexus. 
 Jumblatt manages to utilise Abdelsater-Abusamra’s questioning to do some memory-making 
around Kamal and link it to himself through the metaphor of the journey which enacted the active 
remembering identified in chapter five. Mr. Hassan’s questioning challenges this, and other, memory-
making by Jumblatt at the STL. He challenges the notion that Jumblatt’s PSP kept the journey of Kamal 
and the democratic credentials of an institution which has been in the Jumblatt family since its 
inception. This highlights a potential theory-theory contradiction between social democracy and 
patrilineal Zu’ama clientelism. Understandably, Jumblatt is defensive. Though never mentioned by 
name, Hassan’s discursive strategy highlights the pettiness of patriarchal, zero-sum clientelism. 
Lahoud’s removal of Kamal’s statue and his alleged jealousy that his father did not have one 
emphasises this, in addition to the fact their families were once friendly. Hassan’s conflictual discourse 
with Jumblatt culminates in his alighting upon the nexus in reference to Jumblatt’s 2007 speech which 
utilised Zu’ama war rhetoric. Hassan uses this to accuse Jumblatt of incitement. Hassan is precluded 
from accusing or trying Jumblatt for things which took place during the war, so he appears to creatively 
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use his agency to question Jumblatt’s use of violent language within the limited temporis and loci of 
the STL. The moment at which he truly accuses Jumblatt is the moment at which personae comes in 
to play and he is prevented from continuing. The context of this speech was clearly trying for Jumblatt, 
but Hassan alone among his peers appears to criticise the use of Zu’ama war rhetoric and the potential 
for violence. The implications of this nexus for Lebanese politics are discussed in the conclusion.  
 
(Il)l iberal world order 
 
It was argued at the outset of the STL by scholars of ICL that the transparent funding and diversification 
of funding away from partisan parties was necessary for legitimacy. This chapter has demonstrated 
that, while the names of most contributing states are mentioned by the STL, some states are obscured, 
and the annual itemised contributions of states are absent. Thus, the funding structure of the STL is 
opaque. This necessitated a cross reference with leaked U.S. diplomatic cables from Wikileaks 
detailing the funding for the first year of STL operation. These accounts did not contradict each other. 
Through a process of deduction and inferences based on available evidence, the five biggest foreign 
contributors for the first year were the U.S., Regional State (Saudi Arabia), The Netherlands, Kuwait 
and France. The STL’s provision of 26 of 28 names of states but omission of itemised sums appears to 
be an attempt to mystify power relations and intentionally distort communication to procure consent 
for hegemony.  
 Asked if he still believes the STL is politicised and invited to reflect on the meanings of 
politicisation, Jumblatt merely states that he had read some inaccurate news reports and effectively 
recants. Reflecting on the findings so far, three models of politicisation of tribunals were elaborated. 
First, show trials which judge the innocent guilty for political purposes. This characterisation inheres 
is Hizballah’s designation of the STL as an American-Zionist project. Secondly, we have authoritarian 
selectivity such as that which made an exception to imprison Samir Geagea under Pax Syriana when 
his fellow warlords were amnestied. It cannot be over-stated that the selectivity and arbitrary nature 
of this justice does not imply innocence on behalf of Geagea but rather the instrumentality and 
politicisation of the decision and the undue influence of the executive on the judiciary. Assuming that 
the STL is not a show trial or unfettered American-Zionist stooge, we alight upon the third model of 
(il)liberal selectivity indicated by the findings of this thesis. Here, the epistemological distinction 
between law and politics is reified by practitioners.  
The concrete effect appears to be that law cannot question the politics which bring tribunals 
and their selective jurisdictions about. This reification shields liberal legal practitioners from the 
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theory-practice contradiction of serving (il)liberal world order and furthering impunity. This is also 
achieved through apparent procedural propriety and eschewing of torture and the death penalty 
(unless it is outsourced). Despite these features, (il)liberal selectivity appears as the result of the same 
feature which authoritarian selectivity does; executive dominance of the judiciary. This leads to a 
further insight. What would be considered illiberal or authoritarian at state level, lack of democracy 
and the insufficient separation of powers, are accepted as core features of the core institutions of 
world order. There is an apparent hegemonic ideology of nation-statism which allows universal liberal 
values of good governance to be ignored.  
 The approximation of the STL’s funding structure would not be possible without the use of 
Wikileaks. The STL trial chamber came to the decision that Wikileaks could not be used as evidence, 
despite their wide publication in reputable media. This decision was taken on the basis of providing a 
fair trial. This decision on its own merits appears reasonable. However, it forms part of a wider pattern 
of decisions by the STL which consistently protect powerful interests; not allowing WikiLeaks as 
evidence, not allowing judicial review of the UNSC’s decisions and the retroactive creation and 
application of a core crime of transnational terrorism over the Lebanese civil code. Another hegemonic 
effect is to cast doubt on analyses which utilise leaked documents. Where no official documents are 
available and have not been provided on request, this leaves journalists, scholars and members of the 
public delegitimised in their use of the only available information.  
 Another aspect of the illiberality of world order was present in the discussions of Mr. Korkmaz 
and Jumblatt regarding the intervention of Syria into Lebanon in 1976. This was brought about by the 
collaboration of Henry Kissinger and Hafez al-Assad. This demonstrates that the U.S.- Syrian historic 
bloc was in formation long before 1991 and, indeed, led to the prolonging of the war. It relied, like so 
many damaging decisions, on false universalism. Claims by Syria to be anti-imperialist should be 
treated with disdain in this light. The Assads have apparently relied on colonialist, imperialist and 
authoritarian tactics and strategies. This interpretation is indicated by Jumblatt’s recollection of 
Bashar’s “orientalist” interests in Lebanese sectarian communities and Jumblatt’s designation of the 
Syrian Tutelage as a Syrian Occupation (the language of Tutelage is discursively interesting, arsing both 
here, and in the historical case of the 1860 commission. This may be a fruitful avenue for further 
research). Hafez al-Assad’s collaboration with the U.S. and Israel to destroy the LNM and, most likely, 
assassinate Kamal Jumblatt, indicate the SAR is an alternative colonial project to that of Zionism or the 
U.S., rather than an anti-imperialist force. Thus, at times, the Syrian colonial project overlapped with 
that of the U.S. and resulted in Pax-Syriana. Later, this instrumental relationship faltered, and they 
became dominating, violent and rival imperialisms.  
194 
 
The breakdown of the U.S.-Syria historic bloc has much in common with the Zu’ama politics 
of Lebanon, where former allies turn on one another, sectarian communities are mobilised, and 
violent conflict engaged in. The context of the breakdown of the U.S.-Syria historic bloc and the 
consequent discourse of conflict and violence; the invasion of Iraq, the Syria Accountability Act, 
resolution 1559, Lahoud’s extension, the assassination campaign, the UNIIIC’s arbitrary detention of 
Syrian allies and the Israel-Hizballah war, includes the STL as a partisan actor. This perspective is 
justified by the partisan actions of the UNIIIC, the false universalism embodied in overriding 
consociational politics through the use of Chapter VII to create the statute in resolution 1757 and the 
Jurisdiction limitations. Whatever the moral justification of 1757, the likelihood of its practical success 
of providing peace and security, given its obviously partisan nature, was non-existent. False 
universalism has been the Achilles heel of both 1559 and 1757. The illiberal nature of ICL is now 
discussed under historical comparison and inform the conclusion which follows.  
 
Historical Comparisons 
 
The pentarchy and sovereignty 
 
In terms of the historical structure of world order, there are several distinct similarities between the 
world order which produced the STL and that which produced the intervention of 1860. In both 
structures there are a pentarchy of great powers who, inter alia, control the mechanisms of law and 
intervention within a system of differentiated sovereignty. In the present world order, the pentarchy 
constitute the five veto wielding permanent members of the UNSC. In the world order of 1860, the 
the pentarchy constituted the five most powerful european states at the concert of europe. If we 
define sovereignty from the perspective of law and politics as those powers who only abide by treaties 
they have signed and who can, by extension, expect non-intervention in their sovereign affairs, then, 
in both world orders, it is only the pentarchy who are sovereign. In the 1860’s, the legal order of 
sovereignty was explicitly divided by supposed civilisational/racial level with Europe as the universal 
standard with “semi-civilised” and “barbarous” communities having lesser or no recognition or legal 
personality. In the contemporary world order, the civilisational/racial criteria have been jettisoned but 
a legal differentiation of sovereignty remains.  
The pentarchy enjoys sovereign impunity (with most favoured clients) through control of the 
mechanisms of law and intervention at the UNSC, chapter VII powers, and veto. All other states are 
sovereign only to the extent that they can engage with the system of pacta sunt servanda, but they 
195 
 
are not immune from intervention in sovereign affairs from the pentarchy. Thus, for post-colonial 
states, the sign of sovereignty was attached to the signified of recognition rather than non-
intervention, which had been the nineteenth century definition. Quietly, this earlier definition of 
sovereignty was reserved to the neo-pentarchy. However, the contemporary pentarchy is no longer a 
purely European or western affair. What remains in ICL is the sovereignty/impunity nexus in which 
only the pentarchy and favoured clients enjoy non-intervention. In both historical structures the 
crimes of the pentarchy (or favoured clients) fall outside either law or jurisdiction. Interestingly, there 
appears to be a historical move from the nineteenth century where it was beyond the realms of the 
possible for sovereign European states to be subject to criminal liability vis-à-vis non-sovereign 
peoples (no matter how genocidal their acts). The contemporary pentarchy are nominally liable to the 
same core international crimes as non-pentarchy states. The contemporary pentarchy rely instead on 
UNSC mechanisms to exclude themselves from jurisdiction. Whilst manifesty unjust, it potentially 
represents a move towards equality before the law. The legitimacy of this inequality is potentially 
vulnerable to being de-naturalised through the contrast of universal human rights and criminal 
liabilities with the reality of structural inequality.  
 
Executive domination of the Judiciary  
 
In both the 1860 intervention and the STL there is little judicial independence in the sense that 
investigations and jurisdictions are defined and determined by the pentarchy. However, this 
underlying truth presents itself in different forms in both cases. In the case of the 1860 intervention, 
the commissioners, including Fuad Pasha, represented a conflation of the political and the legal where 
balance of interests, prejudices, and genuine concern for “justice” became conflated and, at times, 
indestinguishable. This was an age of authoritarian selectivity and show trials where commissioners, 
as representatives of their governments, promoted the interests of particular clients and domination 
was essentially naked. For the Ottomans, total obedience from subject peoples was simply an 
expectation (one which was incresingly weakening in Lebanon). For the Europeans, their cultural and 
military dominance was such that they saw no need to hide their partiality or exercises of power. This 
reflected a balance of power in which Europe was in the ascendent and European public opinion was 
saturated with imperial ideologies of European/Christian civilisational superiority. Thus, for 
Europeans, domination of peripheral peoples depended on the hegemonic common sense of imperial 
ideology in the metropoles. The STL (and other contemporary tribunals) by comparison, are staffed by 
legal professionals and judges concerned with procedural propriety and perceived legitimacy. This 
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system emphasises, indeed relies, on the nominal and epistemological distinction between politics 
and law. Thus, it is a system defined by (il)liberal selectivity where, rather than direct executive 
representation or intervention in the court, the pentarchy rely on their predetermination of 
jurisdictions on ad hoc and hybrid bases and a compliant judiciary and counsel who enforce the 
epistemological distinction of politics and law. This mystifies the ontological reality in which the latter 
is dependent on the former. In this sense, the contemporary world order is defined by hegemony 
rather than dominance.  
It is in this hegemonic context where ICL discourses emphasising some justice is better than 
none and the equation of respect for judicial independence with being “careful to front-load 
jurisdictional limitations” (Cerone 2012, p. 62) perform the rationalisation, legitimation, 
universalisation, and naturalisation necessary to mystify the structures of uneven power and reify a 
non-existent egalitarian international community. The fact that this hegemonic and ideological work 
has become necessary should indicate that societal norms of universal human rights, jurisdiction and 
democratic legitimacy have become widespread. However, ideological hegemony is more pernicious 
than naked ideology and domination and therefore, harder to highlight. This presents both problems 
and opportunities on the path to Habermasian legitimacy. This movement from domination to 
hegemony and from authoritarian selectivity and show trials to (il)liberal selectivity is reflected in the 
move from political power to methodological power. The commissioners of the 1860 intervention 
directly interceded and influenced trials in order to balance interests or attain political goals. In the 
nominally independent judiciary of the present, political goals are seemingly achieved through 
application of positivist or interpretivist methodology as necessary; finding that transnational 
terrorism exists as a core crime, that Lebanese terrorism definitions are routinely read in conformity 
with this law, that the STL cannot judicially review the UNSC, or that there is no criminal liability for 
the crime of aggression in English law. Methodology’s innocuous nature makes it perfect for processes 
of naturalisation, rationalisation, universalisation and mystification. In chapter four, we learn that 
article 20 of the Lebanese constitution allows for tribunals made up of judges of different nationalities 
and that this was done both during the French mandate  and during the Syrian intervention. This 
analysis suggested that the presence of courts with mixed personnel might co-occur with forms of 
foreign domination. The analysis contained in the present chapter reinforces this impression. 1860 
was a naked instance of imperial rivalry and prejudice manifested in military, political and judicial 
intervention, and it thus gives one a view of the underlying mechanisms and processes unadulterated 
by legal rationalisations. Various combinations of Ottoman military tribunals and Pentarchy 
Commissioner hearings with cross-fertilisation, oversight or autonomy reflective of geopolitical logic 
and relative power, indicate that mixed tribunals and hybrid law have been part of the historical 
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experience of Lebanon and that instances of hybridity and mixed courts have been correlated with 
colonial and imperial domination. 
   
The dialectic of intervention, destabilisatio n and domination 
 
Another similarity between the interventions is that the violence and escalating conflict in Lebanon 
and its immediate environs, which precipitated the interventions, was the unintended and indirect 
result of intended and direct instances of western imperialism and aggression. With regard to the 1860 
tribunal, destabilisation at the regional level started in 1798 when Napoleon toppled the Egyptian 
Mameluks and left a power vacuum which was exploited by Mohammed Ali who had pretentions to 
regional hegemony. The nine years of Egyptian rule of Syria witnessed proxy conflict between France 
and Britian, played out through Egypt and the Ottomans, and resulted in the first pitting of sectarian 
forces against one another in Mount Lebanon.  
In the twenty-first century, it was the unprompted aggression against Iraq in 2003 which led 
to the undermining of the Syria-America historic bloc and the escalation in conflict between political 
and sectarian camps in Lebanon manifested through; the Syria accountability act, resolution 1559, the 
extension of President Lahoud, the assassination of anti-Syrian figures and the 2006 Hizballah-Israel 
war. Both eras witnessed a proliferation of potential patrons for Lebanese groups, making dynamics 
of conflict more complex. However, the nineteenth century patrons tended to be European pentarchy 
powers, wearas the diffusion of power globally and the regional state system locally, mean that there 
are many more patrons muddying the water in the present conflicts. As always, due to the clientelist 
dynamics of Lebanese and global politics, foreign conflicts are often translated into Lebanese ones 
and vise versa. Thus, the interventions are both implicated in the wider conflicts of their sponsors. In 
chapter five, we noted that Walid Jumblatt oppositonally reworded Pax Syriana from tutelage to 
occupation whilst Mr Korkmaz attempted to hegemomically legitimse and universalise the collusion 
of Henry Kissinger and Hafez al-Assad which led to this tutelage. Tutelege in these accounts was 
inferred, therefore, to relate to a legitimate and positive, patronising, relationship, even if the 
discourse participants themselves disagreed on whether the Syrian presence was tutelage or 
occupation.  
However, historical analysis in the present chapter indicates that the European pentarchy and 
their lawyers, represented their creeping colonial and imperial domination of the Ottomans as “la 
Turquie est en tutelle”, a tutelage (Rodogno 2012, p. 47). This indicates the term has long been 
associated with a hegemonic project of colonialism. Though further research on this contention is 
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warrented, it indicates that Jumblatt’s distinction between tutelage and occupation is largely 
superfluous, as the former is a hegemonically legitimising term for a range of colonial practices. It also 
contributes to the argument that the Assad’s can be conceived as a rival colonial project, rather than 
as true anti-imperialists, and that they have learned and applied the techniques and discourses of 
European colonialism and imperialism at various stages.   
 
Worthy and unworthy victims 
 
Another parallel regarding these interventions is how access to justice is reflective of the key interests 
and prejudices of powerful actors. In 1860, the death penalty and harsher punishments were often 
reserved for commoners and irregular soldiers. The Ottomans decided that the arrest and exile of 
Muslim notables in Damascus was punishment enough. The British protected the interests of the 
Druze Manasib as their proteges, ensuring that many who were guilty of massacring defenceless 
Christian peasants escaped justice. British concern for Manasib “property rights” reflected their class 
bias. At the STL, the entire jurisdiction covers the murder of a billionaire, Saudi and Western connected 
super-Za’im, and victims are deemed as such only as they incidentally relate to this crime. Lower class 
Lebanese, largely Shia, victims of alleged Israeli war crimes in 2006 were intentionally excluded, just 
as they always have been through the various excessive uses of force and occupation by Israelis, 
historically. These victims do not register under the current system of (il)liberal selectivity. The STL’s 
deference to social class and thoughtless reproduction of clientelist structures is manifest in the 
repeated reference to Walid Jumblatt by STL Judges as Beik during his four days of evidence (The 
Prosecutor versus Ayyash et al. 2015a, p. 11, 22, 23, 29, 49, The Prosecutor versus Ayyash et al. 2015b, 
p. 7, 17, The Prosecutor versus Ayyash et al. 2015c, p. 8, 69, 110, The Prosecutor versus Ayyash et al. 
2015d, p. 18, 32). This is likely a corruption of the Turkish honourific Bey which in turn corresponds to 
the Arab honourific Sheikh. Only one of these utterances was by a non-Lebanese, but it highlights the 
importance of class and deference to status reflective of a wider culture of warlord amnesty and 
present among the Lebanese judiciary.  
 
European Commission for Syria Vs STL: inclusivity vs exclusivity  
 
However, whilst both interventions feature prejudice based on patron interest, culture, or class, the 
intervention of 1860 was entirely encompassing and inclusive of relevant state patrons (providing a 
199 
 
semblance of universality), whereas the STL is not. In 1860 the concert powers, including the liminal 
Ottoman authority, operated with rules detailing unanimity and inclusion. Thus the outcome of 
punishments and political agreements reflected these actors’ interests and, therefore, to a larger or 
lesser extent, they cooperated. Perhaps this is part of the reason that the 1860-61 peace lasted for so 
long. By contrast, the STL is bitterly opposed by the “resistance alliance” and represents the sole 
interests of Western UNSC powers, and their regional most favoured clients. In this sense, it can only 
ever be polarising and partisan within a wider conflict.  
Though the Lebanese communities were disenfranchised and many victims overlooked in 
1860, there was at least some assurance and balance in the fact that their community “interests” were 
to some extent being promoted by the French, British and Ottomans on behalf of Christians, Druze 
and Muslims, respectively. This was not the case with the STL in which Russia and China abstained and 
where important patrons like Iran were not included (UN Press Release 2007). At the time of writing 
(June 2018) Russia has begun using its veto to protect Syria and aligned itself with the resistance 
alliance (See Dag Hammarskjöld Library 2017). Unfortunately, this appears more as a pursuit of 
impunity and a polarisation between the West and Russia, than a sign of cooperation between UNSC 
members to bring “justice”, as in 1860. In the classic Coxian sense, the STL reflected the material, 
ideational and institutional forces prevailent at the time of its inception. Those underlying forces, 
have, to a large extent, shifted. The West can no longer promote its ethico-political leadership at the 
UNSC. However, the structures which promote impunity remain in place.  
 
Consociationalism: from colonial solution to neo-colonial problem 
 
A distinction between these world orders is found in the way that they dealt with consociationalism. 
With regard to the violence of 1860, it is a historical irony that it was European ideologies of 
nationalism, orientalist constructions concerning religion as a primary identity,  and colonial practaces 
of patronage and proxy war which facilitated the attachment of clientelism and sectarianism in 
Lebanon and Syria. It is galling that the scale of violence this unleashed necessitated a consociational 
settlement. However, it appears that, given the laws of entropy and the new realities of cantonisation 
and insecurity, it may have been a necessary arrangement. Nevertheless, it has the unpallatable side 
effect of freezing these distinctions in place. Its longevity suggests it was at least partially successful 
in deterring and assuring its constituent communities.  
In the early-twenty-first century, the West and its most favoured clients managed to 
undermine this system and drive conflict. The security of the Ba’athist regime of Syria was severely 
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undermined by the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the consociational system of Lebanon was entirely 
overidden by the pentarchy with resolution 1559, demanding Hizballah and Palestinians be disarmed. 
Resolution 1757 completes the picture of consociational override and deepening conflict. This is 
particularly salient in a world order in which the resistance had no pentarchy representation and is 
reflected now (June 2018) in the polarising situation in Syria and the UNSC. From this perspective, the 
STL was just one polarising step on the path to these wider conflicts. In terms of justice, the main 
progressive development between world orders, despite its many flaws, is the establishment of a 
permanent international court, the ICC. This was not something countenanced in the nineteenth 
century. This also indicates that ad hoc and hybrid tribunals are associated with partisan, rather than 
public, interest. 
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Conclusion 
 
Thesis Context 
 
Chapter one presented a theoretical framework developed from Robert W. Cox. This centred around 
the ontology of historical structures of world order and state-society complexes. It was argued that 
Cox’s ontology was best applied with an undergirding meta-theory of CR rather than interpretivism. 
Key concepts of Gramscian Critical Theory, such as historic bloc, were elaborated as part of this 
theoretical framework to explain how relations of domination, hegemony or legitimate stability come 
in to being or breakdown. This informed, inter alia, the analysis in chapters five and six which found 
that Syria and the U.S. had forged a historic bloc in the hegemonic domination of Lebanon and that 
the bloc’s breakdown had precipitated conflict leading to the death of Hariri. Importantly, the explicit 
undergirding of CR for these concepts allows arguments to be made for the reality of these conditions, 
and not simply as discursive representations. Moreover, the core concepts of Critical Theory central 
to the concerns of this thesis, namely ideology and hegemony, are only coherent in the context of CR 
meta-theory emphasising intransitive ontological reality and transitive epistemological relativism 
because if there is no reality over which one can be intentionally mislead, then ideology ceases to 
exist. The thesis argued that there is an ontological reality over which one can be ideologically misled, 
and this informed the methodology.   
 Realism was also central to operationalising legitimacy which was argued to be a concrete 
practice in line with the Habermasian definition, rather than something simply perceived, as in the 
dominant Weberian definition. This realist definition was a mixed deliberative and procedural 
definition which democratically includes stakeholders and proceeds according to an agreed 
procedure. Interestingly, mainstream ICL sources rely almost entirely on the Weberian definition in 
which legitimacy is simply perceived rather than actual. This gives rise to extended discussions about 
altering the perception of legitimacy without any consideration of structural inclusion or exclusion, 
highlighting this as an idea in the service of hegemonic power. It was demonstrated, furthermore, that 
the historical structure as it pertained to ICL emanated from the colonial encounter which relied on a 
stratification of sovereignty which guided the thesis in searching for sovereign stratification as an 
indicator of continuation of ICL as a tool of power, rather than as a post-colonial rupture.  
The focus on historical structure of ICL as it pertained to Lebanon lead to the discovery of the 
1860 European Commission for Syria and its inclusion in this thesis as a historical comparison with the 
STL through which the development of the historical structure could be elaborated. The CDA of 
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Norman Fairclough represented the ideal set of techniques through which to pursue the research 
questions. It provided a rigorous approach to descriptive, interpretive and explanatory analysis 
through the theoretically sampled transcripts of Walid Jumblatt’s testimony to the STL.  
The thesis then discussed the different forms of violence associated with clientelism and 
sectarianism, namely, feuding and assassination in the former and disproportionate, generalised, and 
surrogate violence and massacre, with the latter. Further discussion lead to the insight that this 
conceptual difference was reflective of the differing origins of clientelism and sectarianism as forms 
of identity and social organisation. The argument was advanced that, up until the eighteenth century, 
clientelism was the predominant form of social organisation which placed emphasis on family name 
and social hierarchy in a heterogenous culture. Clientelism was defined as a dyadic, hierarchical, 
relational, structure dependent on patronage and loyalty. Moreover, it was noted that under the 
Ottoman Empire, this relational structure had one terminus, the Sultan. This demonstrated that the 
relational social structure of clientelism constituted and intra-regional and inter-cultural relation at 
this time and, furthermore, became an inter-state relation upon the establishment of the Lebanese 
state, the Middle East state system, and the imposition of foreign powers into the region. Indeed, the 
argument was advanced that it was the establishment of European powers as sources of regional 
patronage equal to, or greater than, the Sultan, which gave the relational social structure of clientelism 
a conflictual, multipolar aspect which it still retains. Even more problematically, it was demonstrated 
that European powers from the eighteenth century onwards established patronage on the basis of 
religious sect, thus, establishing sectarianism as a primary mode of social organisation. It was 
demonstrated that, whilst clientelist and sectarian forms of violence had differing origins and forms 
they had, nevertheless, come to inhere within the Lebanese state-society in a causal complex where, 
often, one form of violence lead seamlessly to another. It was demonstrated that Zu’ama-lead militias 
and parties during and after the civil wars of 1958 and 1975-1990 embodied both clientelist and 
sectarian dynamics and that assassination during the civil war had often initiated sectarian, surrogate 
massacre. Thus, the nexus of clientelist-sectarian violence and conflict was posited as a key causal 
tendency in Lebanon.  
 The thesis then moved to define and discuss consociationalism. In particular, it was noted that 
this concept could be discussed in descriptive or normative ways, with an emphasis on ideal types or 
its concrete manifestation in Lebanon. It was advanced that consociationalism was useful as a concept 
for the description of Lebanese state-society structure, but that normative proscription should not be 
uncritically adopted. Consociationalism in Lebanon is inherently bound to the clientelist and sectarian 
logic of elites. Their fractious politics makes a consociational system of elite power-sharing based on 
mutual deterrence and assurance somewhat necessary. The sectarian logic is expressed in the key 
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positions of state being allocated to the major sects. The logic of deterrence and assurance is 
expressed constitutionally through the requirement that major branches of government (and thus 
major sectarian groups) must agree on foreign treaties before they can be enforced. This was born 
largely of the experience of the 1958 war caused by the Maronite president attempting to align 
Lebanon with the west. It was argued that, though consociationalism might have some merit as a 
necessary way of preventing conflict between elites, it nevertheless represented the pinnacle of a 
deeper sectarian system in which the state abdicated its role of providing national citizenship and 
identity by allocating this responsibility to sub-state sectarian institutions. This has the effect of 
freezing sectarian societal segments in place and reproducing sectarian subjects with deleterious 
effects for personal freedom and collective security. This gave rise to a paradox which this conclusion 
seeks to address.  
 The final aspect of the Lebanese state-society defined in this thesis was that of memory. 
Definition of the importance of memory for Lebanon begins with the recognition of the dual dynamics 
of amnesty and amnesia which have a pre-modern lineage. Obliteration of the past in times of elite 
transgression was the mode through which harmony was restored in Ottoman times and which the 
Lebanese elite now enact for themselves. It was suggested, following key scholars, that memory 
cultures in Lebanon should be considered in a plural way and that the phenomena of post-memory 
should be accounted for. The complexity of the Lebanese relationship to memory, particularly of 
traumatic events, is highlighted in the ubiquitous motif of the martyr; this amounts to a socially 
acceptable remembrance of victims in a culture of elite amnesty and ostensible amnesia. A specific 
discourse of interest was highlighted in the “war of others” positing that the Lebanese war was simply 
a proxy war on Lebanese territory.  
Chapter four provided perspectives from world order through a critical and historical review 
of the ICL literature. This literature was constituted by ICJ, TJ and CLS approaches and addressed three 
key events in chronological order, the 2007 enactment of UNSC resolution 1757 establishing the STL, 
the 2011 Decision on applicable law, and the 2012 Decisions on legality and legitimacy. Broadly 
speaking, ICJ and TJ scholarship can be defined as the mainstream. Mainstream literature on these 
decisions often highlight problematic issues with various aspects of world order but then expend 
considerable energy and utilise discursive tactics to legitimate or minimise these issues. This was the 
case with the observation that the UN transgressed Lebanese constitutional provisions ensuring 
consensus on foreign treaties when it negotiated for the STL with only the Prime Minister. The 
imposition of 1757 was excused using the semantic argument that the treaty was a blueprint not an 
annex. Discussion of 1757 highlighted the constitutional residue of acceptability of mixed tribunals 
which correlate historically with periods of foreign intervention and domination. Principally, the 2007 
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literature showed an ICL consensus that the applicable law through the statute was conceived to be 
the terrorism definition of the LPC. Mainstream sources from this period appeared to invoke a “some 
justice is better than none” logic to selectivity which appeared to rely on an implied incidental 
selectivity rather than a systematic one emergent from the structure of the UNSC.  
 The 2011 Decision which attracted sustained critique and praise from mainstream sources 
decided that, contrary to the statute, the STL would apply an already existing core international crime 
of transnational terrorism, the existence of which was a controversial topic. This decision relied on an 
unorthodox interpretive methodology which argued that a transnational crime could be detected be 
aligning core aspects of national and international treaties and legislation while excluding aspects 
which did not align. Moreover, it was argued that, though the statute of the STL stipulated that the 
terrorism definition applied would be Lebanese, the standard practice was for all states to read their 
definitions in line with international definitions. Upon analysis of the transnational element of the 
invoked transnational terrorism, it was argued that it was not so much a truth claim relating to some 
empirical facet of the crime, but a speech act located with the UNSC and subject to the institution’s 
structural power and constraints. Thus, the effect of this determination was to empower the UNSC.  
 The 2012 Decision, instigated by defence challenges to the STL and the UNSC, was somewhat 
precluded by RPE. The STL also relied on positivist methodology to argue that the statute did not 
explicitly allow the STL to judicially review UNSC Decisions. This Decision rested on precisely the 
opposite methodology to that of the 2011 Decision but was similar in the fact that it empowered the 
UNSC. In this context CLS literature provided meta-analysis of the ICL discipline in general, and with 
regard to the STL in particular. In general, these sources highlighted ICL’s core narratives of progress, 
colonial and post-colonial rupture, nominal externalising of politics from law and the central purpose 
of ending impunity, a purpose stated explicitly by states in passing resolution 1757 and establishing 
the STL. With specific regard to the STL, CLS literature highlighted recourse to a narrative of politicised 
Lebanon in need of non-political ICL in view of its state failure to sign a treaty. This is in contra-
distinction to the reality that consociationalism was constructed to function in precisely this way.  
  
 Chapter five and six applied this approach to the testimony of Walid Jumblatt and then re-
contextualised this analysis through reference to the 1860 commissions. The conclusions of these 
chapters have been summarised in the previous chapter and will not be repeated here, though the 
key findings are elaborated below and used to develop theoretical models and answer the research 
questions.  
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Research questions  
 
1. What are the differences and similarities in hegemony, domination and legitimacy in the 1860 
commissions and the STL? 
2. What ideological, hegemonic and legitimating discursive practices are employed at the STL? 
3. How do these strategies inform structural power in international law and politics? 
4. What do the 1860 commissions and the STL tell us about hegemonic world order? And what are the 
implications for Lebanon? 
 
Research findings 
 
This thesis noted that there appeared to be a potential link between foreign intervention, domination, 
and colonialism on the one hand, and the presence of hybrid tribunals in Lebanon, on the other. The 
original Lebanese constitution was drafted under the French high commissioner and mandate. Thus, 
the fact the constitution leaves room for hybrid tribunals should not come as a surprise but is 
emergent from these conditions. Historical comparison with the 1860 intervention reveals that 
hybridity in that case was a function of contested geopolitics between the concert pentarchy and the 
Ottoman authorities, with the level of hybridity and European oversight having direct correlation to 
relative material power and strategic manoeuvring in various locales. Similarly, Walid Jumblatt’s 
testimony detailed how UNSC resolution 1559 emerged from a conflict between Syria and Western 
pentarchy members and how the domestic opposition to Syria were excluded from the drafting 
process. Resolution 1757 occurs as part of this wider conflict. These insights give further credibility to 
the notion that, in the historical Lebanese experience, judicial hybridity is related to foreign 
domination or conflict of various kinds.  
In contemporary world order, and with respect to the establishment of the STL, John Cerone 
candidly admits that support for hybrid and ad hoc institutions by the U.S. is inversely proportional to 
its resistance to permanent ICL institutions, particularly the ICC. Thus, these dynamics are capable of 
feeding back in to, or reflecting, wider political conflicts over the structural mechanisms of ICL in world 
order (See figure 6). Moreover, it indicates that not only mixed tribunals, but also ad hoc ones, have 
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been associated with various forms of domination in the Lebanese experience. This is certainly 
demonstrable with the 1860 commissions which were directly reflective of political and military 
power.  
 
Sphere of Activity Ad Hoc and Mixed Tribunals correlated with … 
World Order 1860: Maintaining Balance of Power and 
Preventing Conflict. Multiple competing 
national interests linked to local proxies.  
Present: Undermining the ICC, maintaining 
UNSC impunity, limiting jurisdiction over UNSC 
favoured clients.  
Lebanon  Foreign Domination and Intervention: 1. Concert 
Pentarchy 2. French Mandate 3. Syrian 
Intervention 4. UNSC intervention 
 
Figure 6: Mixed Courts and their Political Context 
 
In chapter four, CLS literature indicated that contemporary ICL considered itself as having 
moved beyond its colonial origins, emphasising a rupture with history. Chapter three established that 
the nineteenth century world order was based on a racial and civilizational hierarchy which recognised 
only Christian European powers as sovereign. The question then became whether sovereign 
differentiation continued by other means. Some results relating to this question are displayed in figure 
7. The top row of this table, type of judicial power, demonstrates that judicial power was exercised 
politically in 1860, and, explicitly so. Indeed, in 1860, judicial power was not exercised through judges 
but through commissioners and extraordinary envoys which reported directly to their respective 
national executives and combined both political and judicial functions openly. Regarding the present, 
judicial power is exercised by a dedicated ICL judiciary which explicitly rejects political considerations.  
Nevertheless, at the STL, and the majority of ad hoc and hybrid institutions, this judiciary 
functions within pre-defined jurisdictions dependent on UNSC Chapter VII powers and pentarchy veto. 
The question then becomes, do its decisions support this political executive from which it is emergent? 
It was concluded throughout this thesis that a pattern of key decisions of the STL support the UNSC 
agenda and that, moreover, these legal decisions were arrived at by apparently contradictory legal 
methodologies. It was posited that this constituted an exercise of power through the application of 
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methodologies with the key ideological effect of mystifying this exercise of power on behalf of a 
specific political group, the UNSC. Methodology could constitute a key mode, or even the mode, of 
contemporary judicial power in ICL.  
 
Type of Judicial Power 1860: Political  Present: Methodological  
Type of Politicisation  1860: Show trials and 
Authoritarian selectivity 
Present: (Il)liberal Selectivity 
Type of pentarchy impunity  1860: Crimes excluded from 
legal definition 
Present: Crimes excluded 
from jurisdiction 
Type of (Post) Colonial 
Sovereignty  
1860: Non-existent or liminal  Present: Sovereign 
recognition not Sovereign 
non-intervention 
Type of world order 1860: Domination  Present: Hegemonic   
 
Figure 7: Historical Structure of ICL 
 
 The second row of figure 7, type of politicisation, demonstrates that the 1860 intervention 
was based on show trials with a political agenda subordinating questions of guilt, and authoritarian 
selectivity where political considerations and prejudices effected the way the guilty were treated. This 
is contrasted with a contemporary illustration of (Il)liberal selectivity, which we have defined as relying 
on the epistemic division of law and politics which allows for tribunals to ignore the jurisdictional 
jerrymandering which ensures the UNSC pentarchy and their most-favoured clients are systematically 
immune. Under (Il)liberal selectivity, political considerations and prejudices influence which crimes 
are selected for prosecution and ad hoc tribunals are as dependent on the executive for their existence 
as authoritarian ones, but the nominal division of politics and law allows the ICL judiciary to externalise 
the political interests they pursue by default and, within that limited confine, pursue truth. These 
insights on politicisation and selectivity relate directly to the third row, type of pentarchy impunity. 
This row compares the type of impunity which the respective pentarchies enjoy. The nineteenth 
century pentarchy enjoyed impunity by not being liable to prosecution under ICL, which only applied 
to the uncivilised, non-European. The contemporary pentarchy, whilst nominally liable to the same 
crimes as non-pentarchy states, in practice, are rendered immune by virtue of their control of the 
mechanisms of world order which determine jurisdictions, namely Chapter VII of the UN charter and 
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the veto function. Thus, (Il)liberal selectivity of cases arises from the same structural mechanisms as 
UNSC jurisdictional impunity.  
 The fourth row, type of (Post) Colonial Sovereignty, theorises sovereign differentiation as it 
pertains to Lebanon through its colonial and neo-colonial eras. In 1860, sovereignty was premised on 
sovereign non-intervention and intra-civilizational recognition among Europeans and, on this basis, it 
was denied to Mount Lebanon within the Ottoman state. In the present era, the Lebanese republic is 
recognised but, like the majority of states globally, does not possess sovereign non-intervention which 
is reserved to the neo-pentarchy. The civilizational and racial criteria for recognition are gone, but the 
stratification between neo-pentarchy sovereignty based on non-intervention and everyone else’s 
sovereignty based on recognition, is present. Thus, we can state that a system of sovereign 
differentiation still exists in the contemporary world order.  
The top four rows of figure 7 justify the fifth row, namely, that nineteenth century world order 
was characterised by overt dominance, where judicial power is openly political, and this politicisation 
manifested in show trials and authoritarian selectivity. Meanwhile, European powers were explicitly 
excluded from criminal liability towards colonial peoples, who possessed no legal sovereign standing 
in front of the European family of nations. These same four top rows of figure 7 also justify the 
characterisation of the present world order in the fifth row as ideologically hegemonic. Here, political 
interests are overtly excluded from judicial decision-making whilst being reserved covertly to the 
seemingly innocuous and soporific methodological arena. Ironically, the disavowal of political process, 
interests, jurisdiction formation, sovereign stratification and pentarchy impunity, allow ICL to 
externalise the jurisdictional jerrymandering and tribunal weaponizing processes whilst, 
simultaneously, pursuing these political interests by default.  
Meanwhile, through this same process of structural impunity, the neo-pentarchy and ICL give 
the impression of equality before the same laws to which all are nominally liable, whilst ensuring that 
they are excluded from jurisdictions through control of the mechanisms of ICL. Lebanese sovereignty, 
whilst nominally recognised, is subject to the same structural vulnerability to pentarchy intervention 
as it was in the days of the Ottoman Empire. From column one to column two in figure 7, the central 
change in the operation of power has been from overt to covert and towards a sophisticated distortion 
of communication to procure enough consent for the pentarchy to maintain its structural dominance 
of world order and ICL. Thus, it is noting that the historical structure of world order viewed through 
the prism of ICL has moved from open domination to a present condition of ideological hegemony. 
The STL appears to be implicated in these progressions of hegemony through manifold processes, 
including reliance on methodological power to achieve political goals which favour the UNSC, 
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embodiment of (Il)liberal selectivity based on the nominal division of politics and law and concrete 
dependence on the executive, tolerance of jurisdictional jerrymandering leading to the central theory-
practice contradiction of rendering the neo-pentarchy and their most favoured clients systematically 
immune from prosecution and their own victims systematically excluded, and the mystification of 
financial contributions of politically partisan states to its maintenance.  
Regarding the third primary research question, we can say that, though it is not devoid of 
meaning it is, nevertheless, somewhat misconceived in view of the results of the analysis in this thesis. 
Whilst it is totally valid to discuss what the mitigating and exacerbating factors are regarding the STL, 
the premise of the question is such that its underlying ontology is of an external relation between the 
pre-constituted STL institution acting upon the local political context in a positive or negative way. The 
reality, however, is that the STL and the pre-existing, internationalised, conflict in Lebanon share an 
internal relation. In the testimony of Walid Jumblatt can be discerned a process whereby the 
instrumental U.S.-Syria historic bloc (which was nascent in the 1976 Syrian intervention and 
consolidated with the Taif accords) began to break down in the context of the withdrawal of Israel 
from south Lebanon in 2000 and the Bush administration’s invasion of Iraq in 2003. This lead, in turn, 
to these rival colonialisms violating the consociational power-sharing system through UNSC resolution 
1559 and the extension of President Lahoud, respectively. The assassination campaign should be seen 
in this context of deepening conflict and it is no coincidence that the establishment of the STL was 
achieved through precisely the same UNSC consociational override mechanisms as resolution 1559 
which also targeted Hizballah and which bookend the assassination crisis. In this light, and 
notwithstanding the nominal division of politics and law and procedural propriety practiced within the 
confines of the jerrymandered jurisdiction of the STL, it should be considered as emergent from this 
wider pattern of conflict.  
From the beginning then, its potential to mitigate this conflict, given its de facto partisan 
nature, is minute. Indeed, historical comparison with the 1860 tribunal highlights its flawed nature, 
particularly in relation to false universalism. The 1860 tribunal, whilst horrifying in its utilisation of 
show trials and authoritarian selectivity by contemporary standards, nevertheless achieved a partial 
universalism through the logic of sectarian clientelism, in which all the parties to the conflict and their 
respective international patrons, were represented and contributed to the aggregate outcome which 
was remarkably stable. By contrast, key regional patrons and local parties are actively hostile to, and 
excluded from, the STL. This makes the outlook grim for inducing any kind of peace. It is also the case 
that the constellation of power present at the passing of 1757 which established the STL has changed. 
Where Russia and other sceptical states were willing to abstain on the STL and thus accept Western 
leadership on the issue (after Russia and the U.S. colluded to prevent abrogation of immunity for their 
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most favoured clients)  (See UN Press Release 2007, Cerone 2012, p. 55) Russia has now engaged on 
a policy of veto protection for Syria, representing a hardening of positions and indicating that the STL 
no longer reflects the current power distribution at the UNSC (See Dag Hammarskjöld Library 2017).  
From chapter two’s operationalisation of concepts, through the analysis of chapters five and 
six, we can posit two related models of causal tendencies crucial to considering prospects for peace. 
The first, represented in figure 8, is the nexus of clientelist-sectarian conflict and violence which is a 
tendency for political assassination to generate conditions conducive to generalised conflict or, in 
extreme conditions, massacre. This was present in testimony on the attempted assassination of 
Marwan Hamade and in Ms Abdelsater-Abusamra’s questions regarding the massacre of Christians 
after the assassination of Kamal Jumblatt.  
 
Figure 8: The Nexus of Clientelist-Sectarian Violence 
 
Though the model is simple, it cannot be overstated that this does not represent a universal law but, 
rather, a tendency within Lebanese state-society which is context dependent as to how the conflict 
and/or violence is manifested and towards whom. Arguably it can be a positive force, for example in 
the Cedar Revolution. Nevertheless, it is central to understanding the danger posed by assassination 
in the Lebanese context. From the same sources, we can posit a theorisation of how memory functions 
when instrumentalised by Zu’ama, how this instrumentalisation of memory has a tendency to interact 
within causal complexes which include the nexus of clientelist-sectarian violence, and to what extent 
the STL mitigates or exacerbates these processes (See figure 9).  
 
 
Sectarian/Political 
polarisation, conflict 
or massacre
Elite Assassination 
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Type of Memory Activation Description of Memory 
Activation Process 
Zu’ama Role in Memory 
Activation Process 
Active Forgetting Active repression and 
suppression of particular 
crimes for instrumental 
purposes.  
Zu’ama encouragement and 
enforcement.  
Active Remembrance Intentional, instrumental, 
reactivation of previously 
actively forgotten topics for 
political expediency. 
Zu’ama encouragement and 
enforcement. 
Spontaneous Remembrance  Spontaneous remembrance of 
previously actively forgotten 
topics. Often induced by 
trauma (See figure 8) 
 Spontaneous nature of 
memory activation does not 
require direct Zu’ama input 
and is largely external to their 
control.  
 
Figure 9: Processes of active and spontaneous memory activation.   
 
As figure 9 demonstrates, Zu’ama manipulation of memory takes place largely to facilitate or 
undermine instrumental political relationships in line with the ideology of amnesty and amnesia. 
Unlike their colloquial counterparts, these processes are active rather than passive. The most 
dangerous aspect of this process is what happens when civilians spontaneously remember the 
previously actively forgotten. This process is often induced by trauma or assassination in the present 
and relates directly to the clientelist-sectarian nexus of violence wherein lies its great threat. Whilst 
the STL’s focus on an assassination makes most sense in the light of challenging this nexus, it fails , in 
Jumblatt’s testimony, to challenge the Zu’ama monopoly and manipulation of memory which 
contribute to the repression of trauma. Indeed, Jumblatt is allowed a monopoly of memory in his 
testimony in which he can step out of amnesia to accuse his fathers alleged murderers whilst, 
simultaneously, ensuring that his amnesty protection remains in place and he will not have to answer 
questions regarding his own victims. He is allowed, by virtue of the power behind and in discourse, to 
advance the ideology of amnesia through a theory of synonymous healing and forgetting.  
By the same power behind discourse, Jumblatt and the STL evince the class-based nature of 
consideration through his designation as a victim, whilst normal Lebanese victims are excluded unless 
they are incidental victims of the Hariri assassination. Their victimhood is entirely relational to an 
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internationally significant super-Zaim. Jumblatt is also able to advance, without challenge, the war of 
others discourse, which absolves Lebanese from participation in their own civil war. Finally, the 
contradictions inherent to Jumblatt’s own testimony regarding the necessity and impossibility of 
forgetfulness are not challenged. Thus, all the major structures of power, domination and impunity 
are left unchallenged, transmitted and legitimated through the STL during this testimony. This 
suggests heavily that the STL is not contributing significantly to emancipation from impunity and 
violence and often contributes to it through its passive acceptance of Zu’ama ideologies of amnesty 
and amnesia. This, of course, is the central contradiction of attempting to end impunity while 
operating through a system with impunity at its core.  
 Thus, the STL’s internal relation to the wider conflict of which it is a part and its lack of inclusion 
both make its prospects for mitigating conflict small and its potential for exacerbation large. It finds 
the majority of its potential for mitigating violence in the fact that it was set up to address 
assassination which forms part of the nexus of clientelist and sectarian violence central to the 
prospects for peaceful relations. Whilst it is possible this may have a deterring effect; this is not likely 
given the adversarial position of the resistance alliance and its new-found pentarchy cover. This 
situation differs entirely from that of 1860 which was much more successful as a function of its 
sectarian and clientelist inclusivity. Meanwhile, the exclusionary class-based structures of impunity, 
memory monopolisation and instrumentalisation which historically give rise to violence are either left 
in place or passively legitimated by the STL. Overall, the STL does very little to mitigate potential for 
violence and quite a lot to ensure their continuation and exacerbation.  
 One of the key problematic issues highlighted in this thesis regarding the STL, and world order 
in general, have been the repeated violations of Lebanon’s consociational system of power-sharing, 
particularly through resolutions 1559 and 1757 and the Lahoud extension and assassination campaign. 
This is made even more problematic from a Critical Theory perspective given the system’s reliance on, 
and reproduction of, clientelistic relationships and sectarian identities. Thus, there is a seeming 
paradox in the recognition that consociationalism enables the deterrence and assurance within the 
political system which enables insulation from internationalised patron-seeking dynamics and conflict, 
whilst simultaneously presiding over a sectarian system which reproduces sectarian subjects and 
societal segments which ensures the continuation of these forms of politics and violence in the long 
term. This leads one to a paradoxical position of arguing for the respect of a consociational system 
which one recognises as injurious to personal and collective emancipation. Figure 10 presents an 
emancipatory strategy for overcoming the consociational paradox with reference to the politics of 
world order. 
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Aspect of consociationalism Description of aspect  Ideal emancipatory strategy 
related to aspect 
Consociational power-sharing 
(Horizontal) 
Mutual Veto and foreign policy 
neutrality, deterrence and 
assurance between 
horizontally opposed sectarian 
elites and societal segments 
Respect from Pentarchy and 
regional patrons and policy of 
true universalism. Respect for 
mutual assurance and 
deterrence and respect for 
constitutional provisions 
regarding inclusive treaty 
ratification and neutrality. 
Non-violation through UNSC 
mechanisms or by state actions 
which are contrary to the spirit 
of true universalism. 
Sectarian system  
(Vertical) 
The freezing and reproducing 
of sectarian subjects and 
sectarian segments 
(suppression of civic identity 
and rights) 
Lebanese civil society owned 
and lead movement for civil 
rights which expand the realm 
of secular rights and citizenship 
and render sectarian affiliation 
obsolete in the long term.  
 
Figure 10: Emancipatory strategy for overcoming the consociational paradox 
 
The key to overcoming the paradox is to resist the temptation to interventionism and false 
universalism which is the bane of all progressive and emancipatory politics in Lebanon. Central is the 
observation that it is for the Lebanese to free themselves from consociational and sectarian politics 
with which they were socialised through European colonialism. Foreign states and institutions simply 
have the duty not to sabotage this process through the manufacturing of crises. It is in this context 
that the Iran nuclear deal was ideal for the stabilisation of consociational politics and a point of 
convergence in an otherwise polarising regional and international landscape. Its compromising by the 
Trump administration should be viewed unfavourably in this light as should attempts by the new Saudi 
administration to sabotage the new Lebanese administration. One can only hope that the un-freezing 
of consociational politics, the holding of elections, and formation of a government, will have enough 
momentum to allow room for more civil society-lead emancipatory politics. It is here, and not in top-
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down politicised solutions like the STL, where Lebanese emancipation from sectarianism and violence 
is likely to come.  
 
Originality and contribution to knowledge  
 
In the introduction, four areas of originality were identified; analysis of the testimony of Walid 
Jumblatt, application of CDA to STL transcripts, historical comparative analysis between the STL and 
the 1860 intervention, and an integrated meta-theoretical, theoretical and methodological approach. 
These four areas share an internal relation, that is, none of them would be what they are without 
reference to the others. Indeed, the first three aspects enumerated are emergent from the fourth 
aspect, the integrated CR and Critical Theoretical approach. It is here then, that an assessment of the 
originality and contribution must begin. A CR meta-theory and its attendant concepts underpin this 
research. This includes, inter alia, ontological realism, epistemological relativism, judgmental 
rationalism, a relational conception of social structure, internal relations, emergence and a focus on 
tendencies, mechanisms and causal complexes. The Critical Theoretical concepts are adopted from 
the disciplines of IR, Political and Social Science and include, inter alia, historical structures, world 
order, state-society complexes and historic blocs. They also include operationalisations of domination, 
hegemony, ideology, and legitimacy. The general methodological approach this gives rise to includes, 
inter alia, multidisciplinary focus on idiosyncratic actors, critical literature review, focus on mediations 
between individuals and systems, dual approach of intensive explication and comparative 
generalisation, emphasis on qualitative, discursive and historical analysis.  
The particular techniques applied through Nvivo qualitative data analysis software were 
adapted and adopted from the CDA of Norman Fairclough’s book Language and Power 3rd edition, 
itself dependent on particular linguistic theories of language and explicitly designed to detect uses of 
power and ideology in language. This set of techniques consisted of three broad phases of textual 
analysis based on description, interpretation and explanation. The interdependence of these meta, 
theoretical and methodological aspects is evident throughout the research process. For example, the 
theoretical notion of historical structures is, first and foremost, a statement of ontological realism as 
is the relational conception of structure on which is depends. This in turn informs the methodological 
preoccupation with historical and comparative generalisation. From the other side, the CDA 
interpretation phase is dependent on operationalised theoretical concepts of ideology and legitimacy. 
The claim is not that no one has utilised this type of analysis before, rather that it is a highly particular 
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combination applied to a highly particular case study. It is this integrated approach which gives rise to 
the other aspects of originality in this thesis.  
An analysis of the transcripts of Walid Jumblatt’s testimony at the STL was the logical outcome 
of studying multidisciplinary literature on the idiosyncratic Lebanese state-society and 
operationalising the concepts and mechanisms associated with this literature; clientelism, 
sectarianism, consociational democracy and memory. In other words, the integrated approach 
outlined determined this theoretical sampling. Similarly, the application of CDA to these transcripts, 
particularly through the descriptive phase, provided rigorous, intensive and empirical analysis which 
could then be explained through drawing on historical, comparative generalisation with 1860 
European intervention. Discovery of this intervention itself was dependent on the historical, 
comparative, and multidisciplinary, approach advocated by this thesis.  
 Enumeration of the contribution to knowledge which this original approach has provided risks 
excessive repetition and, thus, for a fuller elaboration of said contribution, one can refer to the 
research findings contained in this conclusion or the chapter conclusions from chapters five and six 
Here, they are best summarised through the observation that, contrary to the atomist ontology of 
mainstream IR, Lebanon is not an external, pre-constituted entity acted on externally through a 
similarly atomistic and pre-constituted ICL. Rather, judicial and political intervention have literally 
historically constituted the consociational and sectarian polity which now exists. The STL is simply the 
latest iteration of this process. This process, from the nineteenth century to the present, has been 
dependent on a world order of legally differentiated sovereignty which allows for the structural and 
systematic impunity of the pentarchy executive which deploy ICL. Moreover, these historical political 
and judicial interventions co-occur in history with moments of colonial domination and constitute the 
conditions conducive to the next intervention (See figure 11).  
 
 
Figure 11: The historical constitution of Lebanese inferior sovereignty through judicial/political intervention 
Demonstrates the correlation of mixed tribunals and colonialism and how each intervention provides favourable material, 
ideational and institutional conditions for further intervention 
1860 European 
Intervention: 
Creation of 
Sectarian and  
Consociational 
Proto-State 
through mixed 
tribunals 
1923 - 1946 
French Mandate:
Creation of 
Modern Lebanese 
Constitution
Constitutionally 
validated mixed 
tribunals 
1977 - 2005 Syrian 
Tutelege 
(Occupation)
1978 - 1983 mixed 
tribunals for 
protection of 
"Arab Deterrent 
Force" 
2007 - Present STL
mixed tribunal  
2011 Ruling: 
Lebanon routinely 
reads national law 
in conformity with 
international 
provisions
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The iteration of these conditions through mixed tribunals move from establishment of sectarianism 
and consociationalism in Lebanon, consolidation of sectarianism, consociationalism and the legality of 
mixed tribunals, utilization of this law to protect the Kissinger-Assad military intervention and the STL’s 
ruling that Lebanese law (and all other law) will now be (and always has been) read in conformity with 
international provisions. One can only imagine the use this last provision will be put to and by what 
power to justify intervention in Lebanon in the future, but a cursory comparison with English law in 
chapter six demonstrates that this Pentarchy member certainly does not intend to read its codified 
law in line with international provisions for aggression.  Other contributions to knowledge can be 
summarised, in no particular order, as follows 
• Elaboration of processes of active and spontaneous remembrance and relation to the 
clientelist and sectarian nexus of violence. 
• Identification of central theory-practice contradiction of ICL: Ending Impunity. 
• STL complicity in elite monopolisation of memory: ideology of amnesia. 
• SAR as both complementary and rival colonialism to that of the west: U.S.-Syria historic bloc 
(Assad and Kissinger) colonial language of “tutelage” as synonym for colonial occupation. 
• CDA of Ghazaleh and Hariri recording, formal text features support contention of antipathy. 
• Importance of dissonance and relativism within the consociational frame. 
• Presence of false universalism as key indicator of future conflict: 1860 inclusivity vs STL 
exclusivity.  
• Distortion of communication regarding STL funding.  
• Model of Legal politicisation: Show Trials, Authoritarian Selectivity, (Il)liberal selectivity.  
• Theorisation of move from political power to methodological power in ICL. 
• STL emergent from pre-existing internationalised discourse of conflict and violence.  
• Identification of, and proposals for overcoming, the consociational paradox.  
• Continuity in ICL and world order: pentarchy of great powers with sovereign non-intervention, 
legally differentiated sovereignty for non-pentarchy, executive domination of the judiciary, 
access to justice reflective of prejudices and interests of the pentarchy, deference to local 
class structures.  
• Change in ICL and world order: From Domination to Hegemony.  
• Mixed or hybrid tribunals correlated with colonial domination in the Lebanese historical 
experience.  
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• Principal backers of both 1860 intervention and the STL largely responsible for crises which 
necessitated them through their regional imperial aggression: Napoleon in Egypt and British 
and French proxy conflict, George W. Bush in Iraq.  
•  STL no longer represents the constellation of power at the UNSC which gave rise to it.  
• Consociationalism has moved from colonial solution to neo-colonial problem. Both imposition 
and override a function of pentarchy intervention.  
 
The research process  
 
One of the most gratifying aspects of conducting this research was finding, adapting and applying 
Norman Fairclough’s CDA to conduct analysis of transcripts. One reads meta theoretical and 
methodological arguments about the necessity of empirical, interpretation and explanatory modes of 
analysis but until one is doing it you cannot really know these works in practice or how they imply 
each other. The most useful aspect of the CDA was how it provided a rigorous and empirical mode of 
engagement with this data. This, more than anything else, is what allowed this author to make the 
claim that this was a scientific endeavour. Having coded this data, clusters of formal features and 
anomalies emerged and became visible on the page and were often correlated to portions of text in 
which a difficult topic emerged.  
As an example, this happened when the prosecution council Mr Cameron utilised a modal 
auxiliary verb may to politely ask permission from Jumblatt to ask him questions regarding the largely 
Christian movement, Qornet Chehwan. This might sound like a small thing, but this represented a 
significant anomaly and a break in the pattern of questioning. Using qualitative data analysis software, 
Nvivo, allowed me to code such phenomena and view these anomalies more readily. This was similarly 
so in Jumblatt’s answer to Cameron’s question, which featured overwording of the positively valued 
vocabulary excellent. Again, backgrounded against the patterns of coding, this anomaly was notable.  
As per the CDA phases, interpretation played a central and unavoidable part, but, thanks to 
the empirical grounding of the descriptive coding of formal features, interpretation was anchored and 
scientifically driven, not free floating. Only once clusters of phenomena were highlighted could a 
rigorous interpretation begin. This interpretation was dependent on the historical and conceptual 
background laid out in chapters one and two. Only in this context could this author identify that these 
empirical clusters of formal textual features were occurring whilst Jumblatt’s relations to the 
Maronites were raised. The CR insight that meaning is “an intransitive dimension of reality exactly as 
is molecular structure” (Lopez & Potter 2001, p. 13) which elevates interpretation to a scientific 
218 
 
activity became clear at this point. Interpretation is not simply a matter of subjective opinion, but, is 
a judgementally rational activity related to the intransitive world in which we can be more, or less, 
correct. The attachment of this process to systematic empirical observation and contextual 
explanatory analysis, helps ensure interpretation is not simply arbitrary or subjective. 
 Another way in which interpretation became scientifically rehabilitated was through 
observation of the process of coherence through this CDA. According to Fairclough, coherence is 
achieved when formal textual features interact with the MR in a participant’s head to create meaning. 
Often this is automatic, especially if one is in a familiar cultural context. However, in some situations, 
the ideas and formal features communicated are not common sense and require a more active 
inferencing on the part of the participant (or analyst). In this research, this author found that there 
were instances where their cultural difference meant that, what a Lebanese might find common sense 
and coherent, this author was having to inference. This turned out to be beneficial. For example, in a 
Lebanese newspaper article in which Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir was reported to have made “a gesture 
of clear solidarity with Jumblatt” through an injunction “to rise above grudges, revenge, and pettiness” 
the inference that this was a statement of solidarity was not at all obvious from the formal features 
prima facie (The Prosecutor versus Ayyash et al. 2015b, p. 16). Only by actively inferencing that 
grudges, revenge and pettiness were a euphemism for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
ethnic cleansing, could this statement be interpreted as a statement of solidarity. Interpretation was 
dependent on the coded formal features of euphemism, but also on the recognition of the gap in 
meaning between an alleged statement of solidarity and an apparently general injunction to eschew 
grudges. It was nice to experience how the things this author had read about in theory started to occur 
in this research practice.  
 The abductive process of research and the historical and multidisciplinary approach lead to a 
very important discovery, that of the 1860 intervention in Syria. Historical comparison adds strength 
and weight to insights regarding process and structure which have been occurring for a long time. The 
recontextualization of the discourse analysis in this way was very powerful and useful for me in 
generating insights and conclusions critical of the standard chronocentric view of IR and ICL.  
  
Limitations and avenues for further research 
 
Avenues for further research are manifold and extend in multiple directions, theoretical and empirical. 
One avenue for further research is to apply the CDA method wholesale to ICL literature on the STL to 
develop some insights which this author felt were inklings, but which need further empirical 
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verification or falsification, for example the presence of tautological or semantic argument in the 
shoring up of legitimacy. This might be best approached by combining with a quantitative approach 
which addresses the “structure” of the data, journal types, type of author and so on. Utilisation of 
Nvivo allows easier combination of these types of method in one project. This author is also interested 
in the genealogy of the concept of “tutelage” in colonial discourse which requires further historical 
and discursive analysis and verification. This author would also like to write a post-Marxist theoretical 
article of the complementarity of Robert Cox’s Critical IR theory and CR.  
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